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ABSTRACT 
The Government of Zambia plans to become a prosperous middle-income country by 
2030. Therefore, it has announced intentions to upgrade squatter settlements to improve 
the living conditions of the urban poor, and enable them to participate in the vision. 
However, without a squatter upgrading framework in place, the research assumed 
government would use the existing Lusaka Squatter Upgrading Project (LSUP) 
framework. Hence, this research titled Squatter Upgrading in Zambia: Adequacy of the 
Institutional Framework, undertook to examine the extent to which the existing 
institutional framework was adequate for initiating and supporting squatter upgrading. 
The research draws on an analysis of data gathered from in-depth interviews with 102 
participants (including central and local governments, NGOs, financial institutions, and 
squatter residents) observations and documentary review.  
The research has traced the close links between governance – in the form of the 
historical legacy of colonialism, post-colonial socialist housing policies and power 
dynamics between central and local government - and the growth of informal housing 
within Zambia. Further, it has shown that the culture of clientelism is a major barrier to 
future efforts to upgrade squatter settlements. While this study took place in Zambia, it 
is likely that similar links between governance and the growth of squatter settlements 
are likely to be found in many other Sub-Saharan countries. Similarly, the clear links 
between the critical success factors that relate to governance and the likely effectiveness 
of efforts to improve living conditions in squatter settlements are likely to be borne out 
in other sub-Saharan contexts. Moreover, the research revealed the importance of power 
dynamics between local and central governments. The research has shown how central 
government wrestles power from local councils through fiscal and administrative 
manipulations using the very law that created them as autonomous entities. 
Additionally, this research has expanded the definition of the urban housing situation to 
include the quality, tenure, and spatial location aspects. Finally, the research confirmed 
existing literature regarding the importance of tenure security in influencing investment 
decisions in housing improvements. It established that as long as squatters gained the 
assurance of being ‘safe’ from eviction, they made decisions to improve their houses.  
Key words: squatter upgrading, institutional framework, adequacy, governance, power 
dynamics, Zambia 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research examines the existing squatter upgrading framework to establish its 
adequacy for initiating and supporting squatter upgrading. Zambia faces a critical 
shortage of urban housing and hence, a large proportion of the urban population lives in 
squatter settlements (Makasa, 2010; Mutale, 2004). The need to undertake this research 
follows government’s announcements in 2006 and 2011 to upgrade squatter settlements 
across the country to provide municipal services that they lacked (GRZ, 2006a; 2011). 
In 2006, government framed a national vision, the VISION 2030 in which it aspires to 
become a middle-income country by 2030 (GRZ, 2006b). Among key areas of 
development identified was housing development including conventional housing and 
squatter upgrading. This research focuses on squatter upgrading (GRZ, 2006a).  
When government announced intentions to upgrade squatter settlements, my initial 
concern was the availability of a framework for squatter upgrading. Further 
investigations revealed that from 2006 until 2012 when this research began, there was 
no squatter upgrading framework in place. Between 1974 and 1980, government 
implemented a pilot squatter upgrading programme called the Lusaka Squatter 
Upgrading Project (LSUP) that involved four squatter settlements in Lusaka city (Keare 
& Paris, 1982). However, when LSUP ended, government did not replicate it in other 
settlements in Lusaka or in other cities (Rakodi, 1986a). Therefore, this research 
assumed that government would use the existing squatter upgrading framework for new 
upgrading programmes. Nevertheless, this research questions the adequacy of the 
existing upgrading framework to initiate and support squatter upgrading.  
This chapter introduces the whole research and hence, begins with a background to 
contextualise and later state the problem. It then outlines the overall research aim and 
objectives to guide the research. Next, the chapter presents the rationale for the research 
and proceeds with an overview of the research design and methodology. The chapter 
also gives an overview of the country where the research takes place to provide an 
insight to the conditions that have led to the prevalence of squatter settlements and 
possibly influence squatter upgrading. Lastly, it outlines the thesis structure.  
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
Squatter settlements are quite common in urban towns in the developing world where 
they accommodate over one billion people (Arimah, 2010a). In Zambia, although 
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population and housing censuses do not segregate the urban population into squatters or 
otherwise, estimates indicate that more than seventy percent of the urban population 
lives in squatter settlements (Taylor, et al., 2015). The conditions in squatter settlements 
are usually appalling – they often lack basic infrastructure and services such as access 
roads, water and sanitation, and education and health facilities (UN-Habitat, 2003a). To 
understand why squatter settlements occur, analysts have offered several explanations. 
For instance, Cities Alliance (1999, p. 1) believes that squatter settlements are “the 
products of failed policies, bad governance, corruption, inappropriate regulation, 
dysfunctional land markets, unresponsive financial systems, and a fundamental lack of 
political will.” Others believe that squatter settlements signify institutional failures in 
implementing housing policies (Mpofu, 2012; Collier & Venables, 2014; Arimah, 
2010b; Makasa, 2010; Sietchiping, 2005). As Mpofu (2012, p. 46) further notes, 
squatter settlements also indicate “the extent of housing poverty in a society.”  
Until 1996, Zambia did not have a housing policy (Makasa, 2010). As such, housing 
provision seemed incidental to the main development policies. For instance, during the 
colonial era the major development objective was profit maximisation (Siamwiza, 
1986). Therefore, government oriented development policies towards activities that 
made profits rather than consumed resources such as housing provision. The colonial 
government strove to minimise the rate of urbanisation through repressive acts 
including promotion of migratory labour and institutional housing (Mutale, 2004). 
However, urban population increased initially through rural-urban migrations and later, 
naturally. Since urban housing was insufficient to accommodate all migrants, many of 
them built houses in peripheral areas and white owned farms and hence, the beginning 
of squatter settlements.  
The socialist government during the independence era did not have a housing policy 
either. Instead, it implemented housing programmes through national development 
plans (Rakodi, 1986a). At independence in 1964, government removed movement 
restrictions the colonial government had imposed on Africans to curb rapid 
urbanisation. However, this action caused unprecedented rural-urban migrations that 
later triggered an acute urban housing shortage (Seymour, 1975). Between 1963 and 
1980, the proportion of the urban population increased from twenty-one to forty 
percent, but declined slightly to thirty-nine percent between 1980 and 1990 and later to 
thirty-five percent by 2000 (see Table 1.1).  
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Table 1.1: Urbanisation Trends in Zambia (1963-2010) 
Year Total Population Urban Population Urban Population (%) 
1963 3,490,170 715,256 21 
1963-1969 4,056,998 1,192,100 29 
1969-1980 5,661,800 2,258,569 40 
1980-1990 7,383,097 2,905,283 39 
1990-2000 9,885,591 3,426,862 35 
2000-2010 13,092,666 5,173,450 40 
Source: Compiled from CSO (2012a; 2012b; 2013b), Potts (2005) and Mwanza (1979) 
Government attempted to solve the problem of urban housing shortage through 
conventional housing, site-and-services schemes, and squatter upgrading (Mutale, 2004; 
Rakodi, 1986a). However, conventional housing failed to prioritise low-income housing 
while site-and-services schemes seemed to benefit the wealthy more than the poor 
(Amis & Lloyd, 1990). Consequently, many people who could not find affordable 
housing built houses in squatter settlements (Makasa, 2010). By mid-1970s, squatter 
settlements outnumbered formal residential areas in big cities such as Lusaka (Hansen, 
1982; Seymour, 1975).  
Unlike the other two eras, the post-independence era government began implementing 
housing programmes under a new housing policy that won an accolade, the UN-Habitat 
Scroll of Honour in 1996 (Makasa, 2010). Moreover, government documented for the 
first time the national housing deficit, which it estimated at 856,000 units. Its plan then 
was to build 110,000 houses every year until 2010 (GRZ, 1996a). However, two 
decades on, the award-winning housing policy seems not to have lived up to its 
expectation regarding low-income housing provision. By 2010, government had not 
achieved its housing objective. On the one hand, the urban population has increased by 
fifty-nine percent and generated an over one hundred percent increase in the squatter 
population (see Table 1.2). On the other hand, the housing deficit increased to about two 
million units (UN-Habitat, 2012a).  
Table 1.2: Squatter Population Growth (2000-2010) 
 1990-2000 2000-2010 Increase Increase (%) 
Urban Population 3,246,862 5,173,450 1,926,588 59 
Squatter Population 1,713,431 3,621,415 1,907,984 111 
Squatter/ Urban Population (%) 50 70  20 
Source: Compiled from CSO (2003; 2012a), Taylor et al (2015) and ISF-UTS (2011) 
However, the housing estimated deficit does not indicate what proportion of it is urban. 
Evidence shows that squatter housing is increasing rapidly relative to formal urban 
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housing. By 2010, urban housing comprised forty-two percent (337,000 units) squatter 
housing, and fifty-six percent (463,000) conventional housing (see Figure 1.1). Based 
on the national average household size of five persons (CSO, 2012a), and estimated 
squatter population of almost four million (see Table 1.2), the country needs 800,000 
housing units to replace squatter housing, and reduce overcrowding.  
 
Figure 1.1: Composition of Urban Housing, 1963-2010 
Source: Compiled from Census reports (1990-2010) 
Based on the foregoing, the continued presence of squatter settlements signifies 
institutional failures more than lack of a housing policy. For instance, Zambia has an 
award-wining housing policy. It also has the National Housing Authority (NHA), an 
institution created in 1971 specifically to manage and coordinate housing programmes 
(GRZ, 1971a). Yet, there seems to be no deliberate effort to solving the urban housing 
shortage especially for the urban poor. Nevertheless, there seems to be renewed 
enthusiasm to implement squatter upgrading (GRZ, 2011). Although squatter upgrading 
does not mean provision of physical houses for residents, it facilitates enabling 
conditions for squatters to improve their housing (Gulyani & Connors, 2002; UN-
Habitat, 2003a). Therefore, government has highlighted some strategies to achieve 
squatter upgrading including the following:  
 Foster healthy, functional, environmentally friendly and aesthetically pleasant 
housing areas 
 Streamline building standards, regulations and other controls; 
 Provide solid waste management systems; 
 Relocate families from areas earmarked for non-residential developments; 
 Mobilize concessional long-term financing; and 
 Provide municipal infrastructure and services in harmony with other sectors. 
1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Evidence suggests that of all the housing programmes that government implemented 
during the independence era, squatter upgrading seemed to have reached more people 
than the other programmes. Yet, after the pilot squatter upgrading programmes ended in 
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1981, government did not replicate it in other settlements or towns outside of Lusaka. 
Several evaluations of the LSUP revealed endemic weaknesses in the framework used 
to implement squatter upgrading (World Bank, 1983; 2002a; Keare & Paris, 1982; 
Bamberger, et al., 1982). Firstly, the management of LSUP had heavy central 
government control. This minimised the involvement of the Lusaka City Council (LCC) 
and eventual capacity building in the local council to help with project implementation, 
cost control and cost-recovery aspects of the project (World Bank, 1983). Secondly, 
LSUP lacked stakeholder participation beyond government ministries and donor 
agencies (Keare & Paris, 1982). By their very nature, the strategies outlined to support 
squatter upgrading, require stakeholder participation (see 1.2).  
Thirdly, LSUP lacked community participation during the planning and implementation 
stages, and only involved squatter communities in the maintenance aspect of the project 
(Rakodi, 1986a). Absence of community participation during these stages resulted in the 
project not providing service levels that residents wanted (World Bank, 1983). 
Moreover, maintenance of infrastructure after the project completed became a challenge 
because the communities did not want to get involved since government had initially 
sidelined them. Fourthly, LSUP depended almost entirely on external funding and 
expatriate expertise, so that when funding ceased and expatriates left, the government 
could not replicate the project in other cities for lack of financial resources (Rakodi, 
1986a). Lastly, LSUP adopted unrealistically high building standards, which raised the 
cost of housing improvement for squatter residents (World Bank, 2002a). Therefore, 
considering the weaknesses of the LSUP framework, this research questions its 
adequacy to initiate and support new squatter upgrading programmes.  
1.4 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
Fiori et al. (2000) have identified squatter upgrading as presenting an opportunity at 
poverty alleviation. Since poverty is a multi-dimensional condition, reducing it to one 
variable of say lack of income only overshadows other deprivations such lack of access 
to basic infrastructure and services, vulnerability to violence and crime, and low 
education, health and housing standards (Fiori, et al., 2000; Townsend, 2006). Hence, 
any effort aimed at eradication or alleviation of poverty requires a multi-sectoral 
approach that integrates a range of components to meet a range of causes and 
manifestations of poverty (IMF, 2003). There is a need for poverty reduction policies 
that advocate principles and practices such as participation, partnership, and multi-
sectorality (Riley, et al., 2001). Moreover, there is growing consensus that governments 
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alone cannot end poverty. Analysts believe that “it is entirely possible to unlock 
resources by galvanizing new models of funding and collaboration by bringing 
government and the private sector together” (Ibrahim & Polman, 2015).  
Therefore, squatter upgrading requires a multi-sectoral approach - involving actors from 
public, private, and civil society sectors, and communities (Gulyani & Connors, 2002; 
Fiori, et al., 2000; Imparato & Ruster, 2003). This research refers to this multi-sectoral 
approach as an institutional approach. To implement squatter upgrading using an 
institutional approach, there must be a framework, herein called the institutional 
framework, which would guide the upgrading process. This institutional framework 
would comprise, “on the one hand, of formal and explicit rules, regulations, policies, 
etc., and on the other, of informal and implicit norms and values, that govern the 
working of the institution” (Bhagavan & Virgin, 2004, p. 3). In this regard, the 
institutional framework would do the following (Fiori, et al., 2000):  
 Define the programme, its goals and objectives,  
 Identify sources of funding for the programme,  
 Define the programme’s management framework,  
 Identify stakeholders and their responsibilities,  
 Involve communities in programme, and  
 Identify forms of community support.  
Additionally, an institutional framework alone is insufficient to guarantee successful 
squatter upgrading and, hence, there must be an enabling environment. This research 
defines an enabling environment as one where there are effective legal frameworks, 
healthy and supportive interactions between actors, and sustained political will 
(Srinivas, 2012). Based on the assumption that government would use the existing 
LSUP upgrading framework to implement new squatter upgrading programmes, the 
overall aim of this research is to establish the extent to which the existing squatter 
upgrading framework is adequate to initiate and support squatter upgrading.  
To understand the need for an adequate institutional framework for squatter upgrading, 
the research begins by examining literature to establish the critical success factors to 
squatter upgrading. It also identifies examples of successful squatter upgrading 
programmes to determine the extent to which having adequate upgrading frameworks 
influenced their success. Next, the research deems it essential to provide a brief 
historical background to the urban housing problem that had led to the prevalence of 
squatter settlements that seem to transcend three distinct political eras – colonial, 
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independence, and post-independence. It also becomes necessary to investigate the 
relationship between political regimes and squatter settlements. Furthermore, the 
prevalence of squatter settlements indicates an urban housing shortage. Therefore, the 
research seeks to define clearly the housing situation to understand the need for squatter 
upgrading. Lastly, having determined the extent of the housing problem and established 
the need for squatter upgrading, the research endeavours to examine the existing 
upgrading framework to see if it is adequate to initiate and support squatter upgrading. 
Against this background, I raised the following questions that formed the roadmap for 
the research:  
 What are the critical conditions for squatter upgrading to succeed? To what 
extent does an adequate institutional framework contribute to the success of 
squatter upgrading? 
 How have political regimes influenced housing provision especially as it relates 
to the prevalence of squatter settlements?  
 What is the nature of the housing situation and how has it contributed to the 
prevalence of squatter settlements?  
 To what extent is the institutional framework adequate to initiate and support 
squatter upgrading programmes? 
Therefore, the specific objectives of the research were as follows:  
 To identify the critical conditions required for squatter upgrading to proceed and 
establish the extent to which an adequate institutional framework contributes to 
the success of squatter upgrading;  
 To examine how political regimes have affected housing and housing provision; 
 To assess the nature of the urban housing situation and understand the need for 
squatter upgrading; and 
 To investigate the extent to which the institutional framework is adequate to 
support squatter upgrading. 
1.5 RESEARCH RATIONALE, SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The various housing programmes that government has implemented in the past appear 
to have failed to mitigate the urban housing problem because many squatter settlements 
still exist. In fact, the problem has intensified as the largest proportion of urban dwellers 
lives in squatter settlements because of urban housing shortage (see 1.1). Nonetheless, 
government appears to have renewed interest in addressing the urban housing problem 
through squatter upgrading as it desires to improve the living conditions of the urban 
poor to enable them contribute effectively to the VISION 2030. It is a fact that 
government has done squatter upgrading in the past and hence, not surprising that it 
would want to do it again. However, there has been no scholarly research on the LSUP 
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upgrading framework to determine its suitability on new upgrading programmes.  
This research plans to fill this gap and contribute to the body of knowledge by providing 
a strong theoretical foundation for discussions on the importance of an adequate 
institutional framework for squatter upgrading to proceed in small- and medium-sized 
towns in Zambia. Detailed examination of existing literature may provide responses to 
many of the concerns arising out of the research objectives regarding the planning and 
implementation of squatter upgrading programmes. Moreover, the findings from the 
research provide a basis for policy recommendations regarding squatter upgrading in 
Zambia and beyond. Therefore, the research endeavours to understand the link between 
an adequate institutional framework and successful squatter upgrading. This research 
happens at an opportune time when government is considering upgrading squatter 
settlements in the country to improve the living conditions of squatter residents as it 
pursues the VISION 2030. As government endeavours to formulate a policy on squatter 
upgrading, this research would provide a basis for discussions.  
Squatter settlements are widespread in all municipalities in Zambia. However, being on 
a doctoral scholarship of three years, time and funding were the main constraints when 
choosing the study areas. However, I chose two towns of which one is a small-sized 
town and the other a medium-sized town. Although not intended to represent other 
towns, these two towns contained several characteristics that other towns could identify 
with. For instance, the small-sized town is predominantly rural in terms of population 
and its main economic activity is agriculture. The medium-sized town on the other 
hand, is largely urban with an urban population and industrial-based economy. 
Concerns may arise regarding the research’s limitations on generalisability, but that is 
true of all qualitative research. Although this research contains quantitative material and 
analysis, it is largely qualitative. Therefore, like all other qualitative research, its aim is 
not to generalise results beyond the areas where the research took place but to explain 
phenomena in a given environment (Mertens, 2010). Nonetheless, results from this 
research are credible and valid in informing policy on squatter upgrading.  
1.6 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The decision to choose a specific research approach and research methods depends 
primarily on their suitability to answer research questions rather than deriving purely 
from philosophy or methodology textbooks (Buchanan & Bryman, 2007; Reiter, et al., 
2011). This research is exploratory as it investigates the extent to which an existing 
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upgrading framework is adequate to initiate and support squatter upgrading (see 1.3). 
Therefore, I took an exploratory research design approach to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon (see Chapter 4 for detailed research methodology). 
Using a case study approach, I chose two local councils of Chipata Municipal Council 
(CMC) and Kitwe City Council (KCC) for four reasons. In the first place, these two 
councils provided typical examples of rural and urban councils. Chipata is a rural town 
with most of the population subsisting on agriculture (CMC, 2008; CSO, 2003). Kitwe 
on the other hand, is mainly urban depending on commercial and industrial activities 
(see Table 1.3).  
Table 1.3: Some Characteristic features of Case Study Areas 
Municipality Chipata Kitwe 
Status Rural Urban 
Economy Agriculture; Provincial economic hub; 
Cross border trading 
Mining, Commerce; Provincial 
economic hub; Cross border trading 
Overall Population 455,783 517,543 
Urban Population 116,627 (25.6%) 501,360 (96.9%) 
Squatter Population 63,500 (54.4% of urban population) 229,237 (45.7% of urban population) 
Source: Compiled from CMC (2011; 2012) and KCC (2012) 
Next, the two councils represented some diversity in the history of squatter settlements. 
Whereas Kitwe has a long history of squatter settlements dating back to the early years 
of commercial copper mining in the 1930s (Mutale, 2004), squatter settlements in 
Chipata are fairy new and have developed considerably differently from those in Kitwe. 
Additionally, both Chipata and Kitwe are economic hubs in Eastern and Copperbelt 
provinces, respectively and border towns (CMC, 2008; KCC, 2012). As such, they 
attract inward migrants from surrounding towns and countries seeking employment and 
other economic opportunities. Inward migration has contributed to rapid urban 
population growth causing housing shortages, and exacerbating the prevalence of 
squatter settlements in both towns (KCC, 2012). Squatter settlements accommodate 
around half of the urban populations in Kitwe and Chipata, respectively (see Table 1.3). 
Lastly, Chipata and Kitwe proved convenient for me in terms of ease of access to both 
place and relevant information through my previous work experience and contacts to 
avoid time loss that would have occurred had I chosen hard-to-access local councils.  
To understand the phenomenon and formulate the theoretical framework, I began by 
reviewing existing literature from published and unpublished sources. Literature review 
also helped me to determine what kind of evidence I needed from respective target 
groups that included local councils, Ministry of Local Government and Housing 
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(MLGH), Ministry of Finance (MOF), squatter communities (squatter residents), Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and financial institutions. To collect primary data 
from these target groups, I used in-depth interviews, observations and document 
reviews. The research design also considered ethical issues relating to the involvement 
of human participants. Although my research did not require experiments with human 
subjects, it involved the participation of humans in interviews and from whom I needed 
informed consent to use the information from the interviews for my research. Prior to 
the interview, I informed research participants the purpose of the research and how I 
would use the data collected. Once participants agreed to have the interview, I made 
them sign the consent form that I had prepared for the research (see Appendix A). 
However, a few participants chose not sign the consent form but verbally consented to 
having the information they supplied used for research purposes.  
1.7 ZAMBIA – AN OVERVIEW 
This section gives an overview of Zambia under the broad headings of physical and 
political, and economic and social profiles. 
1.7.1 Physical and Political Profile 
Zambia is a landlocked country south of Africa and borders eight countries including 
Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, 
Botswana and Namibia. With an area of 752,614 Km
2
 (Makasa, 2010), it comprises ten 
administrative provinces (divided into districts) (see Figure 1.2) In 2010, Zambia’s 
population was about thirteen million comprising fifty-one and forty-nine percent, 
females and males, respectively. Furthermore, forty percent of the population lived in 
urban areas and sixty percent in rural areas and hence, Zambia finds herself among 
Africa’s most urbanised countries (CSO, 2012a; UN-Habitat, 2012a).  
 
Figure 1.2: Administrative Map of Zambia 
Source: Wikipedia  
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Politically, the country is a democratic unitary state governed through a two-tier 
government system comprising the central government and local government 
represented by local councils at the district level (UCLG, 2008; UN-Habitat, 2005a). 
Central government also has administrative representation at district level through the 
District Commission Office (DCO). As such, the district has a dual administration 
system (UCLG, 2008). The presence of the DCO at the district level has caused much 
debate as many have questioned its purpose (Chikulo, 2009). Some analysts believe that 
the DCO serves merely as a district political watchdog for the ruling party (Mukwena & 
Lolojih, 2002). Through DCO, ruling political parties reinforce the Party-and-its-
Government (PIG) system that once existed during the socialist regime (Rakner, 2003). 
Moreover, central government interferes in local councils through DCO, thereby 
undermining the “autonomy and discretion of local governments” (World Bank, 2004a, 
p. 25). Nevertheless, the consensus is that DCO just takes away resources that should go 
to local councils for service delivery (Rakner & Svasand, 2005; UCLG, 2008; 
Mukwena & Lolojih, 2002). As Sardanis (2014) and the IMF (2005a) observed, the 
DCO appears to be better funded than local councils are.  
1.7.2 Economic and Social Profile 
At independence, Zambia inherited a capitalist economy from its coloniser, Britain that 
depended entirely on the mining sector for employment, foreign exchange and 
government revenue (Andersson, et al., 2000). However, by the 1980s following full 
adoption of socialism it adopted a command economy
1
 system until 1992 when the 
economy was liberalised under new political leadership (Andersson, et al., 2000). 
Copper mining is central to the economy and contributes a large proportion to the 
country’s foreign earnings and employment (ADB, 2014). Copper exports contribute 
about eighty-two percent to the total export earnings (ICMM, 2014). The mining sector 
as a whole contributes about 2.2 percent to the country’s GDP having fallen from 3.9 
percent in 2008 (ADB, 2014). Apart from copper, there are other minerals including 
cobalt, uranium, gold and coal (ICMM, 2014). Efforts to diversify the economy seem to 
have failed (Gondwe & Pamu, 2014; Andersson, et al., 2000; Lungu & Shikwe, 2006).  
Socially, Zambia is one of the least developed and poorest countries in the world 
(Rakner, 2013). It ranks number 141 out of 187 countries on the Human Development 
                                                 
1
 A command economy is characterised by the state owning most of the factors of production and 
decides how to allocate resources and what services to provide to the masses.  
12 
Index (HDI) with a value of 0.561 in 2013 (UNDP, 2014). HDI assesses long-term 
progress in three dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to 
knowledge, and a decent standard of living (UNDP, 1990). Overall poverty is at sixty-
one percent but indications are that urban poverty has declined dramatically from fifty-
three to twenty-eight percent between 2004 and 2010, respectively (see Figure 1.3).  
 
Figure 1.3: Poverty Trends in Zambia (1991-2010) 
Source: Compiled from CSO (1999; 2005; 2012a; 2013a) 
There is no clear explanation for the dramatic decline in poverty (Chibuye, 2014). 
Nonetheless, there are two possible explanations. Firstly, after completing the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative in 2005, the economy transferred some 
benefits to the poor through service provision. HIPC is an IMF/ World Bank initiative 
launched in 1996 to help poor countries manage their debt burdens (IMF, 2015). 
Zambia entered HIPC in 2000 with a debt of US$6.5 Billion (Ndulo & Mudenda, 2005). 
Following strict adherence to stipulated austerity conditions, the country reached the 
decision point
2
 in December 2000 and the completion point
3
, in April 2005 and 
qualified for debt relief of US$2.5 Billion and of US$1.5 Billion, respectively (ADB, 
2005; IMF, 2005b). Therefore, with US$4 Billion worthy of debt relief, the government 
dedicated more resources to provision of social services and basic infrastructure the 
reduction in overall and urban poverty since 2004 (GRZ, 2006b). Secondly, after HIPC 
the country experienced remarkable increases in investments in various sectors of the 
economy. For instance, construction, mining, and agricultural sectors received large 
volumes of foreign investments that rose from US$255 Million in 2003 to over US$4 
billion in 2008 (ZDA, 2013; 2012). With an investment inflow of over US$2 Billion in 
mining, copper production increased from 420,000 to 675,000 tonnes between  2005 
                                                 
2
The ‘decision point’ is the first milestone in the HIPC initiative process at which the World Bank and IMF 
formally determine if a country is eligible for debt relief.  
3
The second milestone, the ‘completion point’, is the stage where a country receives the balance of the 
debt relief that the international creditors committed to at the decision point. 
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and  2011, respectively (ICMM, 2014). Employment levels also began rising after 
falling drastically from about 31,000 in 2005 to 21,000 in 2006 (see Figure 1.4).  
 
Figure 1.4: Copper Production and Employment (2005-2011) 
Source: Compiled from ICMM (2014), Simutanyi (2008, p. 7) 
Additionally, since 2005 copper prices have been rising from 160 to 345 United States 
cents per pound by 2011. Nevertheless, copper prices fell drastically in 2009 after the 
global economic crisis (see Figure 1.5). The fall in copper prices not only resulted in 
reduced employment levels in the mining sector but also affected its contribution to 
GDP, which reduced by one percent and caused immense pressure on the economy 
(ZDA, 2013). Buckley (2011) notes that the fiscal impact of falling copper prices was a 
forty percent drop in the value of the national currency, the Kwacha. Consequently, by 
2014, Zambia’s fiscal deficit widened (Sachs & Maennling, 2015). Nonetheless, 
increased investments in some key sectors of the economy spurred surges in 
employment, and contributions to GDP. Hence, many people benefited from 
employment and improved access to basic services, which resulted in the dramatic fall 
in urban poverty since 2004 (Simutanyi, 2008; Chibuye, 2014).  
 
Figure 1.5: Copper Prices and Minisng share of GDP (2005-2013) 
Source: Compiled from Gondwe and Pamu (2014, p. 7), ICMM (2014) 
The country’s status as one of the poorest countries in the world often raises the 
question as to how a once strong economy could deteriorate in the midst of resource 
abundance. For instance, Zambia’s per capita income is now US$1,070 and much lower 
than the African and SSA averages of US$1,586 and US$1,202, respectively (World 
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Bank, 2013a). This certainly contradicts its status in 1964 as a middle-income country 
with a per capita income of US$752 then that was almost twice that of some African 
countries and seventy-five percent above the African average (Du Plessis, 2006; 
Rakner, 2013; De Haan, 2010). Several analysts have tried to explain the causes for the 
country’s poor economic performance. For instance, Riley (1998) and Sardanis (2014) 
have posited the thesis of economic mismanagement. Chikwanda (1994) surmises that 
the country appears to have had misplaced its development priorities. Arguably, 
spending millions of dollars on assisting liberation struggles in Africa was a worthy 
cause (Kaunda, 2003; Malloy, 2005; Noyoo, 2011). However, Zambia neglected its own 
development needs (Chikwanda, 1994). Likewise, Collier and Venables (2011) have 
cited corruption as the main problem claiming that it prevents resources from reaching 
needy areas. Then again, analysts recognise that external factors such as falling copper 
prices on the international market and the oil shocks in the 1970s have also contributed 
to the country’s poor economic performance (Simutanyi, 2008). The country’s earnings 
from exports declined making it difficult to reinvest in the economy. Therefore, it 
engaged in heavy borrowing to maintain consumption and investments, and finance 
liberation struggles in southern Africa (ACTSA, 2005; Gondwe & Pamu, 2014). This 
led the country to descend into unmanageable indebtedness, and as copper prices 
continued falling, it fell behind on debt repayment (Bigsten & Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2005). 
Since then, the country has struggled to deal with its debt burden. Nevertheless, 
evidence shows that overall, the economy improved greatly and registered a GDP 
growth of over ten percent, while inflation fell from 9.2 percent in 2009 to slightly over 
seven percent during the period 2009-2013 (see Figure 1.6).  
 
Figure 1.6: GDP Growth Rates and Inflation (2009-2013) 
Source: Compiled from Ministry of Finance (2015) 
However, despite a remarkable improvement in economic growth that led to decrease in 
urban poverty, it appears the number of people living in squatter settlements continues 
to rise (see Table 1.2). Besides, an increase in sub-standard housing in squatter 
settlements testifies to the mismatch between economic growth and poverty reduction in 
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urban areas (see Figure 1.1). This is probably because despite the country undergoing 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) from 1991 to the mid-2000s, the country’s 
gross national income has not improved significantly to lift many people out of poverty 
(Bigsten & Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2005; Simutanyi, 2008).  
1.8 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis comprises nine chapters. Chapter 1, which introduces the research begins 
with the background to the research and proceeds to state the problem, aim and 
objectives of the research. The chapter then presents the rationale, scope and limitations 
of the research, and gives a snapshot of the research design and methodology used. 
Next, it presents an overview of Zambia where the research takes place, and concludes 
with the structure of the thesis.  
Chapter 2 presents the research theoretical framework and literature review on the main 
themes framing the research that include squatter upgrading, political regimes and 
politics in squatter settlements, and participation and local governance. The theoretical 
framework also sets the stage for examining literature with particular reference to 
Zambia, and forms the basis for analysis. Chapter 3 begins by presenting success factors 
for squatter upgrading to form that basis for understanding the necessary constituents of 
an adequate squatter upgrading framework. Next, the chapter also justifies the choice of 
the two international upgrading programmes as case studies and later provides an 
overview of the case studies. Then, it critically analyses the performance, and later 
discusses the achievements and challenges of the two squatter upgrading programmes. 
The chapter concludes by drawing lessons from the two upgrading programmes.  
Chapter 4 provides the detailed research design and methodology adopted for this 
research. Therefore, it begins by positioning the research in appropriate epistemological 
and ontological perspectives, and goes on to present the research purpose and approach 
followed. Next, the chapter gives an overview of the case study areas and proceeds with 
methods used to collect data for this research. It also presents the target groups and 
sampling methods used, and follows on with data analysis methods. Finally, the chapter 
discusses the main assumptions made in the research, the limitations encountered while 
conducting the research, and the contributions of the research. Chapter 5 examines the 
relationship between political regimes and housing provision especially as it relates to 
the prevalence of squatter settlements. Therefore, it begins by examining how political 
regimes during the three political eras have influenced urban housing provision. Next, 
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the chapter discusses the impact that political regimes have had on local government’s 
capacity to provide public housing. Finally, it looks at the future of local government 
especially as it relates to its relevance in squatter upgrading.  
Chapter 6 looks at contemporary housing conditions in small towns to understand the 
extent of the housing problem, and in particular, the need for squatter upgrading in 
Zambia. Thus, it begins by examining the role of government in housing provision. 
Next, it defines the urban housing situation in terms of quantity, quality, land tenure, 
and location aspects. The chapter then, analyses the major causes of urban housing 
shortage and their contribution to the growth of squatter settlements. Next, the chapter 
examines the various housing programmes implemented to mitigate the urban housing 
shortage. Lastly, it highlights the importance of housing in development to support the 
case for squatter upgrading. Chapter 7 presents results, which aim to address the extent 
to which the aims and institutional organisation of the squatter upgrading policy have 
been achieved. Chapter 8 also presents results on community participation and local 
governance. The final chapter, Chapter 9 presents discussions, conclusions, and 
recommendations drawn from the research.  
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CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWOK AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the research theoretical framework and reviews literature 
regarding the main concepts that frame the research which include squatter upgrading, 
institutional approach to squatter upgrading, political regimes and politics in the 
emergence of squatter settlement, and participation and urban governance.  
2.2 SQUATTER UPGRADING 
2.2.1 Defining Squatter settlements 
The term squatter settlement is often interchanged with terms like informal settlements, 
spontaneous settlements, shantytowns, and slum (Srinivas, 2012; Huchzermeyer & 
Karam, 2006). Whereas the other terms refer to the same thing, the term slum has a 
different meaning because although a slum exists in squalor conditions, it often has 
tenure security (UN-Habitat, 2006a; 2006b). As Paccione (2005) notes, a slum is an 
area within the city proper with legal permanent dwellings that have become run-down 
through age or neglect. On the other hand, the terms squatter, informal and spontaneous 
settlements and shantytowns refer to human settlements that develop without planning 
permission or any formal land tenure (Srinivas, 2012). For this research, I have opted to 
use the term squatter settlement, which might be used interchangeably with informal 
settlements.  
Squatter settlements have different local names that reflect the state of living conditions 
in different parts of the developing world (Ward, 1982). They are favelas in Brazil 
(Abrams, 1966; Martine & McGranahan, 2010), kampungs in Indonesia (Srinivas, 2012; 
Drakakis-Smith, 2010) or komboni in Zambia (Resnick, 2010). Nonetheless, squatter 
settlements tend to share similar miserable conditions (UN-Habitat, 2003a). Often, 
occupiers of land in squatter settlements acquire it through invasions and illegal sub-
divisions of public or private land (UN-Habitat, 2003a). Therefore, they lack planning 
permission from local governments and have no legal claim to the land that they occupy 
(Abrams, 1966; Srinivas, 2012). Additionally, dwelling structures in squatter 
settlements tend to be sub-standard and haphazardly arranged (Paccione, 2005). 
Moreover, squatter settlements sometimes occur on environmentally hazardous areas 
such as hill slopes and marshlands (Giddings, 2007). As Sanderson (2000, pp. 93-84) 
notes, “many poor urban dwellers live on the worst quality land on the edges of ravines, 
on flood-prone embankments, on slopes liable to mudslide or collapse, in densely 
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packed areas where fires easily start, on roundabouts at busy intersections.” 
Furthermore, squatter settlements are usually overcrowded and inhabited by the most 
impoverished people (Arimah, 2010a). Lastly, they lack basic infrastructure and 
services because governments usually ignore their existence (UN, 2013a; 2014; UN-
Habitat, 2003a).  
Willis (2009, p. 403) describes a squatter settlement as a human settlement of “low 
quality housing, occupied by the poor, usually on the periphery of the cities.” Drawing 
from the features of squatter settlements described above, a squatter settlement could be 
described as a form of human settlement that develops without planning permission or 
formal land tenure and lacks basic infrastructure and services, and often encompasses 
sub-standard dwelling structures, mostly occupied by the poor.  
2.2.2 Approaches to Squatter Settlements 
Lack of affordable urban housing is the main cause of squatting (Arimah, 2010a; UN-
Habitat, 2005a; 2011b). In many developing countries, governments have failed to solve 
the urban housing problem despite implementing several conventional housing 
programmes. Therefore, squatting has become a dominant form of housing tenure (UN-
Habitat, 2003a; Arnott, 2009). Willis (2009) observes that squatter settlements have 
become the fastest growing human settlements in developing countries. For instance, by 
2000, squatter settlements in Lusaka occupied about 10.5 percent of total city land 
compared to 11.4 percent covered by formal residential areas (Simatele & Simatele, 
2009). Globally, recent estimates show that over one billion people live in squatter 
settlements and slums where they lack access to adequate housing and basic 
infrastructure and services (see 2.2.1). UN-Habitat (2012c) notes that with about sixty-
two percent of the urban population, SSA has the largest proportion of squatters and 
slum dwellers (see Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1: Slum share of Urban Population in Developing Countries (2012) 
Source: Compiled from: UN-HABITAT (2012c, p. 127)  
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Regardless of these facts, attitudes towards squatter settlements have been very mixed. 
For example, they have ranged from utter disgust (Drakakis-Smith, 2010), hostility 
(Paccione, 2005; Arnott, 2009) and to admiration for the resourcefulness of the 
squatters as they provide themselves with some shelter using the minimal inputs 
available (Hoy & Jimenez, 1991). Whereas some people have focused on the negative 
aspects of squatter settlements and branded them as ‘slums of despair’, others appreciate 
the squatters’ ingenuity in solving their own problems (Hansen, 1982; Valladares, 1985; 
Arimah, 2010a). Consequently, the attitudes towards squatter settlements have also 
influenced how governments have responded to them by using laissez-faire, suppressive 
and supportive approaches to manage them.  
The main driver for the laissez faire approach to squatter settlements was the disgust 
that governments had towards them. Viewed as ‘temporary aberrations’ in the landscape 
(Friedman, et al., 1988), government simply ignored the existence of squatter 
settlements. The laissez-faire approach dealt with squatter settlements by denying them 
basic infrastructure and services (UN-Habitat, 2003a; 2006a). Instead, governments 
hoped squatter settlements would ‘vanish’ with improvements in the economy 
(Friedman, et al., 1988; Marx, et al., 2013). Therefore, by simply ignoring them 
governments thought squatters would find conditions intolerable without basic services 
and return to their villages (Arimah, 2010a). As Sietchiping (2005) notes, the laissez-
faire approach was widespread in the 1950s and 1960s, the period when nearly all of 
SSA was under colonial rule. This approach continued right through the 1970s after 
many countries gained independence. However, this approach did not succeed in 
deterring squatters and the spread of squatter settlements. Instead, it encouraged the 
growth of squatter settlements (Arimah, 2010a; Simatele & Simatele, 2009).  
As squatter settlements became widespread, attitudes towards them changed to hostility. 
Governments argued then that squatter settlements were as “detrimental to the orderly 
growth of major cities” (Conway, 1982, p. 40), and as a ‘social evil’ (Srinivas, 2012). 
Therefore, using the suppressive approach that applied mechanisms such as forced 
evictions and demolitions, and clearance and redevelopment, government tried to 
eliminate all squatter settlements to pave the way for conventional housing (UN-
Habitat, 2006a). The suppressive approach began in the late 1960s but became popular 
in the 1970s as a preferred approach to handling squatters and squatter settlements 
(Arimah, 2010a). This approach generally assumes a negative approach towards 
squatters and thus fails to recognise their needs (Rahman, et al., 2011).  
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Nonetheless, the suppressive approach failed to solve, and perhaps exacerbated the 
problem of squatting for many reasons. Firstly, governments failed to recognise the 
importance of the location of the site when it relocated squatters to new sites when 
(Rakodi, 1986a; Durand-Lasserve & Royston, 2002). Many squatter settlements are 
strategically located for easy access to places of work, resources such as water, and 
services. Secondly, governments lacked resources to build more public housing such the 
amount of housing supplied did not meet the demand (Friedman, et al., 1988; Rakodi, 
1986a). Thirdly, conventional housing failed to consider the preferences and financial 
capacity of beneficiaries. As such, it became too expensive for squatters to buy or rent 
and hence, they moved to other squatter settlements (Mukhija, 2002). Lastly, demolition 
of squatter settlements in one area simply catalysed the formation of new ones 
elsewhere because of inadequate supply of new housing (Werlin, 1999). Sietchiping and 
Yoon (2010) explain that slum clearance simply redistributes poverty and transfers slum 
problems to less valuable peri-urban lands. Besides, as De Soto (2000) observes, 
suppressive strategies failed to appreciate the value of investment in property in squatter 
settlements. Clearly, a slum demolition was not a solution but instead, governments 
could have solved the problem by improving the environment in squatter settlements to 
encourage squatters to improve their housing (Turner, 1972).  
Governments also realised the futility of ‘fighting’ squatters. After all, not all dwellings 
were of sub-standard quality - people had invested colossal sums of money in dwellings 
(GRZ, 1971b). Squatters also invested in business activities that contributed to the local 
economies. As such, squatter settlements were no longer considered as ‘slums of 
despair’ but “places of opportunity” (Taher & Ibrahim, 2014, p. 71) where the poor used 
their ingenuity to improve their own living environment without government support 
(Hansen, 1982). Hence, governments resolved to ‘support’ them through supportive 
policies in the 1970s through to the 1980s (Marx, et al., 2013; Seymour, 1975). The 
supportive approach sought to include squatter settlements in the national development 
process and ultimately, their social and economic integration into urban life proper 
(UN-Habitat, 2006a; 2009a; Magalhães & Di Villarosa, 2012). Viewed as poverty-
oriented and focused on housing the urban poor, supportive policies included sites-and-
services, and squatter upgrading programmes, normally executed as ‘twin’ programmes 
(Huchzermeyer, 2004; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). The World Bank encouraged 
developing countries to adopt the twin-package as it was a ‘progressive policy on low-
income housing’, “to harness the latent resources of the urban poor and pool it with 
state initiatives in the provision of low-income shelter (Obudho, et al., 2000, p. 255).” 
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Drawing from the World Bank’s neoliberal position for minimal state involvement in 
the market, and promotion of property rights, (Rahman, et al., 2011), the supportive 
approach emphasized the need for tenure security to encourage private ownership and 
participation in the housing market (Sietchiping, 2005; UN, 2013a; Arnott, 2009). 
Supportive policies also included providing incentives to the private sector to encourage 
them to provide housing. In Zambia, government provided some tax incentives in its 
enabling approach (GRZ, 1996a). Nevertheless, the supportive approach appears to 
have failed to solve the problem of squatter settlements (Marx, et al., 2013). The market 
has failed to meet the housing needs of low-income households (World Bank, 1993). As 
such, the squatter population keeps rising, and squatter settlements keep taking up land 
that could be utilised for urban housing development to solve the urban housing 
shortage problem. Some analysts note that the retreat of governments from housing 
provision while urban populations continue to grow has only intensified the housing 
problem (Burgess, et al., 1997; UN-Habitat, 2003a). Clearly, governments cannot leave 
markets alone to solve the housing crisis; they ought to take an active role in adequate 
housing provision. As UN-Habitat (1996a, p. 13) observes, governments must be 
committed to “promoting, where appropriate, the upgrading of informal settlements and 
urban slums as an expedient measure and pragmatic solution to the urban shelter 
deficit.” Therefore, governments must formulate progressive housing policies that 
include legalising and upgrading of squatter settlements to integrate them into the urban 
system proper (Friedman, et al., 1988; UN-Habitat, 2006a).  
2.2.3 Motivations and Goals of Squatter Upgrading 
Squatter upgrading revolves around an identifiable existing community, and this is what 
differentiates it from new developments (Pasteur, 1979). Moreover, high levels of 
poverty characterise these settlements to the extent that residents cannot afford to build 
entirely new houses if the old ones were demolished (Abbott, 2002). Squatter upgrading 
is not a housing programme per se, but rather it is a low-cost housing policy option 
aimed at improving the sub-standard living environments through provision of basic 
infrastructure and services. While undertaken cooperatively and locally, upgrading is 
concerned with physical improvements in existing settlements while causing as little 
displacement as possible (UN-Habitat, 2006c). It can take one of two main forms: 
relocation or in-situ upgrading. With relocation, squatters move to other areas normally 
located away from the town centre where they are given plots to build on. Dasgupta and 
Lall (2009, p. 19) explain that the underlying assumption of squatter relocation is 
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“providing them with more land or improved facilities that will leave them no worse off 
than in their present location.” Nonetheless, relocation often proves unworkable as it 
creates problems such as increased transport costs to workplaces, and disruption of 
socio-cultural settings (De Soto, 2000).  
In-situ upgrading on the other hand, is an adaptive approach that seeks to introduce 
basic infrastructure and services in the settlements without relocating residents (Brown, 
2008). It also reduces both the costs of housing improvement for the squatter and the 
disruption caused by relocation to a peripheral resettlement scheme (Paccione, 2005). 
According to Mehta and Dastur (2008, p. 23), adaptive approaches “are affordable and 
meaningful strategies that improve the situation of existing slum dwellers and further 
strengthen their integration into the social and economic fibre of the city.” While in-situ 
upgrading does not provide housing for residents, it encourages households to improve 
their own housing. However, it might not be appropriate where a settlement exists on 
environmentally unsuitable land (see 2.2.1). Hence, in such cases relocations would be 
unavoidable (UN-Habitat, 2006b).  
The motivations for squatter upgrading vary between countries, but four stand out. To 
begin with, government may genuinely desire to improve living conditions of people, as 
was the case with the Kampung Improvement Programme (KIP) in kampungs in 
Indonesia (World Bank, 1995). Next, government may use upgrading to target specific 
problems such as crime fighting and prevention as was the case of the Favela-Bairro 
Programme (PFB) in the favelas in Brazil (Acioly, 2001). Likewise, upgrading may be 
for public relations – to create an impression that government cares about the people 
while de-radicalising them, as was claimed to be the case in South Africa 
(Huchzermeyer, 2004; Martin, 2010; Seymour, 1975). One last motivation for squatter 
upgrading concerns economic development. Although not a standalone factor, economic 
development comes as a by-product of infrastructure provision and tenure security 
improvement in the settlement. Once people have access to basic services, they begin to 
invest in improving their dwellings and small businesses, which contribute to economic 
development at the local and national levels in form of taxes, fees and charges (Fiori, et 
al., 2000).  
Nonetheless, upgrading aims to improve the quality of life of squatter residents mostly 
through provision of basic infrastructure and services and secure tenure (Gulyani & 
Connors, 2002). In turn, improvements in services encourage squatters to improve their 
own housing and quality of life (Dasgupta & Lall, 2009). The goal of service provision 
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also addresses several interventions such as relocation, sustainability, and social issues 
of security and poverty reduction. Although in-situ upgrading endeavours to occasion 
minimal displacements, sometimes that cannot be avoided (Gulyani & Connors, 2002). 
As such, upgrading may adopt a ‘twin’ approach’ to include site-and service areas 
where displaced residents may be relocated to and compensation where necessary 
(Huchzermeyer, 2004; UN-Habitat, 2006b). Squatter upgrading is a preferred alternative 
to improving conditions of housing for low-income households in squatter settlements 
because of its low unit costs compared to new housing developments (Ramsamy, 2006). 
Nevertheless, even if upgrading is relatively cheap, its investment has to be protected 
and hence, the inclusion of maintenance for sustainability (Dasgupta & Lall, 2009). 
Maintenance of infrastructure may be shared between users and appropriate government 
departments. Another important intervention is the socio-economic aspect, which is 
concerned with ensuring security and protection of residents from violence (UN-
Habitat, 2006b). Likewise, it targets poverty reduction through training and skills, and 
providing residents’ access to credit for them to engage in sustainable enterprises and 
improve their housing (Dasgupta & Lall, 2009).  
The other goal of squatter upgrading is to improve tenure security for squatter residents. 
UN-Habitat (2004, p. 6; 2007, p. 15) defines tenure security as, “the right of all 
individuals and groups to effective protection by the state against forced evictions.” In 
the context of squatter settlements, lack of tenure security poses a real threat of eviction. 
Hence, they cannot invest in improving their housing because of fear of eviction (Van 
Asperen & Zevenbergen, 2012). Choguill (1999) observes that land tenure security is 
actually a prerequisite for any progressive improvement to take place in property 
development. Therefore, residents “must feel secure in their residential circumstances if 
they are to invest the effort, money and time to make upgrading improvements in either 
housing or infrastructure” (Choguill, 1999, p. 299). It is clear that tenure security 
influences investment choices that squatters make. However, there seems to be no 
consensus on what tenure security entails (Van Gelder, 2010).  
Different views abound regarding the type of tenure security that influences investment 
decisions. For instance, some observers believe that legal tenure or land titling serves as 
an incentive in housing development and investment (De Soto, 2000; Field, 2005; 
Galiani & Schargrodsky, 2010). Since squatters are in constant fear of eviction, land 
titling reduces the risk of eviction (Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2009). Once the land title 
guarantees squatters tenure security, they begin to make positive investment decisions. 
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For example, Field (2005; 2007) discovered that land titling among urban households in 
Peru increased the rate of housing renovations to about sixty-eight percent within four 
years of receiving a title while household labour supply increased by ten to fifteen 
percent by freeing resources that were previously used to protect household assets. 
Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010) also show that formal land titling in Buenos Aires led 
to increased investments and education amongst households. Land titling also enables 
landowners to access housing finance as they use their titles for collateral against 
borrowing money for housing improvement and development (De Soto, 2000; Durand-
Lasserve & Selod, 2009). Field and Torero (2006, p. 1) report that in Peru, property 
titles were “associated with approval rates on public sector loans of as much as twelve 
percent higher when titles are requested by lenders and no relationship between titles 
and approval decisions otherwise.” According to UN-Habitat (2006d, p. vii), between 
thirty and fifty percent of urban residents in the developing world lacked any kind of 
legal document to show they had tenure security. In sub-Saharan Africa, most land did 
not have registration of who owned it or had rights to use it (Toulmin, 2009, p. 10). 
Hence, many of them lack access to formal finance to improve their homes. 
Additionally, land titling in formalised squatter settlements could also encourage private 
investors to invest in infrastructure and services (Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2009).  
Other analysts hold the view that when squatter landowners have de facto tenure 
security, they do not necessarily need titles to invest in housing because in some 
countries they already have de facto tenure that gives them the right to the land (Payne, 
2001; Payne & Durand-Lasserve, 2012). Moreover, Payne et al. (2007) caution that one 
cannot universally apply the results from the Latin American experience because the 
behaviour of people differs between regions. Land titling does not necessarily improve 
the squatter residents’ access to credit (Buckley & Kalarickal, 2006). Using data 
gathered from legalised self-help settlements in Bogotá, Gilbert (2002) found that the 
perceived benefits of legalisation were absent. For instance, formal finance was not 
forthcoming after legalisation. Instead, informal finance appeared to be more common 
than formal finance. Gilbert also discovered that land sales were far less common than 
when people lacked legal titles. Yet, another school of thought holds that squatters only 
need perceived tenure security to influence their decision in housing investment (De 
Souza, 2001; Van Gelder, 2010). Perceived tenure may catalyse development at 
household level, but real secure tenure via title deeds offers households many 
possibilities for more substantial investment in property (Huchzermeyer & Karam, 
2006; De Soto, 2000). De facto and perceived tenure are insufficient to enable property 
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owners to access formal credit for investment and reducing poverty.  
In conclusion, tenure security is important because it influences people’s investment 
behaviour. Therefore, whatever form tenure security takes squatter landowners require it 
to have confidence to invest in home improvements (UN-Habitat, 2008a). Clearly, for 
anyone to invest in housing there must be some form of tenure security to protect his or 
her investment (Payne & Durand-Lasserve, 2012). Squatters constantly face threats of 
evictions, and tenure security reduces that fear (Payne & Durand-Lasserve, 2012). 
Moreover, tenure security would substantially increase squatters’ access to finance. 
(UN-Habitat, 2008a; De Soto, 2000). De Soto (2000) explains that although the poor 
have no money, they have wealth (land). However, they cannot transform the wealth 
into capital as they lack property rights. Tenure security would enable residents to 
escape to some extent from the ‘controlling/gatekeeping’ behaviour of local ‘bosses’ 
(Brueckner & Selod, 2009). Tenure insecurity, on the other hand, would inhibit 
landowners from investing in housing, thereby reinforcing poverty and social exclusion 
of squatters (UN-Habitat, 2003c; De Soto, 2000; Payne, et al., 2014). UN-Habitat 
(2007, p. 113) helps to summarise the importance of tenure security as follows:  
The degree of ‘security’ of one household’s tenure will be instrumental in determining the 
chances that they will face forced eviction, have access to basic services such as water 
and electricity, be able to facilitate improvements in housing and living conditions, and be 
able to register their home or land with the authorities.  
Therefore, a successful upgrading programme would be one that provides basic 
infrastructure and services, and improves tenure security for squatter residents. As UN-
Habitat (2002a, p. 54) notes, “slum improvement is not only a goal in itself for a better 
quality of life, but it also provides a positive impact on the health burden and the 
economic development of a country.” 
2.2.4 Challenges and Benefits of Squatter Upgrading 
However, upgrading has its own challenges. Firstly, squatters may resist efforts to 
upgrade their settlements because of lack of understanding of the objectives of 
upgrading (Brown, 2008; UN-Habitat, 2005a). As Huchzermeyer (2004) observed, 
squatters will resist any attempts to upgrade their settlement if the upgrading is not in 
their best interest and if relocation sites do not offer better incentives than the old sites. 
Squatters may also resist upgrading if they do not understand the type of upgrading 
involved (Huchzermeyer & Karam, 2006). As Martin (2010) explains, residents of some 
squatter settlements resisted squatter upgrading in South Africa because government 
chose to relocate them rather than do in-situ upgrading. Resistance may also come from 
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external forces like property owners who have economic interests in the poor conditions 
in squatter settlements (Kok & Gelderblom, 1994). Secondly, upgrading may not be 
possible if community or togetherness is absent. If the residents feel they are not 
included in the processes of upgrading, they may not cooperate. Although government 
could provide basic infrastructure and services, it still requires squatter communities to 
cooperate and participate in physical planning and maintenance activities of the 
infrastructure (Imparato & Ruster, 2003). Therefore, community participation is an 
indispensable element in any settlement upgrading and crucial to achieving better 
outcomes (UN-Habitat, 1985; Choguill, 1996; Turner, 1976). Hence, squatters would 
have to work together as a community, with local government and other organisations 
(Taher & Ibrahim, 2014; Patel, 2013).  
The third challenge concerns the process of integrating squatter settlements into the city 
proper. Apart from improving living conditions in squatter settlements (see 2.2.3), 
squatter upgrading also seeks to integrate squatters and squatter settlements into the city 
proper (see 2.2.2). As Brown (2008) notes, the challenge is for integration to take place 
in a humane way that is less disruptive and destructive. Often, squatter settlements 
develop because of a shortage of affordable low-income housing in formal areas (see 
2.2.2). Therefore, if upgrading results in displacement of many households, it would 
create more housing problems and eventually the emergence of squatter settlements 
elsewhere. As such, relocation of squatters must be kept to its barest minimum. 
Fourthly, the absence of tenure security even in upgraded settlements can be an obstacle 
to development for households. Secure tenure is necessary to improve access to 
economic opportunities, including livelihoods, credit markets, and public and municipal 
services (see 2.2.3).  
Lastly, squatter upgrading may also attract gentrification that results in the displacement 
of intended beneficiaries as the affluent begin to move in upgraded areas. According to 
Kennedy and Leonard (2001, p. 5), gentrification is a “process by which higher income 
households displace lower income residents of a neighbourhood, changing the essential 
character and flavour of that neighbourhood.” It involves the movement of middle-class 
groups into neighbourhoods formerly occupied by squatters (Sheppard, 2012). For 
gentrification to take place, three specific conditions must be met regarding a 
neighbourhood (Kennedy & Leonard, 2001). To being with, there must be physical 
upgrading of the housing stock and thus improving it to allow high-income groups to 
live in. Next, there must be the displacement of original residents as high-income 
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groups buy out their houses. Lastly, the neighbourhood must acquire a completely new 
character that may even include changing the name.  
Some analysts note that gentrification displaces the urban poor people out of their 
neighbourhoods, and reduces affordable housing through escalating prices of housing 
(Nwanna, 2012). However, Byrne (2003) argues that the reduction in affordable 
housing does not result primarily from gentrification itself, but from the persistent 
failure of government to produce or secure affordable housing more generally. 
Additionally, gentrification might help build the image of a neighbourhood. As Smith 
(1996) observes, while people might view gentrification as a ‘dirty word’, it may just 
offer the neighbourhoods some economic, political and social benefits. In fact, “to the 
extent that the urban poor have been hurt by more affluent people moving to the 
suburbs, they are helped by a return of affluent people to the city” (Byrne, 2003, p. 
424).  
Despite the challenges, there are potential benefits from squatter upgrading. For 
instance, it empowers squatter residents with some rights such as the right to occupy 
and use land, and the right to services, to invest and upgrade (Harrison, 2009). 
Moreover, genuine upgrading introduces basic urban infrastructure and services (see 
2.2.3). Additionally, where legalisation of tenure accompanies squatter upgrading it 
encourages homeowners to improve their housing through mutual or individual self-
help building (World Bank, 2004b). Furthermore, upgrading stimulates investment in 
home-based enterprises and hence unleashes their vast productive energy and leveraging 
private capital, which play a major role in poverty alleviation (Gulyani & Connors, 
2002). Finally, it helps to mobilise communities to contribute to the management and 
maintenance of their settlement environment (Durand-Lasserve, 1999). Overall 
upgrading makes a highly visible, immediate, and large difference in the quality of life 
of the urban poor (Cities Alliance, 1999).  
However, squatter upgrading often fails to yield the most desired result of improving 
the quality of life of the urban poor, for several reasons. To start with, upgrading 
programmes are often reactive and hence, tend to be limited in scope and scale 
(Sietchiping & Yoon, 2010). Next, upgrading programmes are usually implemented in a 
piecemeal, project-based fashion without clear mechanisms to scale up (Sietchiping & 
Yoon, 2010). Moreover, they lack sustainability components and hence, upgraded 
settlements suffer from neglect and deteriorate to conditions they were in before 
upgrading (Terzi & Bolen, 2005). Furthermore, planners of upgrading programmes fail 
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to link them to overall poverty reduction programmes (Abbott, 2002). Squatter 
settlements are closely associated with poverty. Although not all squatters are poor, the 
majority are impoverished (UN-Habitat, 2003a; Abbott, 2001). Consequently, although 
squatter upgrading offers physical improvements it may receive little appreciation if has 
minimal impact on poverty reduction. Therefore, squatter upgrading needs to include 
socio-economic interventions linked to wider poverty reduction strategies (Abbott, 
2002; Tibaijuka, 2009). Finally, upgrading programmes fail because of lack of 
understanding of the phenomenon of squatter settlements and related problems, which 
causes governments to address symptoms rather than the underlying causes (UN-
Habitat, 2003a; Huchzermeyer, 2008). Arimah (2010a, p. 3) cautions that, “any attempt 
at improving the lives of slum dwellers and providing alternatives to new slum 
formation in African countries, must be preceded by a proper appreciation of the factors 
that underlie the formation and proliferation of slums.”  
For these reasons, squatter upgrading fails to cause significant impact in the whole ‘sea’ 
of the urban housing shortage (Berner, 2002; Gulyani & Connors, 2002; Rakodi, 
1986a). Nevertheless, upgrading is not a ‘lost cause’ because examples exist of 
successful upgrading programmes in developing countries like KIP in Indonesia and 
PFB in Brazil. These exemplify what I have described as elements of an effective 
institutional framework required for squatter upgrading (see 1.4). 
2.2.5 Institutional Approach to Squatter Upgrading 
This thesis questions the adequacy of the existing squatter upgrading framework to 
initiate and support squatter upgrading at present (see 1.3). Governments in many 
developing countries have been responsible for public housing provision. For instance, 
in the 1960s and 1970s, governments implemented conventional housing programmes 
to solve the problem of shortage of urban housing. However, as Berner (2002, p. 231) 
observed, apart from exceptions like Singapore “governments in developing countries 
proved to be neither effective nor efficient as housing providers.” There are several 
reasons for the failure of conventional housing programmes. To begin with, the scale of 
housing was usually insufficient to meet the demand (Rondinelli, 1990). Even when 
governments knew the amount of demand for housing, such as in the case of India, they 
still failed to deliver housing at the rate that would have closed the gap between demand 
and supply (Nijhoff, 1986). Next, housing programmes did not receive adequate 
funding (Arnott, 2009). To worsen the situation, most housing was so highly subsidized 
that governments failed to recoup the investment to continue funding more housing 
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development (Carmona & Silva, 2009; Mayo & Gross, 1987). Similarly, because of 
lack of technical capacity in many countries, there was poor planning and management 
of housing programmes (Rakodi, 1986a). Lastly, governments failed to prioritise low-
income housing. Instead, housing provision focused on higher-income classes and civil 
servants at the expense of lower-income groups (Sanyal, 1981).  
Governments with World Bank support, also tried sites-and-services schemes between 
the 1970s and 1990s, but these also failed in meeting the needs of the poor. Wakely 
(2014, p. 14) attributes the failure of site-and-services programmes to “un-affordably 
high planning and construction standards.” Planning authorities dictated space 
standards, the use of stipulated (permanent) building materials and time limits for the 
completion of construction. These conditions raised the cost of building such that many 
households could not afford to build. Squatter households’ incomes were simply too 
low to afford building houses with raised standards (Rondinelli, 1990). Next, sites-and-
services sites were often located on the city fringes at long distances from trunk 
infrastructure networks, transport routes and other services (Wakely, 2014). This 
situation created a problem for accessibility to services, and increased the cost of 
providing services to the sites. For instance, in Zambia some squatters refused to take 
up plots in a sites-and-services area that they considered too far away from their places 
of work and other services (Rakodi, 1986a). Amongst those who got the plots, a few 
managed to build houses but others later sold them and went to settle in other squatter 
settlements. Sites-and-services programmes also failed because of poor cost-recovery 
(Sanyal, 1987; Bamberger, et al., 1982). Wakely (2014, p. 14) notes that poor cost-
recovery to was due to “erroneous understandings of affordability and poor urban 
households’ ability/willingness to pay for them.” Lastly, in the 1980s the World Bank 
reduced its financial support to urban development programmes because it began 
supporting Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) (Wakely, 2014). Since most 
governments lacked the financial capacity to fund these programmes, they could not 
continue with sites-and-services programmes (Rakodi, 1986a).  
Along with sites-and-services programmes, squatter upgrading programmes were also 
implemented to improve housing conditions of squatters (see 2.2.2). Although squatter 
upgrading did not contribute to increasing the housing stock, it enabled improved access 
to basic infrastructure of the urban poor (Obudho, et al., 2000; UN-Habitat, 2003a). 
Even so, squatter upgrading also failed to continue because of financial constraints 
(Wakely, 2014). Regardless, squatter upgrading appears to have scored better than 
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conventional housing and sites-and-services programmes in terms of beneficiary 
coverage. It reached many people because there was no need for land as improvements 
took place on existing land.  
In view of the daunting reality of so many urban dwellers living in squatter settlements, 
and the fact that governments have literally stopped investing in public housing, 
squatter upgrading remains a worthy route to improve the urban poor’s access to basic 
infrastructure and services, encourage housing development by improving tenure 
security, and boost local economic development (Werlin, 1999). Therefore, this research 
proposes an institutional approach to squatter upgrading – involvement of many actors 
or institutions in squatter upgrading, for two main reasons. Firstly, although squatter 
upgrading programmes were for the benefit of squatter communities, pioneer upgrading 
programmes were mostly government-led and conducted in a top-down fashion 
(Magigi, 2013). Consequently, after completion planners faced problems with 
community participation in maintenance and operation activities. Imparato and Ruster 
(2003) point out that successful squatter upgrading cannot occur without the 
participation of squatter communities. Therefore, squatter communities ought to be 
involved in all stages of the upgrading programme (Magigi, 2013).  
Secondly, squatter upgrading provides a channel for addressing poverty in squatter 
settlements (Fiori, et al., 2000; Van Horen, 2004). Many urban households live in 
squatter settlements because they are too poor to afford housing in formal residential 
areas (see 2.2.1). Therefore, for squatter upgrading to have a lasting impact there is a 
need to link it to the overall poverty alleviation agenda. While provision of basic 
infrastructure and services, and improvement of tenure security have been the main 
goals of squatter upgrading (see 2.2.3), there is a need to also focus more on matters 
pertaining to sustainability of improvements, and socio-economic improvements 
focused on poverty reduction. Gilbert (2000) observes that squatter upgrading is often 
poorly designed and thus, it fails to consider the important issue of sustainability - 
continuity of poverty reduction interventions. Werlin (1999, p. 1526) gives an account 
of how it appeared the successes that KIP achieved in Jakarta were “a wasted 
investment” because of lack of maintenance of infrastructure. Earlier, Kessides (1997) 
made a similar observation when recounting neglect of maintenance of water and 
sanitation facilities that led to many kampung residents spending too much money on 
treating water-borne diseases. As such, squatter upgrading cannot be a ‘one-man’ 
undertaking but a coordinated effort where many stakeholders or institutions play active 
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roles to achieve its goals. Therefore, for squatter upgrading to achieve the goals of basic 
infrastructure and services provision, improvement of tenure security, sustainability, 
and socio-economic improvements, it requires an institutional approach.  
The involvement of many actors such as national government, local government, private 
sector, civil society and local communities, in squatter upgrading requires a set of 
guidelines within which they can operate to achieve the goals of squatter upgrading. 
This set of guidelines, called the institutional framework, must contain information 
pertaining to the upgrading programme – its goals and objectives, funding, and 
management, and various actors to be involved. It must also provide for community 
participation, and support related to poverty alleviation (see 1.4). Zambia, as I show 
later (see Chapter 5) adopted a neoliberal agenda that advocates for a minimalist state 
policy (Wang, 2003; Grindle, 1996). As such, government withdrew from public 
housing provision to allow the private sector to lead the housing market (Bhalla, 2001; 
Saasa, 1996). However, many of the urban poor cannot afford to pay for housing that 
the private sector provides. Consequently, they live in squatter settlements where they 
find housing that meets their financial capacity (UN-Habitat, 2003a). Although I 
propose an institutional approach to squatter upgrading, I do not take a specifically ‘new 
institutionalist’ approach, which advocates for the centrality of the state in economic 
transformations (Peters, 1999; Chang, 2000).  
Nevertheless, proposing active involvement of national governments in squatter 
upgrading through the institutional approach contradicts with the neoliberal minimalist 
position regarding the role of the state in public service delivery. The market has failed 
to serve the low-income households (Bhalla, 2001; UN-Habitat, 2003a). Markets 
operate under the laws of demand and supply – they will supply to meet the demand as 
long as people can pay for the goods and services. Most of the urban poor cannot afford 
to pay for housing that the market supplies, even though they need it. Therefore, the 
government must come in to provide or facilitate housing for the poor since the market 
is unable to do so. As the World Bank (1991, p. 1) notes, “governments must…invest in 
infrastructure and provide essential services to the poor. It is not a question of state or 
market: each has a large and irreplaceable role.” Clearly, the state has an important role 
to play especially in delivering services meant to lift the poor out of poverty, in this case 
squatter upgrading. Hence, it has to be ‘rolled back in’ (Skocpol, 1985; Peters, 1999).  
Evidence shows that KIP and PFB adopted an institutional approach to squatter 
upgrading (Perlman, 2010; World Bank, 1995). They involved several institutions from 
32 
within and outside of government, and resident committees (AKAA, 1980; IDB, 1995). 
KIP and PFB operated within an institutional framework that contributed to their 
success (see Chapter 3). Presently, PFB and KIP stand as examples of successful 
squatter upgrading because they were able to introduce basic services and infrastructure, 
and improve tenure security for residents (Perlman, 2010; World Bank, 2000). Clearly, 
having an adequate institutional framework is important for the success of squatter 
upgrading programmes. As already noted, this research investigates the adequacy of the 
institutional framework to initiate and support squatter upgrading.  
2.3 POLITICAL REGIMES AND POLITICS IN SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS 
There are mainly two types of political regimes, democratic and dictatorship 
(authoritarian) regimes. However, before discussing these political regimes, and the 
relationship between political regimes and development, I begin by defining here the 
concepts of politics and political patronage, as they relate to public service delivery.  
2.3.1 Politics and Political Patronage 
Defining politics is challenging because many people understand it differently. 
Nevertheless, politics signifies conflict and cooperation (Heywood, 2013). In this 
regard, Hague and Harrop (2013) identified four aspects of politics involving collective 
action within and between groups, a diversity of views on subjects, allowing people to 
express their views and reconciling differences, and making collective decisions and 
binding agreements. Politics is at the heart of all collective social activity, formal and 
informal, public and private, in all human groups, institutions and societies (Leftwich, 
2004). Hence, it determines ‘who gets what, when and how’ (Lasswell, 1936). In its 
broadest sense as Heywood (2013, p. 2) notes, “Politics is the activity through which 
people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live.” Similarly, 
Crick (2005, p. 21) defines politics as “the activity by which different interests within a 
given unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their 
importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole community.” Therefore, politics 
is about power sharing between different groups in relation to their role in society.  
Political patronage, also known as clientelism, is neither specific to any political system 
or regime type nor limited to developing countries only (Gandhi, 2008). It is a 
widespread phenomenon experienced in developed and less developed, democratic or 
non-democratic countries (Gallo & Lewis, 2012). As Lemarchand and Legg (1978, p. 
120) observed, patronage is, “a generic trait of all political systems regardless of their 
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stages of development.” It depends on reciprocal relations between patrons and clients 
(Bobory, 2009). Patrons use influence and social positions to provide favours or 
protection to clients, who being in inferior positions receive favours from patrons in 
exchange for loyalty or support (Weingrod, 1968; Bobory, 2009). The patron-client 
nexus thrives on unequal relationships between an inferior (client) and a superior 
(patron) (Bobory, 2009). In defining patronage, I borrow the definition of Lemarchand 
and Legg (1978, pp. 122-123) who describe it as:  
A more or less personalised, effective, and reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets 
of actors, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually beneficial transactions 
that have political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships.  
Patronage determines the politics regarding development including public service 
delivery (Bowman & Kearney, 2011). In democratic environments, political parties 
have strongholds on which they often capitalise for support. For example, ruling 
political parties normally seek to intensify service delivery in their strongholds to show 
that they care and to garner support from residents (Bobory, 2009). The volume of 
transactions in clientelistic relationships varies; it depends upon the context, including 
both the needs of the client and the influence of the patron. According to Weingrod 
(1968, p. 126), the flow of transactions may be completed at the local level, but 
sometimes it runs through the entire government system resulting in a situation where 
“the organisation of government and the structure of patronage are parallel hierarchies.” 
This probably explains what prevailed in Zambia during the independence era. UNIP, 
the ruling political party at the time had an organisation structure that was identical to 
that of government (Mukwena, 2001; Gertzel, et al., 1984). Hence, it was easy for 
government to merge the structures of the state and UNIP to form the Party-and-Its-
Government (PIG) model (Chikulo, 2009; World Bank, 2002a). With the PIG in place, 
President Kenneth Kaunda’s regime introduced politics of patronage at all levels of 
government. The PIG organised different loyalist groups to amass support for Kaunda 
to continue reigning as president (Gertzel, et al., 1984). In the early post-independence 
years, the flow of patronage was mostly from the top. Like his predecessor, President 
Fredrick Chiluba targeted specific groups such as street vendors, marketeers, soccer 
clubs, church groups, and hospitals that he gave large sums of money from slush funds
4
 
(Van de Walle, 2001). He wanted to develop multiple links with clients within and 
                                                 
4
President Chiluba had the MMD legislature approve a presidential fund of K12 billion (US$6-8 million) 
in 1998 for his discretionary use (Van de Walle, 2001, p. 107). 
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outside of government (Blunt, et al., 2012). After all, patronage was a mechanism 
available to the president to maintain and extend his power over a country, a 
government, and a party (Grindle, 2010). Although Chiluba’s regime did not merge 
state and party structures, patronage was still so entrenched that, as in the words of 
Blunt et al. (2012), the state was “treated as an extension of the property of the leader, 
and the leader rules with the help of clients who get a pay-off for their support.”  
In the above scenarios, patronage clearly served as a survival strategy, a political 
necessity because political parties had to do whatever they could to get in or stay in 
power (Patterson, 2013). As Smith (2003, p. 153) observes, the distribution of rewards 
to supporters and clients on a personalized basis can be crucial for the survival of a 
political party. On the other hand, where patronage is rife, public service delivery tends 
to be affected (Bowman & Kearney, 2011). Often, politicians interfere with the 
targeting of services to either reward supporters or punish opponents (Vicente & 
Wantchekon, 2009). Patronage also affects the capacity of institutions to provide public 
services. During President Chiluba’s reign (1991-2001), government allocated larger 
sums of money as slush funds than as allocations to local councils for service provision.  
2.3.2 Political Regimes 
According to Mann (1993, p. 18), a regime is as “an alliance of dominant ideological, 
economic, and military power actors, coordinated by the rulers of the state.” The term 
political regime “denotes a defined set of institutions and ‘rules of the game’ that 
regulate access to, and the uses of, positions of public authority in a given society” 
(Whitehead, 1994, p. 327). Therefore, for this research a political regime refers to a set 
of regulations by which a political party directs its rule over a people in a given 
territory. As already noted, there are mainly two types of political regimes, namely 
dictatorship/ authoritarian and democratic regimes (see 2.3). Other variants fall within 
these two extremes (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997). There is no consensus on what 
dictatorship is, but historically it has been associated with tyranny (Gandhi, 2008). It is 
the opposite of democracy and hence, we can describe it as a kind of political regime 
where a single person governs free of constraints or influence (Boix & Svolik, 2013; 
Gandhi, 2008). However, contrary to popular perceptions, a dictatorship may allow 
some form of powering-sharing with political institutions like the legislature and 
political parties. Boix and Svolk (2007, p. 1), give a scenario of dictatorships as follows:  
A majority of dictatorships since 1950 have had either legislatures or at least one political 
party. Only during the mid-seventies did the proportion of dictatorships with a legislature 
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fall to less than 60 percent. The proportion of dictatorships with at least one political 
party was even larger and fluctuated between 80 and 90 percent from 1950 to 1990. Even 
in dictatorships without legislatures or parties, the leadership often maintains some 
smaller institutional body, such as a ruling council or a politburo that may restrain the 
tyrannical tendencies of any single ruler.  
In Africa, the majority of dictatorship regimes adopted a single party system to thwart 
opposition and establish supremacy. Smith (2003, p. 143) notes that the single-party 
system was used as a strategy “for coping with the myriad parochial and ethnic 
pressures in the national political party, the single or dominant party currently 
governing the state.” This was an extension of colonial authoritarianism because as 
Smith (2003, p. 143) further observes, the situation that confronted leaders at 
independence “had been formed by the autocratic power of the departing colonialists, a 
culture supported by, in the case of African societies at least, elements that were 
predisposed towards more authoritarian forms of government.” Nonetheless, 
dictatorships exhibited some democratic tendencies that made acceptance of single-
party governments easier.  
A democratic regime on the other hand, has rulers who are selected through the 
electoral process, and incumbent rulers leaving office when they lose elections 
(Przeworski, 2004). Unlike dictatorships, democracies allow participation of many 
citizens in the governance of the country through elections, and participation in local 
governance (Ardito-Barletta, 1990). In the 1990s, a wave of political change swept 
across Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and regimes ranging from civilian one-party states, 
military oligarchies or hybrids of the two embraced political reforms in favour of 
democratic governance (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997). However, the outcomes of 
political reforms have varied immensely (Rakner, 2013). As Bratton and Van de Walle 
(1997, p. 6) observe, political reforms have led to “widely divergent outcomes that were 
expressed through the installation or restoration of a broad range of authoritarian, 
democratic, or mixed regimes.” Nonetheless, political change occurred and in many 
cases, the electoral process encouraged contestation and participation (Hyden, 2002). 
Clearly, democracy has had its victories and crises in SSA. Although still in its infancy, 
the principles of pluralism and political equality that it espouses have made significant 
gains (Hadenius, 1997). However, Hadenius (1997, p. 2) is quick to point out that:  
In many countries, which have gone through political reform, democratic institutions, are 
for the most part surface phenomenon inasmuch as political life is still dominated by 
clientelistic structures and by rule by political bosses in conjunction with a notably low 
rate of political participation.  
Possibly, as Rakner and Svasand (2005) note, some countries are still stuck in the 
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transition. They have not consolidated democracy to a level of maturity to reap the 
benefits of democratisation. Democratisation is incomplete and therefore threatened 
with breakdown (Schedler, 1998). Despite being democratic, political regimes in some 
countries are opposed to competition from other political parties and stifle citizens’ 
freedoms and rights (Rakner, 2013). As Ardito-Barletta (1990, p. 165) notes:  
Democracy works best when competition of ideas and different interests produce 
compromises and a learning curve of what works best for the majority. Democracy works 
less well when it leads to wide swings in policies, frequent stalemates, and the inability of 
groups seeking political favours to avoid establishing self-serving policies that lock out 
the wider sectors of society from opportunities.  
2.3.3 Political Regimes and Development 
There has been wide debate on whether a country requires democracy or dictatorship to 
get out of economic and social underdevelopment (Smith, 2003). Regardless, there are 
no definite consensuses on the relationship between regimes and economic 
development. Mcloughlin and Batley (2012) and the World Bank (2004a) observe that 
the nature of the political regime is a key determinant of the policy choices states make 
regarding delivery of public services. Those who favour authoritarianism often cite the 
Asian Tigers that performed extremely well under authoritarian regimes (Przeworski, et 
al., 2000; Gerring, et al., 2012). Hence, as Smith (2003, p. 277) notes, they argue that, 
“economic development needs an authoritarian regime to push through policies needed 
to facilitate rapid growth in the face of resistance.” Indeed, authoritarianism worked for 
the Asian Tigers then, but as Loh (2003) points out, that experiences of total economic 
failure from North Korea and Burma show that it is not good for economic growth.  
Those who favour democracy believe that economic growth is more favourable under 
democracies than authoritarian regimes. Rodrick et al. (2004) observe that democratic 
governance has a positive impact on economic growth and social welfare. In terms of 
service delivery, analysts believe that democracies perform better than dictatorships. 
While all dictatorship regimes supply public goods such as roads, police, public schools 
and sanitation, they usually dedicate part of the public budget on transfers targeted to 
politically influential groups (Deacon, 2009, p. 242). Mostly, in such cases the kind of 
services or goods provided are usually ‘rival goods’; they are not available to those who 
are likely not to support the state, rather than non-rival goods  - enjoyed by all 
regardless of political affiliation (Deacon, 2009). In economics, a particular good is a 
rival good when its consumption by one person prevents simultaneous consumption by 
other persons (Dionisio & Gordo, 2006). In the political sense, rival goods would be 
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incentives given to and consumed by supporters of political parties, but cannot be 
enjoyed by non-supporters even if they lived close by. A non-rival good on the other 
hand, is one that although it is meant for the benefit of one person or group other 
unintended persons or groups can still enjoy it (Holcombe, 1997). For instance, if a 
ruling party builds a clinic or road in one area to woo support from the electorates, both 
its supporters and non-supporters would benefit from the clinic or road.  
However, other analysts have challenged the positive impact of democracy on economic 
growth or social welfare. Gerring et al. (2012) argues that there is no positive 
correlation between regime type and various measures of human development. Ross 
(2006) even questions if democracy is good for the poor because it has not produced 
favourable outcomes for the poor. For example, persistent inequalities and high levels 
of poverty still confront many democracies in the developing world (Gerring, et al., 
2012). Furthermore, some of the most dramatic improvements in human development in 
the twentieth century occurred under authoritarian rule. Arguably, many African states 
adopted authoritarianism after independence but did not perform as well as the Asian 
Tigers. Similarly, at present many states are democratic and yet, their economic 
performance is still poor. It appears the type of political regime in place does not 
determine economic growth, but it is the politics applied that in turn influence economic 
policies. As Smith (2003, p. 278) points out, “the developmental capacity of a 
democracy will depend partly on politics, especially levels of political equality and 
participation, and the type of party system.” 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the politics involved in development determines 
development or public service delivery, more than the regime type. Mcloughlin and 
Batley (2012) are of the view that services are a product of politics. For instance, 
Resnick (2014, p. s4) bemoans how political decentralisation in democracies in Africa 
has created “vertically-divided authority” whereby an opposition party has been elected 
to manage a major urban agglomeration, such as a capital city. In Zambia, during the 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) reign between 1991 and 2011, 
opposition political parties have controlled the Lusaka City Council (Olowu, 2005). 
Other cities including Kitwe and Chipata have also at one time been under the control of 
opposition political parties. Now capital cities represent ‘seats of power’ and ruling 
governments certainly do not wish to relinquish that seat without a fight. As Diouf 
(1999, p. 45) explains, “The city is the seat of power, the terrain for expressing the 
imaginary of the ruling class and its ascendance. In this field, there are no possibilities 
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other than confrontation and negotiation.” As such, as Resnick (2014, p. s4) observed, 
the ruling parties engage in “strategies of subversion” because they “are loath to see 
political opponents win credit for good performance but eager to assign blame when 
services are poorly delivered.” 
Politics also influences how national governments share power and resources with 
lower levels of governments involved in local development (Elander, 1991). For 
instance, in the 2001 general elections, Southern Province almost unanimously rejected 
the MMD party. Therefore, as a punishment, Livingstone City Council did not receive 
any government funding from 2003 to 2004 (Tembo, 2006). Government also extended 
the punishment to the entire province by ensuring that it had no representation in 
Cabinet. The then President, Levy Mwanawasa justified his actions as follows:  
The people of Southern Province should not complain that I have not given them enough 
Ministers in Cabinet and that is why there is no development in Southern Province, but 
they have themselves to blame because they did not vote for me and my party, but 
development moves with the government of the day.
5
  
In 2006, President Mwanawasa made similar statements to the people of Northern 
Province who voted for the Patriotic Front (Tembo, 2006). He also fired Mr. Lupando 
Mwape, then National Vice President for losing his parliamentary seat in the province. 
On the other hand, Mwanawasa rewarded the people of the Eastern Province for their 
overwhelming electoral support by appointing Mr. Rupiah Banda as Vice President who 
later succeeded him after his demise in 2008.  
2.3.4 Politics and Squatter settlements 
There is overwhelming evidence globally suggesting that a relationship exists between 
politics and urban development, particularly squatter settlements formation (Rakodi, 
2008; Bowman & Pagano, 1996; Collier, 1975). According to Bowman and Pagano 
(1996), politics plays an important role in explaining the path a city chooses. Here, I 
examine this relationship between politics and squatter settlements from two main 
perspectives, of spatial planning and clientelism.  
Since the colonial era, spatial planning has served as a tool in the formation of squatter 
settlements (Home, 1997; Mwimba, 2002). British colonial planning encouraged racial 
segregation “to reduce the public health threat… and to protect property owners by 
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separating them from the social groups and areas perceived as sources of disorder 
(Rakodi, 2008, p. 6; Njoh, 2009). Moreover, politics of racial segregation played a role 
in the way governments provided urban services to Europeans and Africans (Makasa, 
2010; Mutale, 2004). Housing for natives was segregated and separated with cordon 
sanitaires. It also lacked necessary facilities and services such as piped water and 
flushing toilets (Rakodi, 2008). As Home (1997) observed, Europeans lived in nicely 
serviced houses with spacious yards, while Africans lived in densely populated 
locations in single-roomed or barrack-type hostels with shared sanitary facilities. 
Additionally, townships for natives were constantly under night curfew and daytime 
restrictions (Mutale, 2004). These things, residential segregation, inadequate housing, 
and lack of freedom in natives’ townships led many natives to leave colonial-planned 
townships and build houses in the peripheral areas (Makasa, 2010; Rakodi, 2008). 
Berrisford (2011) and Mwimba (2002) observed that independent African states also 
adopted colonial spatial planning systems. They continue to segregate people 
residentially, not based on race as in colonial times, but on economic class (Mutale, 
2004). Besides, low-income residential sites tend to be located far away from the centre, 
and infrastructure networks and services (Perez & Crossley, 2010). Consequently, many 
urban poor choose to live in squatter settlements.  
There is overwhelming evidence regarding the role of politics in the formation and 
maintenance of squatter settlements (Mitlin, 2014; UN-Habitat, 2005a; Collier, 1975). 
The urban poor cannot access affordable housing within formal resident areas because 
local governments no longer provide public housing. They cannot also afford to acquire 
land from local governments to build houses because not only is it too expensive to 
acquire but it also involves complicated land administration procedures (Mutale, 2004; 
Mwimba, 2002). Hence, they turn to the black land market. On the other hand, 
opposition political parties and ruling parties desire to gain and maintain power through 
election or re-election, respectively. Therefore, they use party cadres to generate support 
among squatters, whom they entice with illegally subdivided plots at a small fee. In 
turn, political parties expect electoral support from the beneficiaries of the plots. Party 
cadres may also invade land adjacent to existing squatter settlements. Martin and 
Mathema (2006) narrate an incident involving a ruling political party leadership in 
Lusaka that annexed some nearby land to extend an existing squatter settlement, and 
allocated plots to its supporters. Similarly, an MMD party leadership in Ng’ombe area 
sold land belonging to the Catholic Church to squatters, who paid for the plots. Some 
squatters even had certificates of ownership signed and stamped by the local political 
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leadership. However, in 2004 the Church demolished 600 houses leaving squatters 
homeless (UN-Habitat, 2005a). In Peru, in an effort to garner support for his election in 
the 1956 elections, military ruler Odria encouraged formation of squatter settlements by 
openly declaring government would “not interfere if a particular piece of land were 
occupied” (Collier, 1975, p. 135). Collier (1975) also adds that sometimes the President 
publicly authorised squatter settlements.  
The Zambian and Peruvian scenarios take place within two political systems of 
democracy and dictatorship, respectively. One might argue that in a democracy political 
leaderships should not encourage land invasions, because democracy respects the rule of 
law and upholds property rights (Acemoglu, 2003). Similarly, in a dictatorship a ruler 
may use his power to order land invasions without regard to the rule of law or property 
rights of individuals (Knutsen, 2011). However, the situation in Venezuela during the 
rule of military dictator Perez Jimenez (1952-1958) seems to support the notion that 
politics, more than political regime type, determines the development direction a 
country takes. Collier (1976, p. 196) reports that Jimenez “staunchly defended 
government and private property” and claimed that squatter settlements “spoiled the 
new look of the capital which he was remodelling, and bulldozed them off their sites.”  
Sometimes, opposition parties may also use squatters to get support for election into 
office. In Zambia, between 2010 and 2011 an aspiring parliamentary candidate illegally 
subdivided land belong to a mining company and sold it cheaply to the cadres and 
sympathisers of his political party, Patriotic Front. He got the vote in 2011, and the 
squatters got the ‘boot’ in 20146. While Odria’s government enjoyed paternalistic 
control over squatters in Lima, the opposition also used squatters in some of the very 
squatter settlements he had formed to destabilise him and ruin his chances of winning 
the 1956 elections (Collier, 1975). According to Collier (1975, p. 136), a known 
opposition leader Pedro Beltran sponsored “one of the largest squatter invasions ever to 
take place in Peru.” Odria did not run for president.  
Clearly, politics have a role to play in the formation and maintenance of squatter 
settlements. Mitlin (2014) observes that clientelist relations are particularly prevalent in 
informal settlements, due to the lack of services and the need to negotiate with 
politicians and sometimes officials to secure such investments. According to UN-
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Habitat (2005a), in Zambia politicians have used squatter settlements and squatters for 
their own political advancement since the struggle for independence. “It is not enshrined 
in any written law, but the politicians and the people know that when it comes to the 
power of the vote, illegal or informal settlement dwellers have a lot of power” (UN-
Habitat, 2005a, p. 75). This is probably why all major political parties in Zambia have 
their strongholds in squatter settlements (Rakodi, 2008; Resnick, 2014).  
2.4 PARTICIPATION AND URBAN GOVERNANCE 
Traditionally, local governments have been responsible for public services delivery 
(Rakodi, 2003). However, owing to growing public demand for services and limited 
fiscal resources they are unable to meet the demand (UN-Habitat, 2015). As such, the 
trend has shifted towards local governance – inclusion of other actors like the private 
sector, civil society and communities, in local development (Morphet, 2008; Romańczy, 
2015). Governance describes relationships and interconnections between the state (and 
its agencies), communities, private sector and civil society (Hickey & Mohan, 2004). 
According to Pierre (2011, p. 5), governance looks at “the interplay between state and 
society and the extent to which collective projects can be achieved through a joint 
public and private mobilization of resources.”  
In the sea of governance, the public sector does not have to deliver all public services 
itself but may involve other stakeholders including the private sector, civil society, and 
communities through various arrangements such as public-private partnerships and 
community participation
 
(Morphet, 2008). The public sector’s role, therefore, would be 
to coordinate the production and provision of services among the stakeholders (Pierre, 
2011). In Zambia, some of these actors such as civil society, and communities already 
provide various services including housing in disadvantaged communities (Habitat for 
Humanity, 2013). As Shah and Shah (2006, p. 2) observe, the “presence of a vast 
network of entities beyond government that are engaged in local services delivery or 
quality of life issues makes it unrealistic to treat local government as a single entity.” 
Therefore, Morphet (2008) believes that we can no longer view local government as a 
single entity in the local governance arena. Given the challenges local governments 
face, their survival depends on the extent to which they allow other stakeholders to 
participate in local governance.  
Despite being responsible for delivering public services in many countries, local 
governments seem to have limited capacity to provide services, for two main reasons. 
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Firstly, the ever-increasing urban populations create challenges for public service 
delivery. Secondly, traditional sources of revenue have diminished to the extent that 
local governments cannot raise sufficient revenue to provide public services. This two-
edged dilemma of local governments has become the main driver towards urban 
governance (Harpham & Boating, 1997). Urban governance, which refers to the 
exercise of power to manage a city's economic and social development, explores 
relationships and interconnections among stakeholders pertaining to the urban 
development agenda (Kübler & Pagano, 2012). Broadly speaking, it aims to improve 
urban development by improving administrative competency, improving efficiency in 
resource use by cutting out wastage through vices such as corruption or rent-seeking, 
improving transparency and accountability in the use of resource, and pooling public 
and private resources for improved urban management (Pierre, 1999; 2014). Therefore, 
to meet the challenge of urban development local governments have “to be much more 
innovative and entrepreneurial, willing to explore all kinds of avenues through which to 
alleviate their distressed condition and thereby secure a better future for their 
populations” (Harvey, 1989, p. 4).  
Apart from pursuing entrepreneurship and public-private partnerships, local governance 
also embraces participation of communities in decision-making so that they too become 
part of the network of interconnections. There are several definitions of participation 
(World Bank, 1996b; Bamberger, 1988; Brett, 2003). Nonetheless, the underlying 
theme in all of them is community (beneficiary) involvement in making decisions 
regarding matters that affect their lives. Community participation in development can 
range from simple information sharing, to extensive consultation and joint decision-
making, and to situations where the relevant stakeholders take on responsibility for 
monitoring the process and evaluating its success (McGee, 2001). Therefore, in this 
research participation refers to the process in which communities take part in making 
decisions regarding events that affect their well-being.  
Until the 1990s, governments and donors alike approached development in a top-down 
manner where they decided what they thought communities needed (Reed, et al., 2006). 
However, as Dorsner (2004) observes, this kind of development discourse attracted 
criticism especially for failing to address poverty and its causes. Besides, the top-down 
model lacked accountability and political representation as communities felt they did 
not have fair representation in decisions regarding their needs (Richards, et al., 2004). 
Hence, there has been a change toward a development discourse that has real impact in 
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terms of achieving wider poverty reduction goals as set and agreed by the people - the 
bottom-up approach (Finsterbusch & Wicklin, 1987). The bottom-up approach 
emphasises participation of communities in development and ensures their needs are 
met and voices heard (Mansuri & Rao, 2013; JICA, 1995; Weekes-Vagliani, 1994). As 
they participate, communities also feel empowered and hence this leads to a high sense 
of responsibility and ownership of the programme (Mansuri & Rao, 2013; Mitlin & 
Thompson, 1995). Next, through community participation projects are able to mobilise 
greater resources including benefiting from local knowledge to help in the design of 
projects or programmes (Finsterbusch & Wicklin, 1987).  
By involving communities in development, participation seeks to share the costs of the 
project with the people it serves (Mansuri & Rao, 2013). In that case, communities 
might be required to contribute their labour or some financial contribution, while 
government or donor agencies contribute the larger proportion towards the project. For 
example, the Zambia Social Investment Fund (ZAMSIF), a programme funded by the 
World Bank and GRZ, required communities to contribute twenty-five percent in form 
of labour and basic materials like building stones, sand and bricks towards project 
funding
7
. Participation also helps build capacity in beneficiary communities so that they 
not only own the development but also possess the capacity to protect it through 
maintenance (Bamberger, 1988). Although the campaign for participation in 
development began in the 1940s, it appears to have gained more popularity in the 1990s 
(Hickey & Mohan, 2004; Cornwall, 2006). Nevertheless, participation has gained so 
much momentum in development practice to the extent that it is considered and widely 
accepted as an important strategy of development (Cornwall, 2006).  
However, participation has some downsides. For instance, while it appears to promote 
inclusive development, some interest groups might hijack the process of participation to 
further their own interests (Mosse, 2001). Similarly, Dorsner (2004) observes that often 
organisations emphasise participatory processes in community projects not for the sake 
of participation and its related empowerment objectives, but more as a marketing tool to 
attract funding or to promote a specific agenda. Moreover, sometimes decisions to 
employ participatory approaches to development, especially in local councils, are not 
genuine but motivated by a lack of money (Mitlin, 2003). Furthermore, recent research 
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has revealed that “participation in practice is nowhere near the participatory, bottom-up, 
open process that it is commonly held to be” (Christens & Speer, 2006). Hence, 
participation stands accused of being “co-opted into the neoliberal development 
discourse and praxis, of neutralizing radical language and practices, of being 
exclusionary and even tyrannical, and of ignoring power relations within grassroots 
groups and between them and development practitioners” (Wald, 2014, p. 6). 
Consequently, Cooke and Kothari (2001) equate it to the ‘new tyranny’. Despite 
growing criticism against participatory approaches, mainly for failing to achieve 
meaningful social change and engaging with issues of power and politics (Cooke & 
Kothari, 2001), participation appears to be undeterred and continues to enjoy support of 
many international agencies. For example, over the years international agencies 
including the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
Department for International Development (DFID), and United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) have demanded the inclusion of  community 
participation in development projects (Paul, 1987; Shah & Baporikar, 2012).  
Clearly, participation has gone from being a radical concept to becoming a widely 
accepted transformative development approach (Hickey & Mohan, 2004; 2005). 
Participation is not a replacement for  top-down development (JICA, 1995), nor is it a 
panacea to development problems - it cannot substitute for sound technical and financial 
project design. However, participation is essential for sustainable development. As the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (1996) notes, “if stakeholders help make 
decisions at all stages of the project cycle, then development problems are more likely 
to be understood in their entirety and solutions are likely to be more effective.” 
Participation may be the new tyranny, but it is the only development approach, which 
recognises the importance of community involvement. As such, it would be an 
indispensable element in any squatter upgrading programme (UN-Habitat, 1985). As 
Imparato and Ruster (2003) observe, squatter upgrading cannot succeed without the 
participation of squatters. For instance, although local governments may choose to 
apply the in-situ upgrading model, there would still be a need to realign existing 
structures to allow for service provision. This means that some structures would be 
demolished and people displaced. To achieve this task, local governments have to 
include squatter communities in the upgrading processes from inception to completion 
(Gulyani & Connors, 2002).  
The foregoing discussion has highlighted the dilemma of local governments regarding 
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provision of services in the midst of ‘eroded’ fiscal sources. This has also been a main 
driver towards inclusive local governance. The rest of this section looks at potential 
stakeholders in squatter upgrading, who include local government, private sector, civil 
society, Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), and squatter communities.  
2.4.1 Local Government 
Local government differs from country to country as it depends on the system of 
government. However, wherever it exists local government refers to specific institutions 
or entities created by national or state constitutions, ordinary legislation of a higher 
level of central government, provincial or state legislation, or by executive order, to 
deliver a range of specified services to a relatively small geographically delineated area 
(Shah & Shah, 2006, p. 1). As a system of government at the local level, local 
government is a visible form of government where citizens can participate in local 
governance. However, local government can only encourage and enhance local 
governance if it is effective. According to Singh (2009), the essential elements for an 
effective local government include statutory status, fiscal autonomy, democratic and 
representative in character, autonomy, and specified functional domain. William A. 
Robson (1957) cited by Singh (2009, p. 5) summed up these elements as follows:  
In general, local government may be said to involve a territorial, non-sovereign 
community possessing the legal right and the necessary organisation to regulate its own 
affairs. This in turn presupposes the existence of a local authority with power to act 
independent of external control as well as the participation of the local community in the 
administration of its own affairs. The extent to which these elements are present, must in 
all cases be a question of degree. 
Singh (2009, pp. 5-6) also describes local government as the school for democracy 
where citizens are imparted with political and popular education regarding issues of 
local and national importance. Additionally, it serves as a reservoir of talents for local 
and national leadership. Local governments exist for service delivery to the public and 
fostering democracy through participative local governance (Stevenson, 2009; CLGC, 
2009). Being closer to the people than central government, they provide “the place of 
first resort in any community when individuals need information or are confronted with 
problems such as flooding” (Morphet, 2008, p. 3). Moreover, proximity to the people 
allows local governments to have easy access to knowledge of local economic 
conditions and hence, they are suited to drive local economic development (Von Hagen 
& Dahlberg, 2004; CLGF, 2009). Furthermore, local governments link citizens to 
central government, which enables them to participate in the governance of the country 
(Shah & Shah, 2006). However, the extent to which they allow citizens to participate in 
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local governance depends on amount of responsibility and authority the national 
government has decentralised to local governments.  
Decentralisation is often concerned with improving efficiency in public service delivery 
by local governments. Therefore, it involves the transfer of the responsibility and 
authority for planning, management, mobilisation and allocation of resources from the 
centre to lower levels of government (UNDP, 2012). This is consistent with the 
decentralisation theorem that advances that “each public service should be provided by 
the jurisdiction having control over the minimum geographic area that would internalize 
benefits and costs of such provision” (Shah & Shah, 2006, p. 4). This theorem assumes 
that being closer to the people, local governments will be more responsive to the 
particular preferences of their constituencies and will be able to find new and better 
ways to provide these services (Oates, 1999). Since the 1980s, many observers have 
encouraged decentralisation in African, and by the 2000s, nearly all countries had 
instituted some form of decentralisation (Peterse & Smit, 2014).  
Lately, calls for full decentralisation have renewed in many developing countries to 
improve efficiency in service delivery, quality of services, governance, and equity 
among others (Smoke, 2003; World Bank, 2004a). However, the amount of 
decentralisation a country accommodates depends on the political system in that country 
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2005). For example, a dictatorship wants to 
concentrate power at the centre in one person or party (see 2.3.2). Therefore, 
decentralisation, which means power sharing between the centre and lower units, does 
not resonate with dictatorships (Wong & Takeuchi, 2013). Russia, a famous 
authoritarian example, did not have a local government system until 1917, and when it 
did, the local government system was centralised to benefit the ruling Communist Party 
elite (Ross, 2008, p. 98). Although dictatorships distribute economic benefits to local 
governments, such distributions are unequal (see 2.3.3). Wong and Takeuchi (2013, p. 
99) make this point clear as they note in reference to the Chinese authoritarian regime, 
“central government is strategic in deciding how to distribute economic benefits.” In 
real democracies on the other hand, power is never concentrated in one person because 
there are “institutional arrangements for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1976, p. 269).  
Crawford and Hartmann (2008) observe that although there have been some aspects of 
decentralisation in some countries undergoing democratisation governments need to do 
47 
more. Apparently, although many national governments have devolved some 
responsibilities to lower units, they have accompanied such responsibilities 
corresponding powers for the lower units to mobilise and use fiscal resources as they 
deem fit (Fjeldstad & Heggstad, 2012). For instance, despite devolving many 
responsibilities to local governments since 1991, the Zambian government has not given 
them matching fiscal resources for them to perform their mandatory objectives 
(Mukwena & Lolojih, 2002; Chikulo, 2009; 2014). Besides, despite having the legal 
framework that outlines the autonomy and funding of local governments, the national 
government fails to comply with it. Consequently, funding local governments has 
become problematic while resource sharing among them has become a discretionary 
function of the national government (Chikulo, 2014).  
Clearly, the Zambian situation contradicts conventional wisdom of the decentralisation 
theory and practice that postulates, “finance follows function” (Bird & Slack, 2014, p. 
362). Moreover, although local governments still receive some economic benefits these 
appear strategically distributed and hence, reflect a government system that is more 
authoritarian than democratic (Schumpeter, 1976; Wong & Takeuchi, 2013). Perhaps as 
Diamond (1999, p. 144) observes, in countries emerging from dictatorship, democratic 
local government may be tainted by legacies of the ancient regime. Overall, it seems 
local governments perform better in democratic than authoritarian regimes, as they 
focus on local development and democracy (Diamond, 1999). Allowing the lower units 
to share power with the national government gives them a share in the governance of 
the country and a voice in decisions that affect them (Shah & Shah, 2006; Wong & 
Takeuchi, 2013).  
Arising from the foregoing are two important issues regarding central-local relations, 
and funding of local governments. Firstly, concerning central-local relations, the 
realisation that local governments serve communities better than national governments 
has made analysts examine the relationships between national and local governments. 
According to Bin (2011), central-local relations often embody a certain type of politics 
that influence power and resource sharing and distribution, and will depend on the type 
of government in place. The two main types of government are federal and unitary. A 
federal state is a type of sovereign state characterised by “a union of partially self-
governing states or regions united by a central (federal) government” (Bin, 2011, p. 2). 
Typically, in a federal state system, local government is constitutionally entrenched and 
central government may alter it by a unilateral decision (Steytler, 2005). A unitary state 
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on the other hand, is governed as one single unity where central government is supreme, 
and any administrative units created exercise the power that central government 
delegates (Bin, 2011). Unlike in a federal system, in a unitary state central government 
may create or abolish sub-national units, and broaden or narrow their powers (Bin, 
2011). For example, Zambia is a unitary state whose local government system is a 
constitutional creation (GRZ, 1996b) supported by the Local Government (LG) Act that 
empowers central government to create or abolish local councils, and broaden or narrow 
their powers (GRZ, 1991).  
Since the 1980s and especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, central-local relations 
have attracted intense debate (Elander, 1991). Largely, central-local relations depend on 
whether national governments view local governments as an administrative device for 
public service delivery. Therefore, in such a case the relationship of principal-agent 
applies (Hartley, 1971). A principal-agent relationship exists where an institution (or 
person) called the agent, is authorised by the principal to act on his person’s behalf, and 
is empowered to do what the principal could lawfully do in person (Lupia, 2001). 
Therefore, in a principal-agent relationship, the principal delegates some functions that 
he expects the agent to perform on his behalf. He also transfers responsibility for 
decision-making and administration of the delegated functions to the agent from whom 
he expects accountability (UNDP, 2012). If on the other hand, local governments are 
considered autonomous entities with independent rights and duties, then they represent 
a partnership (Hartley, 1971).  
In unitary states, local governments mostly act as an administrative device that the 
national government treats in any way possible – funded or unfunded. Consequently, 
the relations between the centre and the local are usually strained. Bowman and 
Kearney (2011, p. 342) observed that while they give life to local governments and 
create the rules for their localities, “state governments historically have not treated their 
local governments well.” Globally, many countries including developed and developing 
struggle with central-local relations. For instance, the House of Commons was 
concerned about the growing strenuous relations between the national and local 
governments in the United Kingdom. According to the Communities and Local 
Government Committee (CLGC) (2009, p. 7), it appears that “local government powers 
and responsibilities have been pushed both upwards to central government, and 
sideways and downwards to the regional arms of central government and to other local 
bodies.” Hence, the House of Commons implored government to consider reviewing the 
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balance of power between the centre and the local because it had far-reaching 
implications especially where improving the lives of local people and local communities 
was concerned (CLGC, 2009).  
Funding to local governments determines the amount and quality of public service 
delivery in both developed and developing countries. The general understanding is that 
when a national government delegates responsibilities to local governments, it will also 
provide matching funding (Devas, 2008; Steytler, 2005). However, this does not seem 
to be the case because funding local governments in many developing countries remains 
a challenge (Devas, 2008; Alam, 2014). Many local governments do not receive 
adequate funding to perform assigned functions (Fjeldstad & Heggstad, 2012; CLGF, 
2009). This has prompted international associations to appeal to member countries to 
fund local governments adequately to enable them perform their functions.  
For instance, the Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF), an association of 
local government associations from Commonwealth countries, has implored its 
members to adhere to the Commonwealth principles on good practice for local 
democracy and good governance contained in the Aberdeen Agenda (CLGF, 2005a). 
Accordingly, the Aberdeen Agenda stipulates that a “local government must have 
adequate financial resources to fulfil its mandate and ensure significant autonomy in 
resource allocation” (CLGF, 2005a, p. 8). The CLGF recognises the importance of local 
governments having independent and secure revenue bases that include predictable and 
adequate central transfers. Hence, the Aberdeen Agenda adds, “such transfers must be 
free of political bias, and a local government agreement or legal framework to govern 
such transfers is often of critical importance” (CLGF, 2005a, pp. 8-9). The United Cities 
and Local Government (UCLG) (2010) also notes that local budgets in many 
developing countries accounted for less than five percent of public expenditures while 
those in the European Union averaged twenty-five percent. Consequently, most local 
governments experience widening gaps between availability of financial resources and 
municipal spending needs (UN-Habitat, 2015, p. 8).  
There are two main categories of current revenue for local governments in Africa. These 
include transfers from the central or regional government in form of grants and revenue 
sharing, and own revenue that comprises local taxes, user fees, and various licences 
(Fjeldstad, 2006; UNCDF, 2011; CLGF, 2005b). Transfers, commonly called 
intergovernmental transfers (IGTs) refer to the flow of fiscal resources from higher 
government levels to lower levels of government (Alam, 2014). These form a 
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significant portion of local government revenues in some countries in Africa (Fjeldstad 
& Heggstad, 2012). Alam (2014) observes that although IGTs vary from region to 
region and within countries, they nonetheless constitute a large portion of local 
government expenditures of 70-72 percent in developing countries including, and 38-39 
percent in developed countries. Fjeldstad and Heggstad (2012, p. 5) also show evidence 
that many local governments in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) indeed depended on IGTs 
although in some extreme cases such as that of Zambia, IGTs constitute less than five 
percent (see Figure 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2: IGTs/ Total Local Revenues in Selected SSA Countries (2007) 
Source: Fjeldstad and Heggstad (2012, p. 5) 
Some commentators have observed that modalities for allocating IGTs are mostly 
unclear and inappropriate (UCLG, 2010; CLGF, 2005a). Many central governments do 
not have clearly defined formulas for resource allocation to local governments (CLGF, 
2005b; Brosio, 2002). For example, Chikulo (2014) bemoans the lack of a clear grants 
sharing formula in Zambia. It seems central government uses an ad-hoc model where it 
decides on the amount of transfers on a discretionary basis (Bahl, 2000). Nonetheless, in 
rare instances some countries such as South Africa have constitutionally enshrined the 
funding system to guarantee funding to local councils. The South African government 
uses a needs-based formula to allocate resources to provinces, which also distribute 
them to the local governments according to their needs (Heymans, 2006).  
The other source of revenue for local governments is local revenue that normally 
comprises local taxes, fees, and charges. However, many analysts note that local 
revenue is insufficient for local governments to raise revenue to meet the growing 
demand for public services (Bahl & Bird, 2008; Fjeldstad & Heggstad, 2012). Besides, 
the local taxes are normally quite small and hence, present challenges for collection 
(UCLG, 2010; Devas, 2008). Furthermore, local revenues keep shrinking because 
central governments continue appropriating meaningful sources of revenues. As UN-
Habitat (2015, p. 8) observes, “the more lucrative sources of revenue potentially 
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suitable for financing urban areas, such as income taxes, sales taxes, and business taxes, 
continue to be controlled by the central governments.” The challenge of funding local 
governments in developing countries is real especially in Africa (Fjeldstad & Heggstad, 
2012). Poor funding creates ineffectiveness in councils resulting in failure to provide 
quality services, as the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) (2010, p. 
13) rightly noted in the following excerpt:  
The effectiveness of local governments and the quality of local government services – 
particularly in developing countries – are often constrained by the limited resources 
available to them and the degree of political and administrative autonomy granted by the 
centre. Inadequacy of resources or autonomy can create a vicious cycle – no capacity, no 
responsibilities, no resources and, therefore, no capacity.  
UCLG (2010) observes that in many developing countries, local governments have 
limited spending autonomy and taxation powers. Therefore, to improve the fiscal 
situation in local governments, some analysts suggest formulating enabling legislation 
that allows local governments to raise funds through other means such as external 
borrowing, and gives them more autonomy on expenditures (CLGF, 2009; UNCDF, 
2011). It is also noteworthy that granting local governments revenue-raising powers 
does not absolve central government from making IGTs to them. As UN-Habitat (2015, 
p. 9) points out, even when own revenues are sufficient they must be “complemented by 
intergovernmental transfers to address differences in expenditure needs and fiscal 
capacity across cities; and also for cities to support the implementation of central 
government programmes.”  
As noted earlier, some governments have devolved more expenditure responsibilities to 
local councils than fiscal resources and hence, given local governments the burden of 
delivering public services without the requisite resources. Consequently, the quality of 
service delivery has deteriorated (Bird & Vaillancourt, 2008). Concisely, fiscal 
decentralisation ought to become a reality in many developing countries especially in 
Africa (Fjeldstad, 2006; CLGF, 2005b; Devas, 2008). Smoke (2014) explains that fiscal 
decentralisation may take any one of the following forms:  
 Empowering subnational governments to set up their own tax systems;  
 Retaining all taxes centrally and sharing proceeds with subnational levels 
through transfers;  
 Assigning certain taxes exclusively to subnational governments; and  
 Sharing revenue from certain taxes collected nationally.  
None of these is the best choice but ultimately, the choices a country makes depend on 
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technical matters, historical trajectories, political forces and other factors (Tanzi & 
Ross, 2010; Smoke, 2014). Ultimately, as Bahl & Wallace (1992, p. 1) noted “the 
choice of the ‘right’ central-local fiscal relationship will depend on how the government 
weighs the benefits of decentralised economic development policies against the costs of 
having less effective central fiscal management.” Nonetheless, whatever choice a 
government makes fiscal resources assigned to councils should possess characteristics 
such as adequacy, buoyancy, stability, efficiency, and equity. Others are autonomy, 
administrative feasibility, political feasibility, and integration/ consistency (Smoke, 
2014; CLGF, 2009; Bird & Vaillancourt, 2008). After all, as Bahl and Bird (2008) 
observe, fiscal decentralisation will not only improve welfare directly but also 
contribute to alleviating problems like economic development, revenue mobilisation 
and innovation in public service delivery, and accountability.  
Assigning resources to local governments is one thing but granting them fiscal 
autonomy is another. According to Chapman (1999), fiscal autonomy denotes the ability 
of local governments to raise enough revenues from the local economy and then to 
determine how to spend those revenues. It also includes their ability to create taxes, set 
tax rates and establish the revenue base without central government influence, and 
having the ability to provide the service levels that the public demands. Clearly, local 
governments ought to have more fiscal autonomy than many of them currently have. 
However, many national governments are unwilling to implement fiscal decentralisation 
and let alone grant fiscal autonomy to local governments for fear of losing 
macroeconomic and political control (Brosio, 2002; Fjeldstad, 2006; Bird & 
Vaillancourt, 2008). According to Bahl and Bird (2008), governments are also 
concerned that heavy reliance on own resources might create and widen inequalities 
between well-off larger councils and poor smaller councils with small tax bases. 
Additionally, fiscal decentralization could be costly relative to the benefits gained 
particularly for small local councils that may not have the administrative skills to collect 
taxes efficiently (Bird & Vaillancourt, 2008; Devas, 2008).  
However, Bahl and Bird (2008) point out that despite the potential pitfalls of fiscal 
decentralisation and fiscal autonomy, there are benefits for assigning significant taxes to 
local governments. In effective control mechanisms are in place, fiscal decentralisation 
promises improved political and financial accountability by giving local residents 
greater opportunities for input and participation in decision-making (Fjeldstad & 
Heggstad, 2012). Moreover, being reliant on their own resources might instil fiscal 
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discipline in local governments. Furthermore, Isufaj (2014, p. 459) believes that since 
local government is closer to citizens, “increasing of its competence, financial resources 
and active community participation in decision making, will increase the responsibilities 
of power.” Whether in federal or unitary state, local government autonomy depends on 
the degree to which central government gives decision-making discretion to local 
governments (Lane & Ersson, 1999; Akpan & Ekanem, 2013). In either system, the 
legal framework in which councils are defined also determines their autonomy and the 
“the distribution of public authority between levels of government” (Lane & Ersson, 
1999, p. 170). The debate on fiscal autonomy or autonomy as it were generally centres 
on functions and associated powers that governments should grant to local governments 
within the political system (Akpan & Ekanem, 2013). As Davey (1971, p. 45) observed:  
Local autonomy is primarily a question of responsibilities, resources and discretion. For it 
to be genuine, a wide measure of governmental operation in the field must be devolved to 
local authorities; they must have sufficient resources, particularly of finance, to meet their 
responsibilities as they think fit; they must have extensive freedom to do what they 
choose in the way they choose. These factors are inseparable: absence of central controls 
and 100 percent, financing by direct taxation do not, for example, confer freedom of 
action if potential yields grow only by one or two percent per annum.  
Nevertheless, some commentators argue that local governments cannot be completely 
autonomous because of the interdependence of the levels of government. For instance, 
Adeyemo (2005) points out that local, regional and central governments rule over the 
same population. However, if each level of government is to achieve its purpose, it must 
operate within defined boundaries with sufficient amount of ‘freedom’. Yet again, this 
depends on whether central governments consider councils as agents or partners in 
development. In the words of Dollery and Wallis (2001, p. 1), since councils are 
creatures of central government “their actions are often rigidly manipulated and 
constrained by central governments.” Therefore, councils act within the powers 
delegated to them by legislation or directives of central or regional government 
(Stevenson, 2009). Still, fiscal autonomy is a key ingredient in local self-government. 
As Steytler (2005) observes, political self-government may prove to be an empty shell if 
councils have limited or no revenue-raising powers. Besides, if central government 
downloads too many responsibilities without matching finances, it may cripple the 
councils (Chikulo, 2009; 2014).  
2.4.2 Private Sector 
As government funding to councils declines, local governments ought to find alternative 
service delivery models (see 2.4). In Britain, most of the councils have used models like 
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outsourcing (contracting), and collaborating (Morphet, 2008; Leach & Percy-Smith, 
2001). Outsourcing involves inviting the private sector to provide some services for 
which the local councils pay contractors through revenues collected from own sources 
(UNCDF, 2010). Collaboration on the other hand, entails the involvement of the private 
sector through mechanisms such as a public-private partnership (PPP). In this 
arrangement, a local council collaborates with a private company to provide a particular 
service(s) (Grant Thornton, 2014). Generally, a PPP is a “formal contractual 
arrangement entered into between the public sector and the market in order to deliver a 
well-defined output or service” (Phang, 2013, p. 97). Therefore, a PPP represents a 
finance model entirely driven by collaboration between the public, private, and at times 
non-profit sectors (UN-Habitat, 2011a, p. 2).  
The main driver for PPPs in councils is the desire to attract private finance for service 
provision (UNCDF, 2010). Many local governments in Africa face the challenge of 
providing public housing for the poor, and hence, the prevalence of squatter settlements 
(see 2.2). Ibem and Aduwo (2012) note that many African local governments would 
benefit from PPPs especially in housing provision. However, it appears PPPs in housing 
are quite limited probably because housing is not profitable and people often find 
‘alternative’ housing. As Phang (2013, p. 97) explains, “housing is not a monopoly 
industry and does not have the increasing returns to scale issues generally associated 
with utilities and infrastructure projects.” Besides, the challenges facing PPPs in 
housing provision are based on differing goals between private and public sectors, 
public acceptability, limited capacity in councils, challenges in governance for 
sustainable development, and financing constraints (UN-Habitat, 2011a). Nonetheless, 
councils can still employ PPPs to attract finance for social housing, housing 
development and urban regeneration projects (Phang, 2013).  
Private sector involvement in squatter upgrading can also be through services like 
financial lending to the individual members or groups within squatter communities. 
Squatter upgrading generally does not involve housing provision (see 2.2.3). 
Nonetheless, the idea that squatter upgrading facilitates housing improvement is on the 
assumption that once there is an improvement in basic infrastructure and services 
property owners would be motivated to improve their own housing. Additionally, 
squatter upgrading would facilitate property owners to obtain land titles for use as 
collateral for borrowing housing finance (see 2.2.3). However, some commercial banks 
still do not extend lending to property owners in improved areas because they deem 
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them as ‘high’ risk (Chiumya, 2004; Fotabong, 2012). Moreover, although a property 
owner may have a land title but his/ her property may be of poor quality and hence, 
unacceptable by many lending institutions. On the other hand, communities possess 
social capital, which they could use as collateral for group-based lending. In response to 
the dilemma that such low-income communities face in accessing finance for improving 
their social welfare, the microfinance sector has emerged as a formidable sector that 
opened doors to those in the informal sector including squatter residents who are able to 
borrow and repay short-term loans. In Bangladesh, Grameen Bank has thrived on using 
social capital as their collateral for group-based lending (see 2.4.4).  
2.4.3 Civil Society 
The failure of local governments and the private sector to provide services including 
housing for the urban poor seems to be the catalyst for NGOs’ involvement in service 
delivery (Mukhija, 2005). Hence, the last two decades have witnessed an increase in 
NGOs involved in human settlements in Africa, Asia and Latin America. NGOs (also 
referred to as civil society or third sector) refer to organisations that belong neither to 
the traditional private sector nor to the public sector (Ghaus-Pasha, 2005). Hence, they 
provide an “arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and 
values” (Irish, 2010, p. 166). Nonetheless, while voluntary and autonomously managed, 
NGOs are formally established and legally protected as they perform their many socio-
economic initiatives (Howard, 2010; Defourny, 2001).  
NGOs perform three very important roles of service provider, development catalyst and 
policy changer. Firstly, as service providers, NGOs mobilise resources mostly through 
voluntary contributions for a wide range of services to disadvantaged communities 
(Defourny, 2001; Lewis, 2010). In developing countries, the rolling back of the state 
created a vacuum in service provision (see 2.2.5). Therefore, NGOs stepped in to meet 
some of the social needs of people in disadvantaged communities (Banks & Hulme, 
2012). In Europe, civil society meets an increasing demand for social services especially 
in the fields of welfare provision, education, community development, international 
relations, the environment, or arts and culture (Anheier, 2005, p. 4). It also provides 
microcredit especially to low-income households who are unable to access finance from 
formal lending institutions (Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 2004). Additionally, some civil 
society organisations provide life skills training to community members to help them 
build their own houses through self-help or engage in income-generating ventures. 
Secondly, in their role as development catalyst, NGOs have the ability to inspire, 
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facilitate or contribute to improved thinking and action to promote social transformation 
(Lewis, 2010). Squatter upgrading requires and depends on community participation 
(Sheng, 1989; Cities Alliance, 1999). NGOs have experience in coordinating and 
organising communities to participate in community development (Habib, 2009). For 
instance, the Zambian government depended on American Friends Service Committee 
(AFSC) to organise squatters to participate in the Lusaka Squatter upgrading Project 
(LSUP) (Turner & Maskrey, 1988; Rakodi, 1986a; World Bank, 1974a).  
Finally, as policy changer, NGOs often lobby national governments for specific reforms 
to create policies that are pro-poor (Ibrahim & Hulme, 2010). The general practice has 
been to start at local levels in order to understand the impacts of certain policies on the 
citizens for whom such policies exist. By starting with local governments, NGOs hope 
to bring the problems of the poor to their attention and seek policy changes that would 
enhance the livelihoods of the poor (Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 2004). In championing 
policy change, NGOs do not work as adversaries but as partners, together with 
governments and private sector on joint initiatives to improve the welfare of 
communities (Lewis, 2010). Therefore, they deserve an important role as a partner in 
development, with the public and private sectors, working in an environment where 
citizens’ welfare is at the core of the development paradigm.  
2.4.4 Community-Based Organisations 
Outside of the state, the markets, and NGOs, the community is the largest provider of 
services to its members. In the case of housing provision, whereas the other three actors 
fail to find interim solutions to the housing problem of the urban poor, the community 
readily provides this through informal structures (Turner, 1988). The community has 
been able to respond to the needs of its members through Community-Based 
Organisations (CBOs). For instance, successful land invasions are organised around an 
informal organisation that has identified leadership for managing land allocation among 
its members. Like the NGOs, CBOs rose to prominence in southern Africa during and 
in the aftermath of SAP (Manji & Naidoo, 2005; Banks & Hulme, 2012). After SAP, 
many governments seemed to fail to meet the socio-economic needs of citizens 
(Abegunde, 2009). Hence, using their own initiative, communities stepped in to fill the 
gap in ‘local’ service delivery, and contribute to local development. Some CBOs work 
alongside NGOs in service delivery to the needy (Abegunde, 2009).  
CBOs are non-profit groups that work at a local level to improve life for residents in 
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communities where they exist (Chechetto-Salles & Geyer, 2006). They mainly depend 
on local funding and volunteer efforts. A CBO may be formed at the level of a 
neighbourhood, village, town or conurbation (Aiken, et al., 2011). Typically, it will 
have an executive committee of representatives elected through a voting system or 
volunteering (Abegunde, 2009). A CBO identifies community needs and mobilises 
resources through volunteer efforts and local contributions (Chechetto-Salles & Geyer, 
2006). Through self-help, CBOs design and execute their own projects, but they may 
sometimes lobby governments for financial assistance and technical assistance, and ask 
NGOs and donors to sponsor some activities in their communities (Abegunde, 2009).  
CBOs are very important in local development because as Aiken et al. (2011) note, they 
can encourage local people to come together around their common interests and 
facilitate their participation in their communities. CBOs also offer the most immediate 
and localised responses to vulnerable groups of people (Lentfer & Yachkaschi, 2009). 
Moreover, CBOs can deepen the involvement of citizens in local governance activities 
by organising collective action in support of these activities (Aiken, et al., 2011). CBOs 
can be useful in gaining consensus about an issue or a project like squatter upgrading. 
Because they are close to the people, CBOs can make them understand particular issues 
local or central governments may not be able to explain properly (Banks, et al., 2015). 
In other words, CBOs inspire more trust than local or central governments. 
Additionally, properly structured partnerships between community associations and 
local governments can provide a basis for institutional strengthening at the local level 
(Krishna, 2003). However, CBOs are also prone to elite capture, they are quite often 
poorly equipped with skills and technology, and they frequently look upwards (to 
donors) rather than downwards (to their constituents) for legitimacy and direction 
(Krishna, 2003). Nonetheless, CBOs have come to be recognised as an ‘emerging force 
within the third sector’ (Manji & Naidoo, 2005).  
The basis of CBOs is social capital within communities. People must be in a position to 
work together for the common good of community members. There are various forms 
of capital including physical, human and social capital. Whereas physical capital 
encompasses physical objects and human capital refers to the properties and money of 
individuals, social capital on the other hand, is preoccupied with relationships or 
connections among members of the community (Coleman, 1988). Bourdieu (1986, p. 
248) defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which 
are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
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relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.” Similarly, Coleman (1988, p. 
S98) notes that social capital is not a single entity, but “a variety of different entities, 
having two characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of a social 
structure, and they facilitate certain actions … within the structure.” The World Bank 
(1998, p. 5) also notes the multidimensionality of social capital in the following extract:  
The social capital of a society includes the institutions, the relationships, the attitudes and 
values that govern interactions among people and contribute to economic and social 
development. […]. It is also the glue that holds them together. It includes the shared 
values and rules for social conduct expressed in personal relationships, trust, and a 
common sense of “civic” responsibility that makes society more than a collection of 
individuals. Without a degree of common identification with forms of governance, 
cultural norms, and social rules, it is difficult to imagine a functioning society.  
Since the late 1980s, the concept of social capital has gained prominence in research 
and in the discourse of policymaking (Uphoff, et al., 2013). Many observers agree that 
social capital can contribute significantly to the alleviation of poverty worldwide 
(Rankin, 2002; Willis, 2011). Social capital acts as a binding force in the community 
and influences development of a community by facilitating transactions among 
community members (World Bank, 1998). It may also facilitate community interactions 
with outside communities and organisations. For interactions with outside actors, for 
instance, when lending to communities the microfinance depends on “features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating coordinated action” (Putnam, et al., 1993, p. 167). In Bangladesh, 
the Grameen Bank has implemented microfinance group-based lending to provide poor, 
rural women access to collateral free loans (Larance, 1998; Hossain, 2013). Since the 
loans are given to groups, their social capital is used as collateral (Bernasek, 2003; 
Dowla, 2006). Members of the group have a joint responsibility for the repayment of 
the loans (Bernasek, 2003). As such, there is high peer pressure among the group 
members to repay the loan instalments (Hossain, 2013).  
2.4.5 Squatter Communities 
Squatters as the name suggests, occupy land to which they have no legal ownership 
(UN-Habitat, 2003a). Squatting is a global phenomenon with an estimated one-seventh 
of the world’s population living as squatters (Arimah, 2010a). The majority of squatters 
are in the developing countries (see 2.2.2). Close to four million people in Zambia, live 
in squatter settlements (see 1.2). There are many factors contributing to the rising 
squatter population and these are directly linked to the factors causing the urban housing 
shortage, which I have discussed in Chapter 6. However, they include rapid 
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urbanisation, complex land regulations, unfavourable economic environment, 
inadequate investment in housing, and poverty (see 6.4).  
Since squatters occupy land illegally, they lack tenure security. Without tenure security, 
squatters cannot invest in improving their housing (UN-Habitat, 2003a). Moreover, 
without land titles that financial institutions demand for collateral, squatters cannot 
access housing finance. It appears that the main obstacle to improving their housing is 
lack of tenure security. Squatters have demonstrated their ability to raise finance from 
personal savings to meet the costs of housing construction (Mitlin, 2008). Sometimes, 
they borrow from microcredit lenders, friends and families to build houses 
incrementally (Turner, 1976). The quality of squatter housing may vary from one-
roomed ramshackle to multi-roomed modern housing (Srinivas, 2012). Nonetheless, a 
large proportion of housing in squatter settlements is usually makeshift because of the 
uncertainty surrounding their status (Macharia, 1997). The ease of building and finding 
building materials influences the choice for this type of building because many people 
are poor and unemployed. Yet, it also requires regular maintenance.  
Conventional houses are most common in squatter settlements where squatters have 
perceived tenure security probably arising from long period of existence of the 
settlement. Hence, squatters have attained a high sense of tenure security and 
confidence to invest in housing improvements. The process of housing improvement 
however does not have fixed durations due to capacity constraints, but households build 
incrementally as and when resources are available (Bredenoord & Van Lindert, 2010). 
Squatters also help each other build. This kind of community cohesion is representative 
of village life, on which most of the squatter settlements in Zambia are based. 
Community cohesion is a form of social capital within settlements and which is very 
important especially in squatter upgrading (see 2.4.4). Nonetheless, squatter housing 
provides an important of source of urban housing. As observed by Turner (1988), 
through self-help housing the poor build for themselves more homes and 
neighbourhoods than government and private organisations can ever provide. Turner 
(1988) also observed that between half and three-quarters of all urban settlements and 
homebuilding in the rapidly growing cities of the third world are built by and for the 
poor themselves. Turner’s observation is true in Zambia’s case where at least two-fifth 
of the urban housing consist of squatter housing (see Figure 1.1). Clearly, squatters use 
their ingenuity to solve their housing problems (see 2.2.2).  
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2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter set out to provide a theoretical framework and review literature regarding 
the main concepts that frame the research. These include squatter upgrading, political 
regimes and politics in squatter settlements, and participation and local governance. 
Although squatter settlements are known by different names in various parts of the 
developing world, they all share the same miserable conditions that include lack of 
basic infrastructure and services, tenure insecurity, overcrowding, and sub-standard 
housing among others. Mostly, the nature of squatter settlements attracts varying 
attitudes from people and governments including utter disgust at the living conditions, 
hostility towards squatters, and admiration for the ingenuity of the squatters to solve 
their own housing problems. These attitudes have also influenced the approaches 
developing countries have taken to address the problem of squatter settlements, and 
which have included laissez faire, suppressive, and supportive approaches, respectively. 
Through the laissez faire approach, governments simply ignored the existence of 
squatter settlement, while the suppressive approach sought to eradicate squatter 
settlements by demolishing them and building conventional housing. The supportive 
approach recognised the futility of suppressive strategies and thus, sought to support 
squatter settlements through strategies such as squatter upgrading to provide basic 
services and improve tenure security.  
The motivations for squatter upgrading are many and include a genuine desire to 
improve living conditions of squatters, a need to control and prevent crime, as a public 
relations gesture, and to enhance economic development. Regardless, if squatter 
upgrading involves provision of basic infrastructure and services, and improvement of 
tenure security, it ultimately contributes to improving the quality of life of squatters. 
Squatter upgrading may face several challenges including resistance from communities 
or other interest groups, lack of community cohesion, and inhumane handling of 
squatters in the process of integration into the city proper. Other challenges include 
failure by planners to address the issue of tenure security, and possibility of 
gentrification. On the other hand, squatter upgrading offers several benefits in addition 
to improving access to basic infrastructure and services. It bestows use rights to 
landowners, stimulates investment in housing and local economic development among 
others. Squatter upgrading has the potential to reach many people compared to 
conventional low-cost housing. However, it often fails to yield the desired result of 
improving the quality of life of the urban poor in many countries for many reasons. For 
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instance, governments often implement squatter upgrading as a reactive action and 
hence it tends to be limited in scope and scale, and insufficient to make significant 
impacts. Next, squatter upgrading tends to be done in a piecemeal project-based fashion 
without clear mechanisms for scaling up at city or national levels. Moreover, upgrading 
lacks a sustainability component, which leads to upgraded areas suffering neglect. The 
long list of reasons for the failure of squatter upgrading raises concerns as to whether  it 
is a viable route for improving living conditions of squatters. Many of the failures could 
be addressed by having an adequate institutional framework to guide squatter 
upgrading. 
This chapter also examined political regimes and politics, and their influence on 
development in general and squatter settlements in particular. There is no 
straightforward answer as to what kind of regime supports development more than the 
other does. Strong evidence shows that both authoritarian and democratic regimes 
support service delivery and local development. Nonetheless, there is ample evidence to 
show that politics, rather than regime type, determines whether a country is successful 
economically. Furthermore, overwhelming evidence shows how much politics has 
contributed to the formation and maintenance of squatter settlements in developing 
countries through spatial planning and clientelism.  
In the presence of growing urban populations and diminishing fiscal resources, local 
governments in developing countries have a challenge of providing quality public 
services. Therefore, to survive and remain relevant, they have to embrace local 
governance to include many stakeholders in decision-making in the cities. Moreover, 
local governments are faced with problems of urban development including squatter 
settlements. In view of their limited fiscal capacities, urban governance offers them the 
opportunity to explore relationships and interconnections with the private sector, civil 
society, and communities through partnerships, and participation, respectively.  
The next chapter presents international case studies on squatter upgrading to establish 
the extent to which they had adequate institutional frameworks that enabled the 
implementers to succeed.  
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CHAPTER 3 SQUATTER UPGRADING 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the critical conditions required for squatter 
upgrading to proceed and establish the extent to which an adequate institutional 
framework contributes to the success of squatter upgrading. Therefore, the chapter 
begins by identifying the critical success factors for squatter upgrading. It then proceeds 
to justify the choice of the case study programmes, and later presents an overview of the 
case studies. Next, the chapter examines to what extent the Kampung Improvement 
Programme (KIP) and Programa Favela Bairro (PFB) fulfilled the constituents of an 
adequate institutional framework for squatter upgrading. The chapter also discusses the 
various achievements scored and challenges encountered by both programmes. Finally, 
the chapter concludes with lessons from KIP and PFB that Zambia and other countries 
could apply to their squatter upgrading programmes.  
3.2 SUCCESS FACTORS FOR UPGRADING PROGRAMMES 
Early squatter upgrading programmes in Africa in the 1970s were mostly donor-driven 
and implemented as either part of or subsequent to site-and-services programmes (see 
2.2.2). Although the initial intent was replication, several programmes failed to replicate 
(Buckley & Kalarickal, 2006; Keare & Paris, 1982). Several obstacles made pioneer 
squatter upgrading programmes fail in many parts of Africa. Detailed examination of 
KIP and PFB as discussed later in this chapter will provide firmer evidence on those 
considerations that we could refer to as critical success factors for squatter upgrading. 
At this point, we can anticipate, based on a priori reasoning and other wider/earlier 
literature, that these critical success factors are likely to include factors such as clear 
programmes, funding, stakeholder participation, community participation, programme 
management arrangements, and political will/support.  
3.2.1 Clear Programmes 
Owing to different circumstances that lead to their formation (see 2.2.1), there cannot be 
a one-size-fits-all template for squatter upgrading even within a country. As such, the 
nature of upgrading programmes would depend on the local environment (Srinivas, 
2012). Nevertheless, there is a need to have clear programmes with properly defined 
purposes and objectives. Early upgrading programmes in Africa in the 1970s 
demonstrated that governments could improve living conditions of the poor through 
provision of basic services (see 2.2.3). However, most of the upgrading programmes 
63 
failed to progress beyond pilot phases (Rakodi, 1986a; Gulyani & Connors, 2002). 
According to Gulyani and Bassett (2007) and Bamberger, et al. (1982), the programmes 
were overly ambitious - they had too many broad objectives and interventions that 
increased the cost of the programme. Besides, in some cases the objectives were not 
specific enough to follow through, and evaluate them at the end of the programmes 
(Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). Moreover, many African governments treated upgrading 
programmes as projects and hence, had limited timeframes within which to complete all 
the interventions (Bassett, et al., 2003). Harrison and Lock (2004, p. 5), define a project 
as “a non-routine, non-repetitive, one-off undertaking, normally with discrete time, 
financial and technical performance goals.” A programme on the other hand, denotes a 
series of coordinated, related, multiple projects that continue over an extended time and 
are intended to achieve a goal (Larson & Gray, 2011). Since upgrading programmes 
were treated as projects, they ended with the expiration of funding. Additionally, short 
programme durations not only created challenges for programme evaluation but also 
limited replicability because of lack of comparison within and outside of the projects 
(Gulyani & Bassett, 2008). By the early 1990s, the World Bank realised that upgrading 
programmes were not working and hence, it significantly reduced its financial support 
to upgrading (Gulyani & Bassett, 2008).  
As noted already, the motivations for squatter upgrading are many (see 2.2.3). 
Regardless, the principal motivation for upgrading affects the amount of planning for 
the programme. Assuming that improving living conditions of people is the main 
motivation for upgrading, then it is prudent to have clear aims/goals and specific 
objectives to achieve the identified aims of the programme. From a project management 
perspective, and to increase the chances of achievement, programme objectives ought to 
be specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and time-bound – SMART (Larson & 
Gray, 2011). Having a clear programme with specific objectives enables planners to 
decide which interventions or components would have top priority to ensure achieving 
maximum benefits of the programme.  
3.2.2 Sources of Funding for Upgrading 
Many analysts have shown that nearly all upgrading programmes depended largely on 
external funding (Gulyani & Bassett, 2008; Buckley & Kalarickal, 2006; Keare & Paris, 
1982). Once external funding ceased, governments could not continue funding the 
programmes from own local sources (Bassett, et al., 2003). Consequently, the 
programmes failed to scale up beyond pilot phases despite the fact that replication was 
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their initial intent (see 3.2).  
In many developing countries including those in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), local 
governments are responsible for squatter upgrading. Although strong evidence shows 
that local governments depend on government transfers, it also suggests that some 
national governments do not fund local governments adequately (see 2.4.1). For this 
reason, local governments depend on own local revenue sources that are also 
insufficient. Consequently, they are unable to provide quality public services such as 
squatter upgrading. Successful squatter upgrading requires stable sources of funding. 
The amount of funding available would not only determine the scope of interventions 
but also the extent to which programmes could be replicated in other areas. Therefore, 
local governments planning to execute squatter upgrading need to identify stable 
sources of funding whether internal, external or both. Moreover, they need to devise 
mechanisms for cost-recovery from beneficiaries to assist in loan repayments and 
ensure the financial sustainability of the programmes. Many analysts have bemoaned 
the poor cost-recovery on many early upgrading programmes (Bassett, et al., 2003; 
Bamberger, et al., 1982; Sanyal, 1987). Nevertheless, some countries endeavoured to 
implement cost-recovery indirectly through increases in land and property rates (Basu, 
1988; Fiori, et al., 2000). However, Bassett et al. (2003) point out that cost-recovery 
through general revenue increases remains elusive. This is perhaps because, in many 
SSA countries, property tax is a sensitive issue and mostly controlled by national 
government (Brosio, 2002). For instance, in 2011 a city council in Zambia suffered 
revenue losses when a senior government officer told citizens not to pay taxes to an 
opposition council. The efforts by the city council to adjust property taxes upwards in 
later years have failed as ruling parties fear ‘upsetting’ the electorate8.  
On the other hand, some other countries seem to have performed well with cost-
recovery on squatter upgrading. For example, Senegal recovered costs from 
beneficiaries through land that included costs for participation in the infrastructure, 
land, tax and registration fees (World Bank, 2002c). Additionally, each beneficiary 
signed a deed of engagement in the programme. Jamaica had a different approach from 
that of Senegal because beneficiaries of sites-and-services schemes subsidised the cost 
of land and services for squatters who had a ‘free ride’ (Ferguson, 1996). This does not 
                                                 
8
 Interview with a senior council officer 
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seem to be a fair deal because, as Ferguson (1996) further points out, squatters benefited 
more since they not only acquired land freely by invasion, they also did not pay for the 
cost of services. Nevertheless, cost-recovery is important especially where government 
borrows large sums of money for upgrading and has to repay with high interests. As 
Bassett et al (2003) explain, cost-recovery reduces capital cost to government and 
promotes ownership among beneficiaries. It also mobilises funds for and generates 
interest in maintenance and operations. Moreover, the level of cost-recovery may serve 
as an indicator of demand that would enable local governments to provide services that 
people want and for which they are willing to pay (Bassett, et al., 2003; Gulyani & 
Connors, 2002).  
3.2.3 Stakeholder Participation 
Being closer to the people than national governments are, local governments are suited 
to provide public services (see 2.4.1). However, national governments have the 
responsibility to fund local governments so that they provide quality public services. In 
this regard, some countries have created funding systems that ensure that local 
governments receive funding proportionate to their needs. On the other hand, as already 
noted, many local governments in SSA are not funded adequately (see 3.2.2). Hence, 
they fail to provide quality services to the citizenry within their jurisdictions. Being a 
capital-intensive endeavour, squatter upgrading requires large amounts of financial 
resources to provide basic infrastructure and services that citizens lack (see 2.2.3). 
Considering inadequate funding, there is need for local governments to look outwards to 
other stakeholders in the governance of the cities (see 2.4). Hence, for squatter 
upgrading they must identify stakeholders with whom they would collaborate in 
squatter upgrading by means of either partnerships or participation (see 2.2.3).  
3.2.4 Community Participation 
As already observed, community participation is an important element in community-
based programmes such as squatter upgrading (see 2.4). Squatter upgrading takes place 
in existing communities and as such, it is hard to see it can succeed without community 
participation (see 2.2). Therefore, any upgrading programme that excludes the 
participation of squatters themselves is arguably doomed to fail (Cities Alliance, 1999). 
Many of the early upgrading programmes seemingly neglected community 
participation, and only included it later as an ‘after thought’ (Rakodi, 1986a; World 
Bank, 1983). For instance, in a relocation and clearance programme in Dhaka the 
Bangladesh government did not involve the squatters when relocating them to another 
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location (Choguill, 1987). In other instances, upgrading programmes such as the LSUP 
did not involve beneficiary communities in the initial stages of the upgrading 
programmes but only did after encountering challenges with maintenance and operation 
activities as communities shied away from such activities (Rakodi, 1986a). The 
experience of international case studies with this issue is considered further below.  
Clearly, lack of community participation has consequences on programme success. 
Sometimes, programme planners may sacrifice community participation for speed and 
efficiency (AKAA, 1980). However, they must realise that after the programme ends 
the beneficiaries might not feel the sense of ownership and responsibility towards the 
infrastructure provided (see 2.4). Hence, it would be difficult to convince them to 
participate in maintenance activities of the programme they did not ‘belong’ to (World 
Bank, 2002a). For this reason, there is need to involve squatter communities throughout 
the duration of the upgrading programmes so that they not only inform the programme 
and contribute to its design in the early stages but also assume responsibility for 
maintenance of infrastructure after completion (see 2.4). It is also important to note that 
popular participation in community-based programmes is not entirely possible 
(Imparato & Ruster, 2003). Therefore, there is a need to allow for contingency measures 
in the upgrading programme to mitigate the limitations in community participation.  
3.2.5 Programme Management 
During the 1960s to the 1980s, most development programmes including squatter 
upgrading in SSA were government-led. Hence, their implementation followed a top-
down fashion (see 2.4). Moreover, governments shouldered the responsibility for 
financing, project selection and implementation of development programmes including 
squatter upgrading (Bassett, et al., 2003; Gulyani & Connors, 2002). Hence, central 
governments had ultimate control of programmes compared to local governments 
(World Bank, 1983). As the research shows later with regard to LSUP, managing 
upgrading programmes was problematic in patrimonial environments where political 
control and interference overshadowed local governments (Chikulo, 2009).  
From the foregoing, it may be argued that squatter upgrading would benefit from having 
an independent technical unit that would have the autonomy to design the programme 
according to available resources, and devise cost-recovery mechanisms suited to both 
the programme and beneficiaries. Such a technical unit might operate in a decentralised 
environment that could provide the autonomy required to manage the upgrading 
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programmes efficiently. Moreover, the technical unit would have to plan squatter 
upgrading as long-term endeavours as opposed to as short-term projects (see 2.2.4). 
This would give the technical unit enough time to implement and evaluate the 
programme to improve the chances of success in succeeding programmes.  
3.2.6 Political Will/Commitment 
Many analysts have observed that lack of funding was the reason for failure of early 
squatter upgrading programmes in Africa (see 3.2.2). However, lack of political 
commitment also played an important role in their failure (Gulyani & Connors, 2002; 
Matovu, 2000; Rakodi, 1986a). There is no consensus on what constitutes political will. 
Nevertheless, it seems to suggest the act of matching words with actions (Dixit & 
Londregan, 1995). For instance, if government pledges to fund squatter upgrading it 
should do so when the local councils begin the upgrading and continue funding the 
programme even when results are not immediate. In this regard, Brinkerhoff (2010, p. 
n.p.), defines political will as “the commitment of actors to undertake actions to achieve 
a set of objectives… and to sustain the costs of those actions over time.” Although 
political will is recognised by its absence more than its presence, it is commonly cited 
as the reason for failed development endeavours (Post, et al., 2010; Malena, 2009).  
Nevertheless, while they implemented squatter upgrading some governments still 
harboured negative views of squatter settlements as temporary aberrations requiring 
clearance (see 2.2.2). Others became discouraged because the continued growth of 
squatter settlements seemingly indicated squatter upgrading was failing and hence, 
withdrew both political and financial support (Gulyani & Connors, 2002; Matovu, 
2000). In fact, in some cases political will had waned long before World Bank funding 
ended (Bamberger, et al., 1982). Lack of political will also affected other aspects of the 
programmes such as cost-recovery (Sanyal, 1987). As Bassett et al (2003, p. 17) note:  
A lack of political will to push for cost-recovery has also been evident. In Nigeria’s First 
Urban Project, for instance, leaders were actually proud of the low level of repayment in 
their community and resisted pressure to enforce collection; in other cases governments 
have proven unwilling to take difficult steps such as evicting residents and repossessing 
land for non-payment. 
Often, political will to development endeavours is lacking because politicians are 
unwilling to commit to long-term endeavours. As Post et al (2010) observe, political 
actors tend to support policies for short-term fixes, especially when they have short-
term horizons themselves. Political commitment is very important in development 
programmes such as squatter upgrading. This is maybe because it would determine not 
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only the amount of financial support the programme receives but also the political 
support it requires when faced with challenges that may threaten its very existence. The 
amount of political will directed towards a squatter upgrading programme would also 
determine the extent to which its management would be without political interference. 
The case studies considered below show the importance of political will under differing 
systems.  
3.3 CHOOSING CASE STUDY UPGRADING PROGRAMMES 
There are many examples of successful squatter upgrading globally including the Baan 
Mankong in Thailand (Boonyabancha, 2005), the Million Houses programme in Sri 
Lanka (Huchzermeyer, 2004), the Kampung Improvement Programme (KIP) in 
Indonesia (AKAA, 1980), and the Favela-Bairro Programme (PFB) in Brazil (Acioly, 
2001). All of these programmes have gained international recognition and hence, they 
offer several useful lessons for other developing countries intending to implement large-
scale squatter upgrading. However, this study chose KIP and PFB for two main reasons. 
To begin with, KIP and PFB took place under two opposing political regimes of 
authoritarianism and democracy, respectively. The implementation and completion of 
KIP took place during the authoritarian rule of President Suharto who ruled Indonesia 
for 32 years from 1966 to 1998 (Kimura, 2013). The PFB began in 1993 and completed 
in 2008 under Presidents Itamar Franco (1992-94), Hernando Cordoso (1994-2002), and 
Luiz Lula Da Silva (2003-210), all of different political parties (De Barros Lisboa & 
Latif, 2014). Suharto was one of 20th century’s most corrupt leaders in a country where 
every administrative aspect of governance was centralised (Kimura, 2013). Nonetheless, 
Suharto’s government implemented the KIP that operated within a decentralised 
framework (AKAA, 1980). Similarly, the PFB spanned across three different national 
political administrations (De Barros Lisboa & Latif, 2014) and still maintained its focus. 
This goes on to prove as Smith (2003) observed that it was not the type of political 
regime in place that determined development choices a country made but the politics it 
applied in making those development choices (see 2.3.3). The other reason concerns the 
system of upgrading the two programmes employed. Both KIP and PFB promoted in-
situ upgrading and hence, minimised the displacement of people (World Bank, 1995; 
Imparato & Ruster, 2003). The programmes prioritised provision of basic infrastructure 
and social services to improve living conditions in settlements, and allowed residents to 
improve their own housing. In-situ upgrading is an adaptive approach that also 
facilitates social and economic integration of the squatter settlements into the city 
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proper as opposed to moving people to other places where they feel separated and 
further stigmatised (see 2.2.4).  
3.4 AN OVERVIEW OF THE CASE STUDIES 
3.4.1 Kampung Improvement Programme in Indonesia 
The KIP was a homegrown programme that officially began in 1969 to improve living 
conditions in the kampungs (Patton & Subanu, 1988; World Bank, 1995). However, the 
beginnings of KIP date back to the 1920s when the government initiated improvement 
activities to prevent the spread of diseases from kampungs to the neighbouring wealthy 
residential areas (Silas, 1992). Although KIP begun in Jakarta, it soon spread to other 
cities such as Surabaya within the Java region (see Figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1: Map showing Islands making up Indonesia 
Source: Wikipedia 
Like other developing countries, Indonesia experienced high rural-urban migrations in 
nearly all of its islands causing a high urbanisation rate. Currently, about fifty percent of 
its population of 254 million lives in urban areas (Government of Indonesia, 2012; 
UNDP, 2010; UN-Habitat, 2008c). Consequently, Indonesia faces a serious urban 
housing shortage, which has led to formation of squatter settlements, locally called 
kampungs (Ernawati, et al., 2013; World Bank, 1995). Most kampungs were initially 
villages that later became assumed into the urban fabric as cities expanded, and took on 
slum characteristics (Anzorena, 1993; UN-Habitat, 2003a). They grow incrementally 
through expansion and densification, and now accommodate over eighty percent of the 
population in major cities (Ernawati, et al., 2013; Henshall, 1982). According to the 
Government of Indonesia (2012), the slum area increased from 54,000 hectares in 2004 
to 59,000 hectares in 2009, and was likely to reach over 70,000 hectares by 2025 
without further squatter upgrading.  
To solve the problem of urban housing shortage, the Government of Indonesia (2012) 
implemented many programmes including KIP. Nonetheless, the main driver for 
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squatter upgrading was largely government’s desire to provide basic services and to 
improve physical infrastructure through community involvement (Dhakal, 2002; Basu, 
1988). Moreover, squatter upgrading had the promise and potential of affecting the 
greatest number of citizens as the following quote shows:  
The design of KIP was largely influenced by the need for an inexpensive method of 
rapidly providing basic infrastructure, using minimum technical and administrative 
resources… The premise was that KIP was the only way to improve a maximum area of 
residential development given the constraints, and that improved public infrastructure 
would spur residents to improve their own homes…The KIP, thus, had to be easy and 
cheap to implement. This meant cheap standardised components and a simple 
implementation procedure… The building materials used include bamboo, timber, brick, 
clay tiles, concrete, metal and plastic pipes. The materials are all locally produced and 
construction is on-site. (AKAA, 1980)  
3.4.2 Favela-Bairro Programa 
Like KIP, the Favela-Bairro Programa (PFB) was a locally grown squatter upgrading 
programme, which began as an initiative of the city government of Rio de Janeiro in 
Brazil. To overcome the problem of housing, Rio instituted the PFB, translated as slum 
to neighbourhood in 1993 (Fiori, et al., 2000). Rio is located on the southeast coastal 
area of Brazil (see Figure 3.2). However, PFB did not spread to other regions as did 
KIP. Nevertheless, like Jakarta in Indonesia, Rio has experienced high urbanisation 
from rural-urban migrations, which has caused an urban housing shortage and 
subsequently, the creation of squatter settlements known locally as favelas (UN-Habitat, 
2003a). Presently, Rio has a population of over six million inhabitants (Carneiro, 2014), 
of which twenty-two percent lives in favelas (Hurrell, 2011; Veríssimo, 2013).  
 
Figure 3.2: Map of Brazil and Rio de Janeiro 
Source: Wikipedia 
For a long time, favelas have provided alternative housing to the urban poor 
(Valladares, 1985). Many favelas in Rio date back to as early as 1897 (Osborn, 2012a; 
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Barke, et al., 2001). By the 1950s, they housed 6.7 percent of the city’s urban 
population (Veríssimo, 2013), increasing to 9.3 and thirteen percent in the 1960s and 
1970s, respectively (Valladares, 1985; UN-Habitat, 2003a). There are nearly 800 
favelas in Rio with populations ranging from 70,000 to 180,000 inhabitants (Perlman, 
2005; Hurrell, 2011; Carneiro, 2014).  
3.5 PERFORMANCE OF KIP AND PFB 
This section examines the performance of the KIP and PFB within the context of the 
constituents of an institutional framework, which include definition of the programme, 
programme management, funding for the programme, stakeholder involvement, 
community participation, and community support (see 1.4).  
3.5.1 Clear Programme Definition 
One of the success factors for squatter upgrading is having a clearly defined programme 
(see 3.2.1). Evidence suggests that both KIP and PFB were clearly defined programmes 
and benefited in several ways. Firstly, both programmes formulated achievable aims 
and interventions. For instance, the main aim of KIP was to improve the living 
conditions of people in kampungs through physical infrastructure provision (Devas, 
1981). The main driver of PFB was crime prevention and control in the favelas (Acioly, 
2001). UN-Habitat (2007) notes that Rio favelas have quite high crime rates arising 
from drug and gang related activities. Nevertheless, despite crime prevention and 
control being an important factor in the implementation of PFB, it failed to include a 
safety and security component (UN-Habitat, 2011c). Regardless, the Rio city 
government was determined to improve the living conditions of the urban poor by 
providing basic infrastructure and services (Brakarz & Aduan, 2004). Besides, PFB 
provided the city government with an opportunity to integrate favelas into the city 
proper (Conde & Magalhães, 2004). As for safety and security in the favelas, 
government implemented a community-policing programme that ran parallel to the 
second phase of the PFB. (IDB, 1995; Osborn, 2012a; Conde & Magalhães, 2004).  
Secondly, both KIP and PFB were able to prioritise programme components to achieve 
the most significant impacts. For example, KIP prioritised provision of physical 
infrastructure to improve squatter residents’ access to improved roads, water and 
sanitation, and other social facilities and services (AKAA, 1980; World Bank, 1995; 
Kuswardono, 1997). PFB had two main components including physical infrastructure 
development, and institutional development (IDB, 2000). Under physical infrastructure 
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development, it focused on constructing roads and footpaths, water and sanitation 
facilities, and social buildings, and property formalisation (Soares & Soares, 2005; 
Fiori, et al., 2000). The institutional development component on the other hand, was 
concerned with providing capacity for programme management through monitoring and 
evaluation, building capacity for the technical team and staff, and public information 
(IDB, 1995). Given the magnitude of the interventions, the planners designed KIP and 
PFB as long-term programmes divided into manageable phases (see 3.2.1). For instance, 
KIP had three phases namely KIP1, KIP2, and KIP3 that ran over the periods 1969-
1974, 1974-1976, and 1976-1979, respectively. Similarly, PFB was divided into two 
phases as FB1 and FB2 implemented over the periods 1993-1999 and 2000-2008, 
respectively (IDB, 1995; 2000). Phasing the programmes allowed the planners to 
evaluate programme performance and enhance successive phases, and achieve their 
programme objectives.  
Lastly, these programmes were flexible enough to include additional components in the 
later phases (Fiori, et al., 2000). In KIP3, KIP added the socio-economic development 
component that addressed socio-economic issues including providing entrepreneurial 
skills to kampung residents to help them improve their earnings. This component also 
extended microcredit to residents to help them to improve their enterprises from which 
they earned incomes to invest in housing improvement since KIP did not have a 
component for building houses (Surjadi & Darrundono, 1998). After evaluating FB1, 
PFB also added a social development component that focused on childcare and youth 
support services, training for employment and income generation, financial support for 
entrepreneurs and work cooperatives, and adult education (UN-Habitat, 2011c; IDB, 
2000; Brakarz & Aduan, 2004).  
3.5.2 Management of Upgrading Programmes 
Both KIP and PFB seem to have scored successfully on the management of the 
programmes. Having clearly defined programmes enabled the implementers of KIP and 
PFB to create independent technical units to manage the programmes. The technical 
units comprised technical experts who were responsible for design, supervision and 
management functions of the programmes (AKAA, 1980). From 1969 to 1974, the 
management of projects within KIP was in a piecemeal fashion as various government 
departments performed respective tasks (Devas, 1981). Although a committee 
coordinated departmental activities, it faced challenges of interdepartmental 
coordination, and contractual and scheduling conflicts (Juliman, 2006). Hence, after 
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securing World Bank funding in 1974 an independent technical unit was formed to 
bring fragmented planning and implementation under a single unit called the 
Muhammad Husni Thamrin Proyek (MHT) (World Bank, 1995; Devas, 1981). The 
MHT comprised four divisions including administration, finance, planning, and 
supervision. It was led by a project manager and project secretary (Basu, 1988). With 
the creation of the MHT, KIP's scope also increased to include the health and 
environment component in addition to basic infrastructure provision (Dhakal, 2002). 
PFB also had an independent technical unit, the Municipal Housing Secretariat (SMH) 
whose role was to formulate a city housing policy that would not only be concerned 
with improving slum conditions but also integrating the slums into the city proper 
(Acioly, 2001; Barke, et al., 2001).  
Moreover, the technical units of KIP and PFB operated in decentralised environments 
that helped them improve efficiency in decision-making and implementation. They also 
enjoyed strong political and financial support from the city and national governments 
(World Bank, 1995; Surjadi & Darrundono, 1998). Even when faced with several 
challenges, their governments continued supporting the programmes, politically and 
financially (Brakarz & Aduan, 2004; De Castro, 1999; Surjadi & Darrundono, 1998; 
World Bank, 1996c). Because of its performance and endurance, the Indonesian 
government endorsed KIP as a national policy by 1979 (Silas, 1984). Furthermore, the 
technical units were responsible for setting criteria for selecting squatter settlements for 
upgrading. For example, to select kampungs for inclusion in KIP the MHT considered 
the age of the kampungs, density (persons per hectare), income levels of residents, and 
environmental conditions (AKAA, 1980). The SMH on the other hand, targeted 
medium-sized favelas that were further subjected to other variables that reflected socio-
economic characteristics and infrastructure deficits (IDB, 2011). According to Brakarz 
and Aduan (2004, p. 6), SMH used a system of ranking to select favelas for upgrading 
based on:  
 Poverty indicators (ranked from highest to lowest). These included percentages 
of: children less than four years of age, female-headed households, heads of 
households earning up to one minimum wage per month; and illiterate heads of 
households.  
 Cost-effectiveness, measured by the cost per family to remedy infrastructure 
deficiencies in each favela, and  
 Strategic dimension favoured favelas located in the same region in order to 
increase the urban impact of the intervention, and to take advantage of 
economies of scale. 
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3.5.3 Funding for the Programmes 
Funding is the lifeblood of any poverty alleviation programme because it largely 
determines its sustainability. Both KIP and PFB enjoyed stable funding from both 
internal and external sources that ensured the sustainability of the programmes. For 
instance, KIP1 received US$16 Million from the city and national governments through 
local revenue and provisions in the national budgets, respectively (AKAA, 1980; Devas, 
1981). KIP2 and KIP3, whose budgets were US$35.8 Million and US$89.5 Million, 
respectively were funded by equal contributions from both city and national 
governments, and the World Bank (World Bank, 1995). The funding for PFB that 
totalled US$600 million came from the city and federal governments, and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) (Osborn, 2012b; Brakarz & Aduan, 2004). While 
IDB contributed sixty percent towards the budget, the rest came from internal sources 
(Fiori, et al., 2000; Brakarz & Aduan, 2004). Other sources of funding for PFB were the 
Brazilian Federal Credit Union in 1997 (Lara, 2013).  
Nonetheless, like many of the pioneer upgrading programmes in Africa both KIP and 
PFB performed poorly in cost-recovery (see 3.2.2). Despite being heavily subsidized, 
both programmes did not make any specific targets for cost-recovery from beneficiaries. 
Under PFB, the cost of upgrading per household was US$4000 but there was no specific 
target for cost-recovery (Tibaijuka, 2009). The cost of upgrading under KIP however, 
appears quite low at US$4300 per hectare (Schübeler, 1996). Instead, KIP and PFB 
hoped to recover costs indirectly through increasing tariffs for utility services and 
property taxes (Fiori, et al., 2000; Tulier & Gossmann, n.d). For example, PFB expected 
beneficiaries to pay for utility services provided by independent providers (Lin & 
Geertman, 2013; Fiori, et al., 2000). Similarly, KIP was to recover through increased 
property taxes and certain contributions for operations and maintenance of the 
infrastructure (Basu, 1988; AKAA, 1980). Additionally, KIP made kampung residents 
contribute land (without compensation) for access routes (Basu, 1988).  
3.5.4 Stakeholder Involvement 
Comprehensive squatter upgrading is a complex endeavour that requires not only vast 
amounts of resources but also the input from a myriad of actors or stakeholders (see 
2.2). Evidence suggests that both KIP and PFB involved other actors outside of 
government although the level of involvement varied from one programme to another. 
KIP had three main groups of actors including the technical unit (the city government), 
the Kampung committees, and local contractors (Taylor & Williams, 1982). However, it 
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lacked the involvement of sectoral agencies, which led to problems in coordinating the 
kampung-specific improvements with citywide infrastructure development (Kessides, 
1997). Nonetheless, each of these stakeholders had clearly defined responsibilities. For 
instance, the technical team was responsible for design, management and supervision of 
the programme, and authorised payments to contractors (Taylor & Williams, 1982). The 
Camat, an officer of the city government at the sub-district level, was appointed as site 
manager on projects in his area (Devas, 1981). He also served as mediator between the 
community and contractors (Basu, 1988, p. 40). Next, kampung committees organised 
the communities, and represented them in meetings with the technical unit. Finally, the 
contractors were responsible for constructing physical infrastructure such as roads, 
bridges, footpaths, and social buildings (AKAA, 1980). KIP also assigned 
responsibilities for managing and maintaining infrastructure to parties with the 
necessary capacities. For example, respective government ministries became 
responsible for managing and maintaining schools and clinics. On the other hand, the 
maintenance of civil infrastructure, and footpaths and drains were the responsibility of 
the city government, and kampung committees, respectively (Taylor & Williams, 1982).  
The main actors in PFB were the technical unit (city government), the private sector, 
NGOs, and the communities. The technical unit managed, supervised and coordinated 
all activities with the assistance of other municipal agencies (Osborn, 2012b; Soares & 
Soares, 2005). The private sector that mainly consisted of architectural firms, consulting 
engineers, contractors and utility companies, also had roles in PFB. For example, 
architectural firms designed the infrastructure and provided oversite supervision on 
construction projects in conjunction with the supervision team of the technical unit 
(Fiori, et al., 2000; Conde & Magalhães, 2004). The consulting engineers on the other 
hand, were brought in by IDB to protect its financial interests in the programme. Hence, 
their role was to approve the designs, and act as ‘clerk of works’ to ensure contractors 
executed the works according to design and within cost (Fiori, et al., 2000). The role of 
private construction companies was to construct physical infrastructure. Like in the KIP, 
the favela neighbourhood committees were responsible for organising communities for 
meetings with the technical team (Soares & Soares, 2005).  
Indications are that both KIP and PFB had NGO involvement despite their degree of 
involvement varying (Soares & Soares, 2005; Taylor & Williams, 1982). For instance, 
NGO participation in the initial stages of KIP was low but increase later after including 
the health and environment component in the second phase (see 3.5.2). The NGOs 
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worked with communities to solve environmental problems (Gill, 2000). They were also 
involved through local universities that operated as NGOs and provided technical 
assistance to the local communities in formulating plans and supervising their 
implementation (Menéndez, 1991). Although PFB also involved NGOs, it was mostly 
in the provision of social services (Bate, 2003). Fiori et al. (2000) note that some NGOs 
operated community centres, and offered training and education programmes.  
3.5.5 Community Participation in Squatter Upgrading 
Unlike new development, squatter upgrading takes place within an existing community 
(see 2.2). Therefore, community participation in upgrading becomes a key prerequisite 
to ensure success (see 3.2.4). Both KIP and PFB made community participation central 
to the programme. Although community participation varied between kampungs under 
KIP, the MHT generally consulted residents on the services to provide (Schübeler, 
1996). While in some kampungs residents were involved in improvement activities, 
having initiated them by themselves, in others KIP let contractors do the work 
(Choguill, 1996). Nonetheless, kampung committees attended meetings held by the 
technical unit to discuss and review progress of works (see 3.5.4). Community 
participation in the first two phases of KIP was minimal, probably because KIP’s initial 
concern was physical infrastructure provision, and time was of the essence. As the Aga 
Khan Architectural Award (AKAA) (1980) observed, KIP sacrificed community 
participation “to the aim of benefiting as many as possible in the shortest period, at a 
low cost and with the minimum of disruption.” On the other hand, even if some 
communities did not participate in the planning and implementation stages of the 
programme, they were involved in the maintenance stage. However, as Silas (1987) 
observed, participation in maintenance of infrastructure in improved kampungs was 
higher where communities had been involved early in the programme than where 
communities were not involved in the programme from the initial stages.  
PFB required the maximum participation of communities in planning their upgrades and 
selection of projects (Tulier & Gossmann, n.d). This was probably because the 
underlying motive for PFB was crime fighting (see 3.5.1). Community participation was 
generally quite robust (Fiori, et al., 2000). For instance, mothers built a community 
centre in one favela. However, community participation lacked significantly in other 
favelas where the SMH just implemented the programme on its own in a top-down 
manner (Osborn, 2012b). Fiori et al. (2000, p. 104) note that in such a case, PFB “failed 
to recognise the participation of communities as their right to influence decisions 
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affecting them.” Nevertheless, as the programme advanced, participation also improved. 
The SMH also contracted community labourers to reduce hostility, especially of local 
drug dealers (Fiori, et al., 2000).  
3.5.6 Community Support 
The relationship between squatter upgrading and poverty alleviation does not seem to 
be straightforward. However, analysts have reported positive impacts on poverty 
alleviation after squatter upgrading (Keare & Paris, 1982; Fiori, et al., 2000). From the 
perspective of poverty as lack of capacities (Sen, 1999), squatter upgrading has the 
ability to introduce some of the capacities that squatters lack such as infrastructure that 
they need to improve their livelihoods, and tenure security to enable them invest in 
property or use it as collateral against borrowing for investment (Gulyani & Connors, 
2002). Therefore, squatter upgrading programmes ought to integrate poverty alleviation 
(Serageldin, et al., 2006).  
Although the ultimate goal of both KIP and PFB was to improve the living conditions of 
squatters, they initially did not include a socio-economic development component to 
address poverty alleviation (see 3.5.1). Nevertheless, they later added this component 
and dedicated funding to support socio-economic activities. For instance, during the 
third phase KIP devoted twelve percent of the funding to support job skills training, a 
microcredit scheme, and an arrangement of multipurpose small shops for kampung 
residents (Surjadi & Darrundono, 1998). The credit scheme was simple and did not have 
a minimum amount of credit required. Moreover, the interest rate was subsidized and 
hence, making it accessible to many (Kuswardono, 1997). As for PFB, the socio-
economic component included social programmes for the youths and educational and 
entrepreneurial skills training for the favela residents (Soares & Soares, 2005). 
Additionally, PFB managed a microcredit scheme that gave small loans to residents of 
favelas under the programme since the beginning of FB2 in 2000 (Fiori, et al., 2000).  
3.6 ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES OF KIP AND PFB 
KIP and PFB stand as excellent examples of successful comprehensive squatter 
upgrading programmes (Juliman, 2006; Magalhães & Di Villarosa, 2012). They are 
models of best practice in housing policy, regionally and internationally (UN-Habitat, 
2003a). PFB has a reputation as the most ambitious and extensive squatter upgrading 
programme implemented in Latin America (Perlman, 2005). This section therefore 
discusses the programmes’ achievements and challenges with regard to provision of 
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infrastructure and services, socio-economic development, scaling up influence, capacity 
building, and political commitment.  
3.6.1 Provision of Physical Infrastructure and Services 
KIP and PFB are successful because of evidence of improvement of physical 
infrastructure in upgraded squatter settlements. For example, by the time KIP 
concluded, it had spent close to US$150 Million on provision of physical infrastructure 
such as roads, bridges, and footpaths in the kampungs (see Figure 3.3), and socio-
economic services (see 3.5.6).  
 
Figure 3.3: A part of a kampung before and after interventions 
Source: adapted from AAA (1980) 
PFB also assumes credit for infrastructure and services provision in previously unserved 
communities in favelas and thus, legally and spatially integrating favelas into the formal 
city (Perlman, 2005; Magalhães & Di Villarosa, 2012; Riley, et al., 2001). For instance, 
PFB improved walkways for easy access within the favelas (see Figure 3.4).  
 
Figure 3.4: Hillside improvements in Salgueiro 
Source: Simpson (2013, p. 14) 
The programmes also reached as many people as possible through various services 
various services and facilities including water and sanitation. By 1979, KIP had served 
over three million people in over 300 kampungs through services that it provided (see 
Table 3.1). However, some observers have noted with concern that KIP did not register 
sufficient impact in reducing water-borne infections and diseases. Water and sanitation 
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improvement was one of the major components within KIP, and failure to achieve that 
caused the World Bank to question KIP’s relevance by the 1980s. Consequently, as 
Kessides (1997) notes, the Bank, “sharply reduced the proportion of its urban lending 
devoted to the KIP [from about seventy to ten percent], and shifted into a series of 
second generation urban projects emphasizing broader objectives of public expenditure 
management and capacity building at the local government level.” Nonetheless, overall 
KIP introduced physical infrastructure and services that kampungs did not have before. 
As the World Bank (2000) notes, by the end of its assistance in 1988 KIP had serviced 
about 50,000 hectares of unserved urban communities in more than 500 kampungs and 
improved an estimated fifteen million people’s lives.  
Table 3.1: KIP Performance by 1979 
Description Measurement 
Kampungs improved 331 
Area covered 8,191Ha 
Population Served 3,036,323 
Roads and Footpaths 2,037Km 
Drainage 387Km 
Water supply Pipes 241Km 
Health Centres 76 
Sanitary units 180 
Rubbish collection facilities 720 
Schools 165 
Total Expenditure(US$) 148 million 
Source: Adapted from AKAA (1980) 
Similarly, PFB managed to serve several favelas by 2008. Between 1993 and 2008, PFB 
upgraded 144 favelas and 25 illegal sub-divisions, and benefited about 625,000 
residents (Osborn, 2012b; Brakarz & Aduan, 2004; Riley, et al., 2001; IDB, 2011). A 
quantitative study of the favelas in FB1, showed a significant increase in water and 
sewer access in served communities when compared to the unserved ones (Osborn, 
2012b), and more affluent neighbourhoods (Williamson, 2014). According to Soares 
and Soares (2005, p. 40), there was “substantial increase in the coverage of water and 
rubbish collection in favelas that outpaced the comparison groups identified.” Overall, 
residents’ satisfaction with services in improved favelas was higher than that of the 
residents in unserved favelas. According to IDB (2000), between eighty-two and ninety-
nine percent of residents in upgraded favelas indicated being satisfied with the services 
received, compared to only thirty-three to sixty percent in control neighbourhoods being 
satisfied with similar services. However, the IDB (2010a) notes that access to water 
services did not improve significantly because residents had other water sources. It also 
seems that PFB did not have a significant impact on health, as it did not significantly 
80 
alter the outcomes. Soares and Soares (2005) note that although the proportion of 
diseases related to lack of sanitation slightly decreased between 1995/1996 and 
2000/2001, the health and sanitation components of PFB had no impact on mortality 
associated with vector-borne diseases. However, Tulier and Gossmann (n.d) point out 
that, since data was not available before 2000, “we do not know whether water and lack 
of sanitation was a cause for increased mortality in favelas before the programme was 
implemented.”  
3.6.2 Socio-Economic Development 
The provision of physical infrastructure and services in squatter settlements served as a 
catalyst to local development. The contribution of the upgrading programmes to socio-
economic development can be assessed though property values, maintenance of socio-
cultural cohesion, and tenure security. Firstly, both KIP and PFB seem to have had 
positive impacts on home improvements and property values. Paccione (2005, p. 742) 
observes that KIP triggered increased private investment in home improvement within 
upgraded areas, leading to increased property values. According to Schübeler (1996) 
private investment in home improvement averaged US$550 per household compared to 
control areas where it was US$247. Private investment in improved kampungs was even 
higher than the median public average of US$160 per household. As UN-Habitat 
(1991b, p. 6) explains:  
Although these projects concentrated on the physical upgrading of public services and 
adopted an engineering approach that did not attempt the full recovery of project costs, 
they stimulated residents to make substantial secondary investment in shelter 
improvements. These dramatically improved living conditions and public health 
throughout each city, at density levels that would have been difficult to achieve in new 
development projects.  
PFB also had an impact on property values within and outside of the favelas. For 
example, IDB (2000) observes that property values in wealthy neighbourhoods 
increased following improvements in favelas. The value of properties located in the 
targeted favelas and settlements rose by up to R$220 per square metre. Family incomes 
also grew, probably influenced by the rise in property values (IDB, 2010a). 
Nevertheless, others tend to argue that PFB failed to stimulate rises in property values in 
the favelas claiming that in fact, property values declined compared to the rest of the 
city (Williamson, 2014). Soares and Soares (2005) observed that comparing before- and 
after-upgrading property values was complicated because there was no data.  
Secondly, through the pursuance of in-situ upgrading that minimised displacement of 
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people KIP and PFB were able to maintain the socio-cultural fabric of the improved 
settlements (Dorleans, 2002). Regardless, some houses were demolished to allow for 
infrastructure and service provision that may have altered the social profiles of the 
kampungs in one way or the other, but all the same preserved their existing residential 
stability. In-situ upgrading also discouraged gentrification into kampungs (see 2.2.4), 
which government originally feared would happen (World Bank, 1995; Patton & 
Subanu, 1988).  
Thirdly, both KIP and PFB seem to have failed to address tenure security for property 
owners in improved settlements and hence, exposed them to vulnerability. Initially, KIP 
did not intend to influence land and housing tenure directly, but expected that as 
community security increased many people would want to clarify and improve the 
status of their land. There was also the fear of delaying the implementation process at 
the time if KIP focused on land regularisation (Schübeler, 1996). Even so, KIP 
increased ownership throughout the improved kampungs, which also gave residents an 
incentive to participate actively in the implementation and maintenance processes 
(World Bank, 1995). However, in some kampungs, KIP did not ensure secure tenure 
and as such, it remains an important issue requiring attention. For instance, the wave of 
development currently sweeping across Indonesia has made kampungs vulnerable to 
demolition (Ernawati, et al., 2013). City governments prefer large-scale commercial and 
residential developments to kampungs (Goldblum & Wong, 2000; Werlin, 1999). 
Hence, they have forgone the objective of improving living conditions of the urban poor 
(Kessides, 1997). PFB also seems to have failed to make significant progress regarding 
tenure security for property owners. Although IDB (2010b) reported an ‘economically 
significant’ impact on formal titles, Williamson (2014) observes that there was only a 
three percent increase in formal ownership in the affected favelas compared to the 
control areas. Many property owners only had de facto tenure and De Castro (1999) 
blamed the complexity of the Brazilian legal system. IDB (2011) also notes that lack of 
significant progress on titling was not a reflection of an incorrect model, but rather a 
reflection of the difficulty that the programme had in executing this component, largely 
due to the institutional complexity and constraints involved in recognising and 
providing titles in informal settlements.  
3.6.3 Influence on Government Policies 
Both KIP and PFB had tremendous influence on government policies regarding human 
settlements and provision of urban services to the poor. For instance, through KIP, the 
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Government of Indonesia acknowledged the existence of kampungs as an integral part 
of the city housing system (Anzorena, 1993). As such, it adopted KIP as a national 
programme and extended it to other cities (AKAA, 1980) KIP became a model of 
restructuring in-situ and upgrading settlements (Goldblum & Wong, 2000; World Bank, 
1995). About 800 cities replicated KIP and benefited almost thirty million people and 
hence, winning KIP a position among the best urban poverty relief programmes in the 
world (Surjadi & Darrundono, 1998). Having recognised the importance of community 
participation in drafting and implementing their improvement plans, city governments 
based subsequent housing programmes on the KIP model (Choguill, 1996). Like the 
KIP, PFB also had a scaling-up effect and housing policy influence, locally and 
regionally. Locally, PFB served as a foundation for the new Morar Carioca programme 
(2010-2020) and became a model in many other cities (IDB, 2010a). Regionally, 
squatter upgrading spread to other countries including Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and 
Uruguay (Brakarz & Aduan, 2004).  
3.6.4 Capacity Building 
Programme monitoring and evaluation were major and obligatory requirements of KIP 
and PFB (World Bank, 1995). In the case of PFB, monitoring and evaluation formed 
part of the socio-economic development component concerning capacity building that 
also included skills training in project management for the technical team and staff, and 
information sharing and publication to create understanding of PFB (see 3.5.1). 
Technical teams of both programmes continuously monitored and evaluated them and 
hence, they were able to improve the programme in subsequent phases (Kuswardono, 
1997; UNDP, 2002). As a result, both KIP and PFB were able to add a socio-economic 
development component to the programme after evaluating KIP2 and FB1, respectively 
(see 3.5.1). Furthermore, constant monitoring and evaluation helped both KIP and PFB 
recognise the limited involvement of communities in the initial phases of the 
programmes, and later improved community participation in subsequent phases (see 
3.5.5). Additionally, PFB was able to identify the limitations in monolithic solutions to 
challenges and adopted an integrated solutions approach, and improved its efficiency in 
implementation (Brakarz & Aduan, 2004). Moreover, regular monitoring and evaluation 
of PFB spurred institutional innovation in the city government, which restructured itself 
internally and created a new matrix management structure to facilitate and increase 
cross-sector and horizontal coordination (Acioly, 2001).  
The PFB maintained a continuous training programme for the technical team and staff 
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for continuous capacity building, and knowledge transfer and sharing (Magalhães & Di 
Villarosa, 2012). This way, the PFB not only established its legitimacy but also secured 
political support from the national and city governments, and the communities.  
3.6.5 Political Will 
Despite taking place in different political systems of authoritarian and democratic 
respectively (see 3.3), evidence shows that KIP and PFB tremendously enjoyed not only 
financial support from their national and city governments, but also strong political will 
(Surjadi & Darrundono, 1998; World Bank, 1996c). Strong political will for KIP and 
PFB was demonstrated, firstly through the continued financial support from national 
governments (see 3.5.3). Despite having begun as policy decisions in respective city 
governments of Jakarta and Rio de Janeiro, both KIP and PFB enjoyed political and 
financial support from their national governments through national budgets (see 3.5.3). 
Between 2005 and 2008, PFB suffered a major political setback that led to its stalling 
(Lara, 2013). It appears that personal differences more than political ones between 
different administrations led to the programme stalling as Lara (2013, p. 557) explains:  
The success of its [PFB] first phase (1994–97) catapulted Luiz Paulo Conde from 
Planning Secretary to the mayor’s seat, in defiance of his ‘mentor’ and previous mayor 
Cesar Maia. Four years later Maia was elected again and slowed down Favela-Bairro 
significantly, despite the fact that he was the mayor who launched it in 1993. The main 
problem was that several of the projects initiated by Maia in 1994–96 were inaugurated 
by Conde in 1997–2001 and a strong identity was formed between the latter and Favela-
Bairro. Large-scale upgrades of informal settlements had to wait until the second 
presidential term of Lula da Silva before they were resurrected.  
Regardless, PFB survived the several city and national government administrations and 
concluded in 2008 (see 3.3). The second demonstration of strong political will for KIP 
and PFB was the ability of national and city governments to create independent 
management units to manage upgrading programmes in decentralised environments that 
allowed for quick decision-making (see 3.5.2). As Brakarz & Aduan (2004) note, 
complete decentralisation of the municipality played a very crucial role in the 
performance of PFB and reinforced its legitimacy and commitment to its objectives. 
Lastly, allowing the programmes to be executed under phases spanning long durations, 
demonstrates strong political will from national and city governments (see 3.5.2).  
To sum up, this section has shown that both KIP and PFB recorded several 
achievements regarding provision of infrastructure and services, improving the socio-
economic status of residents in improved settlements. Additionally, both programmes 
had tremendous influence on urban housing policies locally and internationally, 
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instituted capacity-building programmes that improved their project management skills 
leading to the success of the programmes. Most importantly, KIP and PFB secured 
strong political will from city and national governments, which ensured that they 
continued receiving financial and political support regardless of the political systems in 
which they operated. On the other hand, both KIP and PFB faced challenges with tenure 
security for residents in upgraded squatter settlements.  
Nonetheless, KIP and PFB remain excellent examples of how upgrading unserved 
neighbourhoods can contribute to empowering communities and raising the welfare of 
low-income households (World Bank, 2000). As Kessides (1997, p. n.p) noted, KIP 
proved to be, “capable of restructuring and redirection to remain relevant in the face of 
many of the changed circumstances and new challenges of urban Indonesia.” As a 
whole, KIP improved the quality of life and environment of many of the urban poor 
(Dhakal, 2002; World Bank, 1995). In recognition of its contribution to improving the 
lives of the urban poor, KIP was awarded the Aga Khan Award for Architecture in 1980 
(Devas, 1981) and World Habitat Award in 1992 (Werlin, 1999). Some scholar have 
argued that while the PFB showed clear progress on certain outputs in terms of basic 
infrastructure and services, its outcomes regarding “evidence of real progress on formal 
property titles or, perhaps more importantly, activity patterns changing toward more 
integration into the formal city”, have been less than clear (Williamson, 2014, p. 13). 
Perlman (2010, p. 281) also observed that PFB failed to integrate upgraded favelas in 
the city proper as the following excerpt shows:  
In the case of Favela-Barrio, regardless of how much was spent on urban infrastructure, 
paving roads, dredging and cleaning canals, building open plazas, and introducing urban 
design elements, it did not succeed in integrating favelas into their surrounding 
neighbourhoods. There is no doubt in anyone's mind where the asfalto ends and the 
morro begins.  
Even so, PFB is still a successful programme to date (Osborn, 2012b; IDB, 1995). It has 
made positive influences in lives of residents so that, as Perlman (2005, p. 10) notes:  
All of the traditional distinctions between favelas and the rest of the city have become 
useless as boundary markers in today’s reality. […]. The only remaining distinction 
between favelas [morros] and the rest of the city [asfalto] is the deeply rooted stigma that 
still adheres to them. 
3.7 LESSONS FROM BRAZIL AND INDONESIA 
There are several useful lessons that other developing countries could learn from KIP 
and PFB despite the fact that they took place in national contexts with significantly 
different socio-political and economic conditions. The first lesson concerns 
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management of programmes. Both KIP and PFB established technical units consisting 
of necessary departments and staff drawn from the city governments and other 
government departments. The technical units designed, managed, supervised and 
coordinated all the activities of the programme (see 3.5.2). Furthermore, they both 
enjoyed complete autonomy in decentralised environments that allowed them to 
improve efficiency in decision-making and programme implementation.  
Secondly, KIP and PFB have demonstrated the importance of commitment to the goals 
of the programme even when results are not immediate. Commitment to KIP and PFB 
was strong and hence, allowed city governments to maintain the right focus in terms of 
programme objectives (Brakarz & Aduan, 2004; Schübeler, 1996). Nonetheless, both 
KIP and PFB were flexible enough to included additional components later in the 
programmes (see 3.5.1). Maintaining the right focus of the programmes was possible 
because they had clearly defined goals and objectives. KIP and PFB also demonstrate 
that the squatter upgrading programme should not be overambitious with project 
components and objectives. Rather, adopt a medium achievable set of aims, and later 
build on success, rather than build in failure by over ambition.  
Thirdly, KIP and PFB have shown that on poverty alleviation programmes beneficiary 
communities should be involved throughout the programme period. If communities are 
only involved in later stages of the programmes they tend to be reluctant to participate 
especially in maintenance activities (see 3.5.5). Being concerned with provision of 
infrastructure to reach many people in the shortest time and within minimum costs, KIP 
and PFB initially sacrificed community participation for that important objective. 
However, because of their flexible design the programmes the technical units were able 
to increase community participation later on in the programmes (see 3.5.5).  
The fourth lesson concerns incorporating a sustainability component to ensure 
protection and maintenance of the physical infrastructure provided in the improved 
settlements (see 3.5.1). KIP and PFB assigned maintenance activities to parties that had 
the capacity to handle them (see 3.5.4). Nevertheless, as pointed out already some 
squatter communities were reluctant to participate in maintenance activities because 
they were not involved in the planning and implementation stages of the programmes 
(see 3.5.5). Therefore, there is need to incorporate community participation in 
upgrading programmes from inception to completion so as to make communities 
understand and own the programmes (see 2.4).  
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The fifth lesson concerns the use of local building technologies and materials for home 
improvements. KIP did not impose high building standards in improved squatter 
settlements. Instead, it encouraged residents to use local technologies and building 
materials to build and improve their homes (see 3.4.1). The use of local materials helped 
residents to reduce building costs (AKAA, 1980). LSUP on the other hand imposed 
very high building standards that raised the cost of building for residents (see 1.3). 
Moreover, KIP did not fix timeframes for residents to improve their houses but allowed 
then to improve their houses incrementally depending on their capacities.  
The sixth lesson from KIP and PFB is about incorporating community support as a 
component of the programme to ensure that it receives adequate funding (see 3.5.6). 
The planners of both programmes recognised the need to integrate poverty alleviation 
into upgrading programmes to address poverty among squatter residents. Hence, 
although they did not provide for home loans, they created microcredit schemes that 
enabled residents in programme areas to access small loans. While some residents used 
the loans to start small businesses, others invested in housing improvements.  
Seventhly, there is need for securing stable funding for upgrading programmes. Both 
KIP and PFB consistently received funding from internal and external sources so that 
programme phases started and finished within defined periods (see 3.5.3). Secure 
funding also assured progress of programmes from one phase to the next. Lastly, 
monitoring and evaluation were a regular component of the KIP and PFB (see 3.6.4). 
While monitoring and evaluation helped technical units to improve programme 
efficiency, it also formed a basis for future programme funding. Funding agencies also 
carried out their own monitoring and evaluation.  
3.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter sought to identify the critical conditions required for squatter upgrading to 
proceed and establish the extent to which an adequate institutional framework 
contributes to the success of squatter upgrading. For squatter upgrading to proceed and 
be successful, several factors including clearly defining the programme, stable sources 
of funding, stakeholder involvement, community participation, independent programme 
management, and sustained political commitment must be fulfilled. In responding to the 
second part of the objective, the chapter identified two international squatter upgrading 
programmes as case studies to establish the extent to which an adequate institutional 
framework is necessary for successful squatter upgrading. The chapter has established 
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that under the management and supervision of independent technical units, both KIP 
and PFB had clearly defined programme goals and objectives. These helped the 
technical units to identify necessary interventions, and plan how they would deliver the 
programmes that they divided into phases. Moreover, both programmes had stable 
sources of funding that included city and national governments, and external 
organisations. However, KIP and PFB did not factor in the issue of direct cost-recovery 
from the beneficiaries. Instead, they recovered through increases in land and property 
taxes. Furthermore, KIP and PFB incorporated stakeholder participation, with 
stakeholders drawn from city and national governments, private sectors, NGOs, and 
CBOs. Additionally, KIP and PFB incorporated community participation. During the 
initial phases, both programmes did not have much community participation but they 
increased the involvement of communities in subsequent programme phases. Finally, 
the programmes included additional component of socio-economic development that 
targeted poverty alleviation in the improved squatter settlements.  
The chapter also established that KIP and PFB scored many successes in the provision 
of basic infrastructure and services, and improvement of the socio-economic status of 
squatter residents through improved tenure security, and access to skills training and 
microcredit. They also had a scaling up effect locally and internationally. The KIP 
model was replicated in 800 cities across Indonesia. PFB has been replicated in cities 
within Brazil, while its regional influence spread to countries such as Argentina, 
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Uruguay. Another success of KIP and PFB was the amount of 
political commitment they enjoyed throughout their durations, which enabled them to 
continue receiving political and financial support from the city and national 
governments, and external financiers.  
Lastly, the chapter also drew out lessons from KIP and PFB, which other countries such 
as Zambia intending to implement squatter upgrading could learn. These include 
establishing independent units to manage upgrading programmes, commitment to goals 
and objectives of upgrading, involving communities in upgrading, and incorporating 
sustainability component in the programme. Others are encouraging use of local 
building materials and technologies, providing for community support, securing stable 
funding, and ensuring regular monitoring and evaluation of programmes.  
The next chapter presents the research methodology and methods used for in research. 
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The overall aim of this research is to examine the adequacy of the existing squatter 
upgrading framework to initiate and support squatter upgrading (see Chapter 1). 
Chapter 2 presented the research theoretical framework and literature review regarding 
the main research themes. Chapter 3 identified the critical success factors for squatter 
upgrading, and examined the extent to which having adequate institutional frameworks 
helped KIP and PFB succeed. This chapter describes the research approach and 
methodology adopted for this research and thus, begins by positioning the research in 
the context of the philosophical underpinnings and ethical considerations. Next, it 
discusses the approach and purpose of the research. Then, the chapter presents an 
overview of the case study areas to highlight the features that made them favourable for 
study. It proceeds to discuss the methods used for data collection. Additionally, the 
chapter discusses research target groups, and sampling methods, and later presents the 
method adopted to analyse data. The chapter concludes by highlighting the assumptions 
and limitations of the research.  
4.2 POSITIONING THE RESEARCH 
My interest in squatter settlements stems from years in university as an undergraduate 
student in the Copperbelt University. I noticed that there were many squatter settlements 
in Kitwe and that low income-houses in both mine and council townships were 
dilapidated. Therefore, I decided to write a thesis on housing, by comparing in-situ 
concrete and pre-cast concrete housing to determine the most cost efficient method on a 
housing project. This was also in response to government’s intention then to build at 
least 110,000 houses annually (GRZ, 1996a). Furthermore, my work in the local 
government, as Director of Engineering Services in Chipata Municipal Council from 
2002 to 2005, also exposed me to squatter settlements. Naturally, I would have some 
bias especially regarding central-local relations, which this research identifies as an 
important ingredient in creating a suitable environment for implementing the 
institutional framework for squatter upgrading (see 1.4). However, this research seeks to 
find a solution to a problem that affects central and local governments, and the public.  
4.2.1 Philosophical Considerations 
Creswell (2009) suggests that before deciding on the research approach, a researcher 
must identify philosophical assumptions regarding their research. Myers (2008) 
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explains that all research is based on some underlying assumptions about what 
constitutes valid research and what methods are suitable. These philosophical 
assumptions called paradigms represent “worldviews” (Creswell, 2009, p. 6). According 
to Bryman (1988, p. 4), paradigms influence “what should be studied, how research 
should be done, how results should be interpreted, and so on.” A paradigm provides a 
way of examining phenomena and drawing particular interpretations to explain the said 
phenomena (Saunders, et al., 2009). Therefore, it is important as a researcher to 
understand and position oneself in a particular paradigm(s) because the choice of a 
particular paradigm influences the methodology for the research.  
There are many paradigms but, Mertens (2010) and Creswell (2009) group them in 
broad categories as post-positivism, constructivism, transformative, and pragmatism. 
Nevertheless, each of the paradigms helps researchers explain what exists (ontology); 
how we know (epistemology); how to handle values and ethics (axiology); and how to 
obtain knowledge (methodology) (Mertens, 2010). Constructivism has been the main 
influence on my research. I believe that there are multiple realities socially constructed 
by those who experience them. These realities take place in time, space and culture 
where humans construct knowledge from which they derive meanings of phenomena. 
Moreover, the knowledge that researchers generate must be applied to situations in the 
social world. Hence, knowledge must be purposeful. This research is exploratory, as it 
examines the adequacy of the existing institutional framework to initiate and support 
squatter upgrading. Therefore, it seeks to interpret meanings from research participants’ 
responses (realities) to make sense of the situation. Moreover, consistent with Camic et 
al (2003) who explain that qualitative research is appropriate for exploring subject areas 
where little or no research has been undertaken, this research is predominantly 
qualitative. As earlier mentioned, no one has undertaken to examine the upgrading 
framework for the Lusaka Squatter Upgrading Project (LSUP) to determine if it is 
adequate for application to new upgrading programmes. I do not claim the subject of 
squatter upgrading has not been addressed. There is however, relatively little scholarly 
work on squatter settlement upgrading in Zambia. Some scholars have discussed the 
subject incidental to their research (Makasa, 2010; Mutale, 2004; Rakodi, 1986a).  
By following a constructivist pursuit, I sought to make sense of how research 
interviewees constructed meanings to the situation around them, and to identify patterns 
(inductive) contributing towards a particular phenomenon (Creswell, 2009; Myers, 
2008). Whereas the post-positivist will typically look at statistical correlations to 
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establish whether it appears that ‘A’ caused ‘B’, an interpretivist would go and ask key 
actors, ‘why did you act in the way that you did?’ Although this can also be labelled as 
an ‘inductive’ approach, unlike post-positivism, constructivism is not concerned with 
generalising information. It will normally restrict general conclusions to areas or groups 
studied. As Mertens (2010) explains, it focuses on depth rather than breadth, as it seeks 
a deeper understanding of social phenomena. Therefore, the researcher enters the social 
world wherein the phenomenon occurs and interacts with the researched to construct 
knowledge and derive meaning from it (Gray, 2004). Hence, constructivists believe that 
social phenomena cannot be studied independently of those that experience it. As 
Mertens (2010, p. 10) notes, “knowledge is socially constructed by people active in the 
research process, and researchers should attempt to understand the complex world of 
lived experience from the point of view of those who live it.”  
4.2.2 Ethical Considerations 
Research involves interactions of humans with humans or other life or non-life forms. 
Anyhow, a research needs to uphold integrity, which means adherence to ethical and 
professional standards when conducting research. Watts (2008, p. 440) defines integrity 
as “honesty and probity within the conduct of qualitative research.” Integrity requires 
the researcher to be intellectually honest and trustworthy in the way she or he conducts 
research. Ethics are standards that guide the behaviour of researchers as they interact 
with others (Caplan, 2003). They are concerned with the appropriateness of researchers’ 
behaviour in relation to the rights of those who become subjects of their work, or 
affected by it (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000; Saunders, et al., 2009). Therefore, in every 
paradigm ethics should be an integral part of the research process (Mertens, 2010).  
From the initial stage of the research, it was clear that I would have to go back to 
Zambia to collect data for my research. Therefore, I applied for research approval to the 
Heriot-Watt University Ethics Committee that approved my research in early 2014. I 
divided fieldwork into phases one and two spanning from 1 March to 30 April 2014, 
and 4 July to 10 September 2014, respectively. I created a consent form that indicated 
the research topic, whose purpose I explained. The consent form also outlined what was 
expected of the participant while giving him/ her, the option to withdraw from the 
interview if need arose (see Appendix A). This research sought data from residents of 
four squatter settlements used as case study settlements, and from private and public 
officers. Although some participants especially in the private sector consented to taking 
part in the research, they did not sign the consent forms and wished to remain 
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anonymous. On the other hand, every squatter resident who consented to the interview 
signed the consent form. I read and explained the meaning of the contents in the consent 
form and gave participants an opportunity to ask questions if they needed to. As for 
squatter residents, although I had written the consent form in the English language I 
explained its contents in a local language they spoke. In this case, I used Chewa or 
Bemba, which were the main languages in Chipata and Kitwe, respectively.  
4.3 RESEARCH PURPOSE AND APPROACH 
The purpose of research vary from exploring a phenomenon to gain familiarity with a 
phenomenon or to achieve new insights into it (Kothari, 2004); to describe phenomena 
and is not particularly concerned with understanding why it is the way it is (Adams, et 
al., 2007); to explain causal relationships between variables (Saunders, et al., 2009). 
This research is exploratory as it investigates the extent to which the institutional 
framework is adequate to initiate and support squatter upgrading in Zambia (see 4.2.1). 
Therefore, using a range of research methods, I collected data to help me address the 
research questions (see 1.4), and which I restate in this section (see Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1: Research Questions and corresponding Research Methods 
Research Question What the Researcher requires to know Data Collection Methods 
What are the critical conditions 
for squatter upgrading to 
succeed? To what extent does 
an adequate institutional 
framework contribute to the 
success of squatter upgrading? 
The factors that need to be present for squatter 
upgrading to succeed; The influence of an 
adequate upgrading framework on the success 
of squatter upgrading programmes; Lessons 
that Zambia could learn from KIP and PFB 
Literature review, In-depth 
interviews, and 
Observations 
How have political regimes 
influenced housing and housing 
provision in Zambia? 
Influence of politics on housing provision; how 
local government capacity to provide housing 
has been affected; relationship between urban 
housing shortage and squatter settlements 
Literature review, In-depth 
interviews, and Document 
Review 
What is the nature of the 
housing situation and how has it 
contributed to the prevalence of 
squatter settlements? 
Theoretical information helps in understanding 
the extent of the housing situation; contextual 
information from observations helps define the 
housing problem in physical terms 
Literature review, In-depth 
interviews, and 
Observations 
To what extent is the 
institutional framework 
adequate to initiate and support 
squatter upgrading programmes 
in Zambia? 
Define plan and specific objectives for squatter 
upgrading; Wider institutional involvement in 
squatter upgrading; Level of community 
involvement; Level of political will for squatter 
upgrading 
Literature review, In-depth 
interviews, and Document 
review 
Source: Author 
Since all the questions are exploratory and seek to understand the situation better, a 
qualitative approach has been adopted. As Creswell (2009, 4) explains qualitative 
research is “a means for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups 
ascribe to a social or human problem.” It is preoccupied with collecting more detailed 
and descriptive information on smaller groups of people, and uses in-depth interviews, 
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observation, and document review among others (Saunders, et al., 2009). Those who 
favour empiricism over constructivism argue that, if you cannot measure the 
phenomenon you cannot fix it. However, as a famous quote attributed to William Bruce 
Cameron suggests, not everything that can be counted counts and not everything that 
counts can be counted. Clearly, quantitative research can measure the extent or 
magnitude of phenomena, but it would not explain the underlying reasoning for such 
phenomena. Qualitative research on the other hand, provides better understanding of the 
phenomena and helps the researcher gain new perspectives. It locates the observer in the 
world where he/ she studies things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, 
or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005, p. 3). Hence, qualitative research helps the researcher collect in-depth 
information that quantitative research could otherwise not convey.  
There are several approaches to qualitative research including narrative research, 
phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case study (Creswell, 2007). I 
chose the case study approach to explore the research phenomenon using two city cases 
as specific illustrations. Within the city cases, I used purposive sampling to focus on 
four squatter settlements as case study settlements (see Table 4.2). The squatter 
settlements were chosen because they had been approved for upgrading by their 
respective local councils (CMC, 2014; KCC, 2013a; 2013b).  
Table 4.2: Description of Case Study Settlements 
Settlement Brief Description 
Magazine 
(Chipata) 
Magazine began in the 1990s. It is located less than a kilometre from the town centre. It lacks 
health centres, schools and community centres. Road infrastructure is virtually non-existent. The 
local council has earmarked it for legalising and upgrading. 
Mchini 
(Chipata) 
Its beginning is uncertain but was originally part of village system. It was identified as squatter a 
settlement in early 1980s. There is only one government school and a health centre built by the 
community. Mchini is located about a kilometre from the city centre. It is identified for legalising 
and upgrading. 
Ipusukilo 
(Kitwe) 
Its beginnings trace back to the 1950s. It developed through the Kaffir farming system. Ipusukilo 
acquired its status as a squatter settlement in the early 1970s. It is located about three kilometres 
from town. It has no government schools but has several community schools and a health clinic 
built by the community. Government legalised Ipusukilo in 2011 and it awaits upgrading. 
Musonda 
(Kitwe) 
It began in the early 1970s because of urban housing shortage fuelled by rural urban migrations. 
Musonda has no social services of any kind and lacks road infrastructure. It has also been 
earmarked for legalising and upgrading. 
Source: Compiled by Author 
Yin (2009, p. 18) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources 
of evidence are used.” Simon (2014, p. 457) defines a case study as “an in-depth 
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exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular 
project, policy, institution, programme or system in a ‘real life’ context.” Hence based 
on the above definitions, a case study approach places the researcher in the social world 
where real-life events take place, and where knowledge and meanings of social 
phenomena are constructed and explained. Critics of this approach argue that it lacks 
rigour since it normally uses small samples, and that results from case studies cannot be 
generalised beyond the case. As a researcher, I am aware of the stated limitations. 
However, this is qualitative research, which as Mertens (2010) points out is not about 
breadth but depth, understanding and explaining rather than quantifying phenomena.  
The next section looks at the case study areas to give the reader an insight into the areas 
of study in terms of demographic and economic profiles. 
4.4 CASE STUDY AREAS - AN OVERVIEW 
The choice for Chipata and Kitwe as case study areas depended on their diversity in 
status and economic activities, diversity in history of formation of the case study 
settlements, commonalities in functions and housing problems, and convenience in 
terms of ease of access to places and information (see 1.6).  
4.4.1 Chipata District 
Chipata, the provincial capital of the Eastern Province has an area of 6,693Km
2
 and is 
located about 600Km northeast of Lusaka (CMC, 2008). Then called Fort Jameson, 
Chipata served as an administrative capital for North-Eastern Rhodesia for the British 
South African Company from 1901 to 1910 (Hall, 1968). It shares an international 
boundary with Malawi’s Mchinji district, and district boundaries with Chadiza, Katete, 
Mambwe, and Lundazi (see Figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1: Location, Constituencies and Wards of Chipata District 
Source: (CMC, 2008) 
94 
Chipata has four parliamentary constituencies and twenty council wards represented by 
elected Members of Parliament and ward councillors, respectively who form the council 
of the Chipata Municipal Council (CMC, 2005; 2008). All local councils in the country 
follow this system (Chikulo, 2009). It is predominantly rural and depends on 
agricultural (see 1.6). During the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP), 
government privatised all state-owned enterprises
9
 that supported agriculture in the 
district causing high levels of unemployment. Additionally, agricultural productivity 
became low as farmers lost access to agricultural finance and marketing institutions. 
However, in the last decade Chipata has received considerable investments in industry 
and commerce that have created new job opportunities. Consequently, there have been 
inward migrations that have contributed to the increase in the urban population.  
Growing at an average rate of 2.4 percent annually between 2000 and 2010, the district 
has a population of 455,786 of which twenty-six percent in lives in urban areas compare 
to seventy-four percent in rural areas (CSO, 2012a). Over the same period, the district’s 
urban population has also grown rapidly at six percent per annum resulting in a sixty 
percent increase. Consequently, the rapid increase in the urban population has caused an 
acute shortage of urban housing as shown by a twenty-seven percent increase in the 
district’s squatter population. On the other hand, the number of residents in formal 
residential areas has also increased rapidly by 130 percent (see Table 4.3).  
Table 4.3: Urban Population in Chipata District (2000-2010) 
 2000 2010 Change Change (%) 
Squatter Residents 50,000 63,500 13,500 27 
Formal Residents 23,110 53,127 30,017 130 
Total Urban Population 73,110 116,627 43,517 60 
Source: Compiled from CSO (2012b; 2003) and CMC (2011) 
Evidence also suggests that the number of squatter households increased by forty 
percent, while formal residential households increased 143 percent (see Table 4.4). It is 
worth noting that formal residential areas recorded higher increases in number of 
residents and households compared to those in squatter settlements (see Table 4.3 and 
Table 4.4 respectively).  
 
                                                 
9
 These included Lint Company (LINTCO), Zambia Seed Company (ZAMSEED) and the Luangwa Industries. 
Others were the National Marketing Board (NAMBOARD) and Lima Bank that collapsed prior to SAP.  
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Table 4.4: Urban Households in Chipata District (2000-2010) 
 2000 2010 Change Change (%) 
Squatter Settlements 9,615 13,500 3,885 40 
Formal Residential Areas 12,344 30,017 17,673 143 
Total Urban Households 21,959 43,517 21,558 98 
Source: Compiled from CSO (2012b; 2003) 
This scenario reveals the concept of multi-habitation. In the African context, multiple 
habitation or multi-habitation normally falls under the general concept of extended 
family where multiple families share living spaces in one house (Willis & Tipple, 
1991). However, in recent times multi-habitation has also involved people who do not 
define themselves as family, sharing living space as separate households (Schlyter, 
2003b). The motivations for multi-habitation are generally economic especially after 
SAP because of loss of employment and incomes (see Chapter 5). Many homeowners 
have extended their houses by adding extra rooms to accommodate more people. In 
some cases, they have built additional houses on existing plots resulting in more than 
one house on a single plot (Taylor, et al., 2015). However, multi-habitation also gives 
rise to the problem of concealed families that tend to be unaccounted for during 
censuses. The concept of concealed family refers to a family (couple with or without 
children, or single parent) living with a family member (such as parents or sibling) in 
one house but recorded as one family during the census.  
Chipata has over ten squatter settlements, which are all located within a two-kilometre 
radius of the city (CMC, 2011). The council intends to upgrade some squatter 
settlements of which it identified Mchini and Magazine as pilot settlements (CMC, 
2014) (see Figure 4.2). Therefore, I chose Mchini and Magazine because the council 
had already started some preparatory works such as sensitising squatter residents on the 
upcoming upgrading programme, grading some access roads and building a police post 
in one of the squatter settlements using Constituency Development Funds (CDF)
10
.  
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Figure 4.2: Built-up area, and location of Magazine and Mchini in Chipata 
Source: Google Maps 
4.4.2 Kitwe District 
Kitwe began as a mining town in 1928. It became a management board in 1951, a 
municipal council in 1954, and city council in 1967 (KCC, 2012; UN-Habitat, 2009c). 
Like Chipata, Kitwe is a border town and shares an international boundary with the 
Democratic Republic of Congo on the northeast, and district boundaries with Mufulira, 
Kalulushi, Lufwanyama, Luanshya and Ndola (see Figure 4.3). It has an approximate 
area of 777 Km
2
 (KCC, 2012). The district of Kitwe consists of five constituencies and 
twenty-eight council wards (KCC, 2012).  
 
Figure 4.3: Map shows position and built up area of Kitwe in Copperbelt Province 
Source: KCC (2012, p. 4); http://www.zed2011.org/copperbelt.html 
Kitwe is mainly a mining town with a well-developed industrial and commercial base 
(KCC, 2012). However, after SAP Kitwe experienced unprecedented unemployment 
because of large-scale redundancies. While new mine owners strive to improve 
operations through improved technology, demand for human labour has declined and 
hence, contributing to more unemployment. Kitwe is the second largest city after 
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Lusaka with 517,543 inhabitants as of 2010 (CSO, 2012a). However, the real 
population catchment for the city could be as high as 700,000 with daytime population 
averaging over one million because of a transient population from surrounding towns 
(KCC, 2012; UN-Habitat, 2009c). Kitwe is predominantly urban - about ninety-seven 
percent of the population lives in urban areas (see Table 4.5).  
Table 4.5: Urban Population in Kitwe District (2000-2010) 
 2000 2010 Change Change (%) 
Squatter Residents 173,664 229,237 55,573 32 
Formal Residents 190,070 272,123 82,053 43 
Total Urban Population 363,734 501,360 137,626 38 
Source: Compiled from KCC (2012, p. 5); CSO (2004, p. 38; 2012c) 
Like in Chipata, rapid urban population growth because of high birth rates and in-
migration has caused Kitwe to face a major urban housing shortage (UN-Habitat, 
2009c; CSO, 2012a). Being the epicentre of mining activities in the Copperbelt 
Province, Kitwe attracts many people from within and outside of the province. 
Moreover, as a border town it experiences substantial cross-border trading that attracts 
local and foreign nationals into the district (KCC, 2012). Consequently, there is a high 
demand for housing. However, because of insufficient urban housing in formal areas, 
many people tend to find alternative housing in squatter settlements. Presently, Kitwe 
has twenty-eight squatter settlements (KCC, 2013a), which accommodate about forty-
six percent (about 229,000) of the urban population (see Table 4.5). Although there has 
been housing development in the district, it is not on a scale insufficient to meet the 
demand for low-income housing as shown by the increase in squatter households from 
about 33,000 in 2000 to 44,000 in 2010. Still, there seems to have been a very 
significant increase in number of households in Kitwe’s formal areas compared to those 
in squatter settlements over the same period (see Table 4.6).  
Table 4.6: Urban Households in Kitwe District (2000-2010) 
Households 2000 2010 Change Change (%) 
Squatter Settlements 33,393 44,084 10,691 32 
Formal Residential Areas 29,633 49,470 19,837 67 
Total Urban Households 63,026 93,554 30,528 48 
Source: Compiled from CSO (2003; 2012c) 
Like in Chipata’s case, Kitwe may also be experiencing a high rate of multi-habitation 
(see 4.4.1). While recognising the need to upgrade squatter settlements in the district, 
KCC cannot upgrade all of them since some are located in environmentally hazardous 
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areas. Therefore, in 2012, the council resolved to upgrade nine squatter settlements 
including Ipusukilo and Musonda (see Table 4.7).  
Table 4.7: Squatter Settlements selected for Upgrading in Kitwe 
Squatter Settlement Year formed 
2,007 2,010 
Population No. of Houses Population No. of Houses 
Chipata 1966 6,012 739 7,401 910 
Ipusukilo 1972 45,000 6,000 55,395 7,386 
Itimpi 1969 11,000 2,000 13,541 2,216 
Kamatipa 1968 18,000 2,800 18,465 3,078 
Luangwa II 1970 7,000 1,200 8,617 1,477 
Musonda 1974 5,800 900 7,140 1,108 
Mwaiseni 1957 4,360 545 5,367 671 
Racecourse 1972 18,200 2,700 18,465 3,324 
Zamtan 1969 6,000 950 7,386 1,108 
Totals  121,372 17,384 141,777 21,278 
Source: Extracted from KCC (2012; 2013a; 2013b) 
However, because of financial constraints, the Council noted that it was not possible to 
upgrade all the selected settlements at once and thus, resolved to start with Ipusukilo 
and Musonda (KCC, 2013c). Moreover, at that time the council had implemented a 
World Bank funded city eastward expansion programme that involved building a bridge 
across the Kafue River. The programme also involved construction of new low-income 
houses in Riverside Extension for the displaced Mufuchani squatter residents on a strip 
of land separated from Ipusukilo and Musonda by a new road (GRZ, 2009c). Ipusukilo, 
Musonda and Chipata (see Figure 4.4), had already benefited from the programme 
through new road construction. Therefore, it seemed reasonable for council to initiate 
the upgrading process in Ipusukilo and Musonda.  
 
Figure 4.4: Built-up area, and location of Ipusukilo and Musonda in Kitwe 
Source: Google Maps and Taylor et al. (2015, p. 34) 
As in the case of Mchini and Magazine in Chipata, I purposively chose Ipusukilo and 
Musonda because the council had already started some activities towards the upgrading 
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process in Ipusukilo. Ipusukilo would also provide an opportunity to observe the 
progress of squatter upgrading at the time of the study. Being close to Ipusukilo and 
already identified for upgrading, the choice for Musonda became easy. Besides, none of 
these settlements had experienced squatter upgrading before. Therefore, I was 
convinced that knowing that soon they would have improved access to basic 
infrastructure and services, the squatter residents would be excited to talk to someone 
about the prospects of squatter upgrading.  
4.5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
This section discusses the research design and the various methods I used for data 
collection. The research process for this research comprised four main stages: research 
definition, literature review, fieldwork, and data analysis and presentation. During the 
first stage, I defined the research by identifying the research problem, which helped me 
formulate research questions and objectives (see Chapter 1). Next, I reviewed existing 
literature to understand the research phenomenon, and identify research gaps (Mertens, 
2010; Creswell, 2012). It also helped me to formulate the research theoretical 
framework that later guided the research (see Chapter 2) and provided the basis for data 
analysis later in Chapter 9. Moreover, the literature review helped in refining research 
questions and objectives, so that I became more specific about the kind of data to collect 
to answer the research questions and the methods to use to collect data (Creswell, 2012; 
Ridley, 2012). Briefly, literature review helped me form a basis for conducting my own 
primary research. Equipped with the knowledge of the type of data I needed to ‘fill in’ 
the gaps, I was able to decide on the cases for the research. For instance, I decided after 
careful consideration what research approach to use and in this case, a case study 
approach. I also decided the case study areas and the cases within each study area 
following careful reasoning (see 4.4).  
The fieldwork stage comprised identifying methods for collecting data from various 
research target groups, which I discuss in detail later (see 4.6). I considered issues of 
practicality and accessibility to the identified sources of information. For instance, I 
scheduled my fieldwork for between February and September 2014. However, this 
period is the busiest in terms of public activities as many public and private institutions 
take part in conferences, seminars and the like
11
. As such, finding officers in offices 
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 This is based on my experience as a public servant in the local and central government (2002-to date). 
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during certain months like April through to September would have proved quite 
challenging. February-August is also a busy time for those involved in farming because 
that is when they tend to their farms, and harvest crops, respectively. Therefore, I 
strategized by targeting public and private institutions and NGOs for the first phase. The 
institutions I targeted were Ministries of Finance (MOF), and Local Government and 
Housing (MGLH), local councils, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and 
financial institutions. Squatter communities and Area Development Committees 
(ADCs) were included in the second phase. Nonetheless, I provided for testing the 
research instrument for squatter residents to determine the extent to which the questions 
were clear to the respondents. Fortunately, there were no revisions required to the 
questions in the interview guide for squatter residents. Hence, I continued with the rest 
of the interviews with squatters in the second phase. Four sets of introductory letters 
were written of which three were addressed specifically to MLGH, MOF, and the local 
councils. The other was a general letter given to NGOs, financial institutions, ADCs, 
and squatter residents, respectively (see Appendix B, Appendix C, Appendix D, 
Appendix E, and Appendix F).  
The last stage in the research process involved data management and presentation. I 
transcribed all the interviews (102) which I had recorded using a digital voice recorder. 
Then, I coded and analysed the data according to themes that emerged from the research 
objectives and theoretical framework (see 4.7). I also analysed the pictures taken to help 
explain the conditions in squatter settlements. I read the documents collected from the 
local councils to extract the data that I needed. Next, I presented the research findings 
(Chapters 7 and 8) and discussions arising from the findings (Chapter 9).  
4.5.1 In-depth Interviews 
In-depth interviews were the main data collection technique I used to gather data from a 
range of participants including squatter residents (see Appendix G) and representatives 
of organisations such as the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH), the 
local councils, the NGOs, financial institutions (see Appendix H). I chose in-depth 
interviews because they afforded me the opportunity to collect highly personalised data 
from participants (Kothari, 2004). As already noted earlier in this chapter, this research 
is an exploratory qualitative inquiry that attempts to answer the ‘what’ and ‘how’ 
questions to which I sought detailed explanations through responses from research 
participants (see 4.3). Hence, semi-structured interviews also called qualitative research 
interviews, seemed suited to my purpose. As Kvale (1983) explains, the purpose of a 
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semi-structured interview is to obtain rich descriptions of the life world of the 
interviewee with respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomenon. 
Therefore, semi-structure interviews help the researcher to “understand the world from 
the subjects’ point of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples’ experiences, to uncover 
their lived world prior to scientific explanations (Kvale, 1996, p. 1). I prepared 
interview guides for all the research targets (see Appendix I, Appendix J, Appendix K, 
Appendix L, and Appendix M). Nonetheless, I did not follow strictly the order of the 
questions but allowed respondents some latitude as they responded to questions while 
also controlling the extent of ‘straying’ from the subject of discussion (Yin, 2011). The 
open framework system of semi-structured interviews also allowed me to have focused, 
conversational, two-way communication with respondents; they too asked questions or 
raised concerns regarding the nature of the research. The time for interviews varied 
greatly from eight to forty-six minutes for squatter residents (see Appendix G), and 
eight minutes to slightly over two hours with officers from public offices, financial 
institutions, and NGOs (see Appendix H).  
Furthermore, since the interviews were mostly face-to-face and digitally recorded, they 
afforded me the opportunity to probe respondents for clarity on certain points deemed 
relevant to the research. As Kvale (2007) notes, a qualitative interview provides a key 
venue in which the researcher explores the ways in which subjects experience and 
understand their world. Hence, it provides unique access to the lived world of the 
subjects, who in their own words describe their activities, experiences and opinions. 
However, I conducted few interviews particularly with some NGOs and Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs) representatives on the phone since I was unable to interview them at 
appointed times for various reasons beyond any of our control. I left them with the 
interview guides so that when we had the interview, they were already prepared. 
Moreover, in-depth interviews enabled me to obtain first-hand information from 
respondents. As such, interviews potentially increased validity, authenticity and 
reliability. Lastly, interviews allowed for flexibility especially in terms of the language 
of communication. When dealing with squatter residents I was aware of the possible 
barrier of using English as a language of communication. Therefore, I translated the 
questions into the local languages of Bemba and Chewa (see 4.2.2).  
The issue of validity and accuracy of primary data also arises as it does with secondary 
data. Taylor (2005) explains that a researcher can validate the authenticity and accuracy 
of primary data in many ways, including asking participants to review information for 
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accuracy of what they discussed during interviews with the interviewer, validating 
interviews with observations, and reducing bias by reporting only what I observed and 
heard. Therefore, I sent transcripts of interviews to all NGOs, microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) and the local councils that participated in the research for confirmation, and 
received only two written confirmations. The others were verbal confirmations by 
telephone. Nevertheless, I transcribed interviews in their entirety and kept the recorded 
interviews. Later, I coded the transcribed interviews following a thematic system based 
on main themes identified in the theoretical framework (see 4.5).  
4.5.2 Observations 
Sometimes, a researcher cannot collect all qualitative data required for the research 
using only direct verbal interactions with the people. As such, one could supplement 
verbal methods with observations. As Saunders et al. (2009) explain, a researcher may 
employ observations as a research technique when he/ she seeks to understand an on-
going process or situation, intends to collect data on individual behaviours or 
interactions between people, and needs to know about a physical setting. I employed 
observation by means of photography to understand the physical settings in which 
squatter residents lived. For instance, when I asked squatter residents to explain the 
physical conditions of their houses, many of them described them as ‘bad’. Some of the 
residents felt ‘embarrassed’ to talk about the conditions of their dwellings. However, 
with the help of pictures that I took after asking for their permission I understood the 
extent of the physical conditions regarding most of the houses (see 6.3.2). With pictures, 
I also verified the claims of squatter residents regarding inadequate water and sanitation 
facilities, and poor access roads (see 6.3.2 and 6.3.4, respectively). Moreover, pictures 
also helped me to capture various economic activities that some residents engaged in 
including petty trading, carpentry, and mechanical repairs and the like (see 8.4). Pictures 
helped me to see repeatedly what was real (Yin, 2011; Ary, et al., 2010).  
In Chapter 6, where I assess the extent of the urban housing situation in Zambia, 
evidence shows that urban housing is quantitatively insufficient, while most of it is 
qualitatively deficient, lacking tenure security, and spatially segregated (see 6.3). 
Therefore, by observing housing in squatter settlements using photographs, I collected 
physical evidence that confirmed findings from the literature concerning deficiency in 
the quality of housing. With regard to location, literature review shows that low-cost 
housing including squatter housing is usually located far from the centre and as such, 
cannot easily access basic services and lack basic infrastructure (see 6.3.4). From the 
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photographs captured in the case study settlements, I confirmed that squatter settlements 
lacked good access roads, and residents had limited access to water and sanitation 
facilities. Moreover, observations also helped to confirm what residents claimed 
regarding the services local councils provided to the public (see 7.5.1). Clearly, councils 
have not provided roads, and water and sanitation facilities in squatter settlements.  
4.5.3 Documentary Analysis 
Documentary analysis involves studying existing documents, either to understand their 
substantive content or to illuminate deeper meanings that may be revealed by their style 
and coverage. It is particularly useful where the history of events or experiences has 
relevance in the research (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). A document is a written text. 
According to Corbetta (2003, p. 287), “a document is any material that provides 
information on a given social phenomenon and which exists independently of the 
researcher’s actions.” Documents may be produced by individuals or groups geared 
towards their own need (Mogalakwe, 2006). In any case, documents provide the 
researcher with a good source of information in qualitative research and help in 
determining a pattern of events that he or she cannot obtained through direct 
observation or questioning (Creswell, 2012; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). The type of 
documents a researcher could use range from public through private to personal 
documents. Public documents include government publications such as Acts of 
Parliament, policy statements, census reports, and statistical bulletins among others 
(Mogalakwe, 2006). Private documents on the other hand, are those from the private 
sector organisations and civil society, and include among others minutes of meetings, 
annual reports, board resolutions, and personnel records (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003; 
Mogalakwe, 2006). Documents may also be of a personal nature such as personal 
letters, photo albums, diaries and autobiographies (Ary, et al., 2010). Like other social 
research methods document analysis is also concerned with matters of authenticity, 
credibility, representativeness, and (Mogalakwe, 2006; Kothari, 2004).  
For this research, I examined several government publications including Acts of 
Parliament, circular letters, and local council budgets, reports and minutes of meetings. 
These were especially important for gathering statistical and financial data with regard 
to local government funding which I could not get through interviews. However, 
Corbetta (2003) and Gray (2004) warn that institutional documents often present the 
‘official’ position regarding a situation and hence, tend not be objective representations 
of the institutional reality to which they refer. In support of this, having read the 
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councils’ budgets, I saw how councils allocate funding to various activities, but it was 
hard to verify what outcomes they had achieved. Audit reports from which I could have 
extracted that information were not available because the local councils had not been 
audited for several years at the time of the research. Hence, I relied on the integrity of 
the institutions and officers I worked with to provide authentic data.  
In sum, the various data collection methods contributed in several ways to addressing 
the research questions (see 4.3). Literature review helped the researcher gain insights 
into the concerns raised by each research objective while in-depth interviews facilitated 
collection of data that helped to respond to all of the research objectives. Observations 
(photography) helped to supplement evidence from the literature review especially in 
ascertaining the nature of the housing situation with respect to quality of housing. 
Moreover, using pictures of new modern houses built in the settlements, I was able to 
verify that indeed perceived tenure security stimulates investment in housing by way.  
4.6 RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS AND SAMPLING 
In Chapter 1, I identified several elements that would constitute an adequate squatter 
upgrading institutional framework including stakeholder, and community participation. 
Therefore, stakeholders in squatter upgrading would include public institutions directly 
involved in municipal service delivery, the private sector organisations particularly 
involved with finance, and civil society organisations involved with community 
development. The communities in this case were the squatter residents and Community-
Based Organisations (CBOs) in the settlements identified as case study settlements. 
Therefore, my initial research target groups comprised the MOF, MGLH, local councils, 
NGOs, financial institutions, ADCs, and squatter residents (see Table 4.8).  
Table 4.8: Target Groups, Justification, Sampling, and Data Collection Methods 
Target Group Justification Sampling Method Research Methods 
MLGH Interprets government development 
policies; Supervises the local authorities 
Purposive 
In-depth interviews; 
Document Reviews 
MOF Provide funding to local councils Purposive In-depth Interviews 
Local Councils Responsible for service provision including 
housing; implement upgrading programmes 
Convenience 
In-depth interviews; 
Document Reviews 
NGOs Involved in advocacy; Sensitise 
communities on development programmes 
Purposive 
In-depth interviews 
Financial 
Institutions 
Partnerships with other organisations; 
services to include low-income earners 
Purposive In-depth Interviews 
ADCs Identify and prioritise community needs Purposive Focus Group interview; 
in-depth interviews 
Squatter 
Residents 
Beneficiaries and actors of upgrading;  
Important to know their perceptions 
Convenience 
In-depth interviews; 
Observations 
Source: Author 
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Qualitative research is concerned with the depth of the information rather than it breadth 
(see 4.3). As such, statistical representation does not become a defining criterion in 
selecting research participants. Moreover, because of it less focus on statistical 
representation qualitative research usually employs non-probability sampling methods 
such as purposive or judgemental, convenience, and quota sampling. As Cohen et al. 
(2007, p. 113) observe, “The selectivity which is built into a non-probability sample 
derives from the researcher targeting a particular group, in the full knowledge that it 
does not represent the wider population; it simply represents itself.” Therefore, I used 
purposive sampling to select government ministries, NGOs, financial institutions, and 
ADCs, and convenience sampling for local councils, and squatter residents.  
Purposive sampling involves the deliberate choice of participants due to the qualities 
they possess that the researcher can tap into to obtain information for their study. In 
other words, “the researcher decides what needs to be known and sets out to find people 
who can and are willing to provide the information by virtue of knowledge or 
experience” (Tongco, 2007, p. 147). Creswell (2012, p. 206) notes, the choice of 
participants through purposive sampling is influenced by their being “information rich.” 
Moreover, purposive sampling tends to be cost and time efficient (Adams, et al., 2007). 
Clearly, the researcher samples with a purpose in mind and investigates the units of 
study based on his or her judgement. However, critics of purposive sampling point out 
the difficulty in representation and generalization of results across populations. The 
purpose of purposive sampling is not to represent the population, but the sample 
studied. Considering that I was sampling with a purpose in mind, I choose participants 
who by virtue of their knowledge or experience could provide the information that was 
relevant to my research questions. Moreover, I was concerned with the depth (details) of 
the information gathered and not the breadth. Furthermore, concern for representation of 
research samples and generalisability of results did not present major obstacles mainly 
because the major concern of the research was not to generalize the findings beyond the 
sample in question, but to understand the phenomenon under study through the 
experiences of research participants.  
Hence, there were no sampling frames for MLGH and MOF since they fulfilled the 
criteria of being involved in local government and funding of local councils for service 
delivery, respectively. Therefore, purposive sampling was the appropriate tool to use for 
their selection (see Table 4.8). Unfortunately, I did not secure an interview with the 
MOF despite making several attempts that included correspondence and two visits. I 
106 
also used purposive sampling for NGOs to find the ones who could provide information 
to answer my research questions. As such, the NGOs had to be operating within the 
areas under study, and involved in service provision to disadvantaged communities in 
rural and peri-urban areas. The sample frames for Chipata and Kitwe were ten and six 
respectively. The plan was to interview all of the sixteen NGOs but because of other 
commitments that overlapped with interview dates, seven NGOs could not be available 
for interviews. Efforts to get phone interviews with them also proved unsuccessful. 
Nonetheless, I interviewed nine NGOs, six of whom were through face-to-face 
interviews while the other three were by phone.  
As earlier mentioned, I also used purposive sampling to select financial institutions (see 
Table 4.8). The main criterion for selecting financial institutions that included 
commercial banks, and Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) was that they had presence in 
both study areas. For this reason, I could only interview one representative from anyone 
of the study areas who would give the position of the institution on the issues raised in 
the interview. Therefore, the sampling frame for financial institutions was eleven 
comprising six commercial banks and five MFIs. I secured interviews from ten of the 
eleven financial institutions. Gathering data from the financial institutions was quite 
challenging because it was hard to secure interview appointments with commercial 
banks because nearly all of them have their headquarters outside Zambia from which 
they needed clearance. Despite sending correspondence to all the financial institutions 
and physically visiting their offices, the response was generally unfavourable. During 
the first field trip, I interviewed only five financial institutions that included two banks 
and three MFIs. Therefore, I planned my second field trip to coincide with two 
important dates in the Zambian economic calendar, the Trade Fair, and the Zambia 
Agriculture and Commercial Show that took place in Ndola and Lusaka in July and 
August 2014, respectively. Many local and international exhibitors attend these events 
and therefore, they presented me with an opportunity to interview the remaining 
financial institutions. I managed to interview representatives from the remaining three 
commercial banks. The remaining two MFIs were not at any of the two events but I 
managed to interview them by phone within the duration of phase two of the fieldwork. 
By the end of my fieldwork, the eleventh financial institution had not confirmed the 
interview for which it sought clearance from its head office located abroad. 
I purposively selected ADCs because there was only one ADC for both settlements 
chosen as case study settlements in each of the study areas. I had intended to use focus 
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group interviews with the ADCs. However, I only learned during phase one of my 
fieldworks while in the field that government had suspended ADCs in 2011 for alleged 
inappropriate conducts
12
. However, the local councils hoped that government would lift 
the suspension by July or August 2014 following several meetings where they had 
discussed the matter. Nevertheless, by the beginning of phase two of my fieldwork, 
there were still no ADCs in place. One senior council officer explained as follows:  
The issue of ADCs or Ward Development Committees (WDCs) as it were, is still 
outstanding… We are waiting for a go-ahead from MLGH to form new WDCs.  
As noted somewhere in this section, I used convenience sampling to choose local 
councils and squatter residents. In convenience sampling as the name suggests, the 
researcher uses any subjects that are available to participate in the research. These are 
the subjects the researcher hopes will provide the responses to the research questions 
(Cohen, et al., 2007). However, some scholars criticise convenience sampling for being 
unreliable and non-representative (Adams, et al., 2007). Besides, results from a 
convenience sample cannot be generalised to the entire population (Marshall, 1996). 
Just as in purposive sampling, the aim is not to generalise results beyond the sample, 
which does not represent any population but itself. Then sometimes, as Bernard (2006) 
points out, convenience samples are all that is available to the researcher. Hence, I 
based the choice of the two local councils for study principally on convenience. Because 
of time and cost limitations, I decided to conduct the study in areas where I would have 
easy access to key informants and information. I had the advantage of having worked in 
one local council before, and went to university in another where I currently worked 
(see 4.2). In the absence of Freedom of Information in Zambia, no single organisation is 
obliged to give anyone any piece of information. For this reason, prior knowledge of the 
study areas proved to be an important asset to the research as it enabled me easy to 
access relevant information from the local councils.  
Regardless, local councils generally have a strict policy on releasing public information 
to outsiders for fear of misrepresentation. Hence, only the city manager had the mandate 
to release information to the public either directly or through a public relations officer
13
. 
In the case of one local council, upon receiving my correspondence requesting an 
interview the Town Clerk and I agreed on the date for the interview, and to which he 
                                                 
12
 Interview with senior council officers 
13
 Based on my experience as a council employee (see 4.2) 
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invited some senior managers whom he deemed relevant to the purpose of the 
interview. Before the interview began, I explained the aim of my research and the kind 
of information I needed from the council. Then the Town Clerk told senior officers to 
provide the information I had asked for in soft and hard copy formats. One senior 
officer was also assigned to accompany me to the two squatter settlements I had chosen 
prior to starting interviews with squatter residents. Although I lived in this town, I had 
never been to the settlements before. Therefore, the tour with the council officer 
presented an opportunity to familiarise myself with the areas. When the other managers 
had left, I proceeded to interview the Town clerk. The situation in the other council was 
similar except that I did not get the chance to meet other senior managers in one 
meeting. Nonetheless, after I had the interview with the Town Clerk (acting then) he 
assigned a senior accounts officer to provide all the information I had requested for in 
soft and hard copy formats. Although I was already familiar with the two squatter 
settlements I had chosen because of my previous work experience in the town (see 4.2), 
a junior council officer accompanied me in the settlements on a re-familiarisation tour.  
For drawing research samples from squatter residents, I used convenience sampling (see 
Table 4.8). The defining criteria for choosing residents were that they were adults and 
heads of households, and lived in the squatter settlements under study. The only 
excluding criterion with this target group was age. Although I did not specifically ask 
the residents their age, I inquired if they were registered voters. All were registered 
voters who had participated in the 2011 general elections, and hence were over 21 years 
of age at the time of the study in 2014. Normally, any person under the age of eighteen 
would be a dependant and would not have provided the kind of responses the research 
sought. The squatter settlements consisted of sections of which Ipusukilo had four while 
Musonda, Magazine, and Mchini had two each. All of these squatter settlements have 
existed for more than thirty years. Records show that Ipusukilo and Musonda began as 
squatter settlements in the 1970s (see Table 4.7) but an older Ipusukilo resident recalled 
differently, as the following quote shows:  
My family moved from our village and came here in 1956. We lived at Mr. West’s farm 
where my father worked. I was only 9 years old when we came to live here and I have 
been here since. (IP9, adult female, widow) 
In 1970, government enacted the Land Acquisition Act that gave it powers to take over 
without compensation, tracks of land abandoned by their foreign owners (Hansungule, 
2001; Tordoff, 1974). Perhaps, the 1972 date represents the period when government 
officially recognised the existence of Ipusukilo as a squatter settlement on public land. 
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Nevertheless, Ipusukilo developed through a kaffir farming system (see Table 4.2), 
while Musonda developed through land invasion by settlers. Mchini and Magazine in 
Chipata, seem to have developed from village remnants that existed there many years 
before drawing the municipal boundaries that later engulfed the villages. Nonetheless, 
their official recognition as squatter settlements was in the 1980s. Despite having begun 
differently, all the four squatter settlements have a long history.  
Considering the limited time I had to conduct interviews with residents in two towns 
separated by over a thousand kilometres, I sought the help of research assistants, one in 
each town. The main role of assistants was to help with the navigation within the 
settlements and translation of interview questions especially in Kitwe, as I am not fluent 
with the Bemba language. Research assistants also helped with introducing me to the 
residents, as a way of making them feel comfortable and assuring them that I was not 
there to exploit them. This helped greatly especially in Musonda where initially, I faced 
hostility from some residents who thought I represented the government, which they 
claimed, had failed to meet its promise of improving their living conditions. The 
research assistants also helped me interview some participants who seemed to struggle 
understanding my Bemba. Although Bemba is the commonest language in the 
Copperbelt Province, it is also widely spoken in Chipata, Eastern Province. As such, 
some of the research participants in the squatter settlements in Chipata spoke Bemba, 
which was the language they preferred to use. Nonetheless, I drew participants from 
each section of the squatter settlement to ensure as much representation as possible. I 
had a mix of male and female respondents, homeowner-occupiers, homeowner-
landlords, and tenants (see Appendix U, Appendix V, Appendix W, and Appendix X). 
However, in Magazine, Mchini and Musonda, there were more respondents who were 
female than male, while the opposite was true for Ipusukilo (see Figure 4.5).  
 
Figure 4.5: Gender distribution in Case Study Settlements 
As noted earlier, Ipusukilo developed on farmland and many of the people who settled 
there were farmers. Farming is still one of the main economic activities among many 
households compared to formal employment (see Appendix W). Therefore, I was able 
to find male respondents in their homes and interviewed them. I planned interviews 
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with residents for between 10:00am and 4:00pm. There were more respondents who 
were female than male in the other three settlements because I mostly found women at 
home in the case of those who were married (see Figure 4.5). The number of squatter 
residents interviewed was eighty with twenty from each case study settlement.  
4.7 RESEARCH DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis is concerned with giving meaning to data (Ary, et al., 2010). According to 
Marshall and Rossman (2011, p. 207) it is “a search for general statements about 
relationships and underlying themes.” The research questions and theoretical framework 
guided the analytical framework for this research (see Figure 4.6).  
 
Figure 4.6: Relationships between Politics, Housing and Squatter settlements 
Source: Author 
From the literature review, I established that politics within different types of political 
regimes had tremendous influence on housing provision. Politics has undermined the 
capacity of local councils to provide public housing. In effect, it has contributed to the 
urban housing shortage that has led to the prevalence of squatter settlements (see 
Chapter 5). Nonetheless, the research explores the potential for squatter upgrading to 
help solve the urban housing crisis. While evidence strongly suggests that upgrading 
offers many benefits including introducing basic infrastructure, and improving tenure 
security (see 2.2.3), the extent to which these benefits are achieved depends on the 
adequacy of the institutional framework for upgrading. Hence, I sought to examine the 
adequacy of the institutional framework to initiate and support squatter upgrading.  
The analysis process for this research was multi-stage: transcribing interviews, 
familiarisation and evaluation of data, coding of data, and theme identification. 
Transcribing of interviews took a long time because there were 102 interviews to listen 
to and transcribe. Transcribing interviews from squatter residents took particularly 
longer than others did because the interviews had been conducted in Bemba and Chewa, 
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while transcribing was done in English (see 4.5.1). Nonetheless, transcribing afforded 
me intimate knowledge of the information. Thereafter, I organised the transcribed data 
into coherent retrievable sections, and later familiarised myself with the data by reading 
the transcriptions several times. Next, I coded the data to group the interviewees’ 
responses into categories that brought together similar themes (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). 
From the main headings, I created a coding structure based on thematic coding (see 
Appendix U, Appendix V, Appendix W, Appendix X, Appendix Y, and Appendix Z). 
Coding involves developing concepts from raw data through an iterative process to 
generate categories and themes that allow the researcher to examine relationships and 
display data (Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Ary, et al., 2010). As Schutt (2011, p. 330) 
explains, “Examining relationships is the centrepiece of the analytic process, because it 
allows the researcher to move from simple description of the people and settings to 
explanations of why things happened as they did with those people in that setting.” The 
final stage in qualitative data analysis involved interpreting and presenting research 
findings – searching for alternative understanding, and drawing conclusions (Marshall 
& Rossman, 2011). Although this research is predominantly qualitative, I managed to 
extract some quantitative data in the form of simple frequencies and percentages mostly 
to support qualitative responses (see 1.5). As I presented the results, I included some 
quotes from respondents to support sections of the evaluations in the discussion.  
4.8 ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
My initial assumption for this research was that government would use the existing 
upgrading framework on new squatter upgrading programmes (see Chapter 1). As the 
research progressed, there were no indications to the contrary. Although I learned from 
MLGH that it was working with Lusaka City Council to develop a framework for a pilot 
participatory squatter upgrading in two of Lusaka’s squatter settlements and which it 
envisaged rolling out to the other councils, that too had not materialised by the end of 
the fieldwork in September. Hence, I still maintained my assumption of government 
using the old squatter upgrading framework for new upgrading programmes.  
The other assumption I made in the research concerned the selection of case study 
settlements. One of the reasons for the choice of the case study settlements was that 
they had not had any squatter upgrading programmes before. Therefore, I assumed that 
squatter residents would readily welcome me to discuss squatter upgrading with them. 
Largely, this assumption was borne out especially in Mchini, Magazine and Ipusukilo 
where residents eagerly agreed to discuss issues pertaining to the development of their 
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areas. However, Musonda squatter settlement challenged my assumption because some 
of the residents I approached for interviews initially proved quite ‘hostile’ and did not 
want to be ‘bothered’. On further inquiry, I learned that their apparent hostility was a 
manifestation of disillusionment with government’s unfulfilled promises of ‘more 
money in your pockets’ and general lack of development in the area. In the run up to the 
2011 general elections, the current Patriotic Front (PF) government, then a leading 
opposition party, made several promises to the people including building houses for 
them if it assumed power. PF had a political slogan, more money in your pocket and 
hence, some people translated it literally to mean that PF would give them money or 
reward them with favours as gratification. Hence, the residents associated all 
‘foreigners’ as agents of government whom they accused of ‘telling lies all the time’, 
and resolved not to ‘entertain’ any more government promises meant to hoodwink them 
into giving their political support. However, when I told them that I was a scholar from 
abroad and explained the purpose for my research, some residents agreed to be 
interviewed. Participants were drawn equally from the two sections in the area (see 4.6).  
The research also faced some limitations. Due to the qualitative nature of the research, I 
limited the number of case study areas to only two because of time and the financial 
limitations of a PhD programme. A wider selection would have allowed for more views 
from local councils. Therefore, the findings of this research cannot be generalised 
beyond the local councils they were based on. Nonetheless, I hope that the findings can 
be transferrable in many instances, especially in informing government policy 
concerning squatter upgrading in Zambia and beyond. Another limitation concerned my 
inability to interview two important target groups, MOF and ADCs representing the 
case study settlements. I had included the MOF in the research to obtain information on 
funding and remittances to local councils (see Table 4.8). Since local councils received 
funding through the MLGH, I wanted to compare the funds MOF remitted against funds 
the councils received. Non-participation of MOF denied me the opportunity to establish 
the source of the problem of inadequate funding of local councils. Nonetheless, the 
councils provided adequate information regarding funding from government through 
financial statements, annual budgets, and council reports from which I was able to 
extract as much financial information as possible. The absence of ADCs had an effect 
on the research, mainly regarding questions on their involvement in local governance. 
Nevertheless, I am confident that the research covered adequately subjects on living 
conditions in squatter settlements, community participation and political alignments in 
interviews with the squatter residents. Although I interviewed residents as individuals 
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who represented individual views, as they understood them, they shared similar settings 
that influenced their views. Hence, I am confident that I captured the views of ADCs 
through ordinary residents. I am also confident that despite these limitations, the 
integrity and significance of the research have not been compromised in any way.  
4.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the methodology employed in the collection, organisation 
and analysis of data in this research. It started by locating the research in appropriate 
epistemological and ontological perspectives, which in this case is constructivism. The 
chapter has also explained that the type research questions informed the research 
approach to adopt and research methods to employ to gather data from various target 
groups. The research that took a case study approach relied mainly on qualitative data 
methods for gathering, organising and analysing data. However, the research also used 
quantitative data presentation methods such as tables, simple frequencies and 
percentages to supplement qualitative responses and analysis. By using quantitative data 
to support qualitative data, the research improved the reliability of the data. The chapter 
has also highlighted the main assumptions made, while also underlining some of the 
challenges faced in collecting data including inability to interview two important target 
groups, and initial hostility in one of the case study squatter settlements.  
The next chapter examines political regimes and their influence on housing provision as 
it relates to the prevalence of squatter settlements in Zambian.  
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CHAPTER 5 POLITICAL REGIMES AND HOUSING PROVISION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter attempts to provide a historical background to the urban housing problem 
that has led to the prevalence of squatter settlements and hence, it discusses the 
relationship between political regimes and squatter settlements in Zambia. The chapter 
begins by tracing the origin of the urban housing problem in the colonial era, and 
follows it up in the independence era through to the post-independence era. Next, it 
discusses how the different political regimes have affected the local government and its 
ability to provide public housing. Finally, the chapter provides an insight into the future 
of local government by embracing inclusive local governance.  
5.2 COLONIAL ERA: THE AGE OF RATIONED HOUSING 
The colonial era, from 1889 to 1964, defined Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) as an 
extractive state under extractive colonialism. The state’s existence was mainly for the 
benefit of the coloniser who extracted its resources for development elsewhere. As 
Miller (2013, p. 9) explains regarding extractive colonialism, “the colonizing power 
established an extractive state whose purpose was to shift the resources of the colony to 
the coloniser often with few or no protections for the native populace against abuse by 
the colonial authority.” Beyond extracting resources, extractive colonialism also 
ensured that it spent the barest minimum on goods and services for African benefit 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). External political dominance, economic exploitation, 
denial of rights, and suppression of cultural and ethnic pride also characterised 
extractive colonialism (Miller, 2013; Gandhi, 2008). The colonial administration used 
brutal military force to deal with any kind of dissent or rebellion from the locals and 
curtailed their freedoms by imposing repressive laws that restricted migrations, and 
instituted curfews in African townships (Home, 1997; Frederiksen, 2014). As 
Frederiksen (2014, p. 1277) observes, “the character of early British rule in Northern 
Rhodesia was often one of brutal subjugation, as tax defaulters saw their huts burnt, 
cattle seized, or wives kidnapped until taxes were paid.” In essence, the political regime 
during the colonial era was not democratic as it was in Britain but resembled 
“bureaucratic authoritarianism” (Phiri, 2001, p. 228).  
The economic policies during colonial rule were characterised by classical liberalism 
that had emerged as a political ideology in eighteenth century Europe to champion civil 
and political liberties (Thorsen, 2009). As such, classical liberalism emphasised 
minimal state involvement in the economy while allowing laissez-faire capitalism to 
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develop (Phiri, 2001). Hence, as it pursued capitalism the colonial administration 
concerned itself more with maximising profits more than providing social welfare for 
the colonised by ensuring that all activities it carried out contributed directly to profit 
maximisation. As Frederiksen (2014, p. 1283) explains:  
Capitalism, as a dispersed organization of relations of power, became increasingly 
pervasive and created a series of objective demands and immanent imperatives that called 
for specific responses.  
Therefore, in such an economic arrangement the coloniser viewed housing not as a 
priority development objective but a mere consumption good and hence, provided it 
under rationed conditions (Makasa, 2010; Home, 1997). Even when the urban 
population began to grow, there was no significant investment in African housing which 
led to a critical urban housing shortage that later spilled into the independence era 
(Makasa, 2010; Mutale, 2004). Therefore, to meet their housing needs the local people 
who could not get institutional housing began building houses in squatter settlements on 
the city peripheries and on white farms where they practiced kaffir farming (Home, 
1997). Kaffir farming, a system that began in South Africa involved white farmers 
allowing Africans who worked on the farms to cultivate on some portions of the land 
and build shelters in exchange for a fixed fee (Achieng’, 2012; Myers, 2005; Hansen, 
1982). Although not necessarily the cause for squatting, kaffir farming seems to have 
legitimised the creation of unauthorised settlements that later grew into big settlements 
by attracting people not employed by farmers (UN-Habitat, 2003a). Ipusukilo squatter 
settlement is such an example (see Table 4.2).  
Mining was the chief attraction for colonialism in Zambia. That was probably why 
colonialism was extractive. The presence of abundant minerals fuelled the coloniser’s 
ambition for wealth extraction but proved to be a curse for the extractive state because 
the wealth it provided did not bring meaningful investment in activities that would have 
benefited the local people (Bond, 2014). To further its capitalistic ambitions, the 
colonial administration implemented two overarching development policies in its 
approach to development in Northern Rhodesia. These were industrialisation without 
urbanisation (IWU) and stabilisation without urbanisation (SWU) (Makasa, 2010). Both 
the IWU and SWU contributed in many ways to the urban housing shortage and 
formation of squatter settlements. These two overarching polies shaped the way the 
colonial administration managed African housing provision (Berrisford, 2011).  
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5.2.1 Industrialisation without Urbanisation: Implications for Housing 
Industrialisation, which began with the creation of the mining and related industries 
attracted both local and foreign migrant labour. As the pace of industrialisation 
increased so did the inflow of migrants into the urban areas (Mutale, 2004). However, 
although the colonial administration relentlessly pursued industrialisation by increasing 
industrial activity, it was also determined to keep the number of Africans coming into 
urban areas to the minimum (Makasa, 2010; Rakodi, 1986b). IWU seemed to blend well 
with capitalism – maximising profits and minimising expenditures (Siamwiza, 1986). 
To consolidate this development trajectory of IWU, the coloniser passed several laws 
that affected housing provision in various ways (see Appendix N). The notable laws 
included the Employment of Natives Ordinance (ENO) of 1929 and Natives 
Registration Ordinance (NRO) of 1929 (Kanyenze, 2004; Njoh, 2009).  
The ENO served well as a state control mechanism that regulated the employment and 
presence of Africans in towns (Sanyal, 1981; Mutale, 2004). As such, ENO ensured that 
Africans got short work contracts of up to six months after which they would return to 
their villages to rest before returning to work (Harris & Parnell, 2012). To further 
support IWU, the coloniser introduced the Natives Registration Ordinance (NRO) in 
1929, which provided for registration of every African in each district (Elkins & 
Pedersen, 2005). Under this law, once admitted in urban areas Africans received 
identify cards (chitupa) that they carried at all times (Makasa, 2010). The NRO also 
required Africans to have a visitor’s permit that prescribed the duration when visiting 
other townships. Both ENO and NRO only allowed male Africans to work in towns 
(Makasa, 2010; Harris & Parnell, 2012). Therefore, without women in towns these laws 
served as instruments of control of urbanisation that would have otherwise happened 
through natural population growth.  
The ENO further served its control function by establishing an institutional housing 
policy thereby making employers responsible for housing employees but not their 
dependents (Siamwiza, 1986). At the same time, the law ensured that only employed 
Africans could access housing, and loss of that employment led to immediate eviction 
from the house and expulsion from the urban areas (Mutale, 2004; Siamwiza, 1986). 
Furthermore, ENO facilitated capitalism ensuring that employers only supplied housing 
to match the number of employees at any given time. Since employers dealt with 
transient labour, they provided sub-standard housing that suited the migratory nature of 
African labour (Makasa, 2010). African housing was often located in high-density 
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townships, and lacked basic services such as toilets, washrooms and piped water. When 
supplied with communal facilities, these were insufficient for Africans to share 
(Makasa, 2010; Tait, 1997).  
The policy of IWU had tremendous implications for housing provision. Firstly, through 
ENO it promoted institutional housing which tied employment to housing. This meant 
that African migrants were compelled to return to their villages after their work 
contracts. In this instance, the ENO failed to motivate Africans to invest in their own 
housing in towns (Mutale, 2004; Makasa, 2010). By forcing Africans to return to their 
villages upon termination of the contracts, and restricting entry and residence into urban 
areas to only males who were employed the ENO arguably failed to give Africans with 
entrepreneurial potential the chance to settle, invest in property for business or housing 
and thrive in towns (Makasa, 2010). Besides, institutional housing was normally 
inadequate for families and hence, some Africans chose to build houses in squatter 
settlements (Rakodi, 1986a). Secondly, the Natives Private Estate Ordinance (NPEO) 
that the coloniser passed later to control squatting on private estates failed to stop the 
growth of squatter settlements on private farms. Hence, the coloniser introduced the 
Private Locations Ordinance (PLO) in 1939 to regularise the settlements on private 
estates with the consent of estate owners (Mutale, 2004). On the other hand, the PLO 
legitimatised squatter settlements.  
Thirdly, ENO encouraged segregated residential housing not as a way of controlling 
urbanisation but as Myers (2005) observed, as a form of racial segregation in urban 
areas. According to Home (1997), the colonial planners then used urban space for 
conspicuous consumption and maintaining inequality between the whites and native 
Africans. Hence, they created white townships with better-serviced houses than those 
built for Africans in the townships called locations (Makasa, 2010; Home, 1997). While 
whites enjoyed relative comfort in spacious houses, Africans languished in squalor in 
single quarters and barrack-type housing (Schumaker, 1996; Shurmer-Smith, 2011). 
African locations were also under night curfews and daytime police patrols, while 
access to some places within the locations was restricted (Makasa, 2010; Schumaker, 
1996). Faced with such restrictions, many Africans opted to live in squatter settlements 
among fellow Africans where they could be respected and enjoy relative freedom of 
movement (Makasa, 2010). Lastly, the ENO together with the NRO neglected to 
develop rural areas to which African workers would return upon termination of their 
labour contracts. Although both laws intended to keep unemployed African males and 
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women away from towns, they failed to encourage the coloniser to develop the rural 
areas (Gardner, 2009; 2012). Hence, after completing their labour contracts some 
African could not go back to villages where they would lack many services. Therefore, 
they built houses in squatter settlements.  
5.2.2 Stabilisation without Urbanisation: Implications for Housing 
The second policy of Stabilisation without Urbanisation (SWU) began in the 1930s 
when the colonial administration desired to stabilise labour for the mines. SWU brought 
about changes in the duration of labour contracts for Africans from temporary to 
permanent (Ochonu, 2013). Nonetheless, the colonial administration pursued labour 
stabilisation cautiously to curb the influx of Africans in towns (Makasa, 2010; Tait, 
1997). Regardless, more Africans migrated to towns to find work but there was no 
corresponding housing to accommodate them (Mutale, 2004; Makasa, 2010). As 
Ochonu (2013) observes, labour stabilization solved the problem of labour recruitment 
and high labour turnover for many colonial employers but it created housing challenges 
for the coloniser. Existing housing was insufficient to meet the needs of African 
workers who came with families. Besides, remuneration for Africans was generally 
poor and hence, could not afford to buy or build houses from their wages (Duignan & 
Gann, 1975; Gardner, 2012).  
Therefore, to respond to the housing shortage that labour stabilisation caused, the 
colonial administration introduced a new law called the Urban African Housing 
Ordinance (UAHO) in 1948 (Mutale, 2004). Earlier in 1947, the colonial administrators 
had formulated a ten-year development plan (1947-1957) for Northern Rhodesia that 
included the provision of more African and European housing (Baldwin, 1966; Gardner, 
2012). Whereas contractors would build European housing, local governments were to 
provide African housing (UN-Habitat, 2003a; Baldwin, 1966). The initial budget of £13 
million provided £1 million (7.7 percent) for African housing but when it was revised to 
£54.2 million in 1953, African housing received £.6.6 million (12.1 percent) (Baldwin, 
1966, pp. 195-199). According to Baldwin (1966), between 1947 and 1961, the colonial 
administration spent £11.7 million and £8.3 million on African housing and European 
housing, respectively. However, when the coloniser formed the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland in 1953, resource prioritisation favoured Southern Rhodesia for building 
of the new federation headquarters in Salisbury (Gardner, 2012). As such, funding to 
local councils for African housing diminished making it difficult to provide public 
housing (Mutale, 2004). Inadequate public housing for Africans led to many Africans’ 
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continued living in squatter settlements (Makasa, 2010).  
On one hand, UAHO like ENO limited housing development by supporting institutional 
housing. Hence, it did not provide incentives for Africans to build their own houses as 
long as they lived in institutional houses (Mutale, 2004; Makasa, 2010). On the other 
hand, UAHO seemed better than ENO in many ways. Firstly, the UAHO enabled 
African workers to get long-term labour contracts and resident permits. It also allowed 
Africans them to bring their families to towns and hence, helped them maintain family 
ties (Simatele & Simatele, 2009). Secondly, UAHO allowed local councils to build 
houses in suburbs for rent to married couples and hostels for bachelors (Sanyal, 1981). 
As such, anyone who could afford to live in town had the opportunity to do so. Thirdly, 
it allowed Africans to build houses on council leased land, which also saw the 
beginning of African towns in the Copperbelt (Mutale, 2004). In Lusaka, self-employed 
or unemployed Africans were allowed to build houses on land outside municipal 
boundaries, a situation which somewhat ‘legalised’ the formation of squatter settlements 
(Tait, 1997; UN-Habitat, 2003a; Myers, 2005).  
Under SWU, the colonial administration continued with employment-tied housing, a 
practice that as already discussed discouraged Africans investment in own housing. 
Moreover, the transient nature of African migratory labour did not encourage companies 
to invest in sufficient housing for African workers and their families (Mutale, 2004; 
Rakodi, 1986a; Njoh, 2007). Even when the coloniser employed more labour to stabilise 
labour supply for the mines, there was no corresponding investment in African housing. 
The result of the migratory labour system was that Africans bore the cost of spatial 
dislocation (Parnell & Oldfield, 2014). On the other hand, employers benefited 
“because workers’ families were left in the rural areas to carry on with farming, which 
moderated their wage requirements and housing costs” (Tukor, 2014, p. 134). Because 
companies were dealing with transient migratory labour, it was easier to adjust their 
production requirements than if they employed permanent labour. Therefore, it was also 
easy to provide housing that also matched the kind and quantity of workers they needed 
at any particular time (Tukor, 2014). Consequently, African housing consisted mostly of 
non-durable building materials and was devoid of essential social amenities. This 
implies that at independence Zambia inherit both a quantitatively constrained and 
qualitatively challenged urban housing stock (Rakodi, 1986b). 
Furthermore, like the IWU policy, SWU did not encourage rural development. As a 
result, more Africans also migrated into towns to find gainful employment and other 
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opportunities not found in rural areas (Njoh, 2007; Makasa, 2010). Other factors that 
fuelled mass exodus of Africans to towns included the collapse of the rural economy 
because of the introduction of a cash economy, poor crop yields due to infertile soils, 
and environmental factors such as floods and droughts (Fry, 1979; Ranger, 1980). 
Nonetheless, since urban housing was insufficient to meet increased housing demand 
from migrants, many settled in squatter settlements (Makasa, 2010; Rakodi, 1986a).  
To summarise, the colonial regime preoccupied itself with maximising profit through 
industrial activity. As such, its development policies of industrialisation without 
urbanisation and stabilisation without urbanisation worked to limit African presence to 
its minimum in towns. Therefore, to reinforce their goal the colonial administration 
passed laws that did not foster an environment sufficient for decent African housing 
development. For instance, these laws encouraged institutional housing that did not 
provide an incentive for Africans to build their own houses in urban areas. The laws 
required Africans to return to their villages after expiration of work contracts. This 
practice also did not encourage Africans to invest in decent urban housing. By 
favouring transient labour, the laws did not encourage companies to invest in decent 
housing for African workers and their families. In essence, to fulfil classical liberal 
pursuits of maximising profits the coloniser rationed African housing. Consequently, 
inadequate investment in housing created a shortage of urban housing, which became 
more apparent as more Africans migrated to towns to find employment and other 
opportunities they did not have in rural areas. Therefore, to meet their housing needs 
migrants settled in squatter settlements on the town peripheries or on white farms.  
5.3 INDEPENDENCE ERA: FREEDOM WITHOUT HOUSING 
For purposes of this research, the independence era defines the period from October 
1964 to October 1991. Zambia began under a democratic regime at independence in 
1964 (Chikulo, 2009). Nonetheless, soon after independence the democracy transitioned 
into authoritarianism as the state abandoned capitalism to adopt socialism as its 
overarching ideology under the theme of humanism – man at the centre of development 
(Sklar, 1974; Phiri, 2001; Erdmann & Simutanyi, 2003). Arguably, like other newly 
independent African states, Zambia sought to correct socio-economic imbalances 
capitalism created colonial rule (Newman, 2005; Nyerere, 1987; Nkrumah, 1965). 
Socialism then seemed the best alternative as its core principle was to transfer means of 
production from private to state ownership. The assumption was that the state would 
distribute the resources equitably among society (Jalan, 2005). In 1969, the state began 
121 
nationalising several private interests including two large mining companies called 
Roan Consolidated Mines Limited and Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Limited. 
Later in 1982, the state amalgamated the mines to form the Zambia Consolidated 
Copper Mines (ZCCM) and acquired a fifty-one percent majority shareholding 
(Limpitlaw, 2011). Socialism also induced government into forming a single-party state 
after merging the state and ruling party structures to form the Party-and-Its-Government 
(PIG) model of government in 1972 (also see 2.3.1).  
At independence, the new government ‘activated’ citizens’ freedoms including the 
freedom of movement and choice of where one lived (Makasa, 2010). Consequently, 
there was unprecedented rural-urban migration, which created an acute shortage of 
urban housing (Seymour, 1975). Seemingly, prior to the British exit from Northern 
Rhodesia the colonial administration relaxed migration rules that led to the beginning of 
mass migrations into urban areas. In 1963, one year before independence twenty-one 
percent of the population was already in urban areas. By 1969, urban population had 
risen to twenty-nine percent (see Table 1.1). This urban population explosion created 
serious consequences for social infrastructure and services including housing, health 
and education. In particular, housing was insufficient to satisfy all urban dwellers. 
Hence, many migrants settled in squatter settlements that although they began during 
the colonial era, grew rapidly after independence (Seymour, 1975). For example, by 
1974 Lusaka alone had over thirty squatter settlements (Hansen, 1982; Seymour, 1975). 
Hence, the independence era has become synonymous with freedom without housing.  
Therefore, to address the housing crisis, the government intervened through various 
housing programmes including conventional housing, sites-and-services schemes, and 
squatter upgrading (see Chapter 6). Unlike the capitalist authoritarian regime that 
rationed housing to curb urbanisation (see 5.2), the authoritarian socialist regime 
considered housing as a human right and hence, felt compelled to provide public 
housing as its social responsibility (GRZ, 1965a; 1966a; 1971b). Through local councils 
and parastatal companies, the state provided housing for rent and subsidized housing for 
employees, respectively (Mutale, 2004). Funding for public housing was mostly from 
proceeds of many state-controlled enterprises including the ZCCM (Larmer, 2011).  
5.3.1 Socialist Policies and Laws, and Implications on Housing 
The socialist state did not have a comprehensive housing policy for public housing 
provision (Makasa, 2010). However, it planned housing programmes through four 
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national development plans, each of which pursued a specific housing objective 
(Mutale, 2004; Rakodi, 1986a; Sanyal, 1981). The housing objective in the Transitional 
Development Plan (TDP) (1965-1966) was to meet the housing need by providing 
adequate housing for all citizens (GRZ, 1965a). The First National Development Plan 
(1NDP) that lasted between 1966 and 1970 aimed to continue providing conventional 
housing and encourage owner-occupied housing as a fundamental human right for all 
citizens (GRZ, 1966a). The state pursued the objective of meeting the housing needs of 
low-income households in urban areas in the Second National Development Plan 
(2NDP) (1972-1976) (GRZ, 1971b). The Third National Development Plan (3NDP) 
planned for the 1979-1989 period, sought to attain minimum shelter standards (GRZ, 
1979). Government intended to continue with the 3NDP housing objective in the Fourth 
National Development Plan (4NDP). However, the state did not implement the 4NDP 
off for lack of funding (JICA, 2007).  
To support the housing objectives, government amended the Town and Country 
Planning Act (TCPA) of 1961, and passed several new laws including the Lands 
Acquisition Act, Building Societies Act, National Housing Authority (NHA) Act, 
Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act, and Land (Conversion of Titles) Act, 
(see Appendix O). However, while intended to support housing provision, some of the 
laws stifled it. To begin with, in 1965, the state amended the existing TCPA by 
removing the provision for a land tribunal. In the 2NDP government stated that 
demolishing squatter settlements was retrogressive because it destroyed valuable 
properties (GRZ, 1971b). Hence, it gave local councils the mandate to formalise 
squatter settlements in council areas and give land titles occupancy licences to 
homeowners in statutory and improvement areas, respectively (UN-Habitat, 2012a; 
Schlyter, 1998). Having realised that the TCPA did not support squatter settlements, 
government introduced the Housing Act in 1974 to provide for the control and 
improvement of housing in sites-and-services (statutory) areas and squatter settlements 
(improvement areas) (GRZ, 1974). The Housing Act also played a pivotal role in the 
implementation of the sites-and-services, and squatter upgrading programmes in Lusaka 
(Tordoff, 1974). Moreover, the Housing Act signalled a turning point in government’s 
negative attitudes towards squatter settlements (UN-Habitat, 2005a; Berrisford, 2011). 
Both these Acts have not helped much in housing provision per se. For instance, the 
TCPA maintains the high building standards inherited from Britain. These standards are 
too high for the Zambian environment and especially for low-income housing (Keare & 
Paris, 1982; World Bank, 2002a). Hence, they contribute to raising the cost of building 
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or purchasing houses in formal areas, which discourages many forcing them to build in 
squatter settlements (Drummond, et al., 2013). The Housing Act on the other hand, 
gives the Minister for local government too much control over the squatter legalisation 
and upgrading process (GRZ, 1974). Hence, local councils find it difficult to expedite 
the squatter upgrading without government approval.  
Likewise, the new Land Acquisition Act in 1970 gave government powers to take over 
without compensation, tracks of land abandoned by their foreign owners (Tordoff, 
1974; Hansungule, 2001). At the time, it was crucial because private owners controlled 
large tracks of land and hence, made it difficult for government to build infrastructure 
for development (GRZ, 1970). On the other hand, the Land Acquisition Act discouraged 
private investment in housing because landowners feared that government would 
compulsorily acquire their land (Roth, et al., 1995). Similarly, in the same year 
government passed the Building Societies Act and created the Zambia National 
Building Society (ZNBS) to promote homeownership through mortgage lending 
(Rakodi, 1986a). However, mortgage lending only favoured those who were in 
employment (Mutale, 2004). Low-income households who needed finance to improve 
their housing during the Lusaka Squatter Upgrading Project (LSUP) did not have access 
to mortgages (Rakodi, 1986a).  
Next, overwhelmed with the demand for housing government sought to form an agency 
to manage and coordinate housing programmes and hence, it passed the NHA Act in 
1971, which created the National Housing Authority (NHA) (GRZ, 1971a). Beginning 
in 1972, the NHA became responsible for organising and controlling national housing 
programmes (Tordoff, 1974; GRZ, 1971a). Its mandate also included advising 
government on matters pertaining to housing, promoting homeownership through 
provision of affordable housing, providing technical assistance to local councils, 
building, managing and maintaining housing estates, and undertaking research and 
development on low-cost housing (GRZ, 1971a; Makasa, 2010). However, it seems 
NHA focused on meeting the housing needs of higher income groups and civil servants 
who could afford to build their own houses more than on low-income households. As 
such, the state failed to motivate those who had resources to invest in housing (Makasa, 
2010; Mutale, 2004). Like in the colonial era, through the NHA that provided housing 
for civil servants the socialist regime encouraged institutional housing which was not an 
incentive for occupiers to build own houses (Makasa, 2010; Seymour, 1975).  
Lastly, government passed the Land (Conversion of Titles) Act in 1975 that emphasised 
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national patrimony over the land and land vested in the President, using land to its 
fullest advantage, and land not being a commodity for alienation for private gain 
(Hansungule, 2001; Roth, et al., 1995; GRZ, 1975). Actually, this Act limited people’s 
access to land (Mutale, 2004). It also catalysed illegal land acquisition through illegal 
invasions and hence, contributed to the prevalence of squatter settlements. Seymour 
(1975) charges that officials of the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) 
sometimes encouraged and certainly condoned the formation of squatter settlements, 
whose populations provided a massive base of political support (see 2.3.4).  
To summarise, it is evident that the socialist policies and laws while intended to 
promote public housing provision, actually stifled it in many respects. Consquently, the 
socialist regime failed to achieve its housing objectives, while squatter settlements that 
began during the colonial era continued to grow rapidly (see 5.2). Hence, even as the 
state ‘activated’ the freedoms of people and allowed them to live wherever they chose in 
urban areas, it did not provide a sufficient environment with adequate housing for them.  
5.4 POST-INDEPENDENCE ERA: ‘ENABLED’ WITHOUT HOUSING 
The post-independence era spanning from 1991 to date, marked the end of the socialist 
era and beginning of a democratic neoliberal regime under the Movement for Multi-
Party Democracy (MMD) (Rakner, 2003; Chikulo, 2009). There have many government 
administrations since 1991 including the Frederick Chiluba, Levy Patrick Mwanawasa, 
Rupiah Bwezani Banda, and Michael Chilufya Sata. The approach to housing during the 
post-independence era has been somewhat different from the previous two eras. 
Government investment in housing seems to have declined considerably especially after 
embracing neoliberalism since 1992 upon advice from the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to revamp the ailing economy.  
According to Harvey (2005, p. 2), neoliberalism “proposes that human well-being can 
best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, 
and free trade.” Believed to be reformed classical liberalism, neoliberalism follows on 
the ideals of its predecessor (Thorsen, 2009). For instance, it advocates for a minimalist 
state, is concerned about individual property rights, and favours markets as efficient 
allocators of means of production (Heywood, 2003). Zambia’s initial encounter with 
neoliberalism began in the late 1980s when government made two failed attempts at 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) between 1987 and 1991 (Saasa, 1996; 2002). 
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In 1991, it re-entered SAP for the third time under supervision of the World Bank and 
IMF (Saasa, 1996). The country accepted SAP’s austerity measures, which included 
removal of price controls, interest rates liberalisation, salaries and wage freezes, and 
reduction on social spending. Others were promotion of property rights, and 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises (Fraser & Lungu, 2008).  
Cutting government spending on social services created adverse repercussions for 
service delivery (Henriot, 1997; Fraser, 2007). For example, government tremendously 
reduced funding to local councils for new housing. As such, as the urban population 
increased affordable low-income housing became scare leading to many households 
living in squatter settlements (see Table 1.3). Moreover, as government pursued a 
liberalised economy some of its actions left local councils vulnerable and incapable of 
providing public housing. In 1996, government sold all council houses to sitting tenants 
(Makasa, 2010; Mutale, 2004). Consequently, local councils lost an assured source of 
revenue (Schlyter & Tran, 2005; Chikulo, 2009). They also suffered losses on the sales 
because government sold the houses at giveaway prices (Schlyter, 2003a; UN-Habitat, 
2012a). Housing rentals constituted the largest share of revenues for nearly all councils 
(UN-Habitat, 2003a). Furthermore, although government pledged to create an enabling 
environment to encourage private investment in housing (GRZ, 1996a), it appears to 
have failed to do so. Despite liberalising the housing market, private sector investment 
in low-income housing has not been sufficient to meet the housing needs of low-income 
households. Hence, due to inadequate low-income housing, many urban dwellers now 
live in squatter settlements. Evidence shows that between two intercensal periods 1990-
2000 and 2000-2010, squatter population increased by over 100 percent from 1.7 to 3.6 
million (see Table 1.2). Without sufficient investment in low-income housing, squatter 
settlements would continue to grow.  
5.4.1 Neoliberal Policies and Implications for Housing 
As in the socialist regime, the government during the post-independence era has 
outlined several housing objectives through national development plans (GRZ, 2006a; 
2011). The housing objectives include the following:  
 Provide adequate affordable housing for all income groups;  
 Increase the housing stock in districts for both homeownership and rental;  
 Improve the living environment of unplanned urban settlements by providing 
municipal services in settlements;  
 Provide adequate and affordable low cost housing for the urban poor; and 
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 Create serviced plots for individuals and the private sector to build houses.  
To achieve these objectives, government pledged to create an enabling environment first 
by ensuring that it formulated a National Housing Policy (NHP) and provided a legal 
framework to support housing investment. Government formulated the NHP in response 
to the need to stimulate housing investment (Makasa, 2010). The goal of the NHP was 
to facilitate provision of affordable housing for all income groups by creating an 
enabling environment for housing investment (GRZ, 1996a). As such, the NHP outlined 
several strategies that were critical to creating an enabling environment that would 
stimulate investment in housing, and these included the following:  
 Allocate at least 15 percent of the national annual budget to housing; 
 Make serviced land available for housing development; 
 Streamline the land allocation system; 
 Streamlining of building standards, regulations and other controls; 
 Encourage the production and use of local and affordable building materials; 
 Assist the poor to acquire decent shelter; 
 Foster housing areas that are sustainable and accommodating to all; and 
 Prepare a national housing implementation strategy.  
However, it appears government failed to implement fully the NHP. For instance, 
although government pledged to set aside fifteen percent of the national budget annually 
towards housing, it has failed to do so. Allocations to housing have been less than 
impressive. Even after announcing the intention to upgrade squatter settlement in the 
5NDP and 6NDP as a contribution to the VISION 2030, budgetary allocations have 
been far less than the pledged fifteen percent (see Figure 5.1).  
 
Figure 5.1: Government Allocations to Housing (2006-2013) 
Compiled from National Budgets (2006-2014) 
This implies that local councils do not receive adequate funding for housing, which has 
led to urban housing shortage. Yet, as noted already the post-independence era has had 
the most increase in squatter population (see 5.4). Besides, government has not 
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introduced any measures to assist the poor acquire decent housing. Therefore, the poor 
continue living in sub-standard housing in squatter settlements. Moreover, land 
administration has remained complex: it involves too many departments (see Appendix 
P). Furthermore, some local councils charge exorbitantly for application fees and 
services charges (see Table 5.1 and Table 5.2). Hence, land access for the poor remains 
difficult and expensive. Those who could afford to pay for land prefer to acquire it 
through the illegal land market in squatter settlements (Hansungule, 2001).  
Table 5.1: Land Acquisition costs (in Zambian Kwacha) in Chipata District 2013 
Plot Type Area (M2) Application 
fees 
Service 
Charges 
Survey 
fees 
Titling 
charges 
Total 
Cost 
Total Cost 
(US$) 
Low-cost 600 250 3,060 1,000 150 4,460 892 
Medium-cost 1,350 250 4,060 1,000 150 5,460 1,092 
High-cost 2,700 250 6,060 1,000 150 7,460 1,492 
Source: Chipata Municipal Council (2013) (US$1.00 equals K5.00) 
Table 5.2: Land Acquisition costs (in Zambian Kwacha) in Kitwe District 2013 
Plot Type Area (M2) Application 
fees 
Service 
Charges 
Survey 
fees 
Titling 
charges 
Total 
Cost 
Total Cost 
(US$) 
Low-cost 240-375 350 3,000 350 150 3,850 716 
Medium-cost 504-600 350 8,000 500 150 9,900 1,980 
High-cost 1,400-2,400 500 16,000 600 150 17,100 3,420 
Source: Kitwe City Council (2013) (US$1.00 equals K5.00) 
There has been no effort to date to streamline the building standards that many analysts 
observed were too high especially for low-income housing (see 5.3.1). Drummond et al 
(2013) note that building standards are quite high and add to the high cost of building 
especially for low-income households. Moreover, high building standards force people 
to build houses in squatter settlements where such standards do not apply (GRZ, 1974) 
and hence, the prevalence of squatter settlements. Similarly, consistent with the 
objective of empowering citizens by assisting the poor to acquire decent shelter, 
government introduced a homeownership policy and sold all public housing to sitting 
tenants (GRZ, 1996c). Although the homeownership policy was a good idea for 
promoting homeownership especially among the urban poor, the sale of council housing 
robbed councils of significant revenue (see 5.4). In fact, government did not consult 
local councils on the policy, an action that clearly acts against democratic governance 
principles (World Bank, 2002a). Clearly, the NHP has failed to implement several of its 
outlined strategies for creating an enabling environment for housing investment. The 
likely reason for this failure is lack of an implementation plan that was in fact, one of 
government’s strategies to creating an enabling environment. Hence, there is no 
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benchmark to compare performance against targets. Similarly, during the post-
independence era, government has formulated many other policies and laws that have 
diminished the fiscal position of local councils, resulting in diminished capacity to 
provide housing (see Appendix Q).  
Regarding the provision of an effective legal framework to support the creation of an 
enabling environment for housing investment, government amended some existing laws 
and created new ones. The most notable ones include the Lands Act, Employment Act, 
and the Town and Country Planning Act (TCPA) (see Appendix R). However, it 
appears that some laws have contributed more to the urban housing shortage than 
stimulate investment in housing. To begin with, the Lands Act of 1995 that repealed 
many other land laws
14
 liberalised the land market and set a land development fund to 
promote land acquisition and housing development by local councils (GRZ, 1995; Roth, 
et al., 1995). It also provides for transfer of land from the state to local councils and 
government ministries, and customary land to leasehold (UN-Habitat, 2012a). Yet, the 
Lands Act still vests all land in the President as custodian on behalf of the people 
(Hansungule, 2001). The implications of the Lands Act on housing are that although 
government has now liberalised the land market and enabled citizens to have access to 
land, it has also attracted unprecedented interest in land ownership. Those who are able 
to pay the prices asked by local councils are able to acquire as much land as they can 
and hold it until they can sell it for large profits on the land market when prices are 
high. Land speculation has become so rampant that it has led to artificial land shortages 
(Roth, et al., 1995). The new Lands Act places ‘value’ on land so that local councils 
impose exorbitant land charges (see Table 5.1 and Table 5.2) Consequently, access to 
land has become increasingly difficult for the poor who cannot pay the high application 
fees and services charges local councils demand (Hansungule, 2001). As such, they seek 
cheap land sold on the black land market supported by illegal land invasions and sub-
divisions has emerged (UN-Habitat, 2005a; Hansen & Vaa, 2004).  
Likewise, an amendment to the Employment Act in 1997 ended employment-tied 
housing initiated in the colonial era (see 5.2) and carried on during the independence era 
(see 5.3). Therefore, employers no longer have an obligation to house their employees 
                                                 
14
 Others were the Zambia (State Land and Reserves) Orders 1928-1964, Zambia (Trust Land) Orders 
1947-1964, Zambia (Gwembe District) Orders, 1959-1964, and Western Province (Land Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act of 1970. 
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(GRZ, 1997a). Instead, employers can pay employees a housing allowance in lieu of 
housing calculated at least thirty percent of the employee’s basic pay (JCTR, 2006; 
GRZ, 1997a). Employers could also give employees housing loans or advance towards 
the purchase or construction of a house, and guarantee facility for a mortgage (GRZ, 
1997a; Schlyter, 1998; Mutale, 2004). Nevertheless, it seems that many employers have 
exploited the Employment Act to their own advantage by promoting casual employment 
to avoid paying housing allowances and other obligations to employees (Bodibe, 2006). 
As Bodibe (2006) and Petrauskis (2006) observe, there has been a rise in labour 
casualization since the beginning of the post-independence era, which has reduced 
employees’ bargaining power for better service conditions including salaries and wages. 
Although government determines the minimum wages and conditions of employment, 
many employers do not abide by them (GRZ, 1994). Therefore, being on casual 
employment many employees are at risk of employment at any time and sometimes 
without benefits. Furthermore, often employers fail to pay sufficient housing allowances 
to employees or provide them with loan or mortgage guarantees to enable them to 
access housing finance (JCTR, 2006; Petrauskis, 2006). As such, the Employment Act 
has not eased the problem of access to housing by the poor.  
Lastly, government amended the TCPA in 1997 to provide for establishing a land 
tribunal (GRZ, 1997b). However, the land tribunal does not have jurisdiction over 
customary land and thus, cannot help those who live in peripheral areas, most of whom 
are poor and disadvantaged (UN-Habitat, 2012a). Furthermore, the TCPA failed to 
address the obvious conflict it has with the Housing Act regarding handling of squatter 
settlements in urban areas (see 5.3). The TCPA provides a framework for spatial 
planning, granting of planning permission and control of development in urban areas. 
Hence, all structures built without planning permission are to be demolished (GRZ, 
1997b). Some analysts have called on government to realign the TCPA to make it 
responsive to challenges of urbanisation, and diversities in socio-economic and political 
developments (Rakodi, 1986a; Njoh, 2009; Berrisford, 2011).  
To summarise, it is obvious that the democratic regimes during the post-independence 
era have not improved the urban housing situation. Failure to create an enabling 
environment for housing investment has contributed to the housing shortage, as local 
councils do not receive funding for new public housing development. Moreover, the 
legal framework appears to work against housing provision by creating many 
difficulties for the poor to access land, and finance for investment in housing. 
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Furthermore, various policies that government has implemented have acted together to 
undermine the fiscal position of local councils and hence, diminished their capacity to 
provide public housing to meet the needs of the urban poor. Consequently, many people 
continue living in squatter settlements. Clearly, the state has failed to deliver on all of 
the post-independence housing objectives. Theoretically, government ‘enabled’ and 
empowered citizens, but practically it has failed to transform rhetoric into action.  
5.5 POLITICAL REGIMES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
This section discusses the impact that political regimes have had on local government. 
However, it focuses on the post-colonial period, which includes the independence and 
post-independence eras discussing the evolution of, and politics in local government, 
central-local relations, and funding of local governments.  
5.5.1 Evolution of Local Government 
Until 1996, when government amended the Constitution to provide for a local 
government system based on “democratically elected councils on the basis of universal 
adult suffrage” the local government system was based on a national law (GRZ, 1996b, 
p. 51). Local government has evolved over two main periods, the colonial and post-
colonial periods. The research further divides the post-colonial local government over 
three main periods, 1965-1980, 1980-1991, and 1991- to date (see Appendix S). 
Colonial local government appears to have been a reflection of the British local system 
with different levels of government (Rotberg, 1965). Mukwena (2001, p. 4) describes it 
as “a diffuse collection of government departments enjoying a large measure of 
autonomy and only loosely controlled by any central, coordinating body, whether 
bureaucratic or political.” Nonetheless, for administrative purposes, the colonial 
administration divided Northern Rhodesia into eight provinces and further subdivided 
provinces into districts (Bond, 2014). Districts had two levels of administration namely 
management boards in towns, and native authorities in rural areas. Each province had a 
provincial commissioner who had power to appoint directly or to advise the central 
authorities on the appointment of members of various boards and authorities. For 
example, under the Native Authorities Ordinance, he could appoint any African to be 
the “native authority” for an area for a predetermined period (Mukwena, 2001). Native 
Authorities, which the colonial administration created for administrative and taxation 
purposes were organised around chiefdoms as these existed before colonial rule 
(Gardner, 2012). The chiefs then became the appointed ‘native authorities’ and were 
paid a small salary for facilitating colonial indirect rule (Bond, 2014). Later in the late 
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1930s, the colonial administration introduced native treasuries where Native Authorities 
retained a portion of the taxes they collected for development purposes in their areas 
(Schumaker, 1996). The Native Authority was responsible to a district commissioner 
who attended meetings of the native authorities in his jurisdiction in an advisory and 
consultative capacity (Mukwena, 2001).  
However, as Gardner (2012) notes, local government was generally weak because it 
depended on the central government for leadership and financial resources. As such, 
there was no meaningful investment in infrastructure including housing. Besides, the 
colonial administration wanted to limit African presence in towns and hence, did not 
invest much in African housing (see 5.2). Although the colonial administration wanted 
Africans to return to and remain in villages, it did not develop rural areas in particular 
and Northern Rhodesia in general compared to Southern Rhodesia (see 5.2.1). As Mick 
Bond (2014) explained, Southern Rhodesia seemed favoured over its northern partners 
because it had the majority of Europeans for whom the colonial administrations desired 
to provide infrastructure and services. Consequently, because of inadequate funding to 
local governments for African housing development, they were unable to meet the 
Africans housing demand (see 5.2.2).  
Between 1965 and 1980, the socialist regime formulated the Local Government (LG) 
Act of 1965 based on the British system and suitable for a multiparty system of 
government that the country embraced at independence (Mukwena & Lolojih, 2002). 
This Act also replaced the colonial Municipal and Township Ordinances (see 5.2). The 
LG Act provided for three types of local councils namely municipal, township and rural 
councils. The local councils were further divided into wards, each with an elected 
councillor to serve for a three-year term. The LG Act empowered the President to 
confer the title of ‘city’ on a municipal council, and the Minister of Local Government 
to appoint three to five persons as councillors for each council depending on the level of 
the council. Each municipal [and city] council had an elected mayor and deputy mayor, 
while township and rural councils had chairpersons and vice chairs (GRZ, 1965b). 
Town Clerks (for city and municipal councils) and Council Secretaries (for townships 
and rural councils) constituted the executive wings of the councils while the elected and 
appointed councillors constituted the legislative wing of councils (Mukwena & Lolojih, 
2002). In this phase, local councils had wide-ranging powers in their areas. They also 
had extensive resources that enabled them to provide quality services. Moreover, grants 
to local councils were based on a pre-determined formula (Mukwena & Lolojih, 2002).  
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Between 1980 and 1991, government repealed the 1965 LG Act and replaced it with the 
Local Administration Act of 1980 that provided for merging the PIG (see 5.3) and 
council structures, and created only one type of council called district council (World 
Bank, 2002a). While the Local Administration Act’s main theme was decentralisation, 
it appears that ‘wrong’ structures were decentralised rather than local councils. Instead, 
as Greenwood and Howell (1980, p. 176) observed, “The policy of decentralisation has 
been directed towards strengthening provincial and district administration, inevitably at 
the expense of local government.” Furthermore, contrary to the objective of fostering 
effective integration of primary organs of the local administration there was no real 
integration of PIG and council structures (Gertzel, et al., 1984). As Chikulo (2002a) 
observes, although there was integration of all power structures at the local level, there 
was no fiscal integration in the new system because government funded the district PIG 
and councils separately with the former receiving more funding than the latter 
(Mukwena & Lolojih, 2002). Besides, there was heavy politicisation of local 
governance (Gertzel, et al., 1984). Local councils no longer had elected leadership as 
they were led by politically appointed district governors, and secretaries (World Bank, 
2002a). Therefore, the new council composition now comprised a district governor as 
chairperson, district political secretary, two district trustees, chairpersons of ward 
committees, all parliamentarians in the district, and a representative from the Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the district (Mukwena & Lolojih, 2002; 
Gertzel, et al., 1984).  
Next, some of the policies that government implemented undermined local councils so 
that their capacity to provide housing diminished. In the first place, the extension of the 
PIG into local councils introduced clientelism that created various problems (Tordoff, 
1980; Larmer, 2011). For example, land acquisition seemed to favour UNIP cadres 
more than others (Baylies & Szeftel, 1992). Moreover, it seemed that most of the times 
only UNIP members and ‘sympathizers’ benefitted from state-provided housing 
(Mutale, 2004). As Baylies and Szeftel (1992, p. 78) observed, “Development policy 
became a hostage to the distribution of spoils.” Consequently, those who could not 
access housing or land built houses in squatter settlements and hence, the prevalence of 
squatter settlements (Makasa, 2010; Mutale, 2004). Furthermore, the PIG began 
controlling all investment decisions for councils and had the power to approve or veto 
any council decisions (World Bank, 2002a; Mukwena, 2002). As Tordoff (1980) and 
Bratton (1980) observed, the state systematically eliminated a decentralised local 
government system it inherited from the colonial administration. Local councils ceased 
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being the closest link to the people at the local level (World Bank, 2002a). Through 
these actions, government undermined the capacity of local councils to manage land 
administration and provide public housing. The state also engaged in other acts that set 
in motion the economic downfall of local councils such as withdrawing housing grants 
and forcing councils to invest in unprofitable commercial venture (see Appendix Q).  
The third phase, which is the current phase begun in 1991. The post-independence 
democratic regime introduced the LG Act of 1991 that repealed the Local 
Administration Act (GRZ, 1991). The LG Act also provided for a dual district 
administrative system that involved on the one hand, the field administration of central 
government representing line ministries represented at district level and on the other 
hand, the local councils (Chikulo, 2014). It also defined three types of local councils 
including district, municipal and city councils as autonomous entities (GRZ, 1991). 
Furthermore, through the Local Government Elections Act of 1992, councils began 
having elected councils with elected Mayor/ Council Chairperson as heads of city and 
municipal, and district councils, respectively, while the Town Clerks/ Council 
Secretaries were executive heads of the of a city and municipal, and district councils, 
respectively (Chikulo, 2014). Later, the state amended the Constitution to provide for a 
local government system (GRZ, 1996b). However, the Constitution neglected to define 
the purpose and functions of local councils leaving them at the mercy of an Act of 
Parliament that government could change any time to suit a given political situation 
(MCRC, 2005; GRZ, 1996b).  
The current composition of the local government system includes the parent ministry, 
the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MLGH), and the local councils. The 
MLGH oversees and supervises councils through the Provincial Local Government 
Office (PLGO) that conveys ministerial policy directives and instructions to councils for 
execution (GRZ, 1991). The PLGO also provides the necessary technical support to 
councils regularly. It also collects and analyses information or reports from councils 
regularly or on demand by the Ministry, and submits such information or reports to the 
MLGH (CLGF, 2013). Yet, PLGOs have proved ineffective as supervisors because they 
are inadequately staffed (Mukwena, 2002). The MLGH also ensures that it distributes 
financial resources to councils for the performance of assigned functions (GRZ, 1991).  
Local councils, on the other hand, are agencies of central government whose main roles 
are service delivery, and local governance (World Bank, 2002a). They provide a range 
of prescribed services including water and sanitation, health services, fire services, road 
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services, municipal police services, primary education, and agricultural. Their service 
delivery is supported by the LG Act (GRZ, 1991; Mukwena & Lolojih, 2002), and other 
legislation including the Public Health Act (PHA), Housing Act (GRZ, 1974), TCPA, 
(GRZ, 1997b), and Lands Act (GRZ, 1995). The Local Government Elections Act 
provides guidance for the mandate of fostering local democracy (GRZ, 1992; CLGF, 
2013). Nevertheless, other agencies that operate within the local government system 
include the National Housing Authority (NHA) (see 5.3.1) and Local Government 
Association of Zambia (LGAZ). The NHA appears inconspicuous to local government 
as it operates autonomously with direct links to central government. LGAZ on the other 
hand, is a voluntary membership organisation without constitutional status but still an 
important organisation in its representation of local councils (CLGF, 2013).  
The impact of the authoritarian socialist regime on local governments mainly emanated 
from government’s decision to merge the PIG and the councils. To consolidate 
socialism government engaged in actions that undermined the autonomy of local 
councils in terms of decision making (see 5.3.1). Additionally, government undertook 
several actions that affected negatively the fiscal position of local councils (see 5.3.1 
and Appendix Q). Consequently, councils began failing to provide quality services 
including housing (Mukwena, 2002; Lolojih, 2008). Apparently, democratic regimes 
during the post-independence era have engaged in more actions that have affected local 
councils than the socialist regime did in the first two phases of local government (see 
Appendix Q). These actions have undermined local councils and rendered them 
incapable of providing quality services and meeting their fiscal obligations such as 
salaries and wages (Chikulo, 2014).  
5.5.2 Politics in Local Government 
The post-colonial local government system has witnessed instances of devolution and 
recentralisation throughout its evolution (World Bank, 2002a). During the period 1965-
80, councils enjoyed relative autonomy and made their own fiscal decisions regarding 
investments and the like (see 5.5.1). However, after merging the district PIG and 
councils the socialist regime centralised and politicised local councils (Lolojih, 2008). 
The post-independence attempt at decentralisation seems not to be working despite 
creating local councils as autonomous entities (see 5.5.1). In fact, between 1991 and 
2004 government engaged in actions that not only indicated that councils were not 
autonomous but also deprived them of lucrative revenue sources (see Appendix Q). 
Despite launching the Decentralisation Policy in 2004 and formulating its 
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implementation plan in 2009 (GRZ, 2009b; CLGF, 2013), government has not 
implemented decentralisation fully. Local councils still lack fiscal autonomy while the 
state continues with its destabilising acts.  
It appears that politics have played a major part in shaping local government – each 
government administration usually has its own policies relating to local government 
(Rakner, 2003). Local government politics are at two levels, local and national. At the 
local level there are, elected councillors. These represent and operate within the 
expectations of their respective sponsoring political parties (Copus, 2004, p. 1). For this 
reason, councillors’ allegiance is more to their parties than to the electorates. Then there 
are Parliamentarians
15
 whom the LG Act defines as councillors too (GRZ, 1991). These 
bring a strong presence of national politics and tend to dominate deliberations in local 
councils as they ensure to meet their party aspirations. However, their continued 
presence in councils has created tension between them, elected councillors and council 
managers (Mukwena & Lolojih, 2002). Hence, these factors - councillors being more 
accountable to their parties than to electorates, and presence of Parliamentarians in 
councils, explain why local politics are a replica of national politics (Copus, 2004).  
Politics determines the distribution and bargaining of power between different levels of 
government. Therefore, at the national level politics hinges on the balance of power 
between central and local governments. The balance of power matters because 
“improving the lives of local people and local communities matters, and because where 
the balance of power between central and local government lies, there lies the 
responsibility and accountability for the delivery of those improvements” (CLGC, 2009, 
p. 5). Moreover, it matters because the country needs a strong democracy based on 
participatory local governance. By virtue of their creation as autonomous entities with 
various powers and authority to make decisions, councils should have strong bargaining 
powers with government (see 5.5.1). As the LG Act stipulates in Section 6:  
Every council shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal, 
capable of suing and of being sued in its corporate name, and with power, subject to the 
provisions of this Act and of any other written law, to do all such other acts and things as 
a body corporate may do by law and as are necessary for, or incidental to the carrying out 
of its functions and powers as set out in this Act.  
This provision establishes councils as autonomous entities capable of suing and being 
                                                 
15
 These are Members of Parliament elected to the national Assembly to represent electorates in 
constituencies. 
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sued in their own cognisance and hence, should have significant negotiating powers in 
terms of how government treats them. Moreover, Section 61 of the LG Act gives 
councils immense powers including the power to discharge various functions 
categorised broadly as general administration, agricultural services, community 
development, provision of public amenities, provision of education, provision of public 
health facilities, and sanitation and drainage services. Councils also have powers to: 
 Prepare and adopt annual estimates (Section 39); 
 Make investments (Section 44); 
 Borrow money (Section 47); 
 Enter into contracts (outsourcing services) (Section 63);  
 Make standing orders (Section 64);  
 Make by-laws and impose fees, levies and charges (Section 69, 70 and 76);  
 Hire and fire own staff (Section 90); and 
 Institute legal proceedings (Section 112)  
However, the same LG Act diminishes councils’ autonomy through provisions that give 
the state absolute power over local councils. Most of the powers mentioned above are 
subject to ministerial regulation and approval (GRZ, 1991). For example, the LG Act 
stipulates in Section 22(1), that local councils should hold ordinary and special meetings 
on dates and venues they choose but it qualifies that with a proviso:  
[If] the first ordinary meeting of a council newly established under this Act shall be held 
at such place, on such day and at such time as the Minister may appoint.  
Moreover, the LG Act mandates local councils to manage their own staff affairs based 
on their capacity (GRZ, 1991). However, under a new administration government 
created the Local Government Service Commission (LGSC), which now handles staff 
recruitment matters of councils (GRZ, 2010; UN-Habitat, 2012b). Furthermore, the LG 
Act allows councils to apply for loans from government but approval of such loans 
depends on the Minister who determines what to give out (Section 45). Besides, 
councils have the power to borrow and invest but the Act prohibits them from foreign 
borrowing or receiving grants from foreign organisations (Section 47). Additionally, the 
LG Act gives the Minister power to suspend or dissolve councils whenever he deems it 
fit (Section 88), and this diminishes their autonomy.  
The fact that central government enjoys the monopoly of coercive power diminishes 
further the bargaining powers of local councils. Coercive power here refers to the ability 
of government to use its authority or power to threaten, suppress freedoms and mete out 
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legal punishment to force institutions into doing what it dictates (French & Raven, 
1959). Coercive power as far as councils are concerned, involves punishments and 
rewards. As such, some of the councils often align themselves to ruling political parties 
to receive rewards (World Bank, 2002a). Government often punishes local councils that 
do not support the ruling party (see 2.3.3). As observed already, political patronage 
plays a role in how the centre relates to the local (see 2.3.4). Furthermore, with coercive 
power government controls and appropriates revenue sources that are critical to local 
councils’ fiscal stability (World Bank, 2002a; Leiderer, et al., 2012). As noted already, 
the post-independence regimes have engaged in actions that have caused councils to 
lose major revenue sources, and hence weakened their fiscal position (see 5.5.1).  
5.5.3 Central-Local Relations 
Central-local relations in Zambia are generally characterised by tension, suspicion and 
central dominance that undermine the councils’ autonomy and legitimacy and hence, 
reduce their responsiveness to the citizens at the local level (Chikulo, 2014). It is partly 
the reason decentralisation has failed to take off despite several attempts to decentralise 
(Mukwena, 2002). Central-local relations exhibit an imbalance of power between the 
centre and councils. As observed earlier, while the LG Act gives local councils vast 
powers, it also gives central government absolute powers over councils (see 5.5.2). 
Hence, since the 1970s government has exercised its supreme power and authority to 
engage in actions that have systematically weakened local councils (see Appendix Q). 
Since the balance of power in the central-local nexus leans more to the centre than to the 
local, it limits the councils’ access to the centre. Unfortunately, there is no local 
government regulatory body to intervene in the plight of local councils. Although local 
councils could seek intervention through LGAZ, but as earlier noted LGAZ is not a 
constitutional body and thus, has no real influence on government (see 5.5.1). For 
instance, at its annual conference in 2013, LGAZ (2013) implored government to allow 
local councils “to determine, as far as possible their own internal administrative 
structures, to adapt them to local needs and to ensure sustainable and effective 
management.” LGAZ also raised the issue regarding funding for salaries of officers 
employed by the LGSC. According to the LG (Amendment) Act No. 12 of 2010, central 
government was to meet the wage bill. However, it appears that government had 
abrogated the Act’s proviso and as such, the LGAZ (2013) was:  
Surprised at the shift of policy by government to give a salary grant to local authorities to 
meet the wage bill for officers falling under the Local Government Service 
Commission…We are informed that the extent of government support will only be to 
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District Councils, which will receive 100% of their salary bill. This decision has 
budgetary implications since all local authorities’ budgets were prepared and balanced on 
the understanding that government shall give a full grant as provided under the law.  
Furthermore, central-local relations tend to be clientelistic. To advance their political 
existence, government administrations often make policies that favour their clients 
above the interests of others (see 2.3.4). For instance, while local councils strove to end 
street vending, the Chiluba administration created a vendors’ desk at State House in 
1993 and ordered councils not to ‘victimise’ vendors (Hansen, 2010). At the time, 
vendors were among the MMD’s biggest supporters (see 2.3.1). However, this action 
legitimised and institutionalised street vending, which councils have since failed to 
eliminate (Nchito, 2011). Similarly, the state exhibits patronage in the administration of 
grants to local councils. Some analysts have observed that government seems to favour 
local councils where it has the majority control and penalises opposition-led councils 
(Resnick, 2010; 2014; Rakodi, 2003). For instance, government fails to release 
Constituency Development Funds (CDF) on time while in some cases it does not to 
release the funds at all to some of the opposition-led councils (National Assembly, 
2013; Leiderer, et al., 2012).  
It seems the way the state relates to local councils has to do with the very existence of 
the local government system. The Constitution has failed to define local government 
and hence, left its interpretation to an Act of Parliament that the ruling elite could 
change anytime to suit its political aspirations (see 5.5.1). Besides, it appears that the 
state does not respect the LG Act. When asked if the LG Act provided adequately for 
operations of local councils, one senior council officer explained as follows:  
The Act provides adequately for the operations of local councils. In terms of functions, it is 
still valid. However, the challenge is for government to respect the Act…government 
seems intent on abrogating the Act. 
Nonetheless, although central government appears to wield all the power in the central-
local relations, it has made some strides towards decentralising local governance. To 
allow for wider participation in local governance government formed the Provincial 
Development Coordinating Committee (PDCC), District Development Coordinating 
Committee (DDCC), and Area Development Committee (ADC) structures at the 
provincial, district and sub-district levels, respectively (Chikulo, 2014). PDCC, which is 
chaired by a Provincial Permanent Secretary, draws its membership from provincial 
heads of government ministries, and local council heads (UCLG, 2006). Its main 
responsibility is to coordinate the planning and implementation of development 
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activities in the province (World Bank, 2002a; 2014). DDCC on the other hand, co-
chaired by a local council head and a District Commissioner comprises senior council 
managers, ward councillors, district government departmental heads, and 
representatives from civil society and private sector (CLGF, 2013). Its main role is to 
coordinate development in the district, and prepares development plans for submission 
to the district council (Chikulo, 2014). However, DDCC appears more depictive than 
effective. Like the councils, it cannot query government over development issues. 
Besides many of its members represent government and are responsible to government. 
As Chikulo (2002a, p. 104) points out: 
The majority of the members [DDCC] are bureaucrats representing central government 
departments, and are answerable to their parent ministry, not the local authority…Thus 
they remain primarily responsible to their ministerial chain of command. The DDCC is 
thus rendered ineffective because it has no legal authority to back up its operations, and 
the council has no control over its operations.  
ADCs whose membership is elected through a popular vote system from wards were 
formed based on the Registration and Development of Villages Act (CLGF, 2013). 
Councillors are ex-officios of ADC committees (UCLG, 2006). The functions of ADCs 
are three-fold (Chikulo, 2014; GRZ, 2009b):  
 To allow residents involvement in project formulation and management;  
 To facilitate generation of timely, reliable and accurate data for service delivery 
planning; and  
 To provide an avenue for communities to monitor the performance of councils 
and make them accountable to local residents in the execution of agreed annual 
investment plans.  
The relationship between local and central governments is that of principal-agent (see 
2.3.1). Central government has delegated sixty-three functions to local councils for 
which it is to provide funding for through special and general grants (GRZ, 1991). In 
principle, government has also granted local councils legal authority to exercise their 
powers as they perform their service delivery and local democracy functions. In 
practice, the LG Act that has granted councils autonomy has also limited such 
autonomy by subjecting all council decisions to government approval (see 5.5.2). 
However, the issue of the autonomy of local councils does not seem to have consensus. 
Dollery and Wallis (2001) note that since the state create councils, it controls even their 
actions. Therefore, such local councils cannot be fully autonomous because they need 
regulation (Berman, 2003). However, although Miller (2002) also observes that granting 
local councils full autonomy might create conflict between local and national interests, 
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he points out that they should have autonomy to manage affairs designated as local.  
5.5.4 Funding Local Governments 
Funding of councils has deteriorated since the independence era. In 1991, government 
devolved several functions to local councils (see 5.5.3). However, there appears to be 
very little fiscal decentralisation to enable councils to perform those functions (Chikulo, 
2014). Government continues giving councils many mandates in addition to existing 
assignments, and yet, there is no corresponding funding for the mandates (Lolojih, 
2008; Erdmann & Simutanyi, 2003). Revenue for local councils in Zambia comes from 
two main sources, central transfers and local revenue (UCLG, 2006; CLGF, 2005b). 
Section 45 (3) of the LG Act stipulates that central government shall make general and 
specific grants to local authorities for water and sanitation, health services, fire services, 
road services, municipal police services, primary education, and agricultural services 
(GRZ, 1991; Leiderer, et al., 2012). However, central transfers tend to be insufficient in 
relation to total public expenditure, and the functions that councils have to perform 
(UCLG, 2006; Erdmann & Simutanyi, 2003). In 2003, central transfers made up only 
three percent of total revenues for local councils (CLGF, 2005b; Fjeldstad & Heggstad, 
2012). According to Chikulo (2014), government transfers to councils between 2002 
and 2006 were only one percent of the total public expenditure. Clearly, over the years 
transfers have not improved beyond one percent (see Figure 5.2).  
 
Figure 5.2: Government Transfers as Percentage of Public Expenditure 
Source: UN-Habitat (2012b, p. 22) 
It is not surprising that central transfers to local councils have not improved because the 
state has made it abundantly clear on occasions, that it expects councils to use their own 
ingenuity to raise revenues. Late President Mwanawasa
16
 acknowledged the need to 
                                                 
16
President Levy Patrick Mwanawasa’s Speech at the 47th Annual Conference of the Local Government 
Association of Zambia (LGAZ) held in Kasama on 21-22 July 2003 
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support councils but also told them not to expect too much as the quote below shows:  
My administration is cognisant of the need for the active participation of the local 
government authorities in our development process and is, therefore anxious to capacitate 
them to levels where they can meaningfully compliment the central government in its 
continued efforts towards enhancing the livelihood of our people. It is in this light that my 
administration intends to uplift the delivery capacities of local authorities… local 
authorities should however, not be under the illusion that central government will finance 
all their operations… We, therefore, expect that councils will use their ingenuity to raise 
revenue. 
This statement gives an insight into government’s erratic funding of councils. 
Compared to other African countries, Zambia has the least central transfers to councils 
(see Figure 2.2). Furthermore, there is no predefined sharing system for grants or even a 
provision for councils to compel central government to give them grants (CLGF, 2005b; 
2013). Local councils do not know how much they would receive as grants. As UNDP 
(2012, p. 30) observes, “The current national support to councils is inadequate and is 
not based on a scientifically approved criterion.” Local revenue on the other hand, 
consists mainly of property tax, fees and charges, and sundry receipts (KCC, 2012; 
Leiderer, et al., 2012). Central government has taken over many broad taxes leaving 
only local taxes (World Bank, 2002a). Although local taxes are important sources of 
revenue, they tend to be narrow in scope and often difficult to handle (Bahl & Bird, 
2008; Bird & Slack, 2014). As for non-tax revenues such as user charges, rents, and 
fees, these tend to be limited in scope and revenue-generating capacity (Mukwena & 
Lolojih, 2002). Moreover, local councils do not have much freedom in handling local 
revenue sources because of government controls (CLGF, 2005b).  
To sum up, there is overwhelming evidence that the political regimes from the colonial 
through to the independence eras have weakened local government and brought it to ‘its 
knees’. Local councils lack autonomy to make decisions regarding their management. 
Clientelism seems to affect not only how government relates with local councils but 
also how it funds them. This has led to some analysts to conclude, “At present, local 
government is not only dysfunctional in its set up but is in many respects derelict” 
(Erdmann & Simutanyi, 2003, p. 47). Nonetheless, local government remains important 
in its roles of service delivery and fostering local democracy. To continue being 
relevant, it has to be all-inclusive and look outward. Therefore, the next section looks at 
the future of local government in Zambia. 
5.6 FUTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ZAMBIA 
Despite the challenges local government faces in Zambia, it still has an important role to 
142 
play in service delivery and local democracy. Therefore, to continue serving its purpose, 
local government has to find alternative ways of funding and delivering local services. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, local governments in different parts of the world are turning 
to alternative modes of delivering services. For example, they are collaborating with the 
private sector, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and Community-Based 
Organisations (CBOs) (see 2.4). Hence, local government assumes an all-inclusive 
position of ‘local governance’ - transfer of power away from elected local councils 
towards other organisations (Kearns, 1995). Local governance is a broader concept and 
is defined as the formulation and execution of collective action at the local level. It has 
been established that there is a critical urban housing shortage, and that government 
who has been the main provider of public housing can no longer provide it mostly due 
to lack of funding. Therefore, there is a need to involve other actors who could help 
provide services aimed at improving the living conditions of squatter residents. This 
section therefore identifies actors as NGOs, CBOs and private sector that councils could 
collaborate with given that they have powers to enter into contracts (see 5.5.2).  
5.6.1 Non-Governmental Organisations 
An NGO is an association formed from within civil society, which brings together 
individuals who share some common purpose (Munck, 2012). In Zambian, NGOs are:  
Private voluntary groupings of individuals or associations, whether corporate or 
unincorporated, not established or operated for profit, partisan politics or any commercial 
purposes, and who or which have organised themselves for the promotion of civic 
education, advocacy, human rights, social welfare, development, charity, research or 
other activity or programme for the benefit or interest of the public, through resources 
mobilised from sources within or outside Zambia. (GRZ, 2009a)  
Although the definition of NGOs seems broad, it does not apply to churches, clubs, 
political parties, professional groups or organisations, trade unions and religious 
organisations (GRZ, 2009a). Consequently, civil society argues that the NGO Act is 
more divisive than unifying (CIVICUS, 2013; Diakonia, 2013). Most of the NGOs 
interviewed for the research seemed to think it was wrong to exclude organisations such 
as churches and other faith-based bodies from the definition of NGO (see Figure 5.3).  
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Figure 5.3: NGOs satisfied with the NGO Act  
A respondent from one of the NGOs seemed very dissatisfied with the NGO Act as the 
following quote shows:  
It was a wrong idea to exclude the churches and faith-based organisations from the 
definition of a non-governmental organisation. In addition, registration under the new Act 
has become a political issue whereby if you are not in tandem with the government, the 
Minister of Community Development will not issue you with a practicing licence and 
may deregister you anytime they want to. This situation creates insecurity in NGOs and 
breeds corruption, which as civil society are determined to fight. (NGO3, Chipata)  
Some NGOs expressed ignorance why the NGO Act excluded churches and faith-based 
organisations among others from the local definition of NGO, as another NGO 
responded as follows:  
I do not understand the real reason for their exclusion from the NGO definition. (NGO1, 
Kitwe, 5 yrs)  
Until 2009 when Parliament enacted the NGO Act, the Societies Act of 1958 regulated 
the operations of NGOs in the country. NGOs also registered with respective public 
departments including local councils. Now that an NGO Act exists, it requires all NGOs 
to register with the ministry responsible for community development (GRZ, 2009a). 
Apart from being divisive, civil society argues that the NGO Act gives government too 
many powers, including deciding which NGOs to register. NGOs argue that such 
provisions expose the Act to abuse by those in authority (Diakonia, 2013). As such, they 
have suggested repealing the NGO Act and enacting one that would represent the 
interests of all concerned. Some of the NGOs interviewed also felt strongly about the 
NGO Act and suggested amending it, as the following excerpt from one NGO shows:  
Sections that give absolute power to government in the affairs of NGO operations must 
be changed to balance power in the Act. (NGO2, Chipata, 44yrs)  
Another NGO explained that the NGO Act did not foster a good working environment 
for NGOs, as the following quote appears to show:  
The NGO Act remains a bad law as it weakens the independence of the civil society in 
the country.  
Nevertheless, NGOs are still important especially since they have stepped in to fill the 
gap left by the retreating state in the neo-liberal revolution (Munck, 2012; UNDP, 
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1997). As Willis (2005, p. 98) points out, NGOs have been “the answer to the perceived 
limitations of the state or the market in facilitating development – a panacea for 
development problems.” NGOs also play a very important role in human settlements 
(Turner, 1988). In Zambia, NGOs have been active in improving human settlements. 
For instance, the Human Settlement of Zambia formerly called the American Friends 
Service Committee of Zambia (AFSC) was involved in the squatter upgrading 
programme in the 1970s (see 2.4.3). Habitat for Humanity works with marginalised 
communities to teach them building skills that they apply in self-help housing projects 
(Habitat for Humanity, 2013). Briefly, as Turner (1988, p. 175) notes, NGOs contribute 
to housing, “through housing provision programmes of various kinds; through projects 
or programmes testing or demonstrating innovations for adoption by other kinds of 
organisations; and through motivating those who have underused capacities.”  
Nonetheless, NGOs are an important component of society. They operate in rural and 
urban areas where they provide services, which the public or private sectors are unable 
to provide, and engage in advocacy for communities (Lewis, 2010). In some places, 
NGOs are the only organised form of authority providing some basic services to 
communities. Despite the controversies surrounding their Act, NGOs still work in 
vulnerable communities where they provided different social services and advocacy in 
human rights. Interviews with the NGOs revealed that some of them provided wide-
ranging services including advocacy, education and training, and social support for 
vulnerable groups. Evidence from the squatter residents also shows that they received 
various kinds of social services from NGOs operating in their areas (see Figure 5.4).  
 
Figure 5.4: Services Residents received from NGOs in Case Study Settlements 
Source: Author 
5.6.2 Community-Based Organisations 
The community is a very important part of government at the local level – local 
government exists for communities (Shah & Shah, 2006). However, communities must 
be linked to councils in order to benefit from the services that they provide. In Zambia, 
the community has always been organised in one way or the other. Bratton (1980) 
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explains that during the independence era, communities were organised into Ward 
Development Committees (WDC) and Village Productivity Committees (VPC) at ward 
and village levels, respectively. These committees were created according to the 
Registration and Development of Villages Act (1971). Therefore, every village had a 
VPC and each local council ward had a WDC (Tordoff, 1974). In the post-independence 
era, government merged the WDC and VPC structures to form the Area Development 
Committee (ADC) represented by each council ward. Before the formation of ADCs, 
resident development committees existed mainly in squatter settlements to organise 
communities, and proved quite effective in encouraging participation in community-
based programmes (UN-Habitat, 2003a).  
ADCs also proved very instrumental in the implementation of the Zambia Social 
Investment Fund (ZAMSIF), a World Bank supported programme extending over a ten-
year period since 2000. ZAMSIF was based on the World Bank’s social investments 
fund (SIF) model that was specifically established to respond to the impacts of SAPs in 
Latin America, but it was later introduced in the 1990s to other countries under SAP 
including those in Africa (UN-Habitat, 2009b). SIF supports community-led initiatives 
and participation and therefore, provides an alternative to central-led development 
(Pradhan & Rawlings, 2002). The SIF model is demand-driven and provides finances to 
community initiatives that have been appraised at district level and supported for 
funding (Parker & Berthet, 2000; UN-Habitat, 2009b). Through SIF, the World Bank 
sought to support local governance by targeting and empowering poor communities to 
improve participation and local service delivery, and decentralisation by supporting 
governments to transfer responsibility and power for local development to local 
governments and other local institutions (Parker & Berthet, 2000). In a similar way, 
ZAMSIF was concerned with poverty alleviation in rural and urban areas (World Bank, 
2000c). Hence, it encouraged community-driven development initiatives, but focused 
on demand-driven projects. As such, ZAMSIF did not ask communities to engage in 
projects but encouraged communities that had met the requirement for community 
contributions of fifteen percent in terms of building materials and labour to apply for 
project funding (UN-Habitat, 2009b). Communities that failed to meet the requirements 
did not receive project funding
17
. ZAMSIF was initially based on a decentralised local 
government system. However, two years into implementation it appeared government 
                                                 
17
 Based on the researcher’s knowledge while working for Chipata Municipal Council (2002-2005) 
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was dragging on its decentralisation efforts, as the following observation made by the 
World Banks (2008, pp. 6-7) shows:  
The Government of Zambia’s commitment to local participation and local management of 
resources, as expressed in the policy, did not effectively materialize. Throughout the life 
of the project, district administrations operated in an environment, which was not 
supported by the effective decentralization of fiscal, financial, administrative and political 
responsibilities.  
Therefore, as UN-Habitat (2009b) explains ZAMSIF was revised to suit the context at 
the time. Although ZAMSIF neither provided for micro lending nor supported 
individual projects for shelter improvement, the model could be used to establish a 
housing revolving fund to benefit low-income households (UN-Habitat, 2009b). A 
revolving fund may be funded entirely by users or partly by users and partly by 
subsidies (UN-Habitat, 2008b). Through savings and loans, a revolving fund could help 
low-income households access finance for improving housing in squatter settlements 
and rural areas alike. In the 1990s, the Dominican Republic established a revolving fund 
for housing improvement loans. The loans were not available to tenants but only to 
those owners who resided in their homes (UN-Habitat, 1991a). Hawaii also operates a 
revolving fund called the Rental Housing Revolving Fund that provides ‘Equity Gap’ 
low-interest loans or grants to qualified owners and developers constructing affordable 
housing units. Under the revolving fund, funding may be disbursed as a loan or a grant 
for the development, pre-development, construction, acquisition, preservation, and 
substantial rehabilitation of rental housing units (State of Hawaii, 2015). In the 
developed world, revolving funds have played an important role in providing affordable 
housing to low-income households. In the United Kingdom, a revolving fund system 
that started with a few members who wanted to building houses led to the creation of 
many building societies. Building societies begun in the late eighteenth century, and 
were mostly terminating societies – after all members who contributed towards the cost 
of building houses for members had been housed, the society would then be wound up 
(Blair, 1997). However, by mid-nineteenth century, permanent building societies 
emerged that became popular for obtaining housing mortgages. As Samy (2008, p. 5) 
explains, “building societies grew rapidly from their humble beginnings as localised 
‘self-help’ institutions to become the dominant player in the house mortgage market.”  
CBOs have a significant role to play in the setting up of housing finance strategies such 
as revolving funds. They can work with local councils, NGOs and the private sector. 
CBOs are the best link between communities and the public, private or third sectors. As 
observed earlier (see 2.4.4), CBOs have the ability to encourage local people to unite 
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around their common interests and facilitate their participation in development matters.  
5.6.3 Private Sector 
Although not the only important sector in economic development (Chang, 2000), the 
private sector is an important driving force in economic growth and is essential to 
achieving meaningful development outcomes targeted at raising people out of poverty 
and setting them on the path to prosperity (IFAD, 2007; UN, 2008). Economic growth 
generates wealth and therefore, it is an important precondition to poverty eradication 
(UN, 2007). The private sector is capable of creating jobs and raising government 
revenue to finance public services and goods for improving people's quality of life 
(World Bank, 2013b; 2013c). However, to register significant decreases in poverty in 
developing countries, economic growth must be sustained to levels significant enough 
to cause sustainable improvements in incomes and employment prospects (Arimah, 
2010a; 2010b; Berry, 2013).  
Since the beginning of SAP in the 1990s, government’s role in the economy has 
diminished as per the World Bank’s recommendations (World Bank, 1991; 1994a). The 
state has become a facilitator for private sector development (World Bank, 1996a). 
Hence, its main responsibility has been the provision of legal frameworks (laws) and 
institutions to support and stimulate private sector involvement in the economy (World 
Bank, 2002b). However, despite going through institutional reforms Zambia does not 
seems to have benefitted fully from the opportunities a robust private sector generates. 
According to the World Bank (2013b), many countries still lag behind and rank poorly 
on most of the indicators that include starting a business, getting construction permits, 
registering property, getting electricity, paying taxes, trading across borders, getting 
credit, enforcing contracts, protecting investors and resolving insolvency.  
The formal private sector has played a big part in the formation of squatter settlements 
(Brueckner & Selod, 2009). As Baker and McClain (2008, p. 1) observe, the private 
sector’s involvement has been in “slum creation as well as the role of injured party, 
defendant of property rights, or passive landlord.” Although the private sector is 
normally unwilling to respond to the low end of the market (Brueckner & Selod, 2009), 
it may still have a role to play in squatter upgrading. However, it appears that the 
private sector’s role in squatter upgrading has not featured prominently in many 
discussions (Baker & McClain, 2009). Nevertheless, the formal private sector can play a 
role by helping the informal small-scale entrepreneurs to grow their business through 
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provision of much needed capital, which they often lack. Most people in squatter 
settlements are involved in small-scale businesses (Baker & McClain, 2008). However, 
these small-scale entrepreneurs operate using very rudimentary techniques and lack 
substantial capital to grow their businesses. Hence, the private sector also has the 
opportunity to collaborate with small-scale entrepreneurs. Furthermore, private sector 
involvement in squatter upgrading may be through corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
(Baker & McClain, 2008). While there is no agreement as to the precise definition of 
CSR (Watts & Holme, 2000), the most famous definitions of CSR are:  
A concept whereby, companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their 
business operations and their interactions with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis. 
(European Commission, 2002, p. 5) 
The commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic development, working 
with employees, their families, the local community and society at large to improve their 
quality of life. (Watts & Holme, 2000, p. 10; Dahlsrud, 2008) 
For this research, CSR implies the social and environmental responsibility that business 
enterprises, local and international, have towards communities (countries, district, ward, 
etc.) in which they operate. Beyond the realisation of the ultimate goal of profit-making, 
business must give back to the communities that support their business. Hence, I 
consider business enterprises as corporate citizens – they have rights and responsibilities 
as citizens. In developing countries, CSR has mostly been associated with multinational 
corporations. There are many business enterprises operating in Zambia, which through 
CSR can contribute to provision of services and infrastructure in squatter settlements. 
However, there are barriers to private sector involvement in squatter settlements. Firstly, 
squatter settlements are unauthorised settlements that could be demolished any time. 
Hence, the private sector is concerned about issues of property rights and loss of 
investment (Baker & McClain, 2009). Secondly, the private sector is concerned about 
the rate of returns on investment given that many of the squatter entrepreneurs are 
‘small’. These are considered ‘high’ risk and as such, private investors may want to 
invest only in activities that are low risk and highly profitable (Imparato & Ruster, 
2003). Lastly, CSR in Zambia is a purely voluntary practice, and although it presents a 
reasonable source of funding for squatter upgrading it may depend on the relations that 
local councils have with the business community. Nonetheless, CSR practice is very 
common in the Copperbelt Province particularly in rural areas and former mine 
townships (Hamann, et al., 2005).  
This research explores private sector involvement through provision of finance to the 
local councils for infrastructure and service provision, and to squatter residents for 
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home improvements and business development. Financial institutions play a very 
important role in supporting economic growth in any nation (Arestis & Sawyer, 2005). 
They have the ability to collect resources (money) through savings and investments, and 
distribute it to those with deficit through lending (Beck, 2009). According to Beck 
(2012) and Levine (2005, p. 870), a well-developed financial system promotes 
economic growth by:  
 Easing the exchange of goods and services through the provision of payment 
services; 
 Mobilising and pooling savings from a large number of investors; 
 Acquiring and processing information about enterprises and possible investment 
projects, thus allocating savings to their most productive use; 
 Monitoring investment and carrying out corporate governance; and  
 Diversifying, increasing liquidity and reducing inter-temporal risk.  
However, other observers disagree with the finance-growth nexus. For instance, 
Robinson (1952, p. 86) suggests that the expansion of the economy creates the need for 
more financial services and financial development therefore, should not be regarded as a 
determinant of growth - “where enterprise leads, finance follows.” Lucas (1988, p. 6) 
also dismisses the role of finance in economic growth as “over–stressed.” Nonetheless, 
despite lack of consensus on the finance-growth nexus, evidence from the literature 
seems to support the relationship. Levine (2005, p. 921) explains that there is a growing 
body of empirical evidence that “demonstrates a strong positive link between the 
functioning of the financial system and long-run economic growth.” Sutton and Jenkins 
(2007) also note that financial services reduce vulnerability, and enable people to 
manage assets available to them in ways that help them generate income and options to 
get out of poverty. Ideally, financial institutions have the potential to expand economic 
opportunities especially to the poor, but in developing countries it is limited by, as 
Sutton and Jenkins (2007, p. 3) observed:  
A vicious cycle of insufficient information, inappropriate products, inadequate 
infrastructure, and inflexible regulatory environments. […]. A combination of these 
factors has kept costs, and therefore prices, high, limiting companies’ markets to clients 
within the top tiers of the economic pyramid.  
Therefore, one cannot overemphasise that an efficient financial system facilitates 
optimal allocation of resources. It expands the consumption possibility of each citizen 
and makes funds available to entrepreneurs and governments (Herring & Santomero, 
1995). The Zambian financial subsector comprises both local and international financial 
institutions of varying sizes. However, their ability to ‘expand the consumption 
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possibility’ to all citizens is limited. It appears these financial institutions have focused 
their services more on the formal sector than the informal sector of the economy 
(Heidenreich, 2007). This means that the poor, who often live and work in the informal 
economy are excluded (Sutton & Jenkins, 2007). Globally, about one billion people 
operate within the informal economy. Since they lack legal ownership of the land they 
occupy, they cannot use their properties or businesses as collateral against borrowing 
from financial institutions.  
In Zambia, about 4.7 million people subsist on activities in the informal economy 
(Shah, 2012). Commercial banks are the traditional financial institutions involved in 
financial transactions. The informal economy has little or no access to these institutions 
because banks consider it a high-risk sector. However, there is evidence that the poor 
are able to pay for financial services even at high interest rates, and that they present no 
greater credit risk than the average higher-income borrower (Sutton & Jenkins, 2007). 
In the last twenty years or so, Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) have become a dynamic 
force within the financial sector, and established themselves in many towns in the 
country (Chiumya, 2010). According to the Banking and Financial Services 
(Microfinance) Regulations (GRZ, 2005), “microfinance institution is a person who, as 
part of their business, advances micro credit facilities.” Whereas commercial banks are 
concerned more with the formal than the informal sectors of the economy, MFIs deal 
with both. Their presence has provided an opportunity for the majority of low-income 
earners to access financial services.  
Microfinance or microcredit activities in Zambia have been around for many years, 
albeit in the informal sense. However, in the early 1990s, microfinance took on a new 
dimension – it became formal. Since then there has been a proliferation of local and 
international MFIs. After losing formal employment following the privatisation of state-
owned enterprises, many people set up small-scale enterprises for which they needed 
start-up capital
18
. The high demand for short-term and immediate loans created a 
favourable environment for the growth of MFIs (Chiumya, 2004). MFIs present a better 
opportunity than banks to low-income households to access finance for housing 
improvement. They have flexible lending requirements such as simple collateral 
(Chiumya, 2004). However, many of them have since become payroll-based consumer 
                                                 
18
 Many people who lost employment through privation of state-owned enterprises did not receive their 
terminal benefits until after many years. 
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lenders – they target salaried customers (Chiumya, 2010). Effectively, this 
disadvantages those who are unemployed or working in the informal sector to access 
finance for home building or improvement.  
5.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter sought to examine how the political regimes have affected housing 
especially as it relates to the prevalence of squatter settlements. There is overwhelming 
evidence to suggest that throughout the duration of the three political eras, the different 
political regimes engaged in acts unfavourable to housing provision. The authoritarian 
colonial regime was preoccupied with maximising profits at the expense of social 
welfare of local people. Therefore, its development policies of industrialisation without 
urbanisation, and stabilisation without urbanisation only served to advance capitalism 
but did not favour adequate housing provision and homeownership for Africans. 
Because of inadequate investment in African housing, there was a housing shortage, 
which forced many Africans to build houses in squatter settlements.  
The authoritarian socialist regime of the independence era socialist regime undertook 
the responsibility of providing public housing for which it formulated several policies 
and laws to support its provision. Nonetheless, most of the policies and laws seemed to 
stifle housing provision more than promote it. Like the other regimes before, the post-
independence democratic regimes formulated policies and laws for ensuring an enabling 
environment. Yet, they have failed to provide that environment. Consequently, post-
independence regimes have failed to stimulate housing investment to the level that 
could help the urban poor access housing finance and invest in housing. Instead, some 
of the measures government put in place to support housing investment have actually 
reduced poor people’s access to land, failed to stimulate private sector investment in 
housing, and reduced councils’ capacity to provide housing. Although the premise is 
that democratic regimes support development, evidence points to a different scenario in 
Zambia. Housing provision under the democratic regime has been very insignificant 
compared to that during the socialist authoritarian regime.  
There is also evidence that under the different regimes the local governments have been 
consistently weakened to the extent that they are unable to provide housing for the poor. 
During the colonial era, the authoritarian regime failed to fund adequately local councils 
to build African housing. Nonetheless, despite local government being weak, the 
colonial administration provided for decentralised local governance. Local government 
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transitioned from decentralised to being centralised during the independence era. Efforts 
to decentralise only resulted in decentralising district and provincial political 
administrations more than local councils. Later, the merging of political and local 
council structures resulted into a highly politicised clientelistic local government system 
that seemed to serve the interests of a select few more than those of the public. Funding 
to local councils also diminished and hence, reducing the capacity to provide housing 
for the poor. Lack of affordable low-income housing led to many urban poor 
households finding alternative housing in squatter settlements leading to their 
prevalence. While the local government system in the post-independence era began on a 
decentralised basis, it slowly became centralised and lost its autonomy. Successive 
governments have consistently engaged in acts that have caused local councils to lose 
many sources of revenue and hence, their capacity to deliver quality services including 
housing for the poor has diminished. Hence, there are more people living in squatter 
settlements than in formal residential areas.  
However, local government remains important in its roles of service delivery and 
fostering local democracy. Hence, to continue serving its purpose and citizens, local 
government has to find alternative ways to finance delivery of quality services including 
squatter upgrading. The traditional view of local government is that it is only local 
councils. In fact, government has perpetuated this notion through the principle law the 
Local Government Act that governs local councils, which does not promote stakeholder 
participation. Therefore, there is a need to involve other actors like the NGOs, CBOs 
and the private sector, who could help provide services aimed at improving the living 
conditions of squatter residents.  
The capitalist authoritarian, socialist authoritarian and neoliberal democratic regimes all 
had three things in common. They all implemented policies and laws that did not favour 
investment in public housing. The regimes also failed to achieve their housing 
objectives. Lastly, they undermined the capacity of local councils to provide public 
housing because of inadequate funding. All these things led to urban housing shortage, 
and subsequently to the prevalence of squatter settlements.  
The next chapter looks at contemporary housing conditions in small and medium towns 
in Zambia to establish the extent of the housing situation as it relates to the prevalence 
of squatter settlements.  
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CHAPTER 6 CONTEMPORARY HOUSING CONDITIONS IN 
SMALL AND MEDIUM TOWNS IN ZAMBIA 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Many analysts have observed that Zambia faces a critical urban housing shortage. The 
large number of people living in squatter settlements also provides evidence of the 
problem (see 1.2). Although it is a fact that there is a housing shortage, it is not clear 
what its extent is. The definition of the housing problem has tended to be measured only 
quantitatively without taking due consideration of the state of existing housing. For this 
reason, the housing situation remains unclear. Therefore, this chapter assesses the nature 
of the urban housing shortage to appreciate its extent, and in particular the need for 
squatter upgrading. First, the chapter presents an age-old debate on the role of 
government in housing provision. Then, it defines the urban housing situation to clarify 
its real extent. Next, the chapter identifies the main causes of the urban housing 
shortage, while explaining their contribution to the prevalence of squatter settlements. 
Then the chapter examines the various actions in form of housing programmes that 
government has taken to mitigate the housing situation. Finally, the chapter concludes 
by highlighting the importance of housing in socio-economic development to justify 
investment in and support for squatter upgrading.  
6.2 THE HOUSING DEBATE: ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN HOUSING 
Since the 1960s, the housing debate has focused mainly on whether governments in 
developing countries should provide housing for the poor or not (Bredenoord & Van 
Lindert, 2010). This was because conventional housing seemingly failed to address the 
housing problem. Hence, a group of pioneers including Charles Abrams (1966), and 
John F. C. Turner (1976) began advancing a self-help housing school of thought. As 
Mehlomakulu and Marais (2009) note, these pioneers theorised against a background of 
failure of the conventional public housing to provide housing to low-income 
households. They rejected what they called expensive standardised housing solutions 
and suggested a supportive approach in housing policies (Tovivich, 2009; Bredenoord 
& Van Lindert, 2010). They argued that the urban poor had proven they were capable of 
building their own houses if oppressive regulatory systems such as high building 
standards did not hinder their efforts (Bredenoord & Van Lindert, 2010). For instance, 
Turner (1976) believed in letting dwellers have control of major decisions and have the 
freedom to make their own contribution to the design. Although the housing priorities 
vary between individuals, generally they could decide for themselves when to expand or 
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improve their houses based on their needs and priorities (Bredenoord & Van Lindert, 
2010). Turner (1982) notes that decision-making is vital in and for the fulfilment of 
individual desires and freedom of the spirit and hence, it needs to be made as close as 
possible to the individual household. Therefore, as (Bredenoord & Van Lindert (2010, 
p. 279) observe, “A standard solution for the urban poor does not really exist.” It 
appears that major international agencies such as the World Bank together with 
governments in developing countries bought into self-help housing (Mehlomakulu & 
Marais, 2009). Hence, by the early 1970s, the World Bank began lending capital for 
housing projects in Third World cities, particularly for site-and-services schemes and or 
improvements to squatter areas (Seymour, 1975).  
Nevertheless, other analysts including Burgess, Mathey, Ward, and Marcuse have 
criticised the self-help housing school of thought. To begin with, they argue that 
governments have encouraged self-help housing among the urban poor as a substitution 
for housing provision. As Marcuse (1992) notes, self-help housing should not be a 
substitute for public housing provision but encouraged for those who could manage as 
an option alongside other state housing programmes. Hence, by encouraging self-help 
housing, governments use it as an opportunity to withdraw their responsibility of 
providing public housing especially for the poor (Davis, 2006). Next, self-help housing 
is an exploitative and control mechanism (Burgess, 1992; Marcuse, 1992). In fact, 
Burgess (1977) wondered if self-help housing was the new imperialist strategy 
governments were to use to exploit the urban poor. Parnell and Hart (1999) observed 
that the South African government used self-help housing among the urban poor more 
for political and economic advantages than a simple response to a shortage of affordable 
housing. Mathey (1997) also adds that it is not fair that the urban poor people have to 
fend for themselves while the higher classes have the same services provided for them. 
Finally, self-help produces sub-standard housing (Bredenoord & Van Lindert, 2010). 
Nonetheless, as Makachi (2013, p. 167) observes, critics of dweller-initiated 
transformations (squatter settlements) blame them for “their apparent locational 
spontaneity that is often at variance with functional and aesthetic objectives in formal 
housing design.” This is because in squatter settlements, most people build with 
whatever building materials they can get on the market or even from dumpsters. This 
however, does not mean that all self-help housing structures are of poor quality 
(Bredenoord, 2010). Moreover, skills available through self-help are often limited and 
that leads to lowering of housing standards, which not only produces poor quality 
housing but also puts dwellers at risk of accidents or even death (Marcuse, 1992). For 
155 
this reason, self-help housing is likely to produce only temporary solutions to immediate 
housing problems (Marcuse, 1992).  
The truth however painful is that the urban poor in squatter settlements cannot wait until 
the state improves their living conditions. Therefore, the decision to build or not to be 
build becomes daunting either way as “the obligation to build your own house could be 
as oppressive as being forbidden to do so – the corollary of the freedom to literally build 
your own house is the freedom not to have to” (Turner, 1976, p. 128). Evidence shows 
that in both developed and developing countries, government is a very poor direct 
provider of social housing (Whitehead & Scanlon, 2007; Makasa, 2010; UN-Habitat, 
2005c). However, David Smith (2006) points out that government still has a significant 
place in housing provision. With the new neoliberal role as facilitator, governments has 
four main ways in which to participate in housing provision including enacting laws that 
protect property right, and improving access to finance for housing investment (Smith, 
2006). Others are fostering public-private partnerships in housing, and setting up 
housing subsidies for ‘the bottom quartile of society’ (Marcuse, 2006; Smith, 2006).  
To summarise, the housing debate that intensified over half a century ago, and appears 
to have died down. However, the question concerning whether governments must 
provide public housing for the poor still, rings true today. The criticism against self-help 
housing are quite varied and worth noting. It is true that governments have a 
responsibility to provide housing for their people. However, evidence suggests that 
many urban poor live in sub-standard housing in squatter settlements because 
governments have failed to provide housing (see 2.2.2). It is also true that many urban 
poor have used their ingenuity to solve their housing problems through self-help 
housing. Nonetheless, housing is an important basic need that must be met. Therefore, 
in the absence of governments providing housing, the urban poor must meet this need 
through self-help housing. In that case, self-help housing for the urban poor is not an 
option but a must. Perhaps then, the real concern should be about how governments 
could provide enabling environments to assist the urban poor to improve their houses to 
quality levels that not only enhance the appearance of houses, but also reduces the 
amount of maintenance they do to free up time and resources for other things.  
6.3 THE HOUSING SITUATION IN ZAMBIA 
This section examines the housing situation as evidenced from some small towns to 
understand the conditions of housing so that we understand holistically the extent of the 
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urban housing problem. There is no comprehensive data on the number and sizes of 
squatter settlements because population and housing censuses do not segregate 
enumerations according to urban residential status, although they are broken down to 
the sub-district level. However, a large proportion of the urban population lives in 
squatter settlements (see 1.1). Moreover, the definition of the urban housing shortage 
estimated at two million, has tended to be measured in quantity terms only to the 
exclusion of quality, tenure, and location (see 1.2). Hence, this section endeavours to 
define the extent of the housing problem by examining the existing housing situation in 
terms of quantity, quality, tenure, and spatial location.  
6.3.1 The Quantity Dimension 
As Hauser and Jaffe (1947) observed many years ago, measuring the extent of the 
housing shortage is not as simple a problem as may seem upon first consideration, as it 
is a task beset by a number of difficulties of both an economic and social character. This 
task is not simple today especially in the case of Zambia whose housing deficit is 
clearly undefined beyond the quantitative measure. According to Acolin and Green 
(2015, p. 6), the deficit concept aims to capture households living in conditions that 
warrant building new housing units due to dilapidation. Therefore, the housing deficit 
concept was “developed to measure the number of units that need to be built to solve 
existing deficiencies as well as to meet future demand in light of growth and 
depreciation of the current stock” (Acolin & Green, 2015, p. 6). In the Chilean context, 
the quantitative dimension of housing attempts to establish a sufficient amount, 
availability or coverage of its components (Perez & Crossley, 2010). Hence, the 
quantitative definition of housing shortage implies taking into account current shortfall 
in housing plus future demand in a given period.  
It is unclear how government computed the national housing deficit, which stood at two 
million units (see 1.2). Analysts wonder if the estimated figure also accounts for 
replacing dilapidated, traditional and squatter housing, and loss of housing because of 
conversions to non-residential purposes (Makasa, 2010; UN-Habitat, 2011b). 
Furthermore, government does not explain if the estimated housing need considers 
concealed households, families sharing houses and extent of overcrowding (see 4.4). 
Additionally, the estimated housing deficit is unable to indicate what proportion of it is 
urban or rural. Nonetheless, urban housing deficit can be estimated using existing data 
like urban population, household size and squatter housing. This research suggests a 
simple formula (see Figure 6.1).  
157 
 
Figure 6.1: Formula for estimating number of housing units 
Source: Author 
Therefore, based on the suggested formula, between 2010 and 2020 the country needs 
about 1.2 million housing units to address the urban housing shortage (see Table 6.1).  
Table 6.1: Urban Housing Required, 2010-2020 
Replacement  of squatter housing (Refer to Chapter 
1, section 1.2) 
 800,000 
Add    Housing for projected urban Population 
(growing at 3% annually) 
(5.2 million x 3% x10)/ 5 persons 
per household 
312,000 
Add    15% Loss of urban housing due to 
obsolesce, conversions, etc. 
463,000 x 15% 69,450 
Number of Housing units required 1,181,450 
Source: Author 
Data gathered from various private developers shows that the cost of low-cost housing 
ranges between US$37,000 and 90,000 per unit (see Table 6.2). Therefore, to build 1.2 
million houses at the cost of US$37,000 per unit, government needs to set aside about 
US$4 billion annually over the period 2010-2020.  
Table 6.2: Purchase Prices of Houses (US$) 
Name of Developer Low-cost house Medium-cost house High-Cost house 
Lilayi Estates 36,770 38,240 - 
National Pension Scheme Authority - 91,500 166,000 
National Housing Authority 90,000 95,000 - 
Park View Estate - 234,000 334,000 
Unicorn Estate Development - 200,000 - 
Silverest Housing Development 85,000 - 220,000 
Source: Compiled from Email from Steven Akakandelwa (2014) 
The estimated annual expenditure for housing is clearly beyond what government could 
afford because the amount is even more than the annual public expenditure (see Figure 
5.1). Moreover, government continually fails to make meaningful provisions to housing 
despite pledging an annual allocation of fifteen percent of the national budget for 
housing (see 5.4.1). Ironically, subsequent years after the declaration of the VISION 
2030 in 2006 government increased housing allocations from 2.9% to 6.5% and down to 
6%. Thereafter, allocations further reduced to 3.8% in 2009 down to 1.3% in 2012 and 
rose again to 3.1% in 2013 (see Figure 5.1). It is worthy pointing out here that between 
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2006 and 2013, there were three different government administrations of Presidents 
Levy Mwanawasa (2001-2008), Rupiah Banda (2008-2011), and Michael Sata (2011-
2014). Clearly, the other administrations seemed not to share the vision of the 
Mwanawasa administration regarding the improvement of housing and hence, the 
meagre allocations to housing (see Figure 5.1).  
Because of inadequate allocations to housing, investment in low-income housing has 
remained low and not kept pace with the growing urban population. For instance, 
between 2000 and 2010 while urban population grew by fifty-nine percent (see Table 
1.2), urban housing including squatter housing only increased by seventeen percent (see 
Figure 1.6). The urban housing stock has been increasing but only marginally with 
respect to the rate of increase of the urban population. Consequently, housing supply 
has not matched housing demand and hence, failed to meet the urban housing need. The 
average household size is five persons (see 1.2). Therefore, by inference there is 
overcrowding in many urban households. Clearly, when assessed quantitatively the 
housing situation is indeed critical (Makasa, 2010). Nevertheless, the quantity definition 
of the housing situation only provides a glimpse into the housing situation but does not 
convey the full extent of the problem. Therefore, in the following sub-sections the 
research endeavours to extend the definition of the urban housing problem.  
6.3.2 The Quality Dimension 
Quality is a complex notion that means different things to different people. In terms of 
housing, quality implies fitness for purpose (Rumane, 2011). Although quality 
indicators of housing may vary between countries, the common measure of housing 
quality considers housing that meets the needs of occupants in terms of the kind of 
building materials used (safety), size (adequate space) and services (water, sanitation, 
ventilation, etc.) (Arbeláez, et al., 2011). Furthermore, housing is of good quality when 
it promotes well-being (good health and education) and cultural identity. Therefore, 
qualitative housing shortage occurs when housing comprises poor building materials 
that pose safety risks to occupants, lacks basic facilities, has inadequate space for its 
occupants, and does not promote well-being and cultural identity (Hegedus, et al., 
2009). In Zambia, forty-two percent of the urban housing comprises squatter housing 
(see Figure 1.6). Data gathered from squatter residents in the four case study settlements 
in Kitwe and Chipata, shed more light on the quality dimension of the urban housing 
problem. Visual data provided evidence to the claim that a large proportion of housing 
in urban areas comprised sub-standard housing (see Figure 6.2).  
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Figure 6.2: Typical houses in Case Study Settlements 
Source: Author 
Most of the houses in all the case study settlements comprised either sundried or 
unburnt clay bricks or both, and corrugated iron or asbestos roofing sheets or grass 
thatch. The walls and floors lacked waterproofing in form of plaster and screed, 
respectively, which explained why many respondents mentioned physical conditions 
(dampness, leaking roofs and poor ventilation) as the major problem they encountered 
with their housing (see Figure 6.3).  
 
Figure 6.3: Common problems with housing in Case Study Settlements 
Source: Author 
Nonetheless, there were also some good quality houses in the case study settlements. 
This observation supports the claim that not all houses in squatter settlements are of 
poor quality (see 6.2). For example, some homeowners in Mchini and Ipusukilo had 
begun building their houses with durable materials such as burnt clay bricks, concrete 
blocks, and roofing sheets made of corrugated iron and asbestos (see Figure 6.4).  
 
Figure 6.4: Housing improvements in Ipusukilo and Mchini 
Source: Author 
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Although property owners do not have titles, the knowledge that their settlement has 
been legalised or recommended for legalisation as in the cases of Ipusukilo and Mchini, 
respectively, is enough to give them a sense of security and confidence to invest in 
housing improvement. This observation also coincides with the evidence from literature 
review that tenure security plays an important role in influencing investment in housing 
(see 2.2.3). As for basic facilities and services, literature review suggests that few urban 
households have access to important basic services such as water, sanitation, electricity, 
and solid waste disposal. CSO (2012d) reports only 14.6 percent of the urban 
households had access to proper solid waste disposal (paid services managed by refuse 
companies) while about fifty-nine percent used refuse pits. Moreover, only 52.7 percent 
had access to electricity, only forty percent accessed water from their own taps, and 
about twenty-two percent had water-borne toilets inside the house (see Table 6.3).  
Table 6.3: Access to some services in Urban Areas (Percentage) 
Year Safe Water Sanitation (Flushing Toilet) Solid Waste Disposal Electricity 
Own Tap Public Tap Inside Outside Collected Pits 
2010 39.7 32.1 22.2 11.8 14.6 59.4 52.7 
2006 39.2 38.4 23.4 13.3 17.5 60.8 49.2 
Source: Compiled from CSO (2012a) 
Evidence from squatter residents also attests to the claims that a large proportion of the 
urban housing lacked basic facilities and services. Most households depended on water 
kiosks, water-wells or both for their domestic water. Evidently, most households in 
Magazine, Mchini and Ipusukilo used both water kiosks and water-wells with Ipusukilo 
(see Figure 6.5). Access to water from water kiosks was at nominals fee per twenty-litre 
container, of twenty ngwee (Chipata) and twenty-five ngwee (Kitwe) (see Figure 6.6).  
 
Figure 6.5: Access to Water in Case Study Settlements 
Source: Author 
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Figure 6.6: Typical Water Kiosks in Kitwe and Chipata 
Source: Author 
Musonda on the other hand, had the most of households using water-wells compared to 
the other settlements (see Figure 6.5). The water-wells were usually shallow and 
unprotected (see Figure 6.7). When asked why they used water from unprotected water-
wells and not from the communal water kiosks, the respondents explained that the water 
kiosks were not enough for all the residents. Moreover, water kiosks had limited 
operating times while households needed water for many uses.
 19
  
 
Figure 6.7: Typical Water-wells in Case Study Settlements 
Source: Author 
Although use of private taps appeared widespread in Mchini, Magazine and Ipusukilo 
(see Figure 6.5), few households owned private taps. Instead, those with private water 
taps normally allowed their neighbours to draw water at a fee and hence, the sizeable 
numbers of households using private water taps as a source of water. Allowing 
neighbours to use one’s facilities was indicative of a community spirit, which is an 
important asset to the community. Investigations also revealed that nearly all 
respondents used pit latrines that they either shared with other households or privately 
owned. Only two households in Mchini owned a water-borne toilet (see Figure 6.8).  
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 The author captured pictures of water kiosks around mid-morning by which time the kiosk were.  
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Figure 6.8: Access to Sanitary Facilities in Case Study Settlements 
Source: Author 
Although most of the households used private latrines, the households in Magazine and 
Mchini that shared sanitary facilities demonstrated the presence of community. 
Households shared pit latrines where plots were too small to allow for building pit 
latrines and where there were multiple households on one plot. With the arrangement 
for shared use, households also shared maintenance costs. Typically, pit latrines 
consisted of sun-dried mud bricks and roofed with either old iron sheets or grass thatch. 
Sometimes, the pit latrines were covered only with polyvinyl chloride sheeting, but left 
open at the top (see Figure 6.9).  
 
Figure 6.9: Typical Pit Latrines in Case Study Settlements 
Source: Author 
On the subject of living space, the census report illuminated a serious deficiency in 
urban housing. According to CSO (2012d, p. 328), most urban housing (98.4 percent) 
consisted of one and two-roomed structures while three to five- and over five roomed 
houses accounted for 1.4 and 0.2 per cent, respectively. Evidence from squatter 
residents in the case study settlements revealed that most of the houses they occupied 
were mostly one-roomed and two-roomed dwellings. Therefore, based on the average 
household size of five persons, there was insufficient space in the houses especially that 
many households comprised more members than the national average size of five 
persons per household (see Figure 6.10). Moreover, considering the sub-standard 
building materials used for building houses, insufficient space and lack of access to 
basic services, it is apparent that most urban housing fails on the qualitative dimension.  
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Figure 6.10: Household Sizes in Case Study Settlements 
Source: Author 
6.3.3 Land Tenure Status 
Colson (1966) defined land tenure as the legal rules regulating the acquisition and use 
of land, the pattern of holdings during a given period, distribution of rights in land 
among the population or a combination of these. In simple terms, land tenure is the 
“mode by which land is held or owned, or the set of relationships among people 
concerning the use of land and its product” (Payne, 1996, p. 3). Land rights, whether 
formal or informal, determine the level of investment in housing activities (see 2.2.3). 
Over a billion people worldwide live in squatter settlements and lack tenure security 
(see 2.2.2). In Zambia, many urban homeowners do not have land titles to show 
ownership (Mutale, 2004). This is consistent with the observation by Toulmin (2009) 
regarding lack of land titles for most land in SSA (see 2.2.3). According to a television 
news broadcast of Sunday 24 November 2013, an independent media house revealed 
that there were only 80,000 properties with genuine title deeds countrywide. This figure 
included all property on state land minus that in statutory and improvement areas whose 
records were at registries in respective local councils (MUVI TV, 2013). This figure is 
clearly insignificant compared to the number of formal urban housing units estimated at 
463,000 (see Figure 1.6). Then again, because the properties are in approved formal 
areas where local councils have also provided basic services and facilities, the property 
owners have de facto tenure security (see 2.2.3). Yet, as noted already, to access formal 
finance for investment into property applicants need land titles for collateral. Both 
banks and Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) require land titles as collateral, as the 
following quote from one MFI shows:  
The applicant should have a house with a certificate of title, occupancy licence or land 
record card. Moreover, applicants need to have income to repay the loan either from the 
salary or business. (FI6, MFI, 20yrs)  
Then again, there is evidence that some residents in squatter settlements earmarked for 
legalisation and upgrading have a high perception of tenure security, and have thus 
began to invest in improving their houses. In establishing homeownership patterns 
among the residents of the case study settlements, the research discovered that 
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homeownership increased with the age of the settlement. It appears the older the 
settlement, the more sense of security residents have to invest in building and buying 
houses in the settlements despite them still being regarded as illegal. Musonda and 
Ipusukilo, which were much older than Magazine and Mchini, seemed to have more 
respondents who were homeowners than those in the latter (see Figure 6.11).  
 
Figure 6.11: Homeownership in Case Study Settlements 
Source: Author  
It appears that the long period of existence gave residents a high perception of tenure 
security that they lost the fear of eviction. Consequently, they decided to invest in 
acquiring property in the settlements, which was commonly through buying a plot and 
building a house, less commonly by buying a house, and occasionally by inheriting a 
plot and building a house, or inheriting a house (see Figure 6.12). Therefore, largely the 
view that perceived tenure security was also sufficient to influence investment decisions 
in housing investment holds true (see 2.2.3).  
 
Figure 6.12: House Acquisition in Case Study Settlements 
Source: Author 
Tenure security in squatter settlements remains an elusive idea because local councils 
have not legalised them despite having the Housing Act that gives local councils the 
mandate to legalise squatter settlements and establish the land rights of squatters (see 
5.3). The Housing Act stipulates that the minister must declare an area an improvement 
area before legalisation if such an area is on council land, and has a plan showing the 
details such as name of the area, and existing and proposed infrastructure among others 
(GRZ, 1974). However, before a squatter settlement is declared an improvement area, it 
165 
must meet the following conditions the MLGH has set (World Bank, 2002a, p. 10):  
 Sixty percent or more of the land on which the settlement is located must be 
publicly owned; 
 the settlement has been in existence since 1974, 
 development for which the land is zoned on the development plan is not 
imminent, and 
 At least fifty percent of the dwelling structures in the settlement must comprise 
conventional building materials. 
This is a long checklist and it seems to be inconsistent with the current urbanisation 
trend. The conditions were suitable in the 1970s when there were only few squatter 
settlements. Presently, there are almost four million people living in squatter settlements 
(see Table 1.2). Some of the squatter settlements accommodate populations of over five 
thousand persons (see Table 4.7). Evidence suggests that squatter settlements have 
formed on public and private land reserved for either residential or non-residential 
purposes (Taylor, et al., 2015; Makasa, 2010). It appears that at this point, it is not so 
much where the squatters have built that is the problem but to ensure that their living 
conditions are improved. Some of the squatter settlements have existed since colonial 
times – time has lapsed (see 5.2). Moreover, the requirement that at least fifty percent of 
the dwelling structures should be built of conventional materials clearly shows that 
MLGH would not approve legalisation of many squatter settlements. Visual evidence 
collected for this research shows that the majority of dwelling structures in the four case 
study settlements consisted of non-conventional building materials (see Figure 6.2). 
Nevertheless, some squatter settlements seem to have met many of the stipulated 
conditions for legalisation and eventually upgrading. The researcher wondered why 
local councils did not apply the Housing Act to legalise and upgrade the squatter 
settlements. Documentary evidence revealed that although local councils could decide 
to legalise squatter settlement, the final approval rested with the Minister for local 
government (GRZ, 1991). Besides, local councils did not have financial resources to 
provide basic services in legalised settlements as the following quote from a senior 
officer of one of the two councils included in the study, illustrates:  
If it were just the case of recognising squatter settlements, we could do that. However, 
legalisation can only make sense with upgrading - provision of basic services to improve 
the living conditions of people.  
Yet another reason for not legalising squatter settlements concerns the perception that 
they are temporary, as another senior council officer explained:  
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The general belief is that they are temporal settlements meant to benefit the poor and as 
such, there can only be minimal input from the councils.  
Evidence from literature also showed that government authorities often viewed squatter 
settlements as temporary and expected that they would disappear with time and hence, 
they applied a laissez faire approach to handling them (see 2.2.2). Finally, although 
some squatter settlements could have met all the conditions for legalising they sit on 
land unsuitable for human habitation as a senior council officer explained:  
We cannot legalise all settlements because some of them exist on hazardous locations.  
Local councils are careful not to legalise such squatter settlements for health and safety 
reasons. To summarise, secure tenure is important in influencing investments decisions 
that homeowners make. Yet, most urban housing lacks tenure security. Although many 
landowners thrive on de facto tenure security in formal areas and mostly perceived 
tenure security in squatter settlements, these are not sufficient to enable them access to 
housing finance for home improvements.  
6.3.4 Spatial Segregation 
During the colonial era, spatial planning encouraged segregation of people of different 
races (see 5.2). Apart from separate residential areas, Africans and Europeans also went 
to different schools and hospitals (UN-Habitat, 2013). The colonial administration 
institutionalised segregation through legal frameworks such as the Employment of 
Natives Ordinance (ENO), Private Location Ordinance (PLO) and Town and Country 
Planning Act (TCPA) (see Appendix N). Typically, spatial planning in Zambia has 
remained largely colonial (Mwimba, 2002; Berrisford, 2011). Planning authorities zone 
land into residential, commercial, industrial and hinterland (farmland) (GRZ, 1997b). 
Local councils further divide residential land into low-, medium-, and high-cost areas 
(Berrisford, 2011). Although, anyone could acquire a low-cost plot, the target groups 
are low-income earners
20
. By continuing the practice of segregating residential areas 
into low-, medium-, and high-cost, local councils seem to perpetuate segregation of 
people not on race but socio-economic lines (Mutale, 2004; Berrisford, 2011). 
Effectively, the spatial planning system has limited the right of individuals to choose 
where they could live.  
Moreover, residential segregation is contrary to government’s plans for integrated 
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 Researcher’s personal experience while working for Chipata Municipal Council (2002-2005) 
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housing (GRZ, 1966a; Makasa, 2010). Normally, low-cost areas are located further 
away from the town centres where they do not easily access general services such as 
water, roads, education and electricity (Arbeláez, et al., 2011; Perez & Crossley, 2010). 
Just as in the colonial era when African locations lacked most of the basic infrastructure 
and social services (Makasa, 2010; Deane, 1953), most low-cost residential areas still 
lack most services like play parks for children, schools and health centres. According to 
the United Nations (2009, p. 4), housing is not adequate if it is “cut off from 
employment opportunities, health-care services, schools, childcare centres and other 
social facilities, or if located in polluted or dangerous areas.” Squatter settlements are 
low-cost areas but when legalised, they become part of the city proper. However, they 
usually lack basic services and infrastructure, which makes their integration into the city 
proper difficult. For instance, despite government legalising Ipusukilo it still lacks 
primary infrastructure like access roads. Access roads in legalised Ipusukilo are still the 
same as those in illegal squatter settlements (see Figure 6.13).  
 
Figure 6.13: Access roads in Case Study Settlements 
Source: Author 
Residents also lack access to adequate health and education facilities such that some of 
them resorted to lying to receive services outside of their areas, as one Musonda 
resident explained:  
Sometimes we resort to lying about where we live just to get medical attention (MS1, 
Female, married)  
Moreover, residents faced other challenges with the services they received including 
poor staffing and limited services at the clinic, as one resident explained:  
At the clinic staffing is inadequate; poor staff attitude; limited services; poor access roads; 
no street lighting (IP7, Male, Married)  
The various challenges that squatter residents faced appeared to influence the kind of 
services they expected the councils to provide during squatter upgrading (see Figure 
6.14). In all of the settlements, respondents expected access roads to come first, then 
water and sanitation, and health and education services. Only Mchini residents raised 
168 
poverty reduction, security, and housing as priority areas for consideration.  
 
Figure 6.14: Priority Services in Case Study Settlements 
Source: Author 
To conclude, location and status of a residential area often determine the type of 
infrastructure and services it would receive. Many urban residential areas are low-cost 
having being legalised squatter settlements. By default, most of them are located far 
away from the centre making it hard and costly to connect them to primary 
infrastructure and services. Hence, spatial location of low-cost areas tends to worsen the 
urban housing problem.  
To summarise this section, the urban housing problem is compounded by the fact that 
most of the urban housing is quantitatively insufficient to satisfy the urban housing 
need. Moreover, it is qualitatively deficient as a significant portion is of sub-standard 
thereby posing health and safety risks to a large proportion of the urban population. 
Furthermore, urban housing lacks tenure security and hence, limits investment choices 
that people would make regarding improving their houses. Lastly, housing is spatially 
segregated with low-income residential areas being located far from town centres and 
lacking easy access to basic services that would improve residents’ lives and reduce 
poverty. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that when one examines the urban housing 
situation from the quantity, quality, tenure, and location perspectives, one gets a 
comprehensive view of the situation, which this research has established, is indeed 
critical. This confirms the claims that the urban housing situation was critical even 
though it was only analysed from the quantitative perspective (see 1.2).  
6.4 CAUSES OF URBAN HOUSING SHORTAGE 
This section discusses the main causes of urban housing shortage as they relate to the 
prevalence of squatter settlements in Zambia. The presence of squatter settlements in 
towns provides evidence of the extent of the urban housing shortage, defined simply as 
a deficiency in the number of houses desired to accommodate the population of an area 
(Perez & Crossley, 2010). The urban housing situation is critical (see 6.3), and the main 
169 
driver of the prevalence of squatter settlement (see 1.2). Squatter settlements that began 
in the 1930s (see 5.2), have now become enduring forms of human settlements in nearly 
all major towns in Zambia (Mutale, 2004). Many of these squatter settlements are quite 
large with many inhabitants (see Table 4.7). They are also located on either public or 
private land usually reserved for other purposes other than housing (Mutale, 2004; 
Makasa, 2010). Several factors are responsible for the urban housing shortage, and 
include rapid urbanisation (Jenkins, et al., 2007), complex regulations (Mutale, 2004), 
unfavourable economic environment (Arimah, 2010a), poor investment in housing 
(Drummond, et al., 2013), and poverty (Chibuye, 2014).  
6.4.1 Rapid Urbanisation 
Urbanisation refers to the process through which the number of people living in urban 
areas increases compared to those in rural areas (Potts, 2005). The definition of an urban 
area varies from country to country (UN, 2013b; Weeks, 2010). Weeks (2010, p. 34) 
defines an urban area as “a spatial concentration of people whose lives are organised 
around non-agricultural activities.” In Zambia, an urban area refers to a locality that has 
five thousand or more inhabitants, the majority of whom all depend on non-agricultural 
activities (UN, 2013b). Latest data shows that there are more people living in urban 
areas than in rural areas globally (Gulyani & Bassett, 2010; Castells-Quintana, 2015). 
Urbanisation began with the industrial revolution in Europe but later it has been driven 
by the pressures of modernisation (Annez & Buckley, 2009). In many developing 
countries, it appears that socio-economic factors such as employment and natural 
disasters including droughts, famine and floods that force people to migrate to urban 
areas have been fuelling urbanisation (Fasoranti, 2009; Kelley & Baumann, 2011).  
When discussing urbanisation in relation to human settlements, analysts tend to focus 
on the negative outcomes. For instance, the UN-Habitat (2003a) seemed to stress urban 
housing shortages and overcrowding in cities as resultants of urbanisation, while Davis 
(2006) associates urbanisation to formation of urban sprawl – planet of slum. However, 
urbanisation also has some benefits. For instance, it is a commonly held view that cities 
are engines of economic growth (UNICEF, 2012; Annez & Buckley, 2009). Large 
populations in cities provide ready markets for goods and services and hence, contribute 
to economic development (Duranton, 2009; 2014; Nijhoff, 1986). Therefore, the larger 
the city population, the larger its economy will be as many people engage in activities 
that continually stimulate the economy. As such, Annez and Buckley (2009) observe 
that there is a strong connection between urbanisation and economic growth. Next, 
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urbanisation facilitates agglomeration benefits that come from people and activities 
clustering in proximity making it easy and efficient to provide services. According to 
UNICEF (2012, p. 4) “density favours economies of scale to deliver essential social 
services. The World Bank (2015) also shares this view as the following quote shows:  
Cities can be tremendously efficient. It is easier to provide water and sanitation to people 
living closer together, while access to health, education, and other social and cultural 
services is also much more readily available.  
Nevertheless, cities will only continue enjoying agglomeration benefits as long as they 
provide corresponding urban infrastructure to match urbanisation. As Castells-Quintana 
(2015) observes, agglomeration benefits greatly depend on the quality of urban 
infrastructure. Furthermore, agglomeration benefits become limited when the cost of 
meeting basic needs increases as cities grow – there is an increase in the strain on the 
environment and natural resources (World Bank, 2015). This situation is evident in 
developing economies where “congestion diseconomies have prevailed over 
agglomeration benefits” (Castells-Quintana, 2015, p. 2). Urbanisation has instead led to 
urban sprawl (Davis, 2006). Yet, people still move to urban areas because incomes and 
life chances appear greater than in the rural areas.  
The general theory is that economic growth should lead to a decrease in the prevalence 
of squatter settlements (Arimah, 2010a). Marx et al. (2013) explain that economic 
growth played an important role in eliminating slums in many European countries. 
European governments translated economic growth gains by investing in social housing 
and basic infrastructure and services (Balchin & Rhoden, 2002). For instance, as Crook 
(1992) notes, between 1979 and 1987 the British government’s main preoccupation was 
to promote house ownership. Hence, it formulated a housing policy that placed much 
emphasis on private rented housing while also regulating minimum standards of private 
housing (Balchin & Rhoden, 2002). However, seemingly in many of the developing 
cities the opposite is true. Economic grows seems to exacerbate increases in slum 
incidence, as Arimah (2010a) found out in a study of three regions, Africa, Asia and 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The study revealed that a one percent increase 
in economic growth also increased the incidence of slums
21
 in Africa, Asia, and LAC by 
2.3, 5.3 and 3.5 percent, respectively (Arimah, 2010a).  
Zambia has experienced rapid urbanisation since the early 1960s with the urban 
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 Arimah’s definition of slums also includes squatter settlements. 
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population rising from twenty-one in 1963 to forty percent by 2010 (see Table 1.1). 
However, there has not been corresponding urban housing to match the increase in 
urban population and hence, there is now an acute urban housing shortage (see 6.3). 
Although other factors including high birth rates (Nag, 1990; CSO, 2003) and 
conversion of sub-centres into towns (CSO, 2013b) are also responsible for rapid 
urbanisation, the main driver of urbanisation has been rural-urban migrations especially 
during the period between 1963 and 1990, as rural dwellers migrated to urban areas for 
socio-economic opportunities that urban areas offered (Makasa, 2010).  
However, rural-urban migration seemingly stalled between 1990 and 2000 as the 
country underwent economic recession brought on by the economic shocks of the 1970s 
and 1980s (Simutanyi, 2008; Limpitlaw, 2011). This is also the period when the country 
began implementing Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) (see 5.4). Potts (2005; 
2013) attributes the decline in urban population during the stated period to a concept 
called counter-urbanisation, which describes a reverse trend in the movement of people 
from urban to rural areas. A poor performing economy after two global economic crises 
of the 1970s, triggered counter-urbanisation that was more apparent in the Copperbelt 
Province than in other regions due to mass employment redundancies resulting from a 
failing mining industry and its privatisation later (Henriot, 1997; Potts, 2005; 2012; 
Limpitlaw, 2011). As many people lost employment and subsequently their incomes, 
some families opted to ‘go back to the land’ because they could not sustain their 
households’ stay in urban areas. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the urbanisation 
trend seems to have picked up since 2000 causing urban population to increase from 
thirty-five to forty percent in 2010 (see Table 1.1). The probable explanation for this 
scenario is that after HIPC completion in 2005 there was an increased volume of 
investment in existing and new businesses that attracted more people to migrate to the 
cities for work opportunities (see 1.2).  
6.4.2 Complex Land Acquisition Procedures and Building Standards 
Another factor contributing to urban housing shortage arises from the complexity of 
land and building regulatory systems in place. Several observers including Mwimba 
(2002), Mutale (2004), and UN-Habitat (2005a) have pointed out the complex nature of 
the land administration process from land application to issuance of land title in 
Zambia. For instance, in addition to too much documentation, land administration 
involves many departments including local councils, Commissioner of Lands, and 
survey department (see Appendix P). The government has made strides to improve the 
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process such as decentralising land administration to local councils at the district level 
(GRZ, 1985), and issuance of title deeds at the province level. However, Mutale (2004) 
notes that the procedures have remained complex and hence, make land acquisition a 
time consuming and costly endeavour. The land acquisition period ranges from three to 
twelve months, and a further twelve months for acquiring a land title (Mutale, 2004; 
Mwimba, 2002). Consequently, many people often buy land on the black market and 
usually in the squatter settlements to cut on bureaucratic expensive procedures (UN-
Habitat, 1996b; Mwimba, 2002).  
According to Arimah (2010a), for a unit increase in the duration it takes to complete the 
land application and registration processes in Africa, Asia and LAC, there was an 
increase of 0.04 percent in the prevalence of slums. Pursing this further, the cost of land 
from local councils is too high for many low-income earners to afford. Although land 
charges respond to public demand at a given time, they tend to be higher in municipal 
and city councils than in district councils.
22
 The location of the local council – if it is 
urban or rural also influences the demand for land and land charges. For instance, 
documentary evidence from Kitwe City Council (KCC) and Chipata Municipal Council 
(CMC) in 2013 showed that the former charged more for plots that were relatively 
smaller than those the latter offered (see Table 5.1 and Table 5.2). As noted earlier, 
Kitwe is urban while Chipata is mainly rural and hence, the reason for land charges 
being higher in Kitwe than in Chipata (see Chapter 4). One interesting observation 
regarding the plot sizes between the two local councils is that there is no uniformity in 
the sizes of different types of plots – low-cost, medium-cost and high-cost. It appears 
that each local council has its own preferences. Although not part of the discussion of 
this research, the observation seemed quite important to ignore it. Furthermore, it 
appears that local councils’ pricing concentrate on the high end of the land market as 
they often create more medium- and high-cost plots cost than low-cost plots since 
returns on the former are higher than on the latter types of plots. Hence, low-income 
earners seek cheaper land in squatter settlements. However, it appears that local 
councils desire to curb the growth of squatter settlements by creating more low-cost 
plots for lower income groups as the following extract from an interview with one 
senior council officer shows:  
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 Based on author’s experience working in a local council (2002-2005) 
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As a council, we now emphasise on the creation of low-cost plots because we believe that 
in that category many low-income people would be able to build low-cost houses within 
their means.  
Regardless, it seems unlikely that low-income earners would afford to pay for low-cost 
plots either in Chipata or in Kitwe. In a scoping study to assess performance of the 
housing finance sector, Drummond et al (2013) found that many urban households 
earned less than US$500 per month (see Table 6.4). Clearly, they could not afford a 
low-cost plot at US$716 in Kitwe or US$892 in Chipata (see Table 5.1 and Table 5.2).  
Table 6.4: Average Incomes of urban household in Zambia 
Type of 
Housing 
Household number, 
and percentage of 
population 
Residential location/ 
Tenure 
Employment 
group 
Household monthly 
expenditure 
(Income) 
High Cost 79,687 (3%) Low density areas; 
Titled property; 
Owners/ tenants 
Formal sector 
employment; high 
level employment 
In excess of K5000 
(US$1000) 
Medium Cost 104,121 (4%) Medium density 
areas; Mostly titled 
property; Owners/ 
tenants 
Mostly formal sector 
employment; middle 
level employment 
Between K2500 and 
5000 (US$500 to 
1000) 
Low Cost 664,600 (23%) High density areas; 
Mostly untitled 
property in informal 
residential areas; 
Owners/ tenants 
Mostly informal 
sector employment; 
Supplemented by 
multiple informal 
economic activities 
Below K2500 
(US$500) 
Source: Adapted from Drummond et al (2013, p. 25) 
Regarding building standards and regulations, there have been concerns that they are 
unrealistically high and hence contributing to the high cost of building or purchasing 
houses and hence, making housing unaffordable to many low-income households 
(Drummond, et al., 2013; UN-Habitat, 2012a). Therefore, many households opt to build 
in squatter settlements where standards and regulations do not apply (Arnott, 2009). 
Besides, with incomes of less than US$500 (see Table 6.4) and far less than the average 
cost of the ‘basic needs basket’23of US$655 (see Appendix T), low-income households 
are concerned more with meeting the demand for food than buying high quality building 
materials. Drummond et al (2013) and UN-Habitat (2012a) have observed that building 
standards that local councils apply in urban areas are unrealistically high and 
inappropriate, especially for low-income housing. Apparently, Zambia has maintained 
the planning and building standards inherited at independence from Britain (see 6.3.4). 
Ironically, Britain has revised its spatial planning standards and regulations several 
                                                 
23
 The basic needs basket compiles the cost of basic requirements a family of six needs per month. The 
BNB is based on major urban districts, but it is also estimated for rural districts (JCTR, 2005; 2014) 
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times to reflect the changing environment (Collier & Venables, 2014; UN-Habitat, 
2013; Njoh, 2003). However, in 2009 government attempted to review the Town and 
Country Planning Act (Berrisford, 2011). At the end of the fieldwork for this research in 
August 2014, the new Urban and Regional Planning Bill was still in draft form. This 
means that town planning remains static, and unresponsive to socio-economic and 
political changes (UN-Habitat, 2013; Taylor, et al., 2015).  
6.4.3 Unfavourable Economic Environment 
Another cause of urban housing shortage concerns the unfavourable macro-economic 
environment that the country has faced since the late 1970s (see 1.7.2). As noted in 
Chapter 5, Zambia implemented SAP in the 1980s and 1990s to restructure its ailing 
economy (Saasa, 1996). Some macro-economic policies such as privatisation of state-
owned enterprises, and reduced public spending have had tremendous impact on the 
urban poor (Henriot, 1997; UN-Habitat, 2003a; Fraser, 2007). For instance, 
privatisation led to many people losing employment and incomes (see 6.4.1), and 
ultimately lost access to decent housing. Similarly, reduced social spending on social 
services such as public housing contributed to diminishing housing stocks and hence, 
many people now living in squatter settlements (Fox, 2014).  
The private sector also seems to have failed to meet the housing need of lower-income 
groups because it has mainly targeted higher-income groups with regular employment 
and access to formal credit (Durand-Lasserve, 2006). Local councils also invariably 
lack the financial and expert capacity to carry out the work needed to address urban 
problems (Ooi & Hong, 2007). Hence, to meet their housing needs many of the urban 
poor build houses in squatter settlements, adding to their prevalence (Fox, 2014).  
Evidence suggests that Zambia’s economy improved steadily between 2000 and 2010 as 
indicated by its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth from 3.9 to 10.3 percent, 
respectively. During the same period, GDP per capita also increased from US$340 to 
US$1456 (see Figure 6.15). In normal circumstances, an increase in the GDP per capita 
would result in reduction of slums because people would have more disposable incomes 
to build new or improve existing housing. In a study of several countries from Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean to explain the prevalence of slums in 
developing countries, Arimah (2010a; 2010b) demonstrates that a percentage increase in 
GDP per capita occasions a 7.6 percent reduction in the proportion of a country’s urban 
population living in slums.  
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Figure 6.15: GDP Growth and GDP per Capita in Zambia (2000-2010) 
Source: Compiled from the World Bank 
However, the opposite prevails in Zambia’s case where it seems that as GDP per capita 
increased between 2000 and 2010 (see Figure 6.15), the squatter population also 
increased by over 100 percent (see Table 1.2). Although there was an increase of 20.5 
percent in total urban housing between 2000 and 2010, most of it was squatter housing 
that increased by thirty-nine percent while formal residential housing increased by five 
percent only (see Figure 1.1). Therefore, the concern that needs addressing is why there 
was such an increase in the squatter population in the presence of steady economic 
growth and three possible explanations exist. Firstly, the benefits of economic growth 
such as infrastructure development have only been concentrated in urban areas without 
trickling to the rural areas. To access these opportunities that development offers, rural 
dwellers migrate to urban areas where affordable urban housing is already inadequate 
and hence, they end up in squatter settlements (see 6.4.1). Secondly, although GDP per 
capita increased it did not benefit the poor. As UN-Habitat (2003b, p. 27) observes, “the 
poor do not automatically benefit from good macroeconomic statistics, compared to the 
non-poor, particularly in terms of the corresponding improvements in the quality and 
coverage of public services.” This perhaps explains why slum incidence is high in 
countries with high poverty levels (UN-Habitat, 2003b; 2005b; Davis, 2006).  
Lastly, Zambia is a heavily indebted country that spends larger sums of money on debt 
servicing than on investment in infrastructure that could contribute to lifting people out 
of poverty (Marcelino & Hakobyan, 2014; Situmbeko & Zulu, 2004; ADB, 2014). In a 
study to determine what drives infrastructure spending in cities of developing countries, 
Arimah (2005) observed that debt servicing had a tremendous effect on expenditure on 
public infrastructure making it difficult for the poor to get out of poverty. Devas (2003) 
had pointed out earlier that heavy debt obligations would pre-empt financial resources 
that could be used in addressing the poor’s infrastructure needs such as slum upgrading 
and prevention.  
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6.4.4 Inadequate Investment in Urban Housing 
From 1964, the state has been responsible for providing public housing (Makasa, 2010). 
Nonetheless, private companies have also provided housing but mainly for their 
employees’ consumption (Mutale, 2004). Despite having the sole responsibility for 
public housing provision, it appears the state has failed to invest sufficiently in housing 
to meet growing housing demand caused by rapid urbanisation (see 6.4.1). In the mid-
1990s, government liberalised the housing sector to allow private sector participation 
and pledged to provide an enabling environment to stimulate private sector involvement 
in the housing sector (see 5.4.1). Yet, the state seems to have failed to provide the 
anticipated enabling environment. For example, budgetary allocations have been less 
than half of what it pledged. In fact, the biggest allocation was 6.5 percent in 2007 (see 
Figure 5.1). Clearly, allocations to housing are insufficient to stimulate investment in 
housing by companies and individuals. On the other hand, the state provided some tax 
incentives on corporation tax, value added tax and import duties to encourage private 
sector participation in housing development (Makasa, 2010). Sadly, as Drummond et al. 
(2013) observe, uptake of tax incentives has been unimpressive while private sector 
involvement in the housing has remained low. Moreover, private developers seem not to 
favour low-income earners because the cost of low-cost houses that range between 
US$37,000 and US$90,000 is unaffordable (see Table 6.5).  
Table 6.5: Purchase Prices of Houses (US$) 
Name of Developer Low-cost house Medium-cost house High-Cost house 
Lilayi Estates 36,770 38,240 - 
National Pension Scheme Authority - 91,500 166,000 
National Housing Authority 90,000 95,000 - 
Park View Estate - 234,000 334,000 
Unicorn Estate Development - 200,000 - 
Silverest Housing Development 85,000 - 220,000 
Source: Compiled from Email from Steven Akakandelwa (2014) 
In 2010, one needed to earn a gross monthly income of at least US$2500 (K12,600), 
and pay a deposit of about US$14,000 (K69,000) to buy a three-bedroomed low-cost 
house (see Table 6.6). Even this housing scheme was unaffordable to many households 
because they earned less than US$500 (see Table 6.4). Evidently, the private sector has 
also failed to meet the housing need
24
 of low-income households. Hence, poor 
                                                 
24
 Housing need refers to the number and type of housing units required to accommodate a population 
at a given standard of housing occupancy (Myers, et al., 2002).  
177 
households opt to buy plots and build houses incrementally in squatter settlements. As 
Davis (2006, p. 17) observes, “markets in the third world rarely supply more than 
twenty percent of new housing stock, so out of necessity, people turn to self-built 
shanties, informal rentals, private sub-divisions, or the sidewalks.”  
Table 6.6: Lilayi Estate Homeownership Scheme Requirements 
House Type One Bedroom Two Bedrooms  Three Bedrooms 
House Size (M2) 37 57 89 
Cost of Houses (K) 33,333 38,235 55,882 
20% Deposit (US$) 6,667 7,647 11,176  
Closing + Insurance (US$) 1,511 1,696 2,359 
Total Upfront Amount (US$) 8,178 9,343 13,536 
Balance to be paid over 15 years (US$) 25,155 28,893 42,347 
Minimum Gross Monthly Income (US$) 1,499 1,710 2,469 
Source: Human Rights Commission (2010, p. 38) 
6.4.5 Poverty 
The rise in urban poverty became more prominent with the resumption of SAP in 1991 
to the mid-2000s (Chibuye, 2014). Some analysts have observed that while the 
economy needed restructuring, implementing so many SAP policies simultaneously was 
too adverse on a weak economy (Henriot, 1997; Fraser, 2007). Hence, SAP triggered 
many socio-economic problems including rising poverty levels and deepening 
inequality (Fraser & Lungu, 2008; Henriot, 1997). Compared with the rest of SSA and 
the developing world, poverty levels in Zambia have been extremely high since the 
1990s (see Table 6.7). As earlier noted, Zambia is among the poorest countries of the 
world (see 1.7.2).  
Table 6.7: Share of population living in absolute poverty by world region 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Developing World 53% 43% 34% 17% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 53% 57% 59% 47% 
Zambia - 70% 73% 61% 
Source: Compiled from Roser (2015), CSO (2012a), and Chibuye (2014) 
Due to privatisation of state-owned enterprises including ZCCM, many people lost 
employment and incomes (see 6.4.1). According to the World Bank (2003), formal-
sector employment fell from twenty-four percent in the 1990s to ten percent in the 
2000s. Moreover, government removed consumption subsidies and cut social spending 
on services including public housing (see 6.4.3). Together these factors caused 
households to lose incomes and fail to meet costs of social needs and services and 
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hence, the rise in poverty (Chibuye, 2014). Evidence shows that urban poverty 
increased from forty-nine percent in 1991 to fifty-six percent in 1998 (see Figure 1.3). 
Although urban poverty has reduced by half since 1998, many people in the urban areas 
seem to lack meaningful incomes to invest in housing for three reasons. Firstly, urban 
unemployment remains quite high at about fifteen percent compared to 3.1 percent in 
rural areas (CSO, 2013c). This was also evident from the data gathered from the case 
study settlements regarding the employment status of households. It appears that many 
households did not have anyone employed (see Figure 6.16).  
 
Figure 6.16: Household Employment Status in Case Study Settlements 
Source: Author 
Since many financial institutions require a borrower to be in formal employment and 
earn a minimum monthly income of US$500-1500 (Drummond, et al., 2013; Human 
Rights Commission, 2010), it implies that many of the households in the case study 
settlements would not have access to housing finance. Besides, as the research shows 
later (see 8.4), in households where at least one member worked, their earnings were 
less than US$500 per month. Secondly, financial institutions require land titles as 
collateral for home loans and mortgages (Drummond, et al., 2013). However, evidence 
shows that most of the low-income households in urban areas have no title deeds for the 
property they own and hence, they cannot provide the collateral lending institutions 
require (see 6.3.3). Data gathered from financial institutions that included commercial 
banks and Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) also showed that they needed land titles as 
collateral for home loans and mortgages (see 6.3.3), as the following quote from one 
respondent from one commercial bank shows:  
We offer mortgages but not for housing development in squatter settlements. However, 
we have had people from improvement areas that have accessed mortgages and loans to 
improve their housing and other properties. In their case, they had occupancy licences, 
which we accept as collateral. (FI5, BS, 44yrs)  
FI5 brought out an important aspect of accepting occupancy licences - land titles issued 
to landowners in legalised settlements. This situation highlights the importance of 
legalising squatter settlements for landowners to get occupancy licences. It also gives 
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credibility to the debate on whether landowners in legalised settlements need land titles, 
de facto or perceived tenure security to make investment decisions (see 2.2.3). Clearly, 
landowners in Zambia need land titles to access finance for investment in housing.  
Thirdly, interest rates on borrowing are quite high and unaffordable for most of the low-
income households while duration of loans and mortgages are most often short 
(Chiumya, 2004; Gardner & Rust, 2007). Since 2009, the average lending rates for 
loans and mortgages have ranged between sixteen and twenty-nine percent, and 
eighteen and twenty-two percent, respectively (Bank of Zambia, 2014). Evidence 
gathered from several financial institutions revealed that interest rates on loans and 
mortgages were indeed quite high especially for squatter residents who earned less than 
U$500 per month (see Figure 6.17 and Figure 6.18).  
 
Figure 6.17: Maximum durations and Interest Rates on Loans 
Source: Author 
 
Figure 6.18: Maximum durations and Interest Rates on Mortgages 
Only commercial banks offered mortgages at interest rates of sixteen to twenty-four 
percent and durations of ten to twenty-five years (see Figure 6.18). However, the 
requirements for borrowing were similar to those for loans including applicants 
possessing land titles, and a verifiable home address (see 6.3.3). This is a general rule in 
financial lending that the lender takes a charge on the property – if a borrower defaults, 
the lender can take possession of the property and sell. Regarding the duration for loans, 
these seem generally too short considering that many people take longer to complete 
their houses. According to evidence gathered, the modal time the respondents who 
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claimed to have built their own houses took to build was five years (see Figure 6.19). 
However, in extreme cases, it took some homeowners about one month and another 
fifteen years to finish building (see Appendix U, Appendix V, Appendix W, and 
Appendix X).  
 
Figure 6.19: Duration for building houses in Case Study Settlements 
Source: Author 
On the other hand, evidence from various financial institutions show that the maximum 
durations for accessible personal loans ranged from one to five years for MFI loans, and  
three to twenty-five for commercial banks loans years (see Figure 6.17 and Figure 
6.18). Some commercial loans that had durations of up to twenty-five years were mainly 
business and investment loans, which by nature of stricter requirements are inaccessible 
to many low-income earners.  
Consequently, these strict requirements including applicants being in formal 
employment, land titles as collateral, and high interest rates and short durations on 
loans, act as obstacles to many of the urban poor access housing finance (Chiumya, 
2004). As Drummond et al (2013, p. 94) concluded in their study, “existing structural 
conditions in the housing and financial market, which limit access, are complex and 
multifaceted, and can only be addressed through the involvement and cooperation of all 
stakeholders including public, private and tertiary spheres.” To make matters worse, it 
appears many financial institutions especially commercial banks, are unwilling to create 
tailor-made housing finance products for low-income households (see Figure 6.20).  
 
Figure 6.20: financial institutions willing to create special packages  
The financial institutions who indicated that they would create special packages for low-
income households explained that if there were a need for that they would consider. As 
one respondent explained: 
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We already have a special account designed specially to encourage the underserved to 
begin serving. This account has an opening balance of K50 and account holders can 
deposit any amount. […]. We know that there would be increased demand for our 
services. Most of our borrowers are from squatter settlements. Briefly, we will respond 
according to the situation as we always do. (FI7, MFI, 6yrs) 
Another respondent also explained as follows: 
The services and products we offer are demand driven. If a need arises to design purpose-
made services for low-income groups including those in squatter settlements, the pricing 
committee that is responsible for such, will surely come up with some desired products. 
(FI2, CB, 5yrs) 
The financial institutions who indicated they would not create purpose-made products 
for low-income household said their products were sufficient and accessible to all 
people if they met the conditions. As one respondent explained: 
We believe that the services offered now are adequate because they are easily accessible, 
and affordable. (FI5, BS, 44yrs) 
According to the World Bank (1994b), most of the urban poor lived in unplanned 
squatter settlements on the periphery of urban centres, where they lack of legal status 
and service provision constrained their productivity. Nonetheless, in the last two 
decades other non-traditional forms of accessing finance have developed including 
microfinance, kaloba, and chilimba. Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) have emerged to 
provide credit to mostly those not served by commercial banks and mortgage 
companies. They also target small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs (Chiumya, 2004). 
Although MFI interest rates ranging from thirty-three to one hundred and forty-six 
percent are normally excessive, compared to those of commercial banks many low-
income households prefer to borrow from MFIs to because of their ease of access and 
flexible collateral requirements (Chiumya, 2004; Bank of Zambia, 2014). As Rust and 
Gavera (2013) observed, some MFIs have now ventured into providing home 
improvement loans. Kaloba and chilimba are two of the most popular local systems 
used in Zambia (Melzer, 2009). Kaloba, which means ‘the more you borrow, the higher 
the cost of paying back’ is an informal microcredit system that offers short-term loans at 
high interest rates of up to 100 percent (Byrne, 1994). Lenders are usually individuals 
and access is through personal referrals. Nonetheless, it is more flexible and accessible 
than formal credit, and it is available to all income groups (Drummond, et al., 2013).  
Households may also access credit through a chilimba system, another informal system 
designed to help people save towards planned targets (Melzer, 2007). Chilimba, which 
means strengthening in Bemba and Chewa languages, is an equivalent of rotating 
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savings or ‘money-go-round’. It is a self-help way of assisting those who are unable to 
raise the money required for either business or buying household items (Mukuka, et al., 
2002). It usually involves two or more people willing to save for a pre-determined 
target, and members decide on initial amounts to contribute and give to one person 
when it is their turn in the cycle. They can also review the amounts to contribute, and 
once all members have achieved their goals they can decide to stop or continue with the 
chilimba. Although not an income generating venture, chilimba provides good savings 
and access to credit one may not have had at once had they not been part of the system 
(Melzer, 2007). Chilimba savings could help low-income households invest in 
improving their houses incrementally. Kaloba and chilimba are only interim measures, 
and therefore not quite sustainable in a case where a household needs to build a new 
house or even improve an existing one. They still need an assured source of credit at 
reasonably affordable interest rates. Therefore, since many urban households are poor 
and unemployed, they may be unable to pay back to kaloba or join a chilimba group.  
To summarise, urban housing shortage is the main cause of the prevalence of squatter 
settlement. Many factors have led to urban housing shortage including rapid 
urbanisation, complex land procedures and building standards, unfavourable economic 
environment, inadequate investment in housing, and poverty. The next section examines 
the various housing programmes that government undertook to address the urban 
housing shortage and the extent to which they addressed the situation.  
6.5 RESPONSES TO HOUSING SHORTAGE 
The research has established that although the urban housing shortage and subsequently 
the prevalence of squatter settlements originated in the colonial era under authoritarian 
rule, the situation in both cases intensified during the independence and post-
independence eras under socialist authoritarian and neoliberal democratic regimes, 
respectively (see Chapter 5). To address this urban housing situation, government 
during the last two eras implemented several housing strategies which this research 
identifies as fully funded (conventional) housing (1965a; GRZ, 1966a), sites-and-
services schemes, and squatter upgrading (GRZ, 1971b; 1979).  
6.5.1 Fully-Funded Housing 
As the term ‘fully-funded’ suggests, the government funded housing provision without 
passing the cost to the beneficiaries. At independence, the government was concerned 
with the housing shortage that had resulted into many squatter settlements especially in 
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towns along the rail line (Makasa, 2010). Therefore, it planned to build housing for the 
civil service and the public (GRZ, 1965a; 1966a). Although there was no 
comprehensive housing policy to guide housing development at the time, government 
implemented housing programmes through wider national policies called national 
development plans and government circulars. Government also outlined several 
objectives that that it intended to achieve over the period of the development plans (see 
5.3.1). The major drive for adopting conventional housing was to provide standard 
houses to cover as many urban households as possible and curb the development of new 
squatter settlements (GRZ, 1965a; Makasa, 2010). Therefore, the first conventional 
housing programme through the Transitional Development Plan (TDP) targeted and 
built only five thousand medium-cost and high-cost houses for civil servants and 
expatriates mobilised for administrative functions (Rakodi, 1986a; GRZ, 1966a) (see 
Table 6.8). There is no data to show what the housing need was at the time. However, 
evidence suggests that many people were already living in squatter settlements because 
of urban housing shortage.  
Table 6.8: Performance of Conventional housing programmes (1965-1989) 
Period  Target Achieved Shortfall Success rate % 
1965-1966 (TDP) 5,000 5,000 0 100.0 
1966-1970 (1NDP) - - - - 
1972-1976 (2NDP) 28,183 4,283 23,900 15.2 
1979-1983 (3NDP) 284,000 4,200 279,800 1.5 
Source: Compiled from GRZ (1965a; 1966a; 1971b; 1979), Mutale (1999, pp. 90-91) 
The next conventional housing programme came through the First National 
Development Plan (1NDP) and government intended to continue providing 
conventional housing and encourage owner-occupied housing as a fundamental human 
right for all Zambians (see 5.3.1). It is uncertain what quantity of housing government 
planned and delivered as many scholarly works report different figures. For instance, 
Mutale (1999) estimates the number of houses built at 15,993. Several others put the 
figure at 1,429. However, government still failed to provide more low-cost housing 
contrary to the advice of the United Nations (UN) to allocate seventy-five percent of all 
housing investment to low-cost housing. Instead, it invested over fifty percent of the 
allocation into housing for civil servants and higher-income groups (Sanyal, 1981). 
Additionally, the local councils to whom government delegated to responsibility of 
providing public low-cost housing for rent also failed to continue the programme due to 
inadequate funding (Mutale, 2004; Makasa, 2010).  
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The third programme, with the view of meeting the housing needs of low-income 
households, came through the Second National Development Plan (2NDP) (see 5.3.1). 
Therefore, of the total allocation of K43 million (£30.1 million), government assigned 
90.6% to conventional housing while the rest (9.6 percent) went to sites-and-services, 
and squatter upgrading programmes (Kangwa, 2007). As in the 1NDP, government 
spent over seventy percent of the conventional housing allocation on civil service 
housing. Besides, of the 28,183 housing units planned it only delivered 4,283 (see Table 
6.8). Mutale (2004) notes that despite the 2NDP being initiated during a period of 
relative prosperity, its performance was not good. Hansen (1982) explains that the 
construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) that was a pressing matter at 
the time required more funding and hence, funding to housing became secondary.  
The last major conventional housing programme during the socialist regime came 
through the Third National Development Plan (3NDP) under the umbrella objective of 
attaining minimum shelter standards (see 5.3.1). This aim probably focused much on 
sites-and-services and squatter upgrading programmes. By this time, government focus 
had shifted from housing provision to private homeownership financed by personal 
savings. Nonetheless, it continued with conventional housing, which by its scale was 
also the most ambitious (Kangwa, 2007). The government planned to construct 284,000 
houses (78,240 houses per year), which would be broken down as very low-income 
(89.6%), low-income (6.6%) lower middle-income (1.6%), middle-income (1.5%), and 
high-income (0.7%) (GRZ, 1979; Makundi, 1992). However, government only 
delivered 4200 housing units of which low-cost houses were 700 (see Table 6.8). The 
programme suffered a serious lack of financial commitment from government (Kangwa, 
2007). Furthermore, despite government’s plan to encourage homeownership through 
purchasing of completed houses, more than fifty percent of the houses were affordable 
only to less than two percent of the population (Schlyter, 1988). Although conventional 
housing was to continue into the Fourth National Development Plan (4NDP), there was 
no funding for it (JICA, 2007). The country had just began its first SAP attempt in 1987, 
and one of the donor conditions then was to cut social spending and subsidises (Henriot, 
1997; Saasa, 1996).  
Post-independence conventional housing programmes have not performed any better 
than their predecessors have. In fact, they have been quite insignificant in contributing 
positively to solving the urban housing shortage. The first of these programmes was the 
Presidential Housing Initiative (PHI) that began in 1998. PHI had no targets but by the 
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time it ended in early 2000s it had only delivered 500 houses in Lusaka and another 102 
in Ndola. PHI failed to roll out to other districts because of insufficient funding. 
Furthermore, although many of the houses were low-cost to accommodate low-income 
earners, their purchase prices were too high for low-income earners to afford. 
Consequently, PHI failed to meet the housing needs of low-income earners but ended 
up benefiting higher-income earners (Schlyter, 2003a). Instead, the PHI programme 
only succeeded in displacing squatters through the process of gentrification (see 2.2.4).  
Government announced the second post-independence housing programme through the 
Fifth National Development Plan (5NDP). Its intention then was to build 36,500 houses 
spread equally in all of the seventy-three districts during the period 2006-2010 (GRZ, 
2006a; 2011). However, by 2010 government only built 214 houses because of 
insufficient funding (Makasa, 2010). Nevertheless, it planned for more housing in the 
Sixth National Development Plan (6NDP) (2011-2016). Government would facilitate 
building of 150,000 houses annually for both homeownership and rent between 2011 
and 2025 (GRZ, 2011; UN-Habitat, 2012a). However, it is unclear how the government 
intends to fund the programme. Evidently, budgetary allocations to housing have been 
insufficient to have a meaningful impact on the urban housing shortage (see Figure 5.1).  
All conventional housing programmes under the socialist authoritarian and neoliberal 
democratic regimes appear to have failed to solve the urban housing shortage. There are 
several explanations for the failure of housing programmes to solve the urban housing 
shortage. These reasons are similar to all those discussed earlier but here the researcher 
explains them in the Zambian context (see 2.2.5). Firstly, housing programmes lacked 
proper planning and management (Makasa, 2010). At independence, Zambia lacked 
qualified staff that would have planned and managed urban development (Du Plessis, 
2006; Simposya, 2003). However, during the post-independence era, housing 
programmes still lacked proper planning. Although a housing policy exists, government 
has failed to implement nearly all of the strategies it required to create an enabling 
environment for housing investment (Makasa, 2010). Lack of planning resulted in 
failure to match housing objectives with fiscal resources (see 6.5.1). Moreover, the 
number of houses at any given time was inadequate to meet the demand for housing. As 
Schlyter (1998, p. 262) explains of the post-independence PHI programme, “the 
numbers were very limited in relation to the huge need, and the cost was at a level that 
only a few people could afford.” 
Secondly, even when it was aware of the critical shortage of low-cost housing at 
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independence as people already lived in squatter settlements (see 5.3), government still 
failed to prioritise low-income housing and thus, perpetuated the housing problem 
(Sanyal, 1981). Instead, government allocated more funding to higher-income housing, 
than low-income housing, to which it also diverted funding for squatter settlements 
(Mutale, 2004; Makasa, 2010; Rakodi, 1986a). One can cannot clearly explain the bias 
against low-income housing but only speculate that it had to do with priorities of 
clientelist politics (Tordoff, 1980). As observed in Chapter 5, merging party and 
government structures at both national and local government levels lead to the 
entrenchment of clientelism in all spheres of government (Larmer, 2011). This affected 
how government distributed resources among various departments and groups of 
society (Baylies & Szeftel, 1992). The democratic regimes have also failed to prioritise 
low-income housing. For instance, nearly all PHI houses were middle- and high-income 
type (Schlyter, 1998). The houses initially designed as low-income houses turned out to 
be too expensive for the poor to purchase because of the high standard materials used 
that raised the purchase price (Makasa, 2010). Consequently, government failed to 
encourage homeownership as many low-income households could afford to buy the 
expensive houses (Schlyter, 1998).  
Thirdly, housing programmes lacked funding to achieve intended targets (Rakodi, 
1986a). Although the state delegated public low-cost housing provision to local 
councils, funding for housing was erratic and inadequate. Hence, the councils failed to 
continue building houses (Mutale, 2004; Makasa, 2010). Since affordable low-cost 
housing was not available to meet the growing demand for low-income housing, many 
households were “left to their own devices” and built houses in squatter settlements 
(Berner & Phillips, 2005). The fourth explanation for failure of conventional housing 
programmes concerns the continued system of institutional housing (see 5.2). Hence, as 
in the colonial era many people were not motivated to build their own houses (Mutale, 
2004; Schlyter, 1998). Lastly, low-income housing failed to meet the needs of many 
households especially in terms of size and cultural concerns (Rakodi, 1986a). Therefore, 
some people opted to live in squatter settlements where they built houses designed to 
their requirements.  
Makasa (2010, p. 169) summarises the reasons for failure of housing programmes as, 
“inefficiency, cumbersome decision making and administrative procedures, and 
disagreements on suitable standards, that also included the inappropriateness of the 
strategies adopted to meet the needs of a rapidly growing population.” By implication, 
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failure by government to meet the housing targets has exacerbated the housing deficit. 
Hence, in the pursuit of “the dream of a house of one’s own” (Hansen, 1996, p. 128), 
many households continue building houses in squatter settlements.  
6.5.2 Sites-and-services Schemes 
Having recognised that conventional housing alone was not enough to address the 
housing shortage, government introduced sites-and-services schemes, a cost-sharing 
programme (Rakodi, 1986a). This shift began in the mid-1960s through a government 
Circular No. 17/66. In this first informal housing policy, government pledged to provide 
thirty percent of proposed new housing units per year in sites-and-services areas over 
the duration of the 1NDP (GRZ, 1966b). Moreover, through Circular No. 59/68, 
government provided assistance in the form of building materials loans and technical 
assistance to beneficiaries of the sites-and-services plots (Rakodi, 1986a; GRZ, 1968). 
Furthermore, government set up institutions such as the Zambia National Building 
Society (ZNBS) and National Housing Authority (NHA), to provide mortgages for 
home building to individual applicants, and spearhead and control all national housing 
programmes, respectively (see 5.3).  
The underlying principle of the sites-and-services schemes was that authorities would 
provide serviced land/ plots, while beneficiary households would build their houses 
according to approved plans of their own choice (Gattoni, 2009). Sites-and-services 
schemes therefore heavily depend on the willingness to pay and the ability of intended 
beneficiary households to build and improve their own houses (Mayo & Gross, 1987; 
Matovu, 2000). They ranged from an empty plot of land with some basic services like 
water and sanitation connections, and roads to the provision of a ‘core’ house consisting 
of a toilet and kitchen only on the plot with attached services (Gattoni, 2009). There 
were two types of site-and-services schemes, the standard and basic sites-and-services 
schemes. The former was based on the standard definition of providing surveyed plots 
with financial assistance for essential infrastructure while the latter consisted of a plot 
without financial assistance (Matovu, 2000; Gattoni, 2009).  
In Zambia, the primary objective of sites-and-services schemes was to meet the housing 
needs of low-income households in urban areas by providing fully serviced sites in 
accordance with the 2NDP housing objective of encouraging homeownership (see 
6.5.1). Therefore, government would not provide housing but facilitate access to 
housing finance and land for low-income households to improve their housing 
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conditions. Those targeted for the standard sites-and-services schemes were from the 
working class who could afford to build their own houses (Rakodi, 1986a). They 
received serviced plots and developed them through aided
25
 self-help housing (GRZ, 
1966b; Mutale, 2004). However, because of financial constraints government could not 
continue with the standard sites-and-services plots and hence, it introduced the basic 
type without essential infrastructure and financial assistance (GRZ, 1971b). Instead, 
beneficiary households would meet the full cost of the plot including interest payable in 
instalments (Sanyal, 1981). Like conventional housing, sites-and-services schemes 
failed to achieve their planned targets. During the duration of the 2NDP, of the 67,000 
serviced sites planned for, government only delivered 12.2 percent (8138 sites). For the 
14,600 sites planned for delivery during the 3NDP, government only delivered 4963 
sites (34 percent) (GRZ, 1971b; 1979; Rakodi, 1986a).  
There are several reason advanced for the failure of sites-and-services schemes. Firstly, 
Rakodi (1986a) explains that there was controversy over plot sizes, which were too 
small for further house expansions. Secondly, the unresolved question of the legal status 
of serviced plots, prevented beneficiaries from obtaining formal sector credit for house 
construction. Consequently, beneficiaries of core houses could not extend their houses. 
Moreover, the unclear legal status of the site-and services plots made it difficult for 
beneficiaries to understand the grounds for plot repossession in case of cost-recovery 
default (Rakodi, 1986a). Thirdly, the eligibility criteria for a serviced plot favoured 
those in formal employment and excluded the self-employed applicants (Sanyal, 1981; 
1987). Lastly, despite having the capacity to reach more people than conventional 
housing, sites-and-services schemes received inadequate funding (see 6.5.1).  
To summarise, sites-and-services schemes failed to achieve planned targets by far. This 
implies that many households who did not benefit from the programmes continued to 
live in poor housing conditions in squatter settlements.  
6.5.3 Squatter Upgrading 
The driving force for state-led housing programmes was to solve the urban housing 
shortage that manifested through the prevalence of squatter settlements (see 6.5). 
Evidently, these programmes failed because squatter settlements kept on growing. As 
Rakodi (1986a) notes, the inability of housing programmes to keep pace with the 
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Government provided both financial (building materials loans) and technical assistance. 
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rapidly growing urban population catalysed the prevalence of squatter settlements. 
Squatting became a strategic response to urban housing shortage (Hansen, 1982). 
Initially, government responded to squatter settlements through demolition (Schlyter, 
1998; Mutale, 2004). However, for every settlement demolished more sprung up 
somewhere else because there was not enough conventional housing to accommodate 
low-income households (Rakodi, 1986a). By 1971, government realised that that 
demolitions were an exercise in futility; squatter settlement eradication was a difficult 
task that would take long to achieve (UN-Habitat, 2012a). Moreover, it realised that 
squatter settlements played an important role in contributing to solving the urban 
housing crisis (see 2.2.2). Therefore, through Circular 29/68 it announced plans for 
resettling squatters (GRZ, 1968). This circular also strengthened the resolve of councils 
to eradicate squatter settlements by resettling squatters in basic sites-and-services areas 
(Rakodi, 1986a). However, resettlements of squatters also proved unsuccessful because 
government failed to deliver the sites-and-services plots it planned (see 6.5.2).  
Therefore, government chose squatter upgrading as a way of enabling many families to 
attain the minimum shelter standards and to promote a homeownership scheme financed 
by personal savings and long-term institutional credit (GRZ, 1979, p. 324). After all, as 
government later claimed, “Although squatter areas are unplanned, they nevertheless, 
represent assets both in social and financial terms. The areas required planning services 
and wholesale demolition of good and bad houses alike was not a practical solution” 
(GRZ, 1971b, p. 148). Squatter upgrading initially began on a very small scale during 
the 1NDP in the 1960s. The programme also benefited from financial and technical 
support (GRZ, 1966b). However, because of resource constraints in the 1970s, 
government withdrew the support to squatters (Sanyal, 1981). After the impressive 
performance of the Lusaka Squatter Upgrading Project (LSUP)
26
, government decided 
to replicate it in other settlements within Lusaka using own resources. As such, 
government announced the next programme to upgrade 110,900 in the 3NDP. However, 
government only upgraded 13,162 homes (11.9 percent) (GRZ, 1979; Makundi, 1992). 
Some observers have pointed out that there was insufficient funding for squatter 
upgrading because government diverted over fifty percent of the funding to higher-
income housing (see 6.5.1).  
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 Refer to Section 6.6 
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In summation, the responses to the urban housing shortage have been unimpressive. 
Conventional housing, sites-and-services schemes, and squatter upgrading all failed to 
mitigate the problem of urban housing shortage. As a result, many of the urban poor 
continue living in squatter settlements. The main reasons for failure of these housing 
programmes have been lack of planning and management that led to failure to match 
objectives to resources, and inadequate funding to housing programmes. Other reasons 
include failure to prioritise low-income housing, and the failure to understand the 
physical and cultural needs and of the intended beneficiaries.  
6.6 LUSAKA SQUATTER UPGRADING PROJECT – AN EVALUATION 
In 1974, government secured funding from the World Bank to upgrade some squatter 
settlements in Lusaka city. Government was able to obtain this support because at that 
time, the Bank had just approved its policy on funding urban development in 
developing countries (Ramsamy, 2006). Hence, the Lusaka Squatter Upgrading Project 
(LSUP) was one of the pioneering upgrading programmes in Africa (Gulyani & 
Connors, 2002). To support LSUP, government passed the Housing Act, which also 
empowered local councils to give squatters tenure security and provide basic social 
facilities in the areas (see 5.3.1).  
6.6.1 Programme Definition 
According to LSUP, squatter upgrading meant, “the provision of infrastructure at basic 
standards, community services, loans for building materials, and land tenure” (Pasteur, 
1979, p. 52). It also implied resettling in adjacent overspill sites-and-services areas 
“those displaced by insertion of services in existing areas. Therefore, like KIP and PFB, 
LSUP defined the aim of the programme, which helped it identify the necessary 
interventions (see 3.5.1). According to Keare and Paris (1982), LSUP had two main 
components including physical infrastructure and socio-economic improvement (see 
Table 6.9). Within the socio-economic component, LSUP also included land 
regularisation and titling (Bamberger, et al., 1982; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). Generally, 
LSUP seems to have made significant progress and substantial achievements in both 
components in three years since 1974.  
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Table 6.9: LSUP Components and Achievements by December 1977 
Project Components Target Achieved Achieved (%) 
Infrastructure Implementation    
Provision of communal water standpipes, roads and 
security lights to benefit families 
17,700 19,916 113 
Demarcate plots in overspill, and site & services areas 11,601 8,088 70 
Community facilities    
Schools 20 8 40 
Clinics/ health centres 3 0 0 
Markets 17 6 35 
Community centres 17 7 41 
Socio-economic Development    
Allocate site-and-services plots 2,170 2,898 134 
Erect core units in overspill, and site & services areas 11,927 5,047 42 
Building material loans beneficiaries 28,851 9,151 32 
Value of Building loans (US$) 8,728,000 4,081,080 47 
Source: Adapted from Keare and Paris (1982, p. 7) 
6.6.2 Sources of Funding 
Furthermore, LSUP had explicitly defined sources of funding as the World Bank and 
government (Pasteur, 1979; World Bank, 1974a; 1974b). The estimated total cost of the 
project in 1974, US$41.2 Million, was financed by $21.2 million (51.5 percent) from 
the Government of Zambia's own resources, including small contributions by American 
Friends Service Committee (AFSC) and UNICEF, and a supplemental $20 million loan 
(48.5 percent) from the World Bank (Pasteur, 1979; Siamwiza, 1986; Sanyal, 1987). 
LSUP identified four squatter settlements for upgrading namely Chawama, George, 
Chaisa and Chipata (Keare & Paris, 1982). Additionally, LSUP included provision of 
sites-and-services plots, as was the practice with early upgrading programmes (see 3.2).  
However, as LSUP progressed it faced financial constraints arising from the redirection 
of most of the government funding to medium- and high-cost housing for civil servants 
(see 6.5.3). When World Bank funding ended in 1979, LSUP also became financially 
unsustainable because government could not continue funding it (World Bank, 2002a). 
Furthermore, failure to recover costs on building material loans from beneficiaries 
contributed to LSUP’s financial problems (Bamberger, et al., 1982). Sanyal (1987) 
notes that apart from lacking sanctions on loan defaulters, immense political 
interference also contributed to LSUP’s poor cost-recovery. LSUP was also unable to 
control the high project costs it incurred (World Bank, 2002a). Hence, due to financial 
constraints, it could not be replicated within or outside of Lusaka (Rakodi, 1986a).  
6.6.3 Management of LSUP 
Like the Kampung Improvement Programme (KIP) and Favela Bairro Programme 
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(PFB), LSUP also had a technical unit dedicated to its management (see 3.5.2). The 
technical unit called the Housing Project Unit (HPU) and housed within the Lusaka City 
Council (LCC), was a self-contained unit with divisions for Engineering, Social 
Services, and Finance and Procurement (Pasteur, 1979; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007). Its 
staffing comprised professional staff supported by two cadres of field staff - community 
development staff who dealt with relationships with individual participants and 
community groups, and construction advisers who provided technical advice to 
participants on a variety of tasks related to self-help building (Pasteur, 1979). The HPU 
managed and supervised LSUP activities such as design of social infrastructure, 
settlement selection for upgrading, and setting standards for home improvements.  
The criteria used for selecting squatter settlements for upgrading included the size of the 
settlement, proximity to existing services, conformity with existing plans, and income 
levels of residents (Keare & Paris, 1982). In terms of size, the four settlements (see 
6.6.2) selected together inhabited 86% of the city’s squatter population, and were 
relatively close to existing sources of employment, public facilities, and planned or 
existing utility services. Furthermore, planned improvements in the areas conformed to 
the city’s master plan (Keare & Paris, 1982). Moreover, early socio-economic surveys 
indicated that households in the selected settlements had reasonable incomes and could 
afford to pay their share of the development costs (Bamberger, et al., 1982).  
However, unlike KIP and PFB that scored favourably on the management of upgrading 
programmes, LSUP appears to have faced several challenges. For instance, although it 
viewed as a pilot venture to scale down housing standards and improve housing 
conditions of nearly forty percent of the city's population, LSUP still imposed high 
standards on low-cost housing (Keare & Paris, 1982). Moreover, unlike KIP that 
encouraged kampung residents to use local materials and technologies (see 3.5), LSUP 
demanded the use of conventional building materials (Bamberger, et al., 1982). 
Consequently, the cost of building became too high for many of the poor households to 
afford (World Bank, 2002a). Furthermore, although the HPU was created as an 
independent management unit, it did not actually operate independently since central 
government had ultimate control and responsibility for the project (Rakodi, 1986a). 
When LSUP began in 1974, the HPU seemed to operate as an independent unit within 
the Lusaka City Council. This was the period after Zambia had just become a one-party 
state two years before (Chikulo, 2009). Although official merging of the state and 
political structures concluded in 1980, the Party-and Its-Government (PIG) system was 
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already in force, and in control of LSUP (see 2.3.1 and 5.3). Therefore, as the United 
National Independence Party (UNIP) continued consolidating its presence and control 
of all government structures, the HPU also fell under the control of the Office of the 
Prime Minister then. Hence, LSUP became a highly politically controlled programme 
(World Bank, 1983). The Lusaka City Council lost control over plot allocation to 
beneficiaries as UNIP took over the responsibility to ensure that its cadres benefited 
(Sanyal, 1987). The result was a local council land system that was not up-to-date 
(World Bank, 2002a). Additionally, despite being located within the Lusaka City 
Council LSUP, failed to not only provide institutional capacity building but also transfer 
skills to the council because it was not directly involved in the project (World Bank, 
1983). This perhaps explains why after expiration of external and government funding, 
the Lusaka City Council did not replicate LSUP in other squatter settlements within the 
city (Rakodi, 1986a; Gulyani & Bassett, 2007).  
6.6.4 Stakeholder and Community Participation 
According to the World Bank (1983), except for government ministries and donors, 
LSUP did not involve stakeholders outside of government. NGO involvement was also 
limited because only one NGO, AFSC participated. AFSC’s main role was to promote 
community participation in the programme (Turner & Maskrey, 1988). According to 
Turner and Maskrey (1988), community participation in LSUP was impressive. 
However, other analysts observe that LSUP lacked community participation especially 
during the planning and implementation stages of the programme (Rakodi, 1986a). It 
seems to have followed a purely top-down approach where government decided what it 
thought the people wanted (see 2.4). Although there was some form of community 
participation through a UNIP political structure, it appears the arrangement was not 
representative enough for beneficiary communities (Pasteur, 1979). LSUP could have 
adopted the Ward Development Committee (WDC) structure that existed within the 
Lusaka City Council structure that would have allowed for wide representation of 
people within the communities. However, the WDCs appeared to be somewhat weak, 
and hence, the choice to use the UNIP structure of because of its “strength and 
organisation” in the areas (Pasteur, 1979, p. 53; Sanyal, 1987, p. 290). As such, because 
of inadequate community participation, LSUP ended up with service levels that did 
reflect what residents wanted (Rakodi, 1986a). Moreover, the involvement of the UNIP 
community leadership meant that non-UNIP members found it difficult to access plots 
and building materials loans (Rakodi, 1986a). Furthermore, LSUP faced the problem of 
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limited community participation in maintenance activities in some upgraded settlements 
because residents who were not part of the initial stages of LSUP were reluctant to 
participate (see 3.2.4).  
6.6.5 Community Support 
As observed already, LSUP had socio-economic development as one of its major 
components (see 6.6.1). Although LSUP provided building materials loans to 
beneficiaries to enable them improve their houses, it did not make provisions for skills 
training and entrepreneurial development as did PFB and KIP (see 3.5.6). Besides, 
because of political involvement in the distribution of material loans, many people who 
were not UNIP supporters did not benefit from the loans (see 6.6.3).  
Overall, LSUP performed better than the conventional housing programmes (see 6.5.1). 
According to Keare & Paris (1982), LSUP facilitated an increase in the district housing 
stock by about fifty percent through production of low-cost housing. Furthermore, it 
was able to reach many poor households earlier excluded from sites-and-services 
schemes because of low-incomes (Bamberger, et al., 1982; World Bank, 2002a). 
Additionally, LSUP generated substantial amounts of employment, and attained 
efficiency through community participation and involvement (Keare & Paris, 1982). 
Moreover, granting of land titles stimulated local economic development in the 
upgraded areas (World Bank, 1983). As such, the World Bank (1983, p. 3) concluded, 
“the project was substantially implemented as planned and was physically one of the 
most successful first generation urban projects that the Bank has financed.”  
6.7 IMPORTANCE OF HOUSING IN DEVELOPMENT 
This section discusses the importance of housing in development as a way to highlight 
the need for squatter upgrading. Clearly, government recognises the importance of 
housing in development by identifying it as one of the important contributors to 
attaining the VISION 2030 (see Chapter 1). Government is also aware that conventional 
housing failed to solve the housing problem (see 6.5.1). Therefore, in what Gulyani and 
Bassett (2007) describe as ‘retrieving the baby from the bathwater’ government has 
turned back to squatter upgrading as a way of improving the living conditions of 
squatter residents. Through squatter upgrading, government would provide physical 
infrastructure and services, while squatters would improve their own housing.  
Housing is more than a roof over one’s head (Newman, 2002). It provides a place where 
families interact and may be symbols of status – helps enhance one’s identity and self-
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respect. When one views housing in these terms, its expenditure is normally associated 
with social expenditure on consumer goods. However, housing remains an important 
social element. Decent housing facilitates good health, enables children to do 
homework, and frees up women’s time to join in the labour market (Collier, 2014). 
Housing is also a source of wealth in itself or can be used to generate more wealth 
through rentals or when used as a production space for other goods. Evidence shows 
that in Mchini and Ipusukilo where squatters have an assurance of tenure security by 
virtue of their settlement being approved for legalisation and legalised, respectively 
some of them have engaged in Home-Based Enterprise (HBE) activities such as 
tailoring, food processing, trading and others (see 8.4).  
However, in many developing countries governments have tended to view housing as a 
consumption element that is a drag on economic growth, having low returns compared 
to other industries such as manufacturing and infrastructure (Chen, et al., 2011; Arku, 
2006). As such, investment in housing tends not to correspond to the housing need and 
hence, fails to produce sufficient housing especially for low-income households. 
Nonetheless, Tibaijuka (2009) points out that housing is an important economic 
stimulus that requires increased investment. To begin with, investment in housing 
stimulates other service industries other than the construction industry thereby 
contributing to the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Tibaijuka, 2009; Buckley, 
et al., 2009). Next, investment in housing contributes through personal taxes as it 
generates employment for many people through construction-related trades (Tipple, 
1995; 2004). Since many housing projects consist of single storey buildings, they are 
normally labour-intensive and use rudimentary technology and hence, generate many 
employment chances mainly for semi-skilled and unskilled labour (Tibaijuka, 2009).  
Evidence shows that shortage of urban housing is the main cause of squatter settlements 
in Zambia (see 1.2). Therefore, provision of adequate housing would play an important 
role in eradicating squatter settlements and preventing future ones. As Collier (2014) 
observes, housing is the single most important factor in Africa's economic development. 
It has the potential to contribute to meeting the social, economic and civic development 
goals of a nation (PADCO, 2006). Yet, many SSA countries appear not to give housing 
a high degree of political priority, and even when they have implemented many housing 
programmes they have not solved the urban housing problem (see 6.5.1). Tibaijuka 
(2009) observes that at the core of the poor performance of housing programmes is the 
failure to link housing provision to other prime movers of socio-economic development. 
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Makasa (2010) identified a lack of comprehensive housing policy as an obstacle to 
successful housing programmes in Zambia. Collier (2014) also attributes the problem of 
inadequate housing provision to inadequacy in housing policies, or even a lack of 
formal policy in the first place. Housing policies are supposed to guide housing 
provision and as such, should be able to link housing to other economic sectors 
(Tibaijuka, 2009). However, housing has to be affordable or the poor would not afford 
it. As Yuen (2007) argues, providing housing for the poor is not enough unless it is also 
affordable. According to Arnott (2009) and Collier and Venables (2014), affordability 
can be assessed relative to income and the share of budgets that ordinary households are 
willing to devote to housing. For most urban households in Zambia, housing 
affordability is unattainable because their monthly incomes are less than US$500 (see 
Table 6.4). On the other hand, private developers charge at least US$36,000 for a low-
cost house (see Table 6.5), and require buyers to earn at least US$2500 per month in 
addition to predetermined deposit amounts (see Table 6.6).  
Because of public authorities’ failure to provide adequate low-income housing, and 
failure to create an enabling environment, there has been a proliferation of squatter 
settlements as people seek to meet their housing needs (Makasa, 2010). Hence, squatter 
settlements have become a permanent ‘fixture’ in urban areas, growing spatially and in 
population. In some countries, squatter populations are large relative to the size of the 
cities in which they occur. For instance, Nairobi’s Kibera considered as Africa’s largest 
squatter settlement has about 1.5 million inhabitants (Amis, 2004; Marx, et al., 2013). 
Despite lacking basic infrastructure and services, squatter settlements attract many 
people because of the ease of finding shelter that meets their needs (Arimah, 2010a). In 
what Amis (1984) described as the ‘commercialisation of unauthorised housing’, many 
homeowners and tenants in squatter settlements sublet rooms to sub-squatters. Cleary, 
no single government can provide housing for all its citizens because of fiscal limits. 
However, governments could create enabling environments especially for squatters to 
improve their houses, by legalising and upgrading squatter settlements (Hassan, 2011).  
In summation, from the foregoing discussion it is evident that housing facilitates social 
interactions that are fundamental to human well-being and development. Moreover, 
housing is a source of wealth as it facilitates production of other services and hence, 
improves people’s economic status. Furthermore, the production of housing contributes 
directly to economic growth through employment, and services other industries provide 
to drive the housing sector. Lastly, adequate housing acts as a deterrent to further 
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development of squatter settlements. Given these benefits (though not exhausted) of 
housing, it is not only an important driver of development, but also a key to poverty 
alleviation and a deterrent to further development of squatter settlements. The 
importance of housing in national development cannot be overstated. Therefore, as 
government strives to upgrade squatter settlements to facilitate property owners to 
improve their housing, there is need to invest in more adequate housing to reap the 
benefits that housing has to offer.  
6.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The chapter sought to assess the urban housing situation to understand the extent of the 
housing problem, and in particular the need for squatter upgrading. The question 
regarding whether governments must provide public housing for the poor or not that 
many scholars debated on several decades ago remains. Whether governments should 
encourage self-help housing or not, does not diminish the fact that many people live in 
squatter settlements primarily because governments have failed to provide conventional 
housing for them. The fact remains that housing is an important basic need that must be 
met. Therefore, in the absence of governments providing housing, the urban poor must 
meet this need through self-help housing, and governments must at least provide an 
enabling environment for self-help housing.  
Zambia faces a critical shortage of urban housing, which has quantitatively been 
estimated at two million. However, this quantitative definition of the urban housing 
problem has overshadowed other important aspects including the quality, tenure status 
and location of housing. This research confirms that urban housing is quantitatively 
insufficient to satisfy the urban housing need the quantitative dimension of the urban 
housing problem but also goes further to include the other dimensions. Hence, the 
research has also established that a good proportion of urban housing problem is 
qualitatively deficient as a significant portion is of sub-standard thereby posing health 
and safety risks to a large proportion of the urban population. Furthermore, urban 
housing lacks tenure security and hence, limits investment choices that people would 
make regarding improving their houses. Lastly, housing is spatially segregated with 
low-income residential areas being located far from town centres and lacking easy 
access to basic services that would improve residents’ lives and reduce poverty. As 
such, viewed holistically from the quantity, quality, tenure, and location perspectives, it 
is fair to conclude that the urban housing situation is indeed critical.  
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The research established that the underlying cause of the prevalence of squatter 
settlements in Zambia was urban housing shortage, which was caused by factors 
including rapid urbanisation, complex land procedures and building standards, 
unfavourable economic environment, inadequate investment in housing, and poverty. 
All these factors have acted to exacerbate the urban housing shortage and hence, the 
prevalence of squatter settlements. In responding to the urban housing shortage, 
government has implemented many housing programmes that included conventional 
housing, sites-and-services, and squatter upgrading. However, these responses appear to 
have failed to mitigate the problem of urban housing shortage. As a result, many of the 
urban poor continue living in squatter settlements. The main reasons for failure of these 
housing programmes have been lack of planning and management that led to failure to 
match objectives to resources, and inadequate funding to housing programmes. Other 
reasons include failure to prioritise low-income housing, and the failure to understand 
the physical and cultural needs and of the intended beneficiaries. In examining the 
LSUP, indications are that its overall performance was quite impressive as it not only 
facilitated an increase in the district housing stock, but also enabled many urban poor 
households to access financial resources for improving their houses. LSUP also made 
substantial amounts of employment and, attained efficiency through community 
participation and involvement, and enabled many household to receive land titles.  
To state the case for squatter upgrading, the research analysed the importance of 
housing in socio-economic development. Evidence indicates that housing facilitates 
social interactions that are fundamental to human well-being and development. It is a 
source of wealth as it facilitates production of other services and hence, improves 
people’s economic status. The production of housing contributes directly to economic 
growth through employment, and services other industries provide to drive the housing 
sector. Lastly, adequate housing acts as a deterrent to further development of squatter 
settlements. Given these benefits of housing, that prove that housing is not only an 
important driver of development, but also central to poverty alleviation, there is need to 
invest in squatter upgrading to provide basic infrastructure and empower the urban poor 
with rights to land so as to enable them make suitable investment choices. 
The next chapter presents results from data gathered through various methods including 
in-depth interviews, documentary reviews, and observations.  
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CHAPTER 7 THE AIMS AND INSTITUTIONAL ORGANISATION 
OF SQUATTER UPGRADING POLICY 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This is the first of the two results chapters where I present results with regard to the 
aims and institutional organisation of squatter upgrading in Zambia. The chapter 
presents results from interviews with local council senior officers from the two case 
study areas, senior government officers from the Ministry of Local Government and 
Housing (MLGH), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), financial institutions, 
and squatter residents. The main themes in this chapter include planning for squatter 
upgrading, funding for squatter upgrading, financial capacity of the local councils, 
stakeholder involvement, and enabling environment for squatter upgrading. However, 
this chapter first begins by establishing which government organ is responsible for 
squatter upgrading.  
7.2 ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SQUATTER UPGRADING 
The Local Government (LG) Act does not necessarily spell out squatter upgrading as a 
function of the local councils. However, under Section 61 (29) the LG Act states in one 
of the sixty-three functions of the local councils (see 5.5) as follows:  
To control development and manage the use of land and buildings in the interests of 
public health and safety, and orderly development of the council area [paraphrased].  
Hence, there is no doubt as to whose responsibility squatter upgrading is. Therefore, I 
asked the councils what kind of responsibilities they had especially as they related to 
squatter upgrading. A senior officer from one of the councils explained as follows:  
We are responsible for the general management of the city/ district... looking after the 
welfare of all citizens in terms of service delivery. If we look specifically at squatters, the 
fact is that they are part of the city/ district. Seeing, as we are responsible for the city, we 
are also responsible for them and are supposed to look after them and provide the 
necessities.  
In a similar way, another senior officer from the other council also explained that:  
Squatter settlements, whether intended or not, are part of the city and residents are part of 
the city population. They too contribute to the economy i.e. they sell and they buy. They 
own properties, and have so many contributions towards the running of local authorities.  
As such, local councils try to provide some minimum basic services, as one officer 
added later:  
Because in the event that we do not provide services to them [squatters], and if there is an 
outbreak of diseases like cholera, dysentery or typhoid, we will still be responsible. We 
[council] are still expected to provide required services since we are at the lowest sphere 
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of government and closest to the people.  
Therefore, I queried the councils what sort of services they provided and how much 
they spent on those services annually. One senior officer responded as follows:  
We have budgeted K500,000 from local revenue for services in squatter settlements. This 
is mainly for solid waste management. We expect to work on roads and street lighting on 
one road in Mchini.  
In the words of another senior officer:  
We carry out waste management. This year we have considered grading gravel roads. 
Solid waste and poor access roads are among the main concerns in squatter settlements. 
We are also doing perimeter survey and layout mapping, and planning for overspill areas. 
Regarding the proportion of the budget reserved for squatter upgrading activities, it is not 
possible to give a figure yet.  
Clearly, councils have responsibilities towards squatter settlements despite their illegal 
status. Regarding squatter upgrading, I asked the councils what their motivations were 
apart from being one of the housing components in the Sixth National Development 
Plan (6NDP) meant to contribute to the attainment of the VISION 2030. One senior 
council officer explained as follows:  
When we look at the theme of the VISION 2030, becoming a middle-income country by 
2030, we examine the components that would lead Zambia to becoming that middle-
income country. In this regard, the vision has to be people-centred. If people’s living 
conditions do not improve, you cannot talk about being a middle-income state. Our 
position as a council is really to look at the community – how do they move from the 
current conditions in which they are living to better conditions? As we improve these 
living conditions through provision of services such as roads, water, health and schools, 
other components like life-skills for generating incomes will come later.  
A senior government officer also emphasised the need for basic services as the 
following quote shows:  
We want to provide basic infrastructure and services to our people in the squatter 
settlements. These areas lack roads, and water and sanitation among other things. 
Presently, the living conditions in the case study settlements are seemingly unsuitable 
for human habitation. For instance, many residents do not have access to clean portable 
water supplied through water kiosks or piped water. Hence, the squatter residents dig 
shallow water-wells, which they use as sources of water (see Figure 6.7). Additionally, 
many households lack access to decent sanitary facilities. Therefore, they use pit latrines 
that are normally located close to dwelling structures. Typically, pit latrines consist of 
sun-dried mud bricks and roofed with either old iron sheets or grass thatch. Sometimes, 
the pit latrines are covered only with polyvinyl chloride sheeting, and left open at the 
top (see Figure 6.9).  
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Regarding access roads, in all the case study squatter settlements access roads were in a 
bad state. Few roads were wide enough for a vehicle to pass while some of them 
become impassable in the rainy season due to flooding since they lacked proper 
drainage and bridges (see Figure 6.13). Interviews with squatter residents also revealed 
that they did not have adequate access to health and education facilities. For instance, of 
the four settlements only Mchini and Ipusukilo had a public clinic each. The clinics 
initially begun as community initiatives but later government took over control. 
Similarly, only Mchini had a public primary school, while some community schools 
existed in both Mchini and Ipusukilo. Magazine and Musonda did not have any health 
or education facilities. While the local councils were focused on providing services in 
squatter settlements, they were also concerned with the issue of tenure security as one 
senior council officer explains:  
We want to ensure ownership to the land that someone owns in the squatter settlements. 
Then, we give them land records, and those land records are documents, which gives 
them security of tenure, which they even use to acquire loans from the banks.  
Essentially, the motivations of the local councils regarding squatter upgrading are 
consistent with findings from literature, which identified the main motivations for 
squatter upgrading as provision of basic infrastructure and services, and improvement of 
tenure security (see 2.2.3). Squatter upgrading also provides an opportunity for councils 
to improve the quality and tenure status of their housing stock. Having identified the 
motivations for squatter upgrading, I asked the councils how they selected squatter 
settlements for upgrading. In the case of Chipata, a senior council officer revealed that 
the size of the settlement and its proximity to services were the most important 
considerations. In that regard, despite there being many squatter settlements the council 
settled for only three squatter settlements namely Magazine, Mchini and Navutika (see 
4.4.1). However, because of limited financial resources the council decided to start the 
upgrading programme in Mchini because as the senior officer explained:  
Mchini is one of the largest and most populated settlements, and close to the Central 
Business District (CBD) area for various services. […]. Moreover, Mchini fronts the main 
road to Malawi and the Chipata-Mchinji rail line, and thus we wanted to provide a good 
frontage.  
In general, Chipata’s main considerations were suitability of location, proximity to the 
CBD and services network, and population size. For Kitwe, the decision of the local 
council after several council meetings was to upgrade nine of the twenty-eight squatter 
settlements in the district (see Table 4.7). It appears that, as in the case of Chipata, 
Kitwe’s main criteria for selecting squatter settlements for upgrading included 
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suitability of location, access to existing services and size of population. Similarly, 
Kitwe lacked funds to upgrade all the identified settlements. Nonetheless, the council 
decided to start upgrading in Ipusukilo, as there were already existing upgrading works, 
as the ensuing quote from one senior officer shows:  
Government has already declared Ipusukilo an ‘improvement’ area and it has benefited 
from the World Bank programme through road construction. It made sense for us to start 
from there. It also has a large population of over fifty thousand residents.  
Ipusukilo and Musonda squatter settlements benefited from the World Bank funded 
Mufuchani Bridge Project, through the construction of a road that connects the 
settlements to Riverside Extension on the east and Kwacha on the west. The project also 
involved relocating squatter residents from Mufuchani squatter settlement across the 
Kafue River to newly constructed low-income houses on an overspill area in Riverside 
Extension opposite Musonda and Chipata settlements. Furthermore, the council was 
concerned about upgrading squatter settlements located in unsuitable areas as the senior 
officer further explained:  
As council, we would like to upgrade all settlements, but as you may be aware, some of 
them are located on land unsuitable for residential development.  
In summation, although not specially spelled out in the LG Act the responsibility for 
squatter upgrading rests with the local councils.  
7.3 PLANNING FOR SQUATTER UPGRADING 
Successful squatter upgrading requires comprehensive planning. As observed in the 
cases of the Kampung Improvement Programme (KIP) and Programa Favela Bairro 
(PFB) in Indonesia and Brazil respectively, both the national and city governments 
planned the programmes such that they were able to define clearly programme 
objectives and what the expected outputs were (see 3.5.1). Therefore, I inquired from 
the local councils and the MLGH if they had made any plans towards squatter 
upgrading. According to one senior government officer from the MLGH, there was no 
national plan for squatter upgrading and explained as follows:  
The squatter upgrading programmes would have to be developed at the local authority 
level. Here at the Ministry level, we are more concerned with policy.  
On further investigation, it emerged that the MLGH neither had developed any squatter 
upgrading policy nor advised the local councils to develop their squatter upgrading 
plans. Moreover, there seemed to be a contradiction between the government’s decision 
to let the local councils to formulate their own squatter upgrading frameworks and its 
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plan to pilot a Participatory Squatter Upgrading Programme (PSUP) in Lusaka whose 
framework it hoped to roll out to all other local councils. According to the senior 
officer, the MLGH was in the process of developing a squatter upgrading framework for 
Lusaka City Council to upgrade two squatter settlements as the following quote shows:  
We are currently doing a pilot study in Chibolya and Kanyama compounds in Lusaka. We 
are doing a participatory slum-upgrading programme, in partnership with Lusaka City 
Council, which will help us, access some funding. After the pilot participatory squatter 
upgrading programme (PSUP) in Lusaka, the programme will be rolled out to all other 
provincial headquarters.  
In this regard, the MLGH had engaged consultancy services to develop the PSUP 
framework. However, when asked if they were aware of the PSUP or MLGH’s plan to 
roll it out to other districts, the senior officers from the two local councils indicated not 
having official knowledge on the subject. One senior officer explained as follows:  
As a council, we are not officially aware of this development. If anything, PSUP is 
another council’s internal programme that is part of its regeneration programme.  
Nevertheless, as observed above there appears to be a mismatch between government 
decision to allow councils develop their own upgrading frameworks and plan to impose 
one standard upgrading framework on to local councils. The latter appears to be more 
probable and perhaps explains why MLGH has not advised local councils to formulate 
their own squatter upgrading plans, despite government having made its intentions to 
upgrade squatter settlements since 2006. Therefore, I inquired if the two councils had 
any plans for squatter upgrading. Both local councils had plans to upgrade some 
squatter settlements according to their various council resolutions also (see 7.2). 
However, they have been constrained by limited funds, as one senior officer from one of 
the councils explained:  
Yes, as a council we do have plans to upgrade squatter settlements. We have gone further 
by passing council resolutions to upgrade some squatter settlements. However, due to 
financial constraints, we have not moved as quickly as we would like to.  
In essence, the councils had done the basic work by resolving to legalise and upgrade 
identified squatter settlements. Moreover, at the time of the research the local councils 
were in the process of carrying out perimeter and baseline surveys. However, regarding 
legalisation of the squatter settlements the local councils awaited ministerial approval, 
which they had not yet received at the time of doing this research. According to the 
Housing (Statutory and Improvement Areas) Act, the Minister for local government and 
housing must approve applications for legalisation of squatter settlements. Nonetheless, 
I queried the local councils if they could develop their own squatter upgrading 
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frameworks without assistance from consultants. According to the senior officers, the 
councils were capable of developing their own squatter upgrading frameworks because 
they knew and understood the prevailing conditions in the squatter settlements. One of 
the officers also added as follows:  
There is nothing new that the consultant will come up with other than what local councils 
themselves would have done.  
Both local councils indicated they had the technical expertise required for squatter 
upgrading, and would develop their squatter upgrading frameworks if they received 
formal directions from the MLGH.  
To summarise, it appears there has been no planning for squatter upgrading at the 
national level. Although the local councils have approved some squatter settlements for 
upgrading, they also do not have comprehensive plans on how to carry out squatter 
upgrading. Neither of the councils has even defined the programme nor its objectives 
and expected outputs.  
7.4 FUNDING FOR SQUATTER UPGRADING 
The evidence from Chapter 3 shows that both KIP and PFB had consistent sources of 
funding for squatter upgrading (see 3.5.3). This section intends to establish if central 
government and the local councils have identified the sources of funding for the squatter 
upgrading programmes. In Chapter 1, the research established that the government 
identified mobilising long-term finance for squatter upgrading as one of several 
strategies in its effort to facilitate housing development and squatter upgrading. 
Therefore, I asked a senior government officer in the MLGH if there was a budget set 
aside for squatter upgrading and to which he responded that there was none. He 
explained that since squatter upgrading was a responsibility of local councils, 
government expected them to utilise part of the grants they received for services to fund 
squatter upgrading. Accordingly, the senior officer believed that government 
sufficiently funded local councils, as the following quote shows:  
As government, we have continued to give big money to our local authorities for 
providing services, which should include squatter upgrading. However, money as you 
know is in short supply. Therefore, we as a ministry insist that our local authorities do 
everything possible to maximise the collection of their revenues so that they can also try 
to fend for themselves. We [government] will continue to assist them but in the end, we 
would want them to stand on their own.  
Nevertheless, I probed further to establish where the MLGH would get the money for 
the PSUP since there was no budgetary allocation to squatter upgrading. The senior 
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government officer indicated that there was in fact, a budgetary allocation for service 
provision in new area, and which the MLGH would use for the PSUP, as the following 
quote shows:  
We have a budget line called 'Provision of Services to New Areas of Development' under 
the Department of Housing and Infrastructure to provide services to new areas or squatter 
settlements. However, this provision in the budget is not adequate even for the PSUP.  
There seems to be another contradiction here regarding government funding for squatter 
upgrading. Although MLGH claimed it was concerned only with policy formulation, it 
appears that it was in fact involved in planning and funding the PSUP for one local 
council. However, when I asked the councils if there they had set aside any funding for 
squatter upgrading from local revenue, one senior officer from one of the councils 
responded affirmatively as the following excerpt shows:  
We set aside K500,000 mainly for road works.... The water company that will also 
provide water kiosks will take up the water aspect. You may be aware that some water 
kiosks already exist. For the market ablution block, we had set aside K60,000. However, 
as council, we have been able to identify a partner who will build this ablution block, and 
as such, council will not be able to use its own resources for these activities. Instead, the 
resources will be freed for other activities.  
Nevertheless, the sum of money appears too modest for squatter upgrading. The other 
council had not made specific funding arrangements for squatter upgrading as one 
senior officer explained:  
We have not set aside any specific amounts for squatter upgrading. However, we are able 
to get resources from other provisions within the budget [service provision] to support 
some squatter upgrading activities. I must admit now that from the council’s own 
resources without government support, we cannot manage to upgrade any squatter 
settlement. We need the assistance of central government especially with funding to 
upgrade legalised settlements.  
Following up on the claim that government gives councils ‘big money’, I examined the 
local councils’ accounts to determine the extent of government funding (grants) over a 
five-year period 2009-2013. Evidence shows that during the period under observation, 
government funding to the local councils has been inadequate to meet with their 
expectations (see Table 7.1 and Table 7.2).  
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Table 7.1: CMC Budget Estimates (ZMK Millions) (2009-2013) 
 
Source: Compiled from Chipata District Fund (2009-2013) 
Table 7.2: KCC Budget Estimates (ZMK Millions) (2009-2013) 
 
Source: Compiled from Kitwe City Council Budgets (2009-2013) 
This discovery is also consistent with what one of the senior council officers who 
explained that government funding was inconsistent, as the ensuing quote shows:  
Government has not been consistent in providing grants, even grants in lieu of rates [rates 
for government properties paid as a lump sum]. I do not even remember when we 
received a grant in lieu of rates in full. For the past three years [2011-2013], the bill for 
government properties has been K1.8 million but government only pays 20% [K360,000].  
On further examination of the accounts of Chipata, it seems the council regularly 
received more grants than it expected. However, the council seemed to be consistently 
receiving less grants than expected. Although it would appear that government often 
gave the council more funding than it expected, in effect, the council actually received 
the current year’s allocation including balances from previous years (see Table 7.1). 
Arguably, the volume of grants to the councils increased significantly for Chipata in 
2012 and Kitwe in 2013, respectively (see Table 7.1 and Table 7.2). An inquiry from 
the local councils revealed that an amendment to the Local Government (LG) Act in 
2010 that ushered in the LGSC that assumed the responsibility of recruiting staff for 
local councils (also see 5.5.3), also assigned central government the responsibility of 
Revenue Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual
National Support 0.60     0.45   0.60     0.85   1.63     2.33   5.03     4.44   10.37   12.10 
Property Rates 1.73     1.32   1.47     1.31   1.92     1.76   2.21     2.27   7.80     2.22   
Fees & Charges 3.77     3.04   6.60     2.72   5.98     3.76   11.75   2.07   6.50     2.21   
Other Receipts 0.52     3.40   0.91     3.30   0.69     0.98   1.07     2.80   0.19     10.56 
Grand Total 6.62     8.21   9.58     8.18   10.22   8.84   20.07   11.59 24.85   27.09 
Expenditure
Personal Emoluments 1.97     1.57   2.48     1.45   2.80     3.86   4.22     3.97   0.39     13.15 
Provision of Services 3.06     1.86   3.78     2.91   4.06     4.00   7.56     6.26   4.16     1.98   
Other Expenses 1.37     1.03   3.31     1.41   3.35     3.51   5.08     1.09   10.29   5.07   
Grand Total 6.41     4.45   9.58     5.77   10.22   11.37 16.87   11.32 24.85   20.20 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Revenue Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual
National Support 3.90     3.02   4.15     3.86   4.19     1.55   7.66     19.23 35.31   25.48 
Property Rates 17.35   14.14 16.78   12.57 17.95   14.16 28.55   20.12 29.27   22.53 
Fees & Charges 7.27     2.95   6.17     2.69   8.18     5.50   13.68   5.65   35.46   18.33 
Other Receipts 23.20   11.72 28.02   20.83 38.40   17.85 44.55   15.32 18.50   4.32   
Grand Total 51.72   31.83 55.12   39.95 68.71   39.06 94.44   60.33 118.54 70.67 
Expenditure
Personal Emoluments 26.69   23.34 29.52   25.07 34.81   29.82 37.56   28.79 49.05   46.01 
Provision of Services 24.30   8.30   24.82   12.03 32.27   12.46 55.26   13.43 68.20   15.88 
Other Expenses 0.73     0.90   0.23     0.45   1.65     0.12   1.62     0.52   1.30     0.05   
Grand Total 51.72   32.55 54.56   37.55 68.73   42.40 94.44   42.75 118.54 61.94 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
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paying salaries for council staff in lower divisions, as one senior officer explained:  
According to this amendment, government is also responsible for paying emoluments for 
council employees in divisions one up to three.  
For both Chipata and Kitwe local councils, the increase in the volume of grants in 2012 
and 2013 respectively, was because of increased salary grants. In explaining further the 
increase in the volume of grants, a senior officer from one of the councils stated that 
government paid the council to offset some balances that arose due to underpayment of 
salaries for the named groups of employees, as the following quote shows:  
From 1 August 2012 up to the end of the year, government did pay the salaries for 
Divisions 1, 2 and 3. We later realised that government was only paying the net sums, and 
upon making them understand the anomaly, government corrected it. Hence, our salary 
grant increased from K1.5 million to K2.1 million.  
However, senior officers from the local councils also observed that salary grants had 
begun reducing contrary to provisions of the Local Government (LG) Amendment (Act 
of 2010. Moreover, examination of the accounts of the two local councils also revealed 
that Constituency Development Fund (CDF) allocations per constituency, had increased 
from K720,000 to K1,000,000 in 2012, and again to from K1,000,000 to K1,300,000 in 
2013. These increases in CDFs certainly increased the volume of grants the councils 
received especially if they had many constituencies. Chipata and Kitwe had four and 
five constituencies, respectively and that implied that they both received significant 
amounts of CDF. Nevertheless, senior council officers pointed out that the council 
management did not have control over how to use CDF. On the other hand, they were 
optimistic that with the approval of CDF committees, the councils could access CDF to 
fund some squatter upgrading activities. When asked who controlled the use and 
management of CDF, one senior council officer explained as follows:  
We can say that the control is participatory. The Member of Parliament has a stake in 
CDF. The council in liaison with the Member of Parliament choose the committee 
members who are approved by the MLGH. CDF has a stakeholder approach to its 
utilisation. If the committee is not happy with a certain project even if the council 
approves, the committee chairperson being a signatory to the CDF account may refuse to 
sign for the release of funds. These are the control mechanisms on CDF, and there is no 
way such funds can be abused.  
It appears that despite CDF being channelled through the local councils, its control and 
utilisation depends on the decision of the committees who represent the constituencies. 
Therefore, clearly the increase in the volume of grants to the local councils because of 
CDF allocations increasing does not improve funding to local councils for service 
delivery. Nevertheless, although the councils could utilise CDF on some upgrading 
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activities the local councils noted that it was not sufficient as the following quote from 
one senior officer shows:  
CDF is not sufficient to meet the scale of upgrading that we expect to do. We require 
more funding for that.  
Wanting to establish further the claim, that central government gave local councils ‘big 
money’ for service provision, I asked the councils if they received grants for service 
provision regularly and sufficiently. Evidence gathered suggests that service provision 
grants were inconsistent and insufficient. In fact, one senior council officer revealed that 
his council had not received grants for service provision, as the following quote shows:  
Since government began paying emoluments for some council employees…there has 
been no funding to our council for service delivery. The claim is that much of the funding 
goes to meeting the salaries of the employees government is paying for.  
It appears here that government was more concerned with paying salaries than funding 
local councils for service delivery. It also gives the impression that government funding 
for service delivery to local councils might not improve and hence, the councils would 
not use part of that funding for squatter upgrading even if they received instructions 
from government to do so. Therefore, I inquired if the councils would require distinct 
budgets for squatter upgrading. A senior officer from one of the councils categorically 
confirmed the need for a distinct budget for squatter upgrading, as he explained:  
Squatter upgrading requires a great deal of financing and we cannot do that from our 
current resources. Therefore, we would definitely need a distinct budget for it.  
The other council was also certain it would require a separate budget for squatter 
upgrading, one of its senior officers explained:  
If it were possible, we would want a distinct budget for squatter upgrading, and 
government to fund it.  
In relation to the need for a separate squatter upgrading budget, I questioned the local 
councils if they had made any internal funding arrangements. Both councils revealed 
they had set aside funds for preliminary works including perimeter and baseline 
surveys, which were in progress at the time. Additionally, they had imposed an 
administrative charge of K400 (US$80) and K1200 (US$240) for Kitwe and Chipata, 
respectively, which landowners would pay when all preliminary works were completed. 
Although the councils expected to raise significant income from the exercise to fund 
some upgrading activities such as processing of land records for landowners, it was 
unsustainable as it would be a one-off payment.  
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Therefore, considering that the local councils could not use CDF to fund squatter 
upgrading, did not receive service provision grants, and their anticipated revenue from 
administrative charges would be unsustainable, I queried the local councils if they 
would consider creating other kinds of levies to fund squatter upgrading. It appeared the 
respondents were not optimistic with the idea of new levies. According to the senior 
officers, in the past central government had not only obsessively interfered with how 
local councils managed some levies but also banned some of them. This revelation was 
consistent with evidence from literature that showed how government had interfered 
with the management and operations of the local councils and affected their fiscal 
affairs (see Appendix Q). Hence, the councils were uncertain government would 
approve new levies. The behaviour of government towards local councils is contrary to 
the Aberdeen Agenda that stipulates adequate funding of local governments (see 2.4.1).  
Seeing that the MLGH did not have any financial support for squatter upgrading and 
that the local councils were fiscally constrained, I sought to establish what MLGH 
thought about the councils’ capacity for squatter upgrading. A senior government 
officer explained as follows:  
Upgrading requires more financial resources than local authorities have. There is need to 
improve and build more capacity at the local level so that the resources that would be 
directed to them are well safeguarded.  
Therefore, from the government’s view, local councils did not have the fiscal capacity 
for squatter upgrading. I also wanted the councils to explain their capacities, other than 
what documentary reviews revealed. A senior officer from one of the councils explained 
as follows:  
From the council’s own resources, without government support, we cannot manage to 
upgrade any squatter settlement. We need the assistance of central government especially 
with funding to upgrade legalised settlements.  
The councils also appeared to agree with the MLGH’s view regarding the lack of fiscal 
resources. Despite trying their best to perform even basic upgrading activities such as 
perimeter and baseline surveys, the councils conceded that they could not undertake 
squatter upgrading alone.  
Clearly, local councils and government recognise the benefits squatter upgrading stands 
to offer. However, funding might prove to be the one single most important obstacle to 
squatter upgrading. Neither the central government nor the local councils have 
identified any sources of funding for squatter upgrading.  
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7.5 FINANCIAL CAPACITY OF LOCAL COUNCILS 
In Chapter 3, the research established that the local governments that undertook KIP 
and PFB were able to meet part of the funding required for the programmes from their 
own resources. The previous section has established that there has been no government 
funding set aside for squatter upgrading. Therefore, this section examines the financial 
capacity of the local councils to determine if they could fund in part or whole their 
squatter upgrading programmes. Therefore, this section focused on two main questions 
as follows:  
 Did the councils have the financial capacity for squatter upgrading? And 
 What needed to be done to assist the councils to fund the squatter upgrading 
programmes in their areas? 
7.5.1 Assessment of the Local Councils’ Fiscal Capacity 
The financial capacity of a local council depends on the soundness of its revenue base 
as much as its management of the resources. According to evidence from literature, 
there are two main sources of revenue for local councils including central transfers and 
local revenue (see 5.5.4). The research also established that these categories have 
remained the ‘traditional’ sources. The respondents in this section mainly included the 
local councils, MLGH, NGOs and squatter residents. Before establishing if the local 
councils had financial capacity to fund their squatter upgrading programmes, I 
endeavoured to find out what their sources of revenue were. It seemed that the local 
councils depended on the traditional sources for their revenue. Regarding local revenue, 
one senior council officer explained as follows:  
Our main revenue sources include property taxes, market and bus levies, trading permits 
and business licences. However, we have a challenge with collecting property taxes 
because not many people pay the taxes. […]. Nonetheless, we are trying our level best. 
Our budget performance usually stands at 60% but we would want to collect up to 75%. 
Our budget estimate for the 2014 fiscal year is K131million.  
Local revenue also contributes largely to the total revenue of the other council as one 
senior officer explained:  
The budget figure for 2014 is K26 Million. […]. National support contribution is K10 
Million. The rest K16 Million will be raised from local sources which include property 
taxes, business, personal, and other levies, land development and related charges, 
building permits, and nuisance fees.  
Upon examining documentary evidence, I learned that local councils could also borrow 
money from external organisations. According to Section 47 of the Local Government 
(LG) Act, two ways in which a council could receive funds from external sources 
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included borrowing funds [loans] from government or banks, and issuing stocks or 
municipal bonds. The purpose for such funds is solely for discharging its functions. 
However, the LG Act prohibits borrowing from foreign governments or organisations 
(see 5.5.4). Nevertheless, I asked the councils if they could fund squatter upgrading 
from their local revenue. Senior officers from both councils reported that they could not 
fund squatter upgrading from their own budgets because their revenue collections had 
been decreasing in relation to their budget estimates (see 7.4). A further review of the 
local councils' accounts indicated that for the most part of the period 2009-2013, their 
revenue collection efficiency was less than expected (see Table 7.3 and Table 7.4).  
Table 7.3: CMC Revenue from local sources (ZMK Millions) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Budgeted Amount 6.02 8.98 8.59 15.03 14.49 
Collected Amount 7.76 7.33 6.50 7.14 14.99 
Collection Efficiency (%) 129 82 76 48 103 
Source: Compiled from Chipata District Fund (2009-2013) 
Table 7.4: KCC Revenue from local sources (ZMK Millions) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Budgeted Amount 47.82 50.97 64.53 86.78 83.23 
Collected Amount 28.81 36.09 37.51 41.09 45.18 
Collection Efficiency (%) 60 71 58 47 54 
Source: Compiled from Kitwe City Council Budgets (2009-2013)  
The implication here was that if the councils were unable to collect according to their 
budget estimates, they were probably not raising enough revenue to build their fiscal 
capacities to provide capital-intensive services such as squatter upgrading. Therefore, 
given their financial position that was weak, their claims that they could not fund 
upgrading from own sources were correct. Nevertheless, with locally organised 
resources, the councils planned to carry out some basic upgrading activities such as 
baseline and perimeter surveys. For capital-intensive upgrading activities such as 
provision of access roads, and water and sanitation facilities, they needed government 
assistance (see 7.4). During the first interview (in phase one of my fieldwork) with one 
senior officer from one of the local councils, I learned that his council was quite 
determined to proceed with its planned upgrading activities even without government 
support. The senior officer then explained:  
We are proceeding with planned upgrading activities … even if there was no national 
support.  
However, by the time second interview with the officer during the second phase of my 
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fieldwork (see 4.3), the councils had not completed its perimeter and baseline surveys 
that had begun earlier. It had also not held any community meetings that it had planned 
as part of the preliminary upgrading activities in the squatter settlements meant for 
upgrading. At that point, I asked the senior officer if he thought the council could still 
do upgrading without national support. The officer conceded that the council certainly 
required government support as the following statement shows:  
There are basic things that we can fund as a council. Nevertheless, if we are going to 
provide meaningful services and improve the living conditions of residents in these areas, 
we definitely need support; otherwise, it is an exercise in futility.  
The government also seemed to agree with the councils on their lack of financial 
capacity to fund squatter upgrading (see 7.4).  
I also wanted to get the views of NGOs regarding their assessment of local councils’ 
fiscal capacity for squatter upgrading. For this research, I interviewed nine NGOs who 
were involved in providing various basic services in the local councils under study (see 
4.6). All of the NGOs who responded to the question reported that they did not think the 
local councils had the financial capacity to fund squatter upgrading (see Figure 7.1).  
 
Figure 7.1: NGOs Assessment of Local Councils’ Financial Capacity 
One of the NGOs who doubted the local councils’ fiscal capacity for squatter upgrading 
had the following to say:  
The council has in the recent past failed to raise revenues for its own operations because 
the sources of revenue are very limited to begin with. (NGO3, Chipata, 20yrs) 
The Council on its own cannot manage to finance squatter upgrading because their 
finances are tight. (NGO1, Kitwe, 5yrs) 
Another NGO who had the opportunity to work with many types of local councils in the 
country explained the situation that seemed to affect nearly all councils, as follows:  
Local councils do not have the kind of resources that can generate the kind of funding 
they would need for squatter upgrading. Their resource base has immensely depleted. 
Central government now controls all significant revenue sources once held by councils… 
Local councils are left with property taxes from which they are not even collecting 
enough revenue for service provision or salaries. There is too much tax evasion by 
property owners. (NGO5, Kitwe, 3 yrs)  
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Many NGOs interact fairly well with local councils. In fact, before 2009, NGOs in each 
district registered with respective local councils to create synergy and avoid duplication 
in service provision. Some of the NGOs signed memoranda of understanding with 
councils for service delivery. Moreover, NGOs are involved in the affairs of local 
councils through forums such as the District Development Coordinating Committee 
(DDCC). As such, NGOs are able to give independent assessments of councils’ 
capacities regarding squatter upgrading. However, the NGOs believed that the councils 
had qualified technical staff to manage squatter upgrading activities.  
I also inquired from the squatter residents in the case study settlements what their views 
were on the local councils’ capacity to fund squatter upgrading. It seemed farfetched to 
ask squatter residents to assess the financial capacity of their local councils because 
unlike the NGOs that regularly interacted with the local councils, the squatter residents 
did not have similar interactions with local councils. Their only direct link severed 
when government suspended Area Development Committees (ADCs) in 2011 (see 
5.5.3). Nonetheless, I hoped that they would give their assessment based on the level 
(and quality) of services the local councils claimed to provide in the squatter settlements 
including solid waste management, and grass cutting services (see 7.2). Therefore, I 
asked the residents what services the councils provided in their areas. Many of the 
respondents from Magazine and Mchini reported that their local council provided both 
solid waste collection and grass cutting services, while those from Ipusukilo and 
Musonda indicated that the councils only collected solid waste from designated 
collection points in the settlements (see Figure 7.2).  
 
Figure 7.2: Council Services in Case Study Settlements 
However, the residents who indicated receiving garbage collection and grass cutting 
services noted that the services were not on a regular basis. Therefore, given the failure 
of the councils to provide services regularly, I asked the residents if they thought 
councils had the fiscal capacity for squatter upgrading. Most of the respondents believed 
the councils did not have the fiscal capacity. Very few respondents were uncertain as to 
the fiscal capacity of the councils (see Figure 7.3).  
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Figure 7.3: Community assessment of Councils' financial capacity for Upgrading 
Some of the respondents who believed the local councils had no fiscal capacity for 
squatter upgrading wondered how the councils could afford to provide roads, water and 
other services if it could not even manage to collect solid waste regularly. Others 
explained that sometimes the local councils failed to pay their workers’ salaries, as one 
Ipusukilo resident explained:  
Some of them [councils] cannot even pay their own workers’ salaries. (IP11, Male, 
married)  
Another respondent from Magazine noted as follows:  
I do not think so [that council had financial capacity]. Our council tries very hard – you 
can see what they do around town. If the council had money, it could upgrade the squatter 
settlements. (MG17, Male, married)  
In brief, the squatter residents believed that councils had no money to fund squatter 
upgrading. Clearly, the local councils, government, NGOs and squatter residents agree 
that the local councils do not have the capacity to fund squatter upgrading from local 
revenue as demonstrated by their diminishing capacity to collect revenue, failure to pay 
employees’ salaries, and failure to provide the few basic services in squatter settlements 
on a regular basis. Their assessment of councils’ fiscal capacity matches the 
researcher’s assessment based on thorough analysis of the councils’ accounts (see 7.4).  
7.5.2 How Local Councils Could Fund Squatter upgrading 
Having established clearly that the consensus was that the local councils did not have 
the fiscal capacity for squatter upgrading, I asked the respondents what they thought 
could be done to help the councils raise funding for upgrading the squatter settlement. 
According to one senior council officer, it was apparent that the councils needed 
funding from government as the following quote illustrates:  
This appears to be a natural expectation considering that the local councils’ revenue bases 
have diminished mostly because of government actions.  
NGOs also seemed to suggest that the government should fund squatter upgrading 
because the councils were incapable of funding upgrading activities from their local 
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revenue sources, which they believed were insufficient. One NGO suggested that the 
government should fund the programmes, as the following excerpt shows:  
They [councils] need the support of the central government funding. Government must 
provide funds for squatter upgrading. (NGO2, Chipata, 44yrs)  
Another respondent NGO suggested that the local councils seek external support from 
international organisations, as the following quote shows:  
It [council] needs to embark on vigorous fund-raising by perhaps twinning or linking up 
with other cities in the Western World who might perhaps give them grants to carry out 
such programmes. (NGO3, Chipata, 20yrs)  
Responding to the same question on what was needed to help the local councils fund 
squatter upgrading, many of the squatter residents had similar views to those of the local 
councils and NGOs. For instance, a male resident of Ipusukilo, IP 11 noted as follows:  
Central government must fund councils to provide services to the public. We cannot 
expect councils to work miracles.  
Similarly, a male resident of Magazine, MG17 thought government should fund 
councils, as the following quote shows:  
I think government must fund the council more. (MG17, Male, married)  
It is evident from the respondents from the local councils, NGOs, and squatter residents 
that government must fund the local councils for squatter upgrading. Another probable 
remedy to the local councils’ financial malaise, and possibly a means to fund-raise for 
squatter upgrading programmes, concerned decentralising fiscal resources to the local 
councils. In Chapter 2, literature review showed that fiscal decentralisation afforded 
local councils access to reasonable fiscal resources resulting in improved service 
delivery (see 2.4.1). Therefore, I asked the councils if they thought full fiscal 
decentralisation would help to improve their fiscal standing. One senior council officer 
held the view that fiscal decentralisation would indeed help improve the council’s 
financial position especially, as the following excerpt shows:  
As things stand in local councils, decentralisation is probably the best option to the 
present system of centralisation. Local councils do not have the autonomy when it comes 
to decisions that affect them. Every decision is subject to approval by the minister, and 
may take a long time. As argued by many, decentralisation is not the panacea to the local 
government problems but at least the local authorities should be given an opportunity to 
control and manage the affairs of districts.  
Similarly, a senior officer from the other council explained as follows:  
Largely, decentralisation would create real autonomy for councils to operate without 
government or political interference within the legal framework of local government.  
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The local councils believed that only when they were fully decentralised would they 
have access to meaningful revenue sources. I also asked the NGOs if they thought fiscal 
decentralisation would enable the local councils have access to meaningful resources for 
service delivery, and to which most of them agreed (see Figure 7.4).  
  
Figure 7.4: NGOs’ views on Fiscal Decentralisation 
When prompted to explain why they thought decentralisation was good for local 
councils, the NGOs believed that it would afford the local councils access to meaningful 
fiscal resources that could also help them upgrade squatter settlements in their areas, as 
one NGO explained:  
The councils would have access to more revenue sources, and make own decisions about 
managing their operations without interference. (NGO1, Kitwe, 5yrs)  
Similarly, another NGO also explained as follows:  
Local councils would be able to make decisions about the affairs of the councils without 
having every decision subjected to minister’s approval. (NGO3, Chipata, 20yrs)  
A subsequent issue that emerged from the respondents’ views regarding fiscal 
decentralisation was that it must be meaningful in the sense that resources to local 
councils must be sufficient for them to carry out their assigned responsibilities. This 
observation is consistent with evidence from literature review that shows that devolved 
fiscal resources must be adequate, buoyant, stable, and efficient among other 
characteristics (see 2.4.1). Therefore, the councils warned that decentralisation would be 
meaningless if it did not come with matching resources, as the following quote from one 
senior officer illustrates:  
If decentralisation came with matching resources, the decisions to plan and implement 
programmes would be quicker than it is now because most of the decisions are made at 
the centre.  
Some of the NGOs also had similar views on the adequacy of decentralised resources. 
NGO3 explained as follows:  
We are also working on the assumption that central government will not hold on to the 
major revenue sources and that the sharing criteria would be equitable, then fiscal 
decentralisation would enable councils access adequate financial resources for service 
delivery and development.  
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Similarly, NGO5 noted as follows:  
We want a situation where a reasonable share of resources remains in the districts to 
support development.  
Some NGOs felt that in the present centralised system central government needed 
resources to support its operations at the centre. Therefore, to raise the kind of fiscal 
resources needed, it had appropriated many of councils’ revenue sources over the years. 
NGO5 explains this situation as follows:  
As the situation is, most of the resources collected from districts are channelled to central 
government and never come back for development purposes. Our argument as civil 
society is that these resources are just sustaining government’s big cabinet.  
However, the government did not seem to think that local councils had the capacity to 
handle decentralisation. Hence, it felt that local councils needed more capacity building, 
as the following words from one senior government officer show:  
There is a need to improve and build more capacity at local level so that the resources that 
would be directed to them are well safeguarded. It will be possible because as we transfer 
services we shall be transferring the personnel at the centre to go to local councils.  
This view held by government seems to explain why it had delayed implementing fiscal 
decentralisation despite having a decentralisation policy that had seen its third revision, 
and a decentralisation implementation plan. However, the local councils disagreed with 
the view that they lacked capacity for decentralisation. According to some senior local 
council officers, local councils had been preparing for decentralisation since 2003 when 
government piloted decentralisation in some of the local councils including Chipata 
Municipal Council in the Eastern Province. Essentially, the councils were aware of what 
decentralisation meant. They also knew that it was not a panacea to their fiscal problems 
but merely a step to performance improvement, as one council officer explained:  
The decentralisation policy document is very comprehensive, and given a chance, local 
councils are destined to improve their performance.  
Moreover, the local councils seemed to have demonstrated that they could handle 
decentralisation, as one senior officer from one of the councils explained:  
Some of the local councils have proved that decentralisation can work. They have 
decentralised structures at all directorate levels and the system has worked for the last 
twelve years. Other councils on the other hand, require capacity building.  
Since 2011, the government created new local councils and hence, raised the number 
from seventy-two to over one hundred local councils. Certainly, the newly created 
councils would require capacity building in many areas including fiscal decentralisation. 
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As such, the local councils pointed out that implementation of decentralisation could not 
wait until all councils had capacity. They added that since MLGH identified lack of 
capacity as an obstacle, it needed to ensure that it capacity built the councils that lacked 
capacity, as one senior council officer noted:  
This is where the MLGH comes in to ensure that such councils are capacity built. 
I needed an independent view of the local councils’ capacity to handle fiscal 
decentralisation and therefore, I solicited the views of the NGOs on the matter. The 
NGOs who supported full fiscal decentralisation seemed confident of councils’ capacity 
to embrace it. One NGO explained with regard to one of the councils, as follows:  
This council has proved that it can raise finances from a much diminished resource base, 
and manage its own fiscal resources. However, it is obvious that the council is struggling 
to meet its financial obligations because the resource base has depleted over time. […]. 
However, in terms of management, they have qualified staff that can help account for the 
money and use it for right purposes. (NGO3, Chipata, 20yrs)  
NGO5 also explained as follows:  
They [councils] have the capacity to manage decentralised systems. This is not to say 
they do not need continuous capacity building.  
Another NGO representative observed that in fact, local councils began preparing for 
fiscal decentralisation 1991 when government began devolving many of its functions to 
them through the new LG Act, as the following extract shows:  
They have the capacity for decentralisation. They have been preparing for that for many 
years (NGO7, Lusaka, 20yrs)  
The NGOs believed that the local councils had the capacity to handle fiscal 
decentralisation considering that they performed some of their assigned functions under 
constraining conditions given that they did not receive corresponding fiscal resources.  
To sum up, it was clear from the respondents that in view of the local councils’ weak 
financial capacity, they expected central government to fund squatter upgrading. The 
suggestion by some NGOs for councils to consider twining with foreign organisations 
to facilitate external borrowing appears reasonable but does not fall within the 
expectation of the LG Act, which prohibits local councils to borrow from foreign 
organisations. Nevertheless, the respondents also suggest fiscal decentralisation for they 
believed that it would enable the local councils have access to meaningful fiscal 
resources for service delivery including squatter upgrading.  
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7.5.3 Reasons for the Local Councils’ Weak Fiscal Position 
The evidence showing the lack of fiscal capacity of the local councils was quite 
overwhelming. Therefore, I endeavoured to examine the major contributing factors that 
emerged including inadequate government funding, growing urban population, a 
shrinking local economy, and government actions (and inactions). Firstly, as already 
observed government funding to local councils for service delivery has been inadequate 
(see 7.5). Here, I sought to establish the extent to which inadequate government funding 
affected the fiscal capacity of the two local councils with regard to providing services 
such as squatter upgrading. Contrary to the provisions of the LG Act to fund local 
councils through grants (see 5.5.4), it seemed government has failed to provide adequate 
funding to the local councils. Documentary evidence revealed that between 2009 and 
2013, the two case study local councils, Chipata and Kitwe barely received expected 
grants from central government (see Table 7.1 and Table 7.2). Furthermore, it was 
unclear what formula government used when funding the local councils. Kitwe City 
Councils is an urban council and has a larger local revenue base than that of Chipata 
Municipal Council, a largely rural council depending primarily on agriculture (see 
4.4.1). The difference in the two councils’ statuses was also evident in their revenue 
collections for the period 2009-2013 (see Table 7.3 and Table 7.4, respectively).  
Therefore, in terms of grants say if government were to use an equalisation system of 
sharing, one would expect the rural council to receive considerably more than the urban 
council did. If on the other hand, government’s grant sharing considered the size of the 
district population then both local councils would receive similar grant amounts. 
Evidence shows that the difference in total populations between the two councils was 
quite small with almost 456,000 and 518,000 for Chipata and Kitwe, respectively (see 
4.4.1 and 4.4.2). Literature review revealed that there was no clearly defined sharing 
formula or system for government grants to local councils in Zambia (see 5.5.4). 
However, I inquired if the situation in reality were different from what literature said 
regarding absence of a grants sharing formula. A senior officer from one of the councils 
revealed there was no formula applicable to grants, as the ensuing statement shows:  
Sometime back, the system of disbursing national grants was clear and transparent 
because it was always published in the press. Government sent Circulars to all councils, 
and we knew what each council was getting. If you had queries, you could raise them 
with the MLGH. Now, we have no idea who is getting what and for what purpose.  
Since the local councils did not know the formula government used to allocate grants, I 
asked MLGH what criteria it used to allocate grants to local to councils. A senior 
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government officer explained as follows:  
For salaries grants, we consider the number of employees a council has while equalisation 
grants consider the capacity of the council to raise revenue. As for grants in lieu of rates, 
these depend on the number of properties government has in a particular town.  
In the case of the two local councils it is apparent that equalisation grants were not 
‘equal’ to what they are meant to be because there was a large disparity between the 
grants they received (see Table 7.1 and Table 7.2). Worse still, the local councils did not 
know what other councils were receiving and for what purposes. This situation has the 
potential to create distrust among local councils. Nonetheless, government grants to the 
local councils seemed inadequate because they hardly received what they expected (see 
7.4). Many observers including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) and Commonwealth Local Government 
Forum (CLGF), have bemoaned the insufficient funding and lack of sharing formula for 
equitable allocation of resources to local councils (see 5.5.4). Government seems to 
default remitting even constitutional grants such as the Constituency Development Fund 
(CDF) to the local councils. For instance, for the period 2009-2013 CDF allocations to 
the two local councils were erratic and inadequate (see Table 7.5 and Table 7.6).  
Table 7.5: Chipata CDF allocations (ZMK Millions) 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
CDF Expected 0.60 0.60 0.00 3.20 3.90 
CDF Received 0.45 0.70 0.00 0.00 1.30 
Source: Compiled from Chipata District Fund (2009-2013) 
Table 7.6: Kitwe CDF allocations (ZMK Millions) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
CDF Expected 3.00 3.25 3.60 5.00 5.00 
CDF Received 0.00 2.66 0.00 7.88 5.20 
Source: Compiled from Kitwe City Council Budgets (2009-2013) 
On the other hand, while MLGH admitted inadequately funding local councils it also 
raised concerns over local councils’ expenditures. According to a senior government 
officer, government had observed that some local councils spent more on staff-related 
matters than on service delivery, as the following excerpt reveals:  
Local councils spend more than eighty percent of the financial resources on staff-related 
issues. We must address this issue quickly because local councils have become 
employment agencies, using taxpayers’ money for wages and so forth, but not providing 
services to taxpayers.  
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Documentary evidence also supports the claim that local councils spent more money on 
staff-related costs than on service provision. For instance, based on the annual budgets 
for 2009 to 2013, Kitwe seemed to be spending an average of seventy percent of its 
budget on personal emoluments (see Figure 7.5). The expenditure exceeds the 
recommended maximum expenditure on staff-related costs of forty percent
27
.  
 
Figure 7.5: KCC Expenditure Allocations (2009-2013) 
Source: Compiled from Kitwe City Council Budgets (2009-2013) 
Chipata’s expenditure on personal emoluments consistently remained less than forty 
percent from 2009 to 2012. However, expenditure on staff-related costs sharply 
increased to sixty-five percent in 2013 (see Figure 7.6).  
 
Figure 7.6: CMC Expenditure Allocations (2009-2013) 
Source: Compiled from Chipata District Fund (2009-2013) 
This increase in councils’ expenditure on emoluments appears to coincide with the 
Statutory Instrument in 2012 that not only increased various allowances for ward 
councillors but also compelled local councils to pay them monthly salaries effective 
from January 2013. Additionally, senior council officers explained that the continued 
recruitment of staff for the local councils by the LGSC contributed to the rising wage 
bills (see 5.5). Apparently, the LGSC recruits staff based on approved staffing structures 
and not according to individual local councils’ fiscal capacity to meet the staff costs (see 
7.4). Nevertheless, the research sought to learn the financial position of the MLGH to 
                                                 
27
 See Finance Manual for Local Authorities in Zambia (2008) 
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comprehend why the funding to local councils was inadequate. Based on the evidence 
gathered, that funding to MLGH was also insufficient given the number of local 
councils it had distribute grants to for performing various functions of local government 
(see 5.5.2). A senior government officer explained that in the 2014 national budget, the 
MLGH received only about five percent of the national budget. Upon examining 
documentary evidence such as government audit and financial reports for the period 
2009-2013, it emerged that budgetary allocations to the MLGH had been less than two 
percent of the public expenditure (see Figure 7.7).  
 
Figure 7.7: MLGH Budgetary Allocations/ Public Expenditure 
Source: Compiled from Financial Reports (Ministry of Finance) 
Undeniably, central government underfunds local government despite being responsible 
for delivering sixty-three service provision related functions through local councils (see 
5.5). The allocations are clearly insufficient to meet the financial requirements of local 
government, as the senior government officer bemoaned:  
If more than five percent were given to MLGH, we would do more with it. However due 
to many other competing demands, we cannot get more.  
Generally, government funding to local councils was inadequate because the local 
councils usually received less than their expectations. Moreover, funding was 
inconsistent because in some years the councils did not receive some grants such as 
CDF and grants in lieu of rates. Hence, such inadequacy and inconsistency in funding 
created fiscal pressures for the local councils that spilled over into the subsequent years 
making it difficult for them to improve their fiscal capacity.  
Secondly, the local councils’ were fiscally weak because of rapid urban population 
growth. Evidence showed that during the period 2000-2010, the urban population grew 
at annual rates of six percent and almost four percent in Chipata and Kitwe, respectively 
(see 4.4). As such, the urban populations for Chipata increased from about 73,000 to 
117,000 (see Table 4.3), while that of Kitwe grew from 364,000 to 501,000 (see Table 
4.5). The growth in urban population also meant that there was an increase in the 
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demand for public services. Evidence also suggests that the local councils’ ability to 
collect revenue diminished. Both Chipata and Kitwe seemed to have consistently failed 
to achieve full collection of revenues from own local sources and national support (see 
Table 7.3 and Table 7.4). From 2010 to 2012, Chipata saw a tremendous drop in 
revenue collection (see Table 7.3). The explanation for that reduction in revenue was 
largely because the council lost significant revenue from crop levies when government 
banned such levies in 2009. Banning of crop levies is one of many acts central 
government has subjected councils to since the 1970s (see Appendix Q). Furthermore, 
there was a clear decrease in collections for property taxes for both local councils, and 
Chipata seemed to have felt the biggest impact in 2013 (see Table 7.1 and Table 7.2, 
respectively). The cause of decreased property tax revenues was because of government 
interference in property taxes for political expedience (see Appendix Q). Consequently, 
the revenue collection efficiency for Chipata and Kitwe fell below fifty percent of the 
budgeted local revenue in 2012 (see Table 7.3 and Table 7.4). Inadequate cash inflows 
in both local councils have affected their ability to provide quality services. Clearly, the 
local councils have found themselves in a situation where their revenue bases are 
insufficient to support the growing urban population, which for the most part was the 
main recipient of municipal services.  
Thirdly, local economies in the two local councils have been shrinking contrary to 
indications that the national economy improved significantly between 2009 and 2013 
(see Figure 1.6). As noted earlier, both Kitwe and Chipata suffered loss of many 
industries that employed the majority of the urban population (see 4.4), which 
subsequently led to the shrinkage of their local economies and high unemployment 
among the people. The diminishing local revenues for the local councils provided 
evidence of their shrunk local economies (see Table 7.3 and Table 7.4). Moreover, both 
councils have witnessed increased street vending, a consumption-driven informal that is 
extremely difficult to tax. Since there were no manufacturing industries forthcoming to 
create new work opportunities in the areas, street vending seemed to be the main 
occupation and survival strategy for many unemployed youths and households, who 
dealt in various merchandise including foodstuffs, clothing and other items (see Figure 
7.8).  
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Figure 7.8: Some street vending activities in Kitwe and Chipata 
Source: Zambian Watchdog  
Finally, the various acts that government has subjected local councils to contributed to 
the erosion of local councils’ fiscal stability. For instance, central government has not 
only banned important levies that earned local councils enormous sums of money but it 
has also taken over many stable revenue sources from them (see 7.5.2 and Appendix Q). 
However, I asked the councils what other government acts contributed to their weak 
fiscal positions. As earlier noted, a 2010 amendment to the LG Act not only ushered the 
LGSC but also mandates central government to pay salaries for unionised employees in 
local councils (see 7.4). Seemingly, some problems have ensued from this amendment. 
For instance, local councils understood that government would meet the full cost of 
monthly salaries, which it did for about one year. However, as one senior council officer 
explained government changed later. Local councils discovered [without formal 
communication] that government would instead use a new formula, the 50-75-100 ratio 
to allocate salary grants to local councils. Under this new scheme, city councils would 
only get fifty percent towards salaries of concerned workers, while municipal and 
district councils would get seventy-five and hundred percent, respectively. I queried the 
councils if the ratio was government’s legal formula. It appears the 50-75-100 ratio had 
no legal backing, as the senior council officer explains:  
There is no Statutory Instrument regarding these changes [introduction of 50-75-100 
sharing system].  
Another senior officer adds:  
This is not the government’s official allocation system. The present resource allocation 
ratio is the making of the MLGH, to which there is no statutory instrument. Of course, it 
is illegal but they [MLGH] still get away with it.  
This grants sharing system seems to create more financial problems than solutions for 
municipal and city councils. While government appears to back out of paying full salary 
grants, the LGSC has continued recruiting more staff for the councils. This has caused 
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the councils’ staffing levels to increase rapidly and hence, the increased expenditure on 
personal emoluments (see Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6). Moreover, government seems to 
be failing to honour the 50-75-100 ratio. As another senior council officer explains:  
Even the 75 percent we are supposed to get has not been forthcoming. If anything, the 
amounts have systematically reduced. Now, government tells us that salaries are to be 
met from councils’ own resources.  
During the first phase of the fieldwork, I learnt that one of the councils had not paid 
salaries for over two months because it had not received funding from government. 
Some NGOs and squatter residents also confirmed that local councils sometimes failed 
to pay workers’ salaries (see 7.5.1). Clearly, this sharing system has serious 
implications for the fiscal health of councils. Regardless, when probed to learn about the 
origins of the sharing ratio, and what inspired MLGH to adopt it, one senior council 
officer explained as follows:  
This allocation ratio is based on the assumption that city and municipal councils have 
many revenue sources possibly because they are urban. It must however, be borne in 
mind that these councils have lost several of these revenue sources through government 
take-overs. Furthermore, the councils do not have the autonomy to set rates and fees for 
various services without government interfering.  
When asked what the impact of the sharing ratio was on the councils’ finances, another 
senior council officer explained as follows:  
The impact of this non-constitutional allocation ratio has been quite phenomenal. The 
assumption that municipal and city councils make more money than district councils 
make, and therefore require little funding from government, is wrong. It is actually killing 
the councils. The truth of the matter is that central government has taken over all the 
major revenue sources from the councils. Therefore, we do not make a lot of money.  
Indeed government has appropriated nearly all the main revenue sources from local 
councils and weakened their fiscal stability (see 5.5.4). Another government action that 
had serious fiscal ramifications for councils was the introduction of monthly salaries 
and allowances for ward councillors in 2012 (see 7.5.3). However, central government 
did not make budgetary provisions for this additional expenditure to local councils - 
local councils have to finance this additional mandate from own limited fiscal resources. 
The above scenario explains why in the case of our case study councils expenditures for 
personal emoluments have been consistently rising while expenditures for services have 
declined during the period 2009-2013 (see 7.5.3). It also shows how determined 
government is on undermining the autonomy of local councils. Central government 
appears to usurping powers from local councils, which it created as autonomous 
corporate bodies (see 5.5). Instead of promoting decentralisation central government has 
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been re-centralising local government fiscally by appropriating revenue sources, and 
administratively by usurping its powers. Consequently, local councils have become very 
dependent on government grants that also do not seem adequate for their requirements. 
Moreover, a culture of clientelism has mushroomed in local government as local 
councils compete for resources from central government (see 5.5.3).  
In summation, this Chapter has established that the local councils do not have the 
financial capacity to fund squatter upgrading from their local revenue. Their revenue 
bases have diminished following various government acts that have left them fiscally 
challenged. Therefore, the councils need funding from central government to support 
capital-intensive squatter upgrading activities. This chapter has also established that 
because of losing their fiscal stability and autonomy, local councils have become 
dependent on government grants, which are also inadequate and inconsistent. Moreover, 
as they compete for resources to sustain their operations, local councils have fallen prey 
to clientelism that central government exercises in its distribution of grants to councils. 
This culture of clientelism threatens the implementation of squatter upgrading because 
unless the local councils are supportive of the ruling party, they are unlikely to receive 
meaningful grants from which government expects them to fund squatter upgrading.  
7.6 STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVEMENT IN SQUATTER UPGRADING 
This section reports research results regarding stakeholder involvement in squatter 
upgrading. One of the requirements identified for an effective squatter upgrading 
institutional framework is the involvement of stakeholders in upgrading activities (see 
Chapter 2). Therefore, this research wanted to establish the extent to which the local 
councils involved other stakeholders in squatter upgrading activities. Earlier, this 
research established that local councils were responsible for squatter upgrading because 
it was part of the various functions (see 7.2). It also established that government has not 
made any budgetary allocations for squatter upgrading but expected the local councils to 
fund upgrading from the grants they received for service provision (see 7.4). 
Furthermore, the research has revealed that the local councils did not have fiscal 
capacity to carry out squatter upgrading from local revenue (see 7.5). Consequently, the 
local councils face a challenge of funding squatter upgrading to improve the living 
conditions of squatter residents. From literature review, the research established that one 
of the survival strategies for local councils was to collaborate with other councils or 
organisations in service provision (see 2.4). Therefore, I asked MLGH if it had 
considered getting local or foreign organisations to collaborate with local councils in 
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squatter upgrading. A senior government officer reported as follows:  
We are also aware that as government we cannot afford to provide housing for all due to 
limited resources. We are cannot continue to operate in isolation (like an island). We are 
concerned and admit that the perception out there is that we have not performed in 
regards to service delivery. We need the private sector to come in and help us - we want 
many other organisations to join us.  
Subsequently, I inquired if the ministry had identified any organisations that councils 
could collaborate with in squatter upgrading, to which the officer explained that:  
There are many organisations willing to join government in solving the urban housing 
problem. Some of them want to help their own employees build houses if we open up 
areas for housing development.  
This sounded like a very positive development but it seemed to be happening only at the 
ministry level. It appears that MLGH did not communicate that information regarding 
potential partnerships to local councils. One of the local councils admitted to facing 
challenges accessing information on organisations to collaborate with in squatter 
upgrading. On the other hand, local councils expect MLGH to help them find 
organisations to collaborate with in service provision, as the following excerpt from one 
senior council officer demonstrates:  
Knowing the need for councils to upgrade squatter settlements and being mindful of the 
fact that some of the councils are financially constrained, MLGH should be in the 
forefront to source and arrange viable collaborations with potential organisations…  
Finding organisations to collaborate with could be indeed challenging for local councils 
especially since the LG Act did not encourage such arrangements, as another senior 
council officer explained: 
According to the LG Act, the MLGH must approve any kind of collaboration in which a 
council wishes to engage.  
However, I asked the councils if on their own, they had managed to get any partnerships 
with other organisations for squatter upgrading. Although not necessarily in the area of 
squatter upgrading, one of the councils indicated engaging in collaborative ventures 
with some organisations in service provision, as a senior officer explained:  
We have been involved in a public-private partnership regarding infrastructure provision 
especially roadworks.  
The officer also added that the council anticipated another collaborative arrangement 
with a private investor for the construction of an intercity bus terminal. However, the 
council’s contribution would only be legal facilitation, as the following quote shows:  
In this case, our partner owns both land and finances but because according to the 
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Markets and Bus Stations Act No. 7 of 2007, only the MLGH or councils can create and 
control bus stations and markets. For this reason, the company asked the council to be its 
partner. The scheme awaits the approval of the MLGH.  
The other council stated that it did not have any collaboration. Besides, the application 
procedure for ministerial approval of collaborations with organisations was 
discouraging, as the following statement from a senior officer shows:  
For a council to be involved in a public-private partnership it has to submit a project 
proposal to the MLGH and this process takes too long and at the end of the day does not 
yield results.  
Involvement of councils in any partnership has to have ministerial approval. This is one 
of the weaknesses identified in the LG Act that this chapter discusses later (see 7.7.1). 
However, sometimes, ministerial approvals take long and hence, some councils become 
discouraged. Nonetheless, the councils intend to pursue arrangements with local 
organisations willing to work together in service provision. In fact, one of the councils 
hinted at the possibility of a public-private partnership involving squatter upgrading. 
Although, it had not yet identified potential partners, the council preferred organisations 
that would invest in low-income housing, as one senior officer explained:  
We have not identified any partners yet that we would like to involve in squatter 
upgrading. However, we would like especially those that could come in to build low-cost 
housing to target low-income household.  
As a means of attracting investors, one of the councils also proposed adopting the 
Lusaka Model of upgrading. The model seemed to be favourable where squatter 
settlements were located close to main roads. It also implies the local councils have to 
be open to mixed-use planning. The idea behind the Lusaka Model is to leave at least 
300 metres of land measured from the road centreline to the edge of the compound 
boundary. This land would serve as a buffer zone between the settlement and the road, 
and space for commercial and light industrial development (see Figure 7.9).  
 
Figure 7.9: The Lusaka Model of Squatter Upgrading 
Source: Author’s interpretation of model 
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The model seemed to be a suitable option especially since the local council did not 
expect funding from government for squatter upgrading, as one officer explained:  
We are hopeful that if the MLGH approves our upgrading proposal based on the Lusaka 
Model, we would be able to raise some money, which we would then be plough back into 
providing services like roads, water and sanitation among others.  
The local council believed the Lusaka Model could attract organisations that were 
interested in acquiring land since many squatter settlements occupied prime land. While 
the councils appeared eager to collaborate with other organisations, they did not seek 
collaborations with local organisations such Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
that were already involved in provision of various services to vulnerable groups of 
people in their jurisdictions. However, when I asked the NGOs if they were involved 
with the local councils in the squatter upgrading process, only one NGO acknowledged 
being involved in the upgrading process as a member of a committee on squatter 
upgrading in one of the local councils. Anyway, I sought to determine the level of 
willingness of the NGOs to collaborate with the local councils in squatter upgrading 
activities. Most of the NGOs indicated they would work with the local councils in 
squatter upgrading if they asked them do so (see Figure 7.10).  
  
Figure 7.10: NGOs willing to collaborate with councils in squatter upgrading 
Therefore, I asked the NGOs that were already working with the councils to provide 
services in local communities, what form of agreements they had with the councils. It 
appears there was not always a written agreement between local councils and NGOs for 
service delivery. However, local councils are usually aware of NGOs operating in their 
areas and supplementing their efforts in serving disadvantaged communities. A 
representative from one of the NGOs explained that his organisation did not have a 
written memorandum of understanding with the council but it still supplemented the 
council’s efforts, as the following quote shows:  
We supplement the council efforts to provide services especially in areas that they are not 
able to cover. (NGO3, Chipata, 20yrs)  
Nonetheless, I probed the NGOs if they would like to have agreements such as Public-
Private Partnerships (PPP) or joint ventures when they collaborate with the local 
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councils on squatter upgrading. The general indication was that memoranda of 
understanding were adequate. However, if it were a requirement to have special 
agreements, then they would comply, as one NGO1 explained:  
If it is necessary [to have a public-private partnership agreement], yes we would. 
However, so far our working arrangements are all right.  
NGO3 also explained that the type of agreement it would sign with the council would 
depend on the nature of the services to provide, as the following quote illustrates:  
As to the public-private partnership arrangement, that would depend on the nature of 
agreement and services to be provided.  
I also sought to learn if financial institutions would collaborate with the local councils 
in squatter upgrading. Many of the financial institutions who included four 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) and three banks indicated that they would collaborate 
with the local councils (see Figure 7.11). However, they indicated that their 
collaboration with the councils depended on having assurance that changes in 
government would not affect existing arrangements. Earlier, this research established 
that changes in governments normally come with changes in policies that affect 
operations of local councils (see 5.5.2). Hence, financial institutions feared they would 
lose their investment because of such changes.  
 
Figure 7.11: Financial Institutions willing to collaborate with Councils 
The general conclusion from this section is that stakeholder participation in squatter 
upgrading is lacking. This is probably because the local councils do not have 
comprehensive plans for squatter upgrading from which they could determine which 
aspects they would need collaborating on with other stakeholders (see 7.3). 
Nonetheless, the NGOs are willing to collaborate on squatter upgrading with the local 
councils. As for financial institutions, although some said they would collaborate with 
local councils it appears that their scope of involvement would be quite limited. On the 
other hand, attracting private sector participation in upgrading depends on the approval 
and adoption of the of the proposed Lusaka model for squatter upgrading.  
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7.7 ENABLING ENVIRONMENT 
Both KIP and PFB operated in environments that were supportive of the programmes in 
terms of regulations, interactions between national and city governments, and the 
political environment, which favoured their implementation (see Chapter 3). Therefore, 
this section sought to establish if an enabling environment exists where squatter 
upgrading could be initiated and supported. As such, results from interviews from the 
local councils, MLGH, NGOs, and financial institutions have been presented under the 
following sub-themes namely regulatory frameworks, interactions between central and 
local councils (central-local relations), and the political environment.  
7.7.1 Regulatory Framework 
One factor identified as important in creating an effective squatter upgrading 
institutional framework is the definition of the programme, its objectives and goals 
(Chapter 1). This is important in order to determine specific deliverables required. 
Additionally, for all this to happen, a favourable regulatory environment that facilitates 
smooth programme implementation must be in place. In this case, the regulatory 
environment refers to the laws that regulate various activities of local councils and other 
actors that may be involved in squatter upgrading. As noted in Chapter 5, local councils 
drew their mandate for service delivery, and fostering local democracy from the LG Act 
and the Local Government Elections Act, respectively. To support their service delivery 
mandate, local councils use other supporting statutes such as the Town and Country 
Planning Act (TCPA), Housing Act, and Public Health Act, which would also affect 
squatter upgrading in some ways. Regarding the LG Act that forms the basis for local 
councils, I asked the councils if it provided adequately for the operations of local 
councils. Adequacy in this case implied the ability of the LG Act to allow the councils 
to exercise the powers it bestowed on them. It appears the LG Act has sufficient 
provisions in terms of what councils ought to do (functions and governance) and one 
senior council officer acknowledged its adequacy. However, he bemoaned government 
failure to respect the law (see 5.5.3). Similarly, a senior officer from the other council 
noted that the LG Act sufficiently provided for the operations of local councils, as the 
following quote shows:  
The LG Act is all right but the problem is that it gives too many discretionary powers to 
the Minister for local government.  
I posed the same question to the NGOs to solicit their opinions. Evidence shows that a 
good number of them were not conversant with the LG Act. Therefore, they could not 
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give objective responses. Anyway, the NGOs that were familiar with the Act claimed 
that it was not adequate to support local councils especially in their quest to upgrade 
squatter settlements (see Figure 7.12).  
 
Figure 7.12: Adequacy of the LG Act to support squatter upgrading 
Although the local councils claimed the LG Act adequately provided for their 
operations, evidence seemed to suggest differently. For instance, analysis of the LG Act 
revealed several structural weaknesses. However, for the purpose of the research I 
examined only the ones that were likely to affect the implementation of squatter 
upgrading programmes. In the first place, the LG Act contained provisions that seemed 
to reduce the powers of local councils. For instance, while the Act has assigned many 
different functions to local councils, it also contains provisos that require them to seek 
prior approval from MLGH. Secondly, the LG Act fails to define relationships between 
various stakeholders in local governance – local government simply means local 
councils only (see 7.6). Evidence from literature showed that stakeholder involvement 
in squatter upgrading was a vital element of an adequate institutional framework (see 
chapter 3). Therefore, if the Act did not provide for stakeholder involvement, the local 
councils could find it challenging to involve other actors in the upgrading programmes. 
This also perhaps explains why there was no stakeholder involvement in the two 
councils’ upgrading processes (see 7.6).  
Thirdly, while it clearly assigns several functions to local councils, the LG Act fails to 
address the issue of funding. Although it states that government shall give general and 
special grants to local councils, it does not elaborate how government would administer 
the said grants. Squatter upgrading is a capital-intensive endeavour. Hence, if the LG 
Act does not stipulate where funding for service provision (including squatter 
upgrading) would come from, the local councils would have a challenge where to 
source funding (see 7.5). Lastly, the LG Act gives the Minister responsible for local 
government too many powers over democratically elected councils. As such, if the 
decisions of the local councils to upgrade squatter settlement did not resonate with 
government’s political aspirations then the Minister would not approve them. These 
weaknesses expose the LG Act to manipulation, and make it almost useless to councils 
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themselves. Therefore, in its current form the LG Act is inadequate to support squatter 
upgrading.  
From the literature, it appeared that the LG Act actually brought about the autonomy of 
local councils (see 5.5). Therefore, considering that while on one hand, the LG Act gave 
local councils vast powers but on the other hand, punctuated them with caveats, I asked 
the councils if they believed they were autonomous. The general observation was the 
local councils do not have autonomy in the sense that the LG Act intended them to 
have, as one senior council officer explained:  
Essentially the Act gives all the power and authority due to councils but the power 
relations between central government and local councils are what stand in between. At 
the end of the day, central government takes an upper hand.  
Similarly, another senior council officer explained as follows:  
We can operate as councils in the confines of the law but there are many other things that 
the Minister must have a final say.  
The intention of the LG Act was to initiate and support full decentralisation as 
demonstrated through the assignment of various functions to local councils (see 5.5). 
However, it seems central government has not adhered to the LG Act provisions, as one 
senior council officer observed:  
Rather than supporting decentralisation, which is what the Act is all about, government 
often re-centralises some functions and sources of revenue for political expedience.  
It looks like the LG Act has given local councils autonomy in principle while real 
autonomy is lacking. In reality, the Minister who approves many of the decisions of 
local councils has the final authority on local councils. This also signifies failure of 
government to respect the LG Act (see 5.5.3). As observed already, giving the Minister 
immense powers over elected councils is a weakness in the LG Act that exposes local 
councils to direct political control and interference. By implication, central government 
would only approve council decisions that were favourable to its existence, and that of 
its ruling political party. This also partly explains why local councils cannot query 
government for failing to meet its statutory obligations like remitting annual grants to 
local councils. As one council officer explains:  
The Act assumes that government will act accordingly. In that case, the Act is not explicit 
enough. Additionally, it does not state anywhere that councils could sue or petition 
government for breach of any clause within the Act.  
I inquired from the local councils how they handled grievances against central 
government considering that the LG Act made no provisions for litigation or mediation 
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of disputes with government. According to one senior council officer, local councils 
normally sought the intervention of the Local Government Association of Zambia 
(LGAZ) as the following excerpt shows:  
Where there is need to petition anything, councils do it through the LGAZ. Then it is up 
to government to take or leave it.  
The research has established that the LGAZ is a voluntary association without 
constitutional authority and hence, has little influence on government (see 5.5.3). 
Nevertheless, I asked the councils why it seemed government was intent on 
disregarding the provisions in the LG Act concerning decentralisation. One senior 
council officer explained as follows:  
There is obviously a lack of political will on the part of government. If there were, 
councils would not have challenges in implementing the Act and carrying out their 
functions.  
Failure to follow decentralisation according to the LG Act indicates central 
government’s desire to maintain control over local councils. This also ties in with the 
various acts that government subjects local councils to that reduce their autonomy, 
fiscally and administratively (see 7.5.3). Additionally, the observation reinforces the 
finding from literature that politics applied to development more than the type of 
political regime determines the economic success of a country. Politics also influenced 
how government shared power with local governments (see 2.3.3). At the core of 
politics was political will (see 3.2.6). Clearly, central government lacks political 
commitment to decentralising local government.  
Regarding the supporting states such as the Housing Act and TCPA, an examination of 
the same revealed a serious conflict that could jeopardise squatter upgrading. Whereas 
the Housing Act supports squatter settlements by advocating for their legalisation and 
upgrading, the TCPA does not condone unplanned settlements and thus, seeks their 
demolition. Therefore, I asked the councils how they would reconcile the two Acts as 
they prepared for squatter upgrading. Clearly, the councils were aware of the nature of 
the conflict between the two statutes but they explained that they restricted application 
of the Housing Act to squatter settlements while the TCPA applied only to planned 
settlements. As one senior council officer explained:  
In an ideal situation, I would prefer to go with the TCPA. However, in the current socio-
political scenario, we tend to balance the two Acts. We balance in the sense that in the 
planned settlements, we are strict and enforce the TCPA to the letter. However, in the 
unplanned settlements we apply the Housing Act taking also taking into account the 
‘political temperature’. 
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In terms of balancing the two statutes, the other council emphasised on creating more 
low-income plots to allow the poor access to land and build houses in formal areas, as 
the following quote shows:  
The way we reconcile the two is that we have to try as much as possible to minimise the 
mushrooming of more unplanned settlements and emphasize more on low-cost-housing 
units because most of the people found in these settlements are poor. As a council, we 
emphasise on the creation of low-cost plots because we believe that in that category many 
low-income people would be able to build low-cost houses within their means. 
As overseer of local councils and custodian of both the Housing Act and TCPA, I asked 
the MLGH how it would handle the conflict between the two Acts. One senior 
government officer explained that since both statutes had good intentions for improving 
housing it was just a question of coordinating them well, as the next excerpt shows:  
Both Acts mean well, but it is the question of coordinating them. We hope that with the 
legal reforms going on in the country, such issues will be resolved to avoid conflicts. We 
also hope to realign the TCPA and Housing Act to work side by side especially that we 
are concerned about improving housing in all areas including squatter settlements.  
I probed the local councils if the conflicts in the two statutes had anything to do with 
their inertia to legalise squatter settlements. Apparently, the underlying reason for not 
legalising squatter settlements was lack of resources to provide basic infrastructure and 
services (see 6.3.3). The research established that government funding to the local 
councils was insufficient while their local revenues were insufficient to support squatter 
upgrading (see 7.5.3). Clearly, the local councils did not want to legalise settlements 
without providing basic services and infrastructure required in the improvement areas as 
had been the case in many of the squatter settlements legalised in Lusaka in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Often, the assumption was that squatters were not only poor, but also 
uneducated and unaware of the implications of legalising squatter settlements. To the 
contrary, many residents of the case study settlements seemed informed of the 
implications of legalising settlements, as one Musonda resident clearly demonstrates:  
We are also human beings just like our friends in formal residential areas. We have the 
right to free speech and others like the right to tell government to provide roads, schools 
and clinics for our children. However, as long as we are here in Musonda, Ipusukilo, 
Chipata or any other such settlements [illegal settlements], government cannot provide 
anything we ask for. They say we have settled here without legal rights. Now, where shall 
we go? You know the answer, ‘nowhere’. (MS15, male, married)  
Legalisation of a squatter settlement bestows on to residents, the right of access to basic 
infrastructure and services (see 2.2.3). Therefore, once a squatter settlement is legalised, 
its residents expect the council to provide the necessary basic infrastructure and 
services. Another reason for not utilising the Housing Act appears to be lack of 
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knowledge among policy makers (councillors). In the words of one senior officer:  
From my own observations, the officers running the councils are the ones to blame - they 
have not educated civic leaders on the provisions of the Housing Act. Instead, they have 
placed emphasis on the Town and Country Planning and the Public Health Acts. We do 
not take advantage of the provisions of the Housing Act to explain it to civic leaders. 
The Housing Act appears overshadowed by the TCPA and Public Health Act that local 
councils use frequently. The other reason for the limited use of the Housing Act was 
that public authorities often viewed squatter settlements as temporary settlements. As 
such, they did not have to spend substantial sums of money providing them with 
services (see 6.3.3). Nevertheless, I asked the councils if the Housing Act was adequate 
for implementing squatter upgrading. One senior officer explained that the Housing Act 
was adequate since it gave them more powers than did the TCPA, as the extract shows:  
The Housing Act is adequate and very good to local councils as it gives them more 
powers and control of land than the TCPA does.  
Another senior council officer believed the Housing Act was adequate for squatter 
upgrading, as he explained in the following quote:  
The Housing Act is adequate in as far as managing unplanned settlements is concerned. 
However, we must apply it sparingly to avoid approving settlements that should not exist 
at all like those in hazardous locations.  
With respect to squatter settlements on council land, the Housing Act gives local 
councils the power to subdivide the land and apportion it for various uses. Generally, 
the local councils believed the Housing Act was adequate for implementing squatter 
upgrading programmes. Nonetheless, analysis of the Housing Act revealed several 
contentious issues likely to hinder the squatter upgrading process. According to the 
MLGH, a squatter settlement could be legalised if it satisfied several stipulated 
conditions (see 6.3.3). However, many squatter settlements exist on both public and 
private land. In fact, in many cases they have developed on land meant for purposes 
other than residential. Evidently, these requirements are inconsistent with recent 
urbanisation trends. Most of the urban population lives in squatter settlements (see 1.2). 
Evidence also shows that squatter settlements lack basic services and residents live in 
overcrowded spaces (see 6.3). Therefore, the conditions for legalising squatter 
settlements appear restrictive and hence, hinder progress in enabling low-income 
households to improve their living conditions. Moreover, the Housing Act gives the 
Minister exclusive powers over the outcomes of the legalisation process. This is 
especially not suitable where the Minister considers some of the local councils 
unsupportive of the ruling party (see 5.5.2).  
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Furthermore, while concerned with legalising squatter settlements, the Housing Act 
does not provide any incentives for improvement areas beyond mere recognition. 
Although the Housing Act exists to facilitate the integration of squatter settlements into 
the city proper, it seems to maintain their status as ‘separated’ from the city proper. The 
term ‘improvement area’, still connotes separation from the rest of the areas. 
Unfortunately, the Housing Act does not specify how long the acquired status of 
‘improvement area’ lasts. Lastly, the Housing Act fails to provide a definite duration of 
the occupancy licence. Although the Act specifies a period of not more than thirty years, 
local councils generally give up to fourteen years for occupancy licences in 
improvement areas. By failing to specify the actual duration of occupancy licences, the 
Housing Act does not provide secure tenure. Besides, a local council could revoke any 
occupancy licence at any time if it determined that a licensee breached certain 
conditions. As such, property owners do not have any assurance that the councils would 
not evict them. It appears that if anything, the Housing Act creates uncertainties more 
than assurances in property owners and hence, they cannot make long-term investment 
plans for their properties. Consequently, the weaknesses the Housing Act exhibits make 
it inadequate to support squatter upgrading.  
The research further examined the regulatory frameworks for the NGOs and financial 
institutions as potential stakeholders in squatter upgrading to determine how they would 
affect their involvement. Literature review showed that until 2009, NGOs did not have a 
statute to regulate their operations (see 5.6.1). Therefore, I sought to learn how the new 
NGO Act had changed how NGOs operated and how such changes would affect their 
involvement in squatter upgrading. Many of the NGOs indicated that nothing had 
changed significantly in their operations because of new Act (see Figure 7.13).  
 
Figure 7.13: NGO Act impact on NGO operations 
The NGO that claimed the NGO Act had an impact on the organisation’s operations 
explained that after undergoing a new registration process it received recognitions from 
government departments, as the following quote shows:  
We are now registered as a limited company and government recognises us as a public 
interest. (NGO1, Kitwe, 5yrs) 
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The NGO had noticed increased interactions with other organisations and government 
departments and begun receiving many business and partnership opportunities in 
service delivery to vulnerable communities. Nevertheless, I also asked the NGOs if the 
Act had somewhat improved interactions between NGOs. Nearly all the NGOs reported 
that there were no changes in their interactions with other NGOs. Absence of impact on 
the operations of the NGOs and on interactions between NGOs could be because the 
NGO Act was in its infancy only having been launched in 2014. In fact, many NGOs 
were still registering under the new provisions (see 5.6.1). Hence, it was quite early to 
make any assessments regarding its impact on operations or interactions of NGOs, as 
one respondent noted:  
It is too early to tell. (NGO7, Lusaka, 20yrs)  
Regardless, the NGO Act appeared not to facilitate an enabling environment for NGOs 
(see 5.6.1). For instance, the exclusion of important organisations such as churches and 
faith-based organisations, which were among those involved in providing services in 
vulnerable communities, could affect their involvement in upgrading programmes and 
rob the local councils of potential partners.  
With regard to the regulatory framework that governed financial institutions, I asked the 
respondents if they were satisfied with their regulatory framework the Banking and 
Financial Services Act (BFSA) of 1994 (see 5.6.3). The majority of the respondents 
from the financial institutions did not respond to the question. However, the few 
financial institutions who responded though mainly microfinance institutions (MFIs), 
felt that the government needed to relax on some requirements especially with regard to 
the policy rate, which they said was too high. In 2012, the central bank introduced a 
policy rate of 12.5 percent for all financial institutions, which affected interest rates that 
lending institutions charged on borrowing. As one of the respondents explained:  
Our operations were affected because the cost of borrowing increased for us since we also 
borrow from commercial banks, which are the main sources of our finance. Hence, we 
have also increased our interest rates on loans (FI9, MFI, 5yrs)  
Another respondent elaborated on the impact of the policy rate increase as follows:  
We lost clients because we increased interest rates on loans. Subsequently, our loanable 
funds dwindled causing our lenders to withdraw their intended investments in our 
institution. They regarded the interest regulatory regime to be unattractive, and hence, 
their lending enthusiasm to Zambian MFIs dwindled. (FI6, MFI, 20yrs)  
The increase in the policy rate affected MFIs in various ways as some of them seem to 
have lost funders because of the high cost of borrowing while other MFIs increased 
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interest rates on borrowings to stay afloat in business and in the process lost some of 
their clients. This explains why interest rates on MFI loans were higher than on 
commercial banks loans (see Figure 6.17). Therefore, I asked the concerned financial 
institutions if they had petitioned the central bank to reconsider the policy rate. Only 
one financial institution, FI6 indicated petitioning the Bank of Zambia, as he explained 
as follows:  
We petitioned the Bank of Zambia when it increased the policy rate and introduced 
interest rate capping in January 2013. We petitioned through the Association of 
Microfinance Institutions of Zambia (AMIZ) but nothing has come of it.  
Besides increasing the policy rate, the central bank also imposed a capping on interest 
rates MFIs could charge on lending. Nonetheless, although MFIs have suffered loss of 
business because of increase in policy rate and imposed capping on interest rates, some 
of them seem to have adjusted to the new economic environment. For instance, four 
MFIs reported that their business portfolios had expanded greatly, as the following 
quote from one of them shows:  
The MFI has grown and is still growing. Since 2010, our portfolio has grown at about 
50% per annum in terms of clients and volume of business. Recovery rate is not very bad. 
In fact, it is above 80%. (FI0, MFI, 11yrs)  
The financial institutions appeared not to have major concerns with their regulatory 
framework. However, it also seemed that the decision of the central bank to increase the 
policy rate and cap interest rates on loans affected MFIs more than it did the banks.  
Overall, this section has established that the main legal frameworks, the LG and 
Housing Acts that the local councils require for application in squatter upgrading have 
several weaknesses that render them insufficient to support squatter upgrading. For 
instance, both Acts require ministerial approvals for many processes related to squatter 
upgrading and hence, they are susceptible to political control and interference. The LG 
Act does not guarantee the local councils funding for squatter upgrading or allow them 
to borrow locally or externally for infrastructure development. Furthermore, it does not 
provide for involvement of other actors in local governance. The Housing Act does not 
guarantee tenure security to landowners. Therefore, in their current forms both Acts are 
insufficient to support squatter upgrading. The impact of the NGO Act has yet to be felt 
within civil society because at the time of the research, government had just launched 
the Act. However, early indications are that there is discontentment among members of 
the civil society who view the NGO Act as not favourable to the existence and survival 
of civil society in the country. In its current form, the NGO Act seems more divisive 
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than unifying and hence, it could be an obstacle to the participation of NGOs in the 
squatter upgrading. The regulatory framework for financial institutions on the other 
hand, seems all right because it did not impose any legal barriers that would hinder their 
participation in squatter upgrading.  
7.7.2 Central-local Relations and Interactions 
In this subsection, the research examines the relations between the centre (MLGH) and 
the local (local councils) to establish the extent to which they would affect squatter 
upgrading. Good relations and interactions between the local councils and the MLGH 
were central to the squatter upgrading programmes. However, a review of literature 
revealed that central-local relations were mostly constrained (see 5.5.3). Evidence 
indicates that Rio de Janeiro and Jakarta city governments that undertook the PFB and 
the KIP in Brazil and Indonesia respectively, maintained good relations with their 
national governments (Chapter 3). Therefore, the national governments remained 
committed to the programmes and ensured that they received funding throughout the 
programme phases. In fact, the KIP phases tied in with the national development plans 
so that it became easy for central government to fund the programme through national 
budgets (see 3.5.3). Hence, KIP and PFB maintained the right focus in terms of goals 
and objectives and are be among the most successful upgrading programmes globally 
(see 3.6). Therefore, I began by asking the local councils how often they had meetings 
with the MLGH and if in any of those meetings they had discussed squatter upgrading. 
According to the senior council officers, there had been no direct meetings between 
local councils and MLGH for a long time. Besides, the officers did not recall attending 
meetings concerning squatter upgrading, as the following quote from one senior council 
officer illustrates:  
There has not been a specific meeting between councils and MLGH especially to discuss 
squatter upgrading. Some years back we used to have frequent meetings.  
The meetings between the MGLH and local councils were quite rare that at the time of 
the research, MLGH had not formulated a national plan for squatter upgrading (see 7.3). 
Moreover, it had not interpreted the VISION 2030 for local councils, as another senior 
council officer explained:  
It appears the ministry has left the interpretation of the vision to individual councils.  
Seemingly, MLGH had failed to show leadership for local councils especially regarding 
the contribution of local government to the achievement of the VISION 2030. In 
particular, it failed to show leadership on squatter upgrading by failing to formulate a 
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national plan for the programme. Nonetheless, I queried the local councils on what sort 
of meetings they had whenever they did with MLGH. According to the local councils, 
there were no longer direct meetings between local councils and MLGH compared to 
past years, as one senior council officer explained:  
Then we had consultative meetings that centred on pro-poor programmes. When we talk 
of pro-poor programmes, we think mostly about the poor people in disadvantaged 
communities like squatter settlements and villages.  
An interview with a senior government officer also revealed a lack of direct meetings 
between the ministry and local councils, as indicated in the following excerpt:  
There have been meetings between MLGH and other agencies like the Local Government 
Association of Zambia (LGAZ). However, there have not been direct meetings with local 
councils.  
It seemed that the LGAZ provided the forum for MLGH and local councils to meet. 
However, as observed already the LGAZ is not a constitutional entity and often, the 
government does not heed its counsel regarding the management of local government 
(see 7.7.1). As such, local councils required direct interactions with the MLGH to 
discuss pertinent issues about local government. Nonetheless, I quizzed the local 
councils to speculate on why there were no direct interactions between the MLGH and 
local councils. In the words of one senior officer:  
Probably, it is because government has challenges towards funding councils.  
It is unclear why interactions between the MLGH and local councils seem absent 
outside of the LGAZ forums. However, it was quite certain that relations between them 
were strained as demonstrated by MLGH’s failure to communicate important issues 
including the grant allocation formula for salaries. Moreover, it had failed to provide 
clear policy guidelines regarding squatter upgrading to local councils. Furthermore, 
strained relations between MLGH and councils manifested in the way that the ministry 
treated local councils, as one senior council officer explained:  
I have observed that the Department of Physical Planning in the MLGH does not have 
support for all councils. They appear to have support only for district councils and assume 
that municipal and city councils are able to handle their own things. However, I think that 
the way they [MLGH] are supposed to operate at the ministry level, is that they should 
have a supervisory role for all the councils regardless of status. 
The local councils seem to think the MLGH treats district councils better than municipal 
and city councils. Hence, they suspected that was the reason they got the largest share in 
the 50-75-100 ratio (see 7.5.3). This is consistent with observations made earlier that 
central-local relations in Zambia were generally characterised by tension and suspicion 
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(see 5.5.3). Yet, municipal and city councils have more people to provide services for 
and hence, have more financial demands than district councils. This kind of favouritism 
regarding certain types of councils poses leadership challenges for MLGH and raises 
concerns over the effectiveness of its oversight role.  
In summary, central-local relations were clearly strained. Interactions between MLGH 
and local councils normally took place in forums organised by LGAZ. Consequently, 
strained relations have affected communication between MLGH and local councils. 
Moreover, absence of interactions outside of LGAZ forums has rendered the MLGH’s 
leadership and oversight role of local councils ineffective. As such, strained central-
local relations would affect squatter upgrading because the local councils did not have 
direct interactions with MLGH to discuss matters pertaining to upgrading in their areas.  
7.7.3 Political Context 
In this subsection, I examine the extent to which the political environment is suitable for 
squatter upgrading by looking at four sub-themes including political changes, political 
interference, political resistance, and political will.  
Political Changes 
The research established that changes in political leadership also occasion significant 
policy changes that affect local councils in many ways (see 7.6). Therefore, the 
intention here is to examine the extent to which politics and type of political regime 
would influence squatter upgrading. Evidence shows that once a new government takes 
over office it is compelled to adjust some policies and legislation to suit the ideology of 
the ruling party, as a senior government officer demonstrated in the following quote:  
What the Patriotic Front government has done is to realign the 6NDP with its manifesto 
so that we now have the revised 6NDP that brings into focus the aspirations of the PF 
party, which is now in government. We also linked the Decentralisation Policy to the 
6NDP.  
These are only few of the policies that government has changed, but nonetheless affect 
how local councils and other public departments operate. This cycle of changes occurs 
every five years when a new government comes into power. As observed in Chapter 5, 
the local government system has gone through many changes since 1964. I asked the 
local councils how changes in governments had affected them especially in the last ten 
years. In the words of one senior council officer:  
Changes in governments come with changes in policies, and this affects councils a great 
243 
deal. We feel the immediate impacts of such changes through issues of revenue and 
funding to councils.  
A senior council officer from the other council explained as follows:  
Here in Zambia, development goes with where your councillors belong. If the ruling party 
is different from the party that dominates in the council, then you do have certain 
challenges.  
The above statement seems to reflect observations made earlier regarding political 
patronage in local councils whereby central government favours local councils where it 
has control as opposed to those that opposition parties control (see 5.5.3). I also asked 
the NGOs what they thought about the changes in governments and the extent to which 
they affected councils’ operations. Nearly all the NGOs believed that changes in 
governments affected local councils mostly negatively. According to NGO3:  
Changes in governments have to a great extent, affected local governments. As you may 
be aware, government has been taking away all the lucrative revenue sources from local 
councils.  
Similarly, NGO1 also observed as follows:  
Changes in national governments affect local government operations because it depends 
on the political priorities of the new government.  
Indeed development priorities differ from one government to another. Each new 
government has its own agendas and sets its own policy guidelines that affect local 
councils. Consequently, there is no continuity of policies. However, what seems 
consistent is that each new government like its predecessors continues to engage in acts 
that reduce local councils’ fiscal stability (see Appendix Q). Furthermore, I wanted to 
find out what kind of changes affecting the local councils they could attribute directly to 
changes in governments. Notably, the councils explained that funding had reduced as 
one senior council officer explained in the following quote:  
Funding to councils has significantly changed since the Patriotic Front took over 
government – grants are not forth coming. We seem to be going back and forth on the 
issue of salaries for the employees government indicated it would pay for. Now, 
government says councils have to open buoyancy accounts.  
The NGOs also noted that government had reduced national support to councils such 
that many are failing to provide services and pay salaries. This revelation is consistent 
with the finding that government grants to local councils have been inadequate and 
inconsistent (see 7.5). Moreover, the NGOs alluded to the many acts central government 
has committed against local councils (see Appendix Q). NGO3 explained as follows:  
As you may be aware, government has been taking away all the lucrative revenue sources 
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from councils starting with the Zambia Electricity Corporation (ZESCO) in 1976, motor 
vehicle licensing in 1992 and selling of houses in 1997. In the last ten years or so, 
government has banned crop and bicycle levies. Recently, government reduced property 
rates at a political rally for political expedience.  
Concerning the acts that government executed against local councils, one senior council 
officer also had this to say:  
With each new government in power, councils are immensely affected. Notably, one or 
more council revenue sources would ‘disappear’. Hence, this leads to the erosion of the 
revenue base.  
Clearly, changes in governments also bring changes in policies that affect councils 
negatively. Seemingly, the immediate impact of these changes on local councils is fiscal 
and typically, manifests through stresses in the revenue bases as councils lose lucrative 
revenue sources through government appropriations or bans of some levies (see 7.5.3). 
However, I probed the councils to learn what a buoyancy account was. Apparently, it 
was to act like a holding account for local councils, which council officers would not be 
signatories to, as the excerpt below shows:  
According to the circular from MLGH, councils should deposit all revenues from 
property rates, billboards and the like from the first to the fifteenth day of each month 
without making any withdrawals. On the fifteenth day, council management will then 
meet and prioritise expenditure, which the MLGH has to approve. Now, what happens to 
the day-to-day activities of the council?  
The above situation clearly contradicts calls for governments to grant fiscal autonomy 
to local councils (see 2.4.1). This demonstrates not only the usurping of fiscal autonomy 
from local councils from, but also a form of appropriating revenue from local councils 
and making them do the job of collecting it. An account to which only the MLGH had 
access also meant that it did not belong to the council. It seems central government can 
do anything like impose limits on how local councils use local revenue simply because 
politicians control development policies, as one senior government officer noted:  
Politicians are the ones in the driver’s seat. We as technical people advise on the best 
possible ways to do things. However, at the end of the day, they decide what to do.  
Since politicians ‘are in the driver’s seat’, and ‘decide what to do’, it explains why the 
MLGH has tended to announce important policy changes affecting local councils 
through the media without consulting with local councils. For instance, the MLGH 
announced the banning of crop and bicycle levies, through media and political rallies. 
Similarly, a sitting President advised citizens not to pay property taxes to opposition-
controlled councils at a rally (see 7.5.3).  
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Political Interference 
Related to control, I asked the councils if they experienced political interference, and 
how that affected their decisions especially regarding squatter upgrading. According to 
the local councils, there was considerable political interference. One senior officer 
explained as follows:  
There is significant political interference. Perhaps, there is too much of it. If we can 
quantify it, say fifty percent.  
Another officer also explained that:  
Political interference is at many levels and it is worse for city councils. The interference 
is from both central government and the local level. 
Most of the NGOs also concurred with the local councils concerning the presence of 
political interference in council operations. NGO3, explained as follows:  
There is political interference at both local and national levels. At local level, this may be 
coming from the mayor who has to please his political party and cadres whereas at 
national level, interference comes from the political party in power that wants to use the 
council as a conduit for delivering its agenda.  
Political interference into the operations of local councils had cost them revenue and 
autonomy (see 7.5.3). Furthermore, government exhibited clientelistic relations with 
local councils and as such, many of them have had to align themselves with the ruling 
political party to survive. Therefore, I asked the councils if they thought that the way 
national government relates to local councils was too much bound up with politicians 
rewarding their supporters and ‘clients’. The councils seemed to think so, as one senior 
officer explained:  
To some extent it does. The way councils are treated has a lot to do with the composition 
of the council. Where the party in power controls local councils, government tends to 
have a soft touch towards such councils compared to the opposition party controlled 
councils. It is always firefighting for opposition councils.  
Another senior council officer explained that as follows:  
We see it in the way certain grants are distributed. There are certain councils that even 
when they are not supposed to benefit from certain grants, they still do.  
Most of the NGOs also believed that there was political clientelism involved in the way 
central government treated local councils (see Figure 7.14).  
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Figure 7.14: Clientelistic treatment of Local Councils 
The results here coincide with the discovery in literature review that central-local 
relations tended to be clientelistic whereby central government seemed to reward the 
councils that supported it more than the councils it thought opposed it (see 5.5.3). The 
situation here also illustrates that politics determines how government allocates 
resources amongst local councils as much as it does power (see 2.3.3). At whatever 
level, political interference affected not only the councils’ fiscal position but also their 
development directions, as one officer revealed:  
We cannot implement some projects because government is sceptical. Even though they 
realise that such projects would benefit many, they wonder if people would realise that 
the party in power brought that development. […]. There is more concern about who gets 
the credit for any kind of development than actually ensuring that there is development.  
Bearing in mind revelations of political interference, I asked the councils to what extent 
the LG Act protected them against political interference. In effect, the LG Act did not 
protect the local councils against political interference, as one senior officer explained:  
The Local Government Act does not explicitly protect councils against political 
interference.  
I also asked the NGOs if they thought the LG Act protected local councils against 
political interference. There appear to be varied views among the NGOs regarding this 
question probably from non-familiarity with the LG Act (see Figure 7.15).  
 
Figure 7.15: LG Act protects Councils against political interference 
The NGO that believed the LG Act protected councils against political interference 
based the argument on the assumption that because the Act was law, the parties to it 
would respect it. Generally, we assume that citizens, organisations and governments 
alike would respect laws of the land. As such, the LG Act does not exactly contain 
clauses that protect councils against interference. NGO3 explains as follows:  
247 
Other than specifying the functions and duties of the councils, the LG Act does not 
adequately provide for the local councils in terms of funding or protection.  
The NGOs who believed the LG Act does not protect councils against political 
interference argued that by virtue of vesting many powers in the Minister over elected 
councillors the LG Act made councils vulnerable to interference. Clearly, the LG Act 
does not protect councils against political interference or control. If anything, it 
facilitates political interference by subjecting council decisions to ministerial approval 
(see 7.7.1). Nonetheless, by inference from an interview with one senior council officer, 
it does not matter if the LG Act explicitly protects councils against political interference 
or not because as he explained:  
Politicians have the propensity to ignore the law when it suits them.  
Clearly so, because politicians were in control and could do anything they wanted to do. 
Therefore, I queried the councils if they could petition against such interferences, and 
one senior officer revealed as follows:  
We would like to petition such things even in the courts of law. The truth is we are an 
‘endangered species’ [he chuckles].  
The LG Act grants local councils many powers to carry out many functions and perform 
activities that would enable them raise fiscal resources for service delivery (see 5.5). 
However, it also vests absolute power in the Minister as the final authority over 
councils’ decisions and hence, creates a favourable environment for political 
interference. A minister is a political representative of the ruling party and therefore, has 
to protect his/ her party’s agenda.  
Political Resistance 
Squatter upgrading stands to offer several benefits to beneficiaries and local councils 
alike (see 2.2.4). However, some interest groups such as politicians and proprietors 
might not be supportive of the programmes because of potential losses. Therefore, I 
asked the councils if they expected any political resistance to squatter upgrading. Both 
local councils indicated enjoying good relations with the councillors and hence, did not 
expect resistance from within, as one senior officer elaborated:  
We enjoy a very good relationship between the council and its management. We have 
very experienced councillors who are also knowledgeable in terms of how development is 
supposed to take place. They do not politicise development…we have explained the 
programme objectives and the benefits to the communities, and councillors will support 
such projects.  
Besides, the local councils approved the decisions to legalise and upgrade named 
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squatter settlements through various council resolutions (see Chapter 4). Good relations 
between management and councillors in local councils are as important as central-local 
relations are for the growth of councils. It is quite rare that management and councillors 
enjoy good working relations in local councils in the country. Often, there are wrangles 
in local councils stemming from differences between management and councillors. 
However, most of the NGOs held a different view regarding political resistance to 
squatter upgrading (see Figure 7.16).  
 
Figure 7.16: Political resistance to squatter upgrading 
For example, they argued that since decisions regarding squatter upgrading were subject 
to the approval of the Minister, a politician interested in serving the interest of his 
political party, he might not approve the decision of the councils to upgrade certain 
settlements it threatened his party’s chances in elections. Furthermore, acceptance and 
support of councils’ squatter upgrading decision depends on who drives the upgrading 
process and when it would begin. There is usually hostility between government and 
opposition-led councils (see 5.5.3). As noted elsewhere in this section, “development 
goes with where your councillors belong.” Therefore, if an opposition-led council is 
driving the squatter upgrading process, the ruling party may not be too keen to support 
that process because they are afraid of losing electoral support to the opposition. 
Moreover, timing of upgrading is of the essence because if it coincides with general 
elections, politicians could hijack the programme and use it to gain political mileage. 
On the other hand, if squatter communities were unhappy with the upgrading 
programmes, they could use the ‘volatile’ period to garner support from politicians to 
resist squatter upgrading. The NGOs who indicated there would be no political 
resistance explained that each political party wanted development and to improve the 
living conditions of the people in squatter settlements. As such, they would be inclined 
to support the efforts of local councils. This reasoning does not seem to hold water 
because many of the squatter settlements have been around for decades. If all political 
parties were interested in developing the areas as they claimed when campaigning, they 
would have upgraded most of the squatter settlements once they formed government.  
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However, the local councils indicated that resistance to squatter upgrading could come 
from third-party interest groups such as landlords/ proprietors within the squatter 
settlements or outside in other areas. These have a stake in squatter upgrading because 
they own property in squatter settlements from which they earn revenue. Proprietors 
benefit from the squatter conditions since they are not subject to any law that would 
compel them to improve housing conditions for tenants. Likewise, they prey on the 
desperation of tenants to hike rents whenever they choose to do so. Lastly, proprietors 
profit from not paying property taxes to councils. Hence, they would resist any attempts 
to upgrade squatter settlements to continue benefiting from the poor conditions in 
squatter settlements. As insurance against attempts to upgrade squatter settlements, 
proprietors often align themselves to both ruling and leading opposition political parties. 
The councils were alive to the influence of landlordism and the impact it could have on 
their plans to upgrade squatter settlements, as one senior officer explained:  
There could be few individuals in the squatter areas who would want to cause trouble but 
we can manage them. Otherwise, many people want their properties legalised so that they 
can get titles.  
Therefore, I asked them how they would handle such resistance. Although they were not 
specific as to their nature, the councils indicated that they had plans to counter negative 
actions that could jeopardise squatter upgrading. Since some of the squatter residents 
interviewed were also landlords, I wanted to find out how they would react to squatter 
upgrading. First, I questioned the residents if they belonged to any political parties. 
According to the evidence gathered, most of the respondents did not belong to any 
political party (see Figure 7.17).  
 
Figure 7.17: Residents belonging to Political Parties 
Nonetheless, many respondents disclosed that they normally supported any political 
party that reflected their desires and gave them incentives, as one respondent revealed:  
Wherever the wind blows, there we go too. If a political party is giving out material 
things to gain support then I will go there. I am everything – MMD, UPND, PF. We have 
to eat with them. (IP12, Male, married)  
Another female resident from Mchini expressed similar sentiments as follows:  
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We will support a party that we think will be good. Sometimes we follow parties that give 
people gifts – but as you know, the vote is secret. (MC12, Female, married)  
When prompted to explain how they would assure politicians of their vote, IP12 
responded as follows:  
Well, we tell them we shall vote for them, but the secret is in the heart. Only you know 
the person for whom you will vote.  
For many years, squatter residents have longed for development in their areas but 
politicians did not fulfil their promises. Therefore, nearly all respondents from the case 
study settlements indicated that they would not want to politicize upgrading 
programmes. As one female Ipusukilo resident explained:  
Politics started a long time ago. Politicians come and go. […]. We do not know which 
party will rule next. It is now fifty years since independence, and yet here in Ipusukilo 
there is no development. We must realise that politics and development are separate 
concepts. What we want is development and that is why as residents of Ipusukilo we have 
pledged to work with the local council in upgrading our settlement. Let us put politics 
outside development. (IP9, Female, widow)  
Another resident of Mchini also thought that it was important to separate politics and 
development, as the following excerpt shows:  
We need development. Politics should not interfere with development. If we mix politics 
and development, then we have a problem. (MC5, Male, married)  
Clearly, the residents knew what they wanted and were aware that politicians hardly 
delivered on their promises. This also concretises the analysis made earlier that if all 
political parties were interested in development, they would have upgraded many 
squatter settlements. In 50 years of independence, governments and ruling parties have 
changed with the promise to upgrade squatter settlements and yet, squatter settlements 
still exist with no development. Nevertheless, awareness of separating development 
from politics seems to help explain why nearly all respondents in all the four 
settlements indicated that there would be no political party influence on their 
willingness as individuals to participate in any projects (see Table 7.7).  
Table 7.7: Political party influence on participation in upgrading activities 
Settlement 
Political party influence on 
individual residents 
Political party influence on community as a 
whole 
Yes No Yes No Uncertain 
Magazine - 20 1 17  2 
Mchini - 20 3 17 - 
Musonda - 20 2 18 - 
Ipusukilo 1 19 4 16 - 
Although the residents supported different political parties, they indicated that political 
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affiliations would not affect their desire for development, as the following quote from 
one Musonda resident shows:  
We all want development. Even if we [residents] belong to and support different parties, 
what we want here in Musonda is development. We want our living conditions to 
improve. Government must provide roads, clinics and schools for our children. We want 
clean water and toilets so that we stop having cholera very year. (MS3, Female, married)  
A Mchini resident also thought politics should not interfere with development especially 
that they have waited for too long for development as he explains:  
People have waited for too long for development in the compounds. Therefore, if the 
council came today and told us to participate in some activities we would do that. Yes, we 
belong to different parties and have different views, but politics would not stop us from 
working together for development. (MC4, Male, married)  
The residents had witnessed and participated in several general elections hoping that the 
next government would bring development in their areas. Yet, the settlements had 
remained undeveloped and lacked basic services and infrastructure. Undoubtedly, the 
residents had realised this, which perhaps explains why most of them said that political 
parties would not influence participation of communities in upgrading programmes (see 
Table 7.7). I asked the NGOs if they thought politics and political affiliations would 
influence squatter residents’ decision to participate in squatter upgrading and most of 
the NGOs indicated that would be the case (see Figure 7.18).  
 
Figure 7.18: NGOs’ perception of political influence on residents 
Many NGOs believed that political influence would take an upper hand especially if the 
objectives of the programme were unclear. Besides, one could not dismiss politics from 
influencing people’s participation in upgrading activities because of the importance of 
squatter settlements in the political system of the country, as NGO1 explained:  
The people in the squatter settlements are in the middle of all political transformations. 
Political parties in their political campaigns use them. The squatters play an important 
role in any political transformation. Furthermore, the residents would want to know what 
happens to those displaced. They want to know issues of compensation if any.  
Similarly, NGO2 (Chipata, 44yrs) also noted that politics could influence the residents 
either positively or negatively towards participation in squatter upgrading activities. 
Another NGO explained that squatter settlements were normally the strongholds of 
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political parties and as such, politics would place a key role in residents’ decision to 
participate in squatter upgrading, as the following extract illustrates:  
We cannot rule out politics in disadvantaged communities where you find political 
strongholds. (NGO4, Kitwe, 3yrs)  
These observations coincide with evidence from literature that political parties often had 
their strongholds in squatter settlements (see 2.3.4). As such, there is likely to be 
political influence in squatter upgrading. Besides, many squatter settlements began 
through political clientelism that is still rife at present. The NGO who indicated politics 
would not influence residents’ participation in squatter upgrading explained that:  
Squatters will participate in community projects regardless of the party to which they 
belonged. They have demonstrated that on several community projects in many areas. 
People have come to realise the importance of development especially if it is to their 
benefit. (NGO6, Kitwe, 15yrs)  
Clearly, the other NGOs also believed that residents would participate in squatter 
upgrading provided the objectives of the programmes were clear. Besides, the decision 
to participate or not depended on individuals and what kind of development they wanted 
in their areas. The choice was the residents’, as NGO2 notes:  
Whether politics would influence them negatively or not is a matter personal decision, but 
at the end of the day, residents have to decide what is best for them. However, evidence 
shows that communities generally work together on projects that benefit them.  
NGO4 also concurs with NGO2 that the decision rested with squatter residents, as he 
explained as follows:  
At the end of the day, people must be able to decide for themselves what they really want.  
Indeed, the choice to participate in squatter upgrading rested with squatter residents. 
They have longed for development in their areas, and squatter upgrading presents an 
opportunity for development.  
Political Will 
In this part of the section, I wanted to establish the level of political will that the local 
councils had towards squatter upgrading. This research has established that PFB and 
KIP enjoyed strong political will from both local and national government. Evidently, 
both programmes spanned several phases and recorded several successes (see 3.6). For 
instance, PFB survived several political changes nationally and locally. KIP on the other 
hand, survived a continuous dictatorship regime (see 3.3). When asked if there was 
sufficient political will from central government towards squatter upgrading, the local 
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councils appeared not to respond favourably to the question. Nonetheless, I asked the 
NGOs if they thought there was political will towards squatter upgrading. Many of the 
NGOs strongly believed that political will towards squatter upgrading was lacking (see 
Figure 7.19). In fact, they thought politicians chose not to end squatter settlements to 
maintain political control over them.  
 
Figure 7.19: Political Will to Squatter Upgrading 
According to NGO1, squatter settlements were strongholds of many political parties and 
hence, politicians were afraid that if they upgraded the settlements, residents would no 
longer need them, as the following quote shows:  
Look at it this way, squatters are the majority in urban areas, and if they remove them, 
there would be chaos and they would make the districts ungovernable. This would in turn 
make the ruling party unpopular and politicians do not want to risk that.  
NGO2 also observed that some politicians were responsible for formation of some of 
the squatter settlements, as the following extract illustrates:  
Many of the squatter settlements in the country started because of politicians illegally 
allocating land to cadres as gratification or inducement for political support.  
Likewise, in the next quote NGO4 explained that many squatter settlements began 
because of the influence of politicians:  
You will find that about eighty percent of the squatter settlements developed out of 
political influence and political deception.  
From the foregoing, it is clear that there is no political will for squatter upgrading 
simply because ruling parties find it more beneficial to maintain squatter settlements. 
This also casts shadows over announced intentions of government to upgrade squatter 
settlements. Overall, the political environment seems unfavourable for squatter 
upgrading because of the influence of politics. It appears that it does not matter whether 
or not safeguards such as the LG Acts are in place because politicians have the ultimate 
control of development decisions.  
To summarise, the enabling environment for squatter upgrading does not exist because 
firstly, the legal frameworks that the local councils need to apply in squatter upgrading 
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are ineffective. Hence, they are inadequate to support squatter upgrading. Secondly, 
central-local relations seem to be completely broken down making it difficult for local 
councils to access information, funding and support for squatter upgrading. Lastly, the 
political environment is also unfavourable to squatter upgrading because of rampant 
political control of councils.  
7.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This set out to establish the extent to which the aims and institutional organisation of 
squatter upgrading policy were present for squatter upgrading to proceed. Several things 
emerged from this chapter. Firstly, the LG Act does not clearly assign squatter 
upgrading as a function of local councils. Nonetheless, the assumption is that squatter 
upgrading is a community activity and therefore, falls under community development 
that is one of the functions of local councils. Secondly, the chapter established that there 
is no national plan for squatter upgrading. This is contrary to central government’s 
intention to upgrade squatter settlements to improve the living conditions of people and 
enable them contribute to the VISION 2030. At the local level, the local councils also 
lacked comprehensive plans for upgrading the squatter settlements that they had 
approved. This implies that they have not defined the aims of the squatter upgrading 
programmes, its objectives or expected outputs. Thirdly, there is no government funding 
for squatter upgrading. Evidence, also shows that the local councils do not have the 
fiscal capacity to fund squatter upgrading from own revenues. Over the years, their 
resource bases have depleted owing to inadequate government funding, growing urban 
population, shrinking local economy, and government actions that have contributed 
directly to weakening their fiscal positions. Fourthly, there are no tangible 
collaborations between the local councils and other potential stakeholders in squatter 
upgrading. Despite being aware that the local councils have no fiscal capacity to fund 
squatter upgrading, and that it has not funded them for squatter upgrading, central 
government has made no efforts to find organisations that would work with the local 
councils in squatter upgrading. Finally, the environment for implementing squatter 
upgrading appears unfavourable because the legal frameworks are ineffective, central-
local relations are unsupportive, and political will is virtually non-existent.  
The next chapter presents results on community participation in squatter upgrading 
programmes.  
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CHAPTER 8 COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION AND LOCAL 
GOVERNANCE 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This is the second of two chapters presenting research results. This chapter is concerned 
with community participation in squatter upgrading and local governance and thus, 
examines the extent to which the local councils have involved squatter communities in 
the upgrading process. Therefore, the chapter presents findings arising from in-depth 
interviews with the local councils, squatter residents, and the NGOs.  
8.2 COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN SQUATTER UPGRADING 
Earlier on, I identified community involvement in the upgrading programme as part of 
an adequate institutional framework (see Chapter 1). Evidence shows that although 
community involvement varied between settlements in KIP and PFB, it was an 
important component in the programmes (see 3.2.4). Hence, I asked if the local councils 
had involved squatter communities in the upgrading process. Both local councils have 
not involved the communities directly but instead entrusted councillors to hold meetings 
with the communities to explain the squatter upgrading, as one senior officer elaborated:  
The communities have not been involved as much as we would want them to. However, 
ward councillors of the affected communities have met with people to sensitize them.  
Another senior council officer also indicated that councillors had held meetings with 
residents in the case study settlements as the following quote shows:  
Councillors have held meetings with residents to sensitize them and explain the squatter 
upgrading process. Residents are also aware that we will displace some people in the 
process of upgrading.  
To confirm the claim of the local councils regarding councillors holding meetings in the 
squatter settlements, I asked the residents if they had attended any meetings called by 
the council authorities or councillors. It appeared that many of the residents interviewed 
did not attend the meetings (see Figure 8.1).  
 
Figure 8.1: Residents who attended meetings on squatter upgrading 
Many respondents claimed not to have been aware of the meetings. Nonetheless, nearly 
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all residents interviewed expressed willingness to attend future meetings to hear news 
concerning general development issues including squatter upgrading (see Figure 8.2).  
 
Figure 8.2: Residents willing to attend future meetings on Squatter Upgrading  
Squatter upgrading is a complex endeavour and faces the possibility of resistance from 
interest groups such as politicians and property owners (see 7.7.3). By failing to engage 
the communities, the local councils seem less serious about the consequences of side-
lining them in development such lack of community interest in maintenance and 
operation activities of the upgrading programme (see 6.6.4), and even resistance to 
upgrading (see 7.7.3). Therefore, I still probed the councils to learn if at all technical 
personnel had made efforts to meet the squatter communities and explain squatter 
upgrading. One senior council officer explained that some officers had engaged the 
communities on matters of legalisation, as the following extract shows:  
Council officers also went around sensitizing residents on the need to pay legalisation 
fees, and explain the possibility of displacing some people to pave way for service 
provision once the upgrading process began.  
A senior officer from the other council explained that particular departments within the 
council were in contact with squatter communities, as the following quote shows:  
We have a strong presence in the communities through the Housing, and Community 
Development Departments. These are the ones carrying out baseline and perimeter 
surveys in the areas and are able to reach the residents.  
However, I asked the council officers if they had planned any meetings with the squatter 
communities to explain squatter upgrading and its associated implications. During the 
first phase of the fieldwork (March-April 2014), both local councils had indicated they 
would hold meetings with squatter communities around the May-June period. However, 
by the end of August 2014, none of the councils had held any meeting with residents in 
the case study settlements. Nonetheless, one senior council officer reported holding 
meetings with squatter communities in other newer settlements whose growth the 
council wanted to control, as the following excerpt shows:  
The council was concerned that these settlements were growing rapidly and would 
eventually choke the available land for district expansion.  
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I queried the councils what could have led to lack of community involvement on the 
upgrading programmes. The local councils explained that they lacked a direct link with 
squatter communities because of the absence of Ward Development Committees 
(WDCs) following their dissolution in 2011 (see 4.6).  
To conclude, the local councils have not involved the squatter communities as much as 
they should in the upgrading processes. This problem could be explained by the absence 
of WDCs, which would have provided effective community representation and facilitate 
community participation in squatter upgrading processes. Instead, they have relied on 
councillors to explain squatter upgrading to communities. However, reliance on 
councillors has the potential to create undesirable results for squatter upgrading as a 
whole such as misinformation and resistance to upgrading. Councillors are policy 
makers and politicians and therefore, look out for own political interests. Besides, they 
do not have the technical expertise to explain squatter upgrading to squatters.  
8.3 ENCOURAGING COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
Participation is usually voluntary but where all community members stand to benefit 
from services, programme organisers expect many people to participate (see 2.4). 
Hence, I queried the councils how they would ensure that the residents participated in 
decision-making and upgrading activities. According to one senior council officer, the 
council had implored other service providers who agreed to stop providing services 
such as electricity and piped water in squatter settlements until they were legalised, as 
the following quote shows:  
The electricity company has stopped electrifying houses in squatter areas until they are 
legalised. This in turn makes squatters who have property more involved and supportive 
of the upgrading process.  
This implies that even if residents could afford to pay for the services, service providers 
would not provide them until the councils formerly recognised the squatter settlements. 
The council took this particular route because it believed that it was one way of 
advancing its squatter upgrading agenda. According to the senior officer, squatter 
residents who needed services such as electricity, and piped water were more likely to 
support and encourage the council in squatter upgrading. The officer also added that in 
the absence of WDCs, the council would identify community leaders in the settlements 
who would influence residents to participate, as the next excerpt illustrates:  
Squatter settlements are replicas of villages and in each village; you have a headman as a 
leader. It is the same in the squatter settlements. These settlements usually start with 
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someone who assumes the headship (chief or chairperson) and starts giving out plots, and 
eventually the settlements grow into sections or zones headed chairpersons. However, the 
chiefs or chairpersons are the ringleaders who control the squatter settlements.  
Chairpersons preside over squatter settlements in informally organised committees. 
They have deputies called section or zone chairs. The chairpersons in squatter 
settlements appear to have significant influence as they determine who gets a plot or 
not, as the next quote from the officer shows:  
These [chairpersons] have control over the residents and usually whatever they say is 
final.  
They also seemingly have powers to expel residents who fail to live by the ‘norms’ of 
the settlement. Naturally, the relationship between chairpersons and the councils are 
cardinal to the success of squatter upgrading especially where some components of 
upgrading activities require community participation, as the officer further explains:  
For us [council], if we want to advance any development agenda in the squatter 
settlements we have to rely on these Chairpersons. We have to let them know before we 
go into any of their territories. We have meetings with them to explain our programmes 
so that by the time we get there, people would have already known about our intentions.  
However, while chairpersons have the capacity to influence their community members, 
they are not accountable to them since their leadership is informal. Besides, 
chairpersons also align themselves to political parties for support, as the senior officer 
further elaborated:  
They [chairpersons] want power in perpetuity and as such, they will align themselves to 
any political party in power. They can also be dualistic in their political alignments - they 
can align themselves to the ruling party and the party in control of the district.  
Because of their political inclinations, chairpersons do not seem to be appropriate 
leaders to organise communities for squatter upgrading. Only formal structures such as 
WDCs are likely to provide avenues for effective community representation, and 
participation in squatter upgrading programmes. If followed, the informal structures 
would replicate the experience of LSUP where a political leadership took over control 
of the project and eventually, stifled community participation (see 6.6). Another way to 
encourage community participation in squatter upgrading was through community 
contributions. The councils indicated that they would follow the ZAMSIF model 
because it had established procedures for community participation in development 
projects (see 2.4 and 5.6.2). Although the basis of the ZAMSIF model was rural 
projects, the councils were optimistic they could apply it to projects in urban areas, as 
one senior council officer described:  
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The contribution may not really be 25 percent for peri-urban communities. Unlike in rural 
communities, residents in urban communities may not be able to give their time because 
some are involved in formal employment. As such, they may contribute money. 
Therefore, we estimate that the contribution may be between 10 and 15 percent.  
Reducing the amount of contributions might be a positive encouragement to the 
residents, but I questioned how the councils would make residents contribute to the 
programme seeing that many residents especially in Mchini and Magazine were merely 
tenants (see Figure 6.11). Both councils disclosed they would conduct baseline surveys 
to gather data on the status of a squatter settlement, as one senior officer explained:  
We want to find out who is living in the areas and what their status is. Where there is 
need to relocate squatters to overspill areas, we will relocate only affected residents and 
not proprietors who do not live at the properties.  
Another senior officer offered a similar explanation as follows:  
When we design the questionnaire for the baseline survey, we will also ensure to include 
questions that would help us capture the status of the residents - whether they are tenants 
or property owners. We would also be able to know when they moved into that particular 
area. That information will help us to decide whom to relocate to other areas.  
Baseline surveys would also help the local councils to identify vulnerable groups that 
would need special assistance. While the number of vulnerable households (headed by 
widows, divorced and single women) seemed paltry compared to the sample sizes for 
each case study settlement, they nonetheless highlighted the presence of vulnerability in 
the settlements especially in Magazine, Mchini, and Musonda (see Figure 8.3).  
 
Figure 8.3: Residents’ marital status in Case Study Settlements 
Female-headed households were particularly vulnerable. To begin with, they supported 
large households. For instance, a Mchini resident MC17 is a widow who has lived in 
Mchini for 21 years and supports a household of six people, as the quote below shows:  
My husband died ten years ago and I look after orphans. My two daughters also died a 
few years after my husband, leaving behind five children altogether. It is not easy but I 
try my best to manage and find food for my family.  
Similarly, a widow of Magazine also supported a large household, as she explains:  
I am a widow and head of the house of six people, two of whom are orphaned little boys. 
My daughter and her husband died two years ago. (MG7, Female, Widow) 
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The second reason why female-headed households are vulnerable is that some of them 
live with terminal illnesses like HIV/AIDS, as the following excerpt from a Mchini 
resident illustrates:  
I live alone in a one-roomed house that I rent. I will not hide my status [she laughs]. I am 
HIV positive and unemployed. (MC10, Female, Single) 
Yet, another reason that makes female-headed households more vulnerable than others 
is that they are unemployed, and depend on activities such as street vending to get by 
and support their families. MC17 is such an example and she narrates as follows:  
I sell different merchandizes at the market and sometimes on the streets to make money 
for the family. I also grow maize because maize meal from shops is very expensive. I 
cannot manage to buy maize because there is no one who works in our house.  
MG7 also does casual works and street vending to support her family, as the following 
quote shows:  
I sell stuff on the streets. Sometimes, when I cannot sell stuff because there are many 
street vendors, I go in the rich people’s areas [mayard] to do cleaning jobs and washing.  
Like MC17, MG7 and MC10, there are several other residents in similar situations in all 
the case study settlements. Street vending seemed to be an easy contingency activity for 
many because it afforded them the opportunity to trade from anywhere without paying 
councils taxes. Although viewed as a self-employment activity, for many street vending 
is a hand-to-mouth survival strategy. Street vendors hardly earn enough to save for 
activities such as investing in housing improvements. Finally, the vulnerability of 
female-headed households lay in the fact that some of them did not own the houses they 
lived in but rented them from property owners who subjected them to untimely rental 
increases, as MC10 explained:  
Sometimes she [proprietor] increases the rent without telling me.  
Nonetheless, not all vulnerable households were renting houses. For example, MG7 and 
MC17 were homeowners. While MG7 inherited the house from her parents, MC17 and 
her late husband bought a plot and built a house (see Figure 6.12). Evidence also shows 
that the problems of proprietors increasing rent at will did not only affect female-headed 
households but also other households. MS3, a married woman from Musonda also 
explained that the owner of the two-roomed house she rented had the tendency to 
increase rentals whenever it suited him. This scenario further highlights the role that 
proprietors would have in resisting squatter upgrading. As beneficiaries from poor 
conditions in squatter settlements, proprietors are more than likely to resist any attempts 
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to improve living conditions in squatter settlement (see 7.7.3).  
To summarise, the local councils recognise that getting popular participation in squatter 
upgrading is usually not possible. However, they explained that they would take 
measures that would make the residents understand that squatter upgrading was for their 
benefit including asking service companies to stop providing services to squatter 
residents in squatter settlements even though they could them. Other measures include 
using existing informal structures within the settlements to organise squatter 
communities, and adoption of the ZAMSIF model of community participation.  
8.4 WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN SQUATTER UPGRADING 
This section undertook to assess the extent to which squatter residents were willing to 
participate in squatter upgrading. Despite not being involved in the upgrading process 
(see 8.2), the squatter residents showed a high level of willingness to participate in 
squatter upgrading if the local councils involved them (see Figure 8.4).  
 
Figure 8.4: Squatter Residents willing to participate in Squatter Upgrading 
Despite identifying the possibility of resistance to and political influence in squatter 
upgrading, the residents showed that they were willing to participate in squatter 
upgrading, as one Ipusukilo resident explained:  
People are prepared to participate in squatter upgrading to the extent that we are ready to 
contribute labour if council gives us materials to work with. (IP9, Female, Widow)  
IP9’s sentiments also seemed to show readiness to accept the ZAMSIF Model (see 2.4). 
MS3 also had similar views to IP9, as shown in the following quote:  
If the council asked us to participate in squatter upgrading, we will work together whether 
we belong to different parties or not. The key is being united and working together.  
One cannot deny that politics would play a significant role in how people interact with 
others. On the other hand, squatter residents are willing to participate in upgrading 
activities to improve their living conditions. The local councils indicated that they 
would consider applying the ZAMSIF model to engage the participation of squatter 
communities. However, they were also concerned that since some of the residents could 
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be in employment their contribution to squatter upgrading activities would have to be in 
monetary form as opposed to labour (see 8.3). Therefore, I sought to establish the level 
of employment among the respondents. It appears that most of the households did not 
have anyone working (see Figure 6.16). Where at least one member of the family 
worked, many were involved in low-paying work as cleaners, domestic workers or 
security guards (see Appendix U, Appendix V, Appendix W, and Appendix X). 
Questions about how much households earned seemed to make some respondents 
uncomfortable that they were unwilling to discuss them, as one Ipusukilo resident 
demonstrated in the following quote:  
I work as a cleaner at the clinic. Salaries are secret matters madam. Let me just say it is 
close to the non-taxable band. My husband is self-employed as a carpenter and that is 
how we manage to make ends meet. (IP17, female, married)  
At the time of the research in 2014, the non-taxable threshold was K0 to K3000 (at the 
time exchange rate was US$1 equals K5.10). No one who earned less than K3000 per 
month paid income tax. Hence, I stopped asking how much those who worked earned. 
Nonetheless, other respondents disclosed their earnings voluntarily as they explained 
what work they did. Generally, some of those who worked earned less than the average 
monthly food basket cost of about K3500 (US$655) (see Appendix T) and the lowest 
paid category of workers (see Table 6.4). For instance, some households earned 
between K200 and K300 per month. One household earned a combined monthly salary 
of K600. These earnings fell below the taxable threshold. Self-employed residents on 
the other hand, engaged in activities such as running small retail shops, and operating 
various kinds of workshops for carpentry and joinery, bicycle repairs, and mechanical 
works, near or adjacent to their homes (see Figure 8.5).  
 
Figure 8.5: Some self-employment activities in Case Study Settlements 
Respondents also indicated engaging in other activities from which they earned income 
including subsistence farming, trading, rentals and support from family members within 
or outside of the household. It appeared that many engaged in farming and trading more 
than in other activities (see Figure 8.6).  
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Figure 8.6: Other Main Economic Activities in Case Study Settlements 
Farming was especially popular in Ipusukilo being an old farming area as noted earlier 
(see 4.4.2). Trading, which mostly involves petty trading at home or in the streets is 
another activity for most households especially in Mchini and Magazine. Petty traders 
dealt in various goods ranging from foodstuffs to second-hand clothing (see Figure 8.7).  
 
Figure 8.7: Typical Petty Trading Activities in Case Study Settlements 
Since the residents showed a high level of willingness to participate and contribute in 
squatter upgrading, I wanted to establish what skills were available in the settlements 
should the councils require the residents to contribute their labour towards squatter 
upgrading programmes. It appears that there were more respondents with building skills 
such as bricklaying, carpentry and joinery, plumbing and block making in Ipusukilo and 
Musonda than in Mchini and Magazine, which had most of the respondents with 
farming
28
 skills (see Figure 8.8). Others were homemaking and entrepreneurial skills.  
 
Figure 8.8: Building skills in Case Study Settlements 
The pattern of skills in the settlements reflects the main economic statuses of Kitwe and 
Chipata as an industrial urban town and agricultural town, respectively (see 4.4). 
                                                 
28
 Farming skills involved skills in fish farming, poultry, livestock and crop farming skills. 
264 
Although monetary contributions towards squatter upgrading programmes could be 
challenging, there was a wealth of building skills within the settlements that could 
benefit upgrading programmes. Moreover, the residents demonstrated the presence of 
community and togetherness by helping each other build houses (see Figure 8.9).  
 
Figure 8.9: Community Involvement in Case Study Settlements 
Furthermore, the presence of community structures such community schools and clinics 
in Mchini and Ipusukilo demonstrated that residents worked together as to achieve 
common goals. This was indicative of a spirit of community and togetherness, an 
important form of social capital (see 2.4). Although the respondents overwhelmingly 
indicated their willingness to participate in squatter upgrading activities (see Figure 
8.4), I asked the NGOs what they thought about squatter communities participating in 
development programmes considering that they worked in many disadvantaged areas 
including squatter settlements, and were in direct contact with communities. Nearly all 
of the NGOs indicated that communities were usually eager to participate when they 
understood the objectives and benefits of the projects (see Figure 8.10).  
 
Figure 8.10: NGOs' assessment of residents' willingness to participate in Projects 
The NGOs explained that it was important for project implementers to ensure that 
communities understood the programme objectives, as one NGO explains:  
The willingness of communities to participate in community programmes depends on 
their understanding of the same programmes. When they know programmes are for their 
benefit, their participation is unquestionable. (NGO3, Chipata, 20yrs)  
Another NGO expressed similar views as follows:  
Once they understand that [the importance of development], you will be amazed how 
much they are willing to participate. Therefore, what they need is a clear explanation of 
objectives of the activities and the benefits to the people. (NGO1, Kitwe, 5yrs)  
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In other words, unclear objectives and absence of benefits to the communities could be 
important barriers to their participation. In fact, this revelation was consistent with one 
of the defining elements of an adequate institutional framework for squatter upgrading 
regarding having clearly defined goals and objectives of the programme (see 1.4).  
To sum up, squatter residents were willing to participate in squatter upgrading activities 
to improve their living conditions. Although, many residents had not been involved in 
community projects before or helped other people build their houses, there was 
evidence of togetherness in the settlements through the presence of community schools 
and clinics. Most importantly, the residents overwhelmingly expressed willingness not 
only to participate in but also to contribute to squatter upgrading activities.  
8.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter set out to establish the level of community participation in squatter 
upgrading. Three main points emerged from this chapter. Firstly, the local councils have 
not involved the squatter communities in all of the case study settlements as much as 
they should in upgrading programmes. Where the local councils have made efforts to 
reach the communities they have used local councillors to explain squatter upgrading to 
communities. This scenario however, presents the challenge of ensuring that squatter 
communities receive the correct information on the nature of the upgrading 
programmes, because councillors do not have the expertise to explain squatter 
upgrading. Therefore, the absence of WDCs that would have provided interactive 
linkages between the communities and the local councils is quite challenging. Secondly, 
the local councils recognise that getting popular participation in squatter upgrading is 
usually not possible. Therefore, they planned to take some measures to encourage as 
much participation as possible including discouraging service providers outside of the 
council from providing services in squatter settlements until after upgrading, in the 
absence of WDCs, using existing informal structures in the settlements to organise 
squatter communities, and adopting the ZAMSIF model of community participation. 
Thirdly, despite the councils not involving the communities in the upgrading processes, 
squatter residents were willing to participate in upgrading activities.  
The next chapter synthesises the findings from the research, and makes necessary 
recommendations arising out of the research.  
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CHAPTER 9 DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research is a contribution to our knowledge of processes in squatter upgrading in 
small- and medium-sized cities in Sub-Saharan Africa in general and Zambia in 
particular. The overall aim of this research was to examine the adequacy of the 
institutional framework to initiate and support squatter upgrading in Zambia. Therefore, 
the results of the study have revealed that the framework used for the Lusaka Squatter 
Upgrading Project (LSUP) comprised all the important elements identified earlier as 
constituents of an adequate squatter upgrading framework. Briefly, the existing LSUP 
upgrading framework is adequate for initiating and supporting squatter upgrading in 
Zambia. On the other hand, the research revealed that while the LSUP upgrading 
framework was adequate, the environment in which successful squatter upgrading could 
proceed was not favourable. Particularly, the main legal texts that the local councils 
would apply in squatter upgrading were ineffective, interactions between central and 
local governments were tense and unsupportive towards upgrading, and political 
commitment was lacking.  
The present chapter, which combines discussions, conclusions, and recommendations, 
concludes the research. First, the chapter presents the main findings from the whole 
research. Next, the chapter discusses the findings in the result Chapters 7 and 8. The 
chapter proceeds to present implications for squatter upgrading policy and draws out the 
main conclusions of the research. Next, the chapter presents recommendations for 
practice, and later highlights the contributions to the body of literature. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with suggestions for future research. 
9.2 MAIN FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH 
This research has resulted in many findings, which have provided responses to some of 
the on-going debates especially regarding land tenure security, and role of government 
in housing provision for the poor. These findings also address the objectives of the 
research. I have presented these findings based on the main research themes to highlight 
important topics and contributions to the body of knowledge.  
9.2.1 Squatter Upgrading and Improvement of Living Conditions 
Several important results emerged from literature and primary data with regard to 
squatter settlements and upgrading. To begin with, the research has confirmed evidence 
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from literature that squatter settlements as the most dominant form of human 
settlements in urban areas in many developing countries (UN-Habitat, 2003a; Willis, 
2009). Literature has shown that in small and medium towns in Zambia, squatting is 
indeed the commonest form of tenure – squatter settlements provide shelter to the 
majority of urban citizens. Evidence from the two case study areas, Chipata and Kitwe 
shows that a high proportion of urban citizens live in squatter settlements (see 4.4).  
Next, results from the research have also confirmed that tenure security plays a vital 
role in influencing the decisions that squatters make regarding investing in housing 
improvements (De Soto, 2000; Field, 2005; Durand-Lasserve & Selod, 2009). They 
demonstrate that in the process of squatter upgrading which begins with legalisation of a 
squatter settlements and later upgrading, at the initial stage - at the precipice of rejection 
and recognition, squatters are concerned more with legalisation as it brings recognition. 
Besides, squatters gain the assurance of being ‘safe’ from eviction. At that point, they 
rely on de facto tenure security that comes with recognition of their status, and it seems 
to be sufficient for them to initiate improvements in their housing. Ipusukilo provides an 
excellent example of this scenario (see 6.3.2). Another important outcome regarding 
tenure security is that sometimes squatters gain confidence in tenure security through 
knowing their local council intends to legalise their settlement. Mchini provides such an 
example where the local council resolved to legalise it together with other squatter 
settlements in the district. However, the MLGH has not approved its legalisation but 
that has not stopped some squatters from improving their houses (see 6.3.2). Moreover, 
results from Mchini and Ipusukilo show that when squatters gain assurance of tenure 
security they do not wait for the authorities to provide basic infrastructure before 
starting to improve their houses. Arguably, this is understandable especially that 
legalised settlements are hardly upgraded. For instance, several of the squatter 
settlements that were legalised in Lusaka city in the 1980s and 1990s have not been 
upgraded (UN-Habitat, 2003a). In 2011, government legalised Ipusukilo but to date the 
local council has not provided any basic infrastructure in the area. Nevertheless, one of 
the most important outcomes of this research is that it confirms the importance of tenure 
security in influencing the decisions that squatters make with regard to investing in 
housing improvements.  
The research also established several critical success factors for squatter upgrading to 
proceed. These included clear programmes, sustainable sources of funding, stakeholder, 
and community participation, independent programme management, and sustained 
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political will (see 3.2). These critical factors form the basis for an adequate squatter 
upgrading framework, which seems to have applied to KIP and PFB (see 3.5).  
9.2.2 Political Regimes and Housing Provision 
The research confirmed the finding from literature that the development route that a 
country takes depends more on the politics it applies to development than the type of 
political regime in which the development occurs (Smith, 2003). Analysts have debated 
for a long time the relationship between political regimes and development. Some tend 
to argue that authoritarian regimes are favourable where countries need to develop 
rapidly. Others believe economic development is assured more and sustained under 
democracy than autocracy. Both groups have compelling examples and reasons to 
justify their claims. The former often cite of the East Asian countries that experienced 
rapid development under autocracy (see 2.3.3). The results show clearly that Zambia 
does not seem to fit any of the modes. For instance, where housing development is 
concerned we cannot ascribe poor housing provision to any particular type of political 
regime. Evidence shows that housing provision throughout all of the types of regimes - 
capitalist authoritarian, socialist authoritarian, and neoliberal democracy, has been 
inadequate and caused the urban housing shortage that has led to the prevalence of 
squatter settlements (see Chapter 5). During each of the political regimes, government 
implemented housing policies that hindered rather than promoted housing development. 
This has led to a cumulative urban housing backlog that successive governments have 
failed to solve because of insufficient investment in adequate low-income housing.  
Another example concerns the local government system. Governments under each type 
of political regime consistently weakened and undermined local government. For 
instance, from colonial time to date government has failed to fund local government 
adequately. Moreover, from the socialist era through to the democratic era government 
continues to appropriate main revenue sources from local governments, which has 
weakened their fiscal capacity to provide public services including housing (see 5.5).  
9.2.3 Housing Conditions in Small and Medium Towns in Zambia 
One of the important outcomes of this research has been to confirm evidence from 
literature that government still has an important role to play in the provision of housing 
for the urban poor (Marcuse, 2006; Smith, 2006). The neoliberal view of service 
delivery is to let the market do the work while government maintains the role of 
facilitator. This research has demonstrated firstly, that in Zambia the market has failed 
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to provide the ‘service’ of housing provision for the urban poor. It has instead, focused 
on supplying housing for the higher end of the market (see 6.4.4). Therefore, 
governments cannot completely take a facilitator’s role when no one is serving the poor 
(UN-Habitat, 2003a; 1996a). secondly, even in a neoliberal environment, government 
could participate in housing provision by enacting laws that protect property rights, 
improving access to finance for housing investment, fostering public-private 
partnerships in housing, and setting up housing subsidies for the urban poor (see 6.2). 
These are key elements in the formation of an enabling environment for investment in 
housing. However, government has not applied itself effectively to delivering any of the 
mentioned strategies it pledged to create an enabling environment to stimulate 
investment in housing (see 5.4.1). Hence, it has failed to assist local councils deliver 
municipal services in squatter settlements (see 1.2).  
Secondly, while many analysts have described the urban housing situation as critical 
(Makasa, 2010; UN-Habitat, 2012a), they have mainly focused on the quantitative 
aspect of the problem. However, this perspective has tended to narrow down the extent 
of the urban housing problem, which should also include aspects of quality, tenure 
security, and spatial location (see 6.3). Detailed examination of the housing situation 
from literature and primary data reveals that urban housing is generally insufficient and 
unable to accommodate all urban dwellers adequately. Besides, most of the urban 
housing is of sub-standard as it consists of squatter housing built with poor quality 
materials. Similarly, a large proportion of urban housing lacks tenure security, and is 
spatially segregated and lacks basic infrastructure and services. Therefore, this research 
describes the urban housing situation as one where housing is insufficient for the urban 
populace, and most of it is of sub-standard, lacking tenure security, and is spatially 
segregated. Given all these deficiencies, the research conclusively confirms that the 
urban housing situation is indeed critical.  
Thirdly, of all the housing programmes that government has implemented in the 
independence and post-independence eras, squatter upgrading reached more people than 
conventional housing and site-and-services programmes did (see 6.5.3). This 
demonstrates that if government has to make an impact with improving living 
conditions of people, squatter upgrading provides the means. Although, there is no 
provision of housing involved in squatter upgrading, it nonetheless facilitates provision 
of basic infrastructure and improvement of tenure security that squatters lack (see 
2.2.3). Lastly, the research confirmed the finding from literature that housing plays a 
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role in fostering Home-Based Enterprises (HBE) (Collier & Venables, 2014; Tibaijuka, 
2009) (see 6.7). In all the case study settlements, some squatters managed one form of 
HBE or another. However, squatters involved in HBE in Mchini and Ipusukilo had gone 
further by improving the conditions in which they carried out their businesses (see 8.4). 
The example in Mchini and Ipusukilo also testifies to the importance of tenure security 
in investing not only in housing improvements but also in buildings used for enhancing 
livelihoods.  
9.2.4 Aims and Institutional Organisation of Squatter Upgrading Policy 
The Zambian government plans to upgrade squatter settlements to improve the living 
conditions of people through introduction of municipal services (see 1.1). As such, it 
requires an upgrading policy that would guide squatter upgrading to have maximum 
impact. After an intensive investigation, the research has established several facts. 
Firstly, the Local Government (LG) Act does not specifically spell squatter upgrading 
as one of the functions of local councils (see 7.2). In fact, it does not even mention 
squatter upgrading. Nonetheless, it provides for community development as one of the 
functions of councils. Hence, the assumption is that squatter upgrading is a community 
development activity and a responsibility of local councils.  
Secondly, there is a complete lack of political will towards squatter upgrading. For 
instance, despite government’s intention to upgrade squatter settlements it has neither 
prepared a national plan for upgrading nor set aside funding for the same (see 7.3 and 
7.4). Similarly, even if government expects councils to fund squatter upgrading from the 
grants it gives them, evidence clearly shows that they are inadequate and inconsistent to 
support service delivery let alone squatter upgrading (see 7.5).  
Thirdly, although the local councils intend to upgrade some squatter settlements they 
too have not formulated any comprehensive plans for upgrading (see 7.3). Until they 
have tangible plans for upgrading, it is difficult for them to identify which areas they 
need to collaborate with other stakeholders. This probably explains why they have not 
involved stakeholders in the upgrading process (see 7.6). Moreover, it is difficult for the 
councils to estimate the amount of funding they require for upgrading without tangible 
plans. Therefore, plans for upgrading are quite important in the upgrading process.  
Fourthly, the local councils have no fiscal capacity to fund squatter upgrading from own 
revenue. They made efforts towards squatter upgrading by approving squatter 
settlements for legalising and upgrading, carrying out cadastral and perimeter surveys, 
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and sensitizing communities on the programmes. However, the councils are unable to 
fund complex tasks such as providing access roads, and water and sanitation facilities 
because their depleted revenue bases cannot support them (see 7.5).  
Fifthly, the main legal texts that would support the local councils in the upgrading 
process are generally ineffective and unsupportive (see 7.7.1). For instance, both the LG 
Act that governs the operations of the local councils, and the Housing Act that promotes 
squatter upgrading require that any decision towards upgrading be subject to ministerial 
approval. This not only makes them bureaucratic but also causes delays and 
uncertainties. Most importantly, delays in legalising squatter settlements effectively 
deny many urban poor access to tenure security.  
Lastly, the research established that relations between local and central governments are 
generally strained, while interactions between them are virtually non-existent (see 
7.7.2). Central government exercises political patronage in its relations with local 
councils to extent that grants allocation favours local councils where the ruling party has 
majority control. The opposition-led local councils often have important grants such as 
Constituency Development Funds (CDF) delayed or not released at all. This confirms 
the findings from literature where Resnick (2010; 2014) and Rakodi (2003) note that 
development in Zambia seemed to favour areas where the ruling party had the most 
control (see 5.5.3). Additionally, there appears to be a struggle for power between the 
MLGH and local councils. For instance, MLGH re-established the Local Government 
Service Commission (LGSC) to manage staff matters of local councils when they are 
capable of handling those matters by themselves (see 5.5.3). On the other hand, local 
councils were created as autonomous entities responsible for own operations and 
management including hiring, firing, and disciplining staff. Moreover, MLGH appears 
to be implementing policies without consulting local councils. For example, it passed a 
statutory instrument that introduced salaries for ward councillors to be paid by councils 
(see 7.5.3). Similarly, MLGH also compelled councils to form buoyance accounts 
where they would deposit revenues from major sources, which it would control by 
deciding how the councils could use the revenue. These acts clearly demonstrate an 
action of the MLGH usurping power from local councils.  
9.2.5 Community Participation and Local Governance 
Having established that squatter upgrading is a community development activity, it 
means therefore, that it cannot take place without community involvement. Many 
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observers have emphasised the importance of community participation in squatter 
upgrading (see 2.4). However, this research established that that community 
involvement in the squatter upgrading process was seriously lacking in both local 
councils (see 8.2). It also revealed that the local councils have not taken an active role in 
informing squatter communities about squatter upgrading. Instead, they have entrusted 
the responsibility of explaining squatter upgrading to squatter communities to ward 
councillors who do not have the expertise to do so. This situation has the potential to 
produce undesirable outcomes such as unrealistic expectations and even resistance to 
the programmes. Another important finding is that, in the absence of WDCs one of the 
local councils would use an existing informal structure within the squatter settlements to 
organise squatter communities to participate in squatter upgrading activities (see 8.3). 
Finally, squatter communities exhibited a high level of willingness to participate in 
squatter upgrading if the councils asked them to do so (see 8.4).  
9.3 DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This section presents a discussion of the research results that emerged from Chapters 7 
and 8, as follows:  
9.3.1 Planning for Squatter Upgrading 
The results of this study indicate that there has been no planning for squatter upgrading 
at the national or local levels of government (see 9.2.4). Since 2006, when the 
government announced its intention to upgrade squatter settlements to improve the 
living conditions of the urban poor and enable them to contribute to the VISION 2030, 
nothing seems to have been done to plan for upgrading. On the other hand, the Fifth 
National Development Plan (5NDP) that first announced squatter upgrading expired in 
2010 without a single squatter settlement being upgrading. The succeeding Sixth 
National Development Plan (6NDP) in 2011 reiterated the intention of government to 
upgrade squatter settlements but it expires soon in 2016 having not seen a settlement 
upgraded. Next, estimates based on the 2010 population census showed that the number 
of people living in squatter settlements was almost four million while the urban housing 
deficit was two million (UN-Habitat, 2012a).  
Yet, there has been no deliberate national plan for squatter upgrading. According to 
MLGH, it is not the responsibility of government but councils’ to prepare a plan for 
squatter upgrading. Therefore, government expects local councils to formulate own 
plans for squatter upgrading (see 7.3). The research also established that MLGH has not 
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informed local council that it expects them to prepare own squatter upgrading plans. 
Two things arise out of this scenario. First, the LG Act that assigns responsibilities to 
local councils does not specifically state squatter upgrading as a function of local 
councils. Instead, it is silently ‘extracted’ from community development. Even the 
Housing Act does not mention squatter settlements or squatter upgrading. Instead, it 
refers to improvement areas’ meaning areas of land [squatter settlements] legalised by 
means of statutory instruments. Furthermore, the Housing Act does not assign the 
responsibility of ‘improving’ legalised improvement areas to councils per se but instead 
Section 38 makes it optional for the council to improve the areas (GRZ, 1974). 
Nonetheless, Section 19 of the Housing Authority (NHA) Act clearly shows that the 
NHA is responsible for management of squatter settlements (GRZ, 1971a). Among the 
functions of NHA is one particular function that states as follows:  
Clear squatter settlements and plan improvement and redevelopment of such areas. 
(Subsection 2 (d)) 
The second point concerns interactions between local councils and the MLGH, which as 
this research discovered have broken down (see 9.2.4). The MLGH expects local 
councils to formulate own plans for squatter upgrading and yet, it has not informed local 
councils officially or otherwise. This situation raises further concerns about the capacity 
of the MLGH to perform its role as supervisor of local councils. The research 
established that by 2014, the MLGH had not even had the ministerial interpretation of 
the VISION 2030 and how squatter upgrading fit into it. Local councils have to do own 
interpretation. Clearly, the MLGH has not taken a leading role in squatter upgrading.  
The responsibility for squatter upgrading is legally for the NHA. However, local 
councils are the closest to the people (see 2.4.1). The local councils are also aware of 
the implication of their proximity to the people – society expects them to provide 
services even in squatter areas. Hence, they have accepted that they are responsible for 
squatter upgrading (see 7.2). As such, the councils have made preparatory works 
towards squatter upgrading including passing council resolutions to approve legalisation 
and upgrading of some settlements, and undertaking perimeter and baseline surveys of 
the said settlements (see 7.3). However, they too have not made comprehensive plans 
for squatter upgrading. Although not formerly communicated to the local councils, the 
decision of MLGH to let them formulate own plans for squatter upgrading is correct. 
Local councils know the conditions in which squatter settlements exist in their areas and 
hence, they are in a better position to formulate plans that consider local conditions (see 
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7.3). Literature review shows that the city governments of Jakarta and Rio de Janeiro 
had plans for KIP and PFB, respectively that helped them (see 3.5.1). Programme plans 
helped the city governments [management units] to divide the programmes into 
manageable phases that focused on specific programme objectives (AKAA, 1980; IDB, 
2011). Proper programme planning also enabled them to continuously monitor and 
evaluate the programmes, and plan improvements for the next phases.  
The lack of comprehensive plans for squatter upgrading also suggests that the local 
councils have not yet defined the exact nature, aspirations and expectations of the 
programmes. Therefore, it becomes difficult for them to involve other stakeholders in 
the upgrading process. Nonetheless, there is still a need for the councils to prepare 
comprehensive plans for squatter upgrading to help them design successful 
programmes. A national plan for squatter upgrading is also necessary to address the 
issue of funding. The discussion in the next subsection makes it apparent that the 
councils do not have fiscal capacity to fund squatter upgrading. Therefore, central 
government has to fund squatter upgrading.  
9.3.2 Funding for Squatter Upgrading 
Another important finding was that there was no funding for squatter upgrading. 
Despite announcing squatter upgrading in 2006, central government seems not be 
making the effort to fund squatter upgrading (see 7.4). Moreover, the general budgetary 
allocations to housing and community services that could be a source of funding have 
decreased tremendously since 2007 (see 6.4.4). The reason for government’s failure to 
fund squatter upgrading through the national budgets is that it believes the grants it 
gives local councils are sufficient for service delivery including squatter upgrading (see 
7.4). However, this research has established that government funding to the local 
councils is inadequate and inconsistent (see 7.5.3). Therefore, this contradicts the claim 
that government gives local councils enough money. Information from the Ministry of 
Finance would have helped the research understand the financial contradictions but as 
mentioned earlier, I could not secure an interview with the ministry (see 4.6).  
By inference, perhaps central government expects local councils to fund squatter 
upgrading from local sources. This is also an unrealistic expectation because having 
chronicled all the revenue sources that central government has appropriated from local 
councils, the councils’ current revenue sources cannot fund squatter upgrading. It is a 
fact and hence, they are unable to meet many of their administrative and statutory 
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obligations (see 7.5.1). There is irrefutable evidence that revenue bases of local councils 
have diminished making it fiscally difficult for them to fund squatter upgrading from 
own sources (see 9.2.4). Therefore, they need national support and to be able to receive 
it regularly, government must formulate a funding plan for squatter upgrading (see 
9.3.1). Besides, literature shows that the central government and the World Bank funded 
the LSUP, and not Lusaka City Council (see 6.6.2). Moreover, although respective city 
governments of Jakarta and Rio de Janeiro partly funded KIP and PFB, respectively, 
they had national support and external funding (loans) (see 3.5.3). Financial support 
from the national governments came through national budgets and hence, programmes 
had assurance of funding on a yearly basis (IDB, 2011; World Bank, 1995).  
The failure by central government to fund squatter upgrading contradicts not only its 
intention to improve living conditions of squatters but also its pledge to encourage 
investment in housing. As a way of creating an enabling environment, government 
pledged to allocate annually at least fifteen percent of the national budget to housing to 
promote investment in housing. Yet, budgetary allocations to housing have been less 
than half of government’s pledge (see 5.4.1). Clearly, the Zambian situation signifies a 
lack of political commitment to squatter upgrading and presents a profound contrast to 
that in Indonesia and Brazil where national governments continually provided financial 
support to KIP and PFB, respectively.  
9.3.3 Stakeholder Involvement 
This research established that the future of local government lay in embracing local 
governance – involving other stakeholders in governance (see 5.6). Overwhelming 
evidence shows that the local councils are fiscally challenged and hence, unable to 
provide public services. They have also indicated that they cannot fund squatter 
upgrading from local revenue without the support of government (see 9.3.2). The 
research has also established that central government has not funded and seemingly 
does not intend to fund squatter upgrading because it already gives them grants for 
service delivery (see 9.3.2). Yet, the local councils have not involved other stakeholders 
such as NGOs, and the private sector in the squatter upgrading process (see 9.2.4). 
Evidence from literature suggests that the success of KIP and PFB was because partly 
because of their ability to involve a range of stakeholders who performed specific roles 
within the programmes (see 3.5.4). LSUP also involved other stakeholders who were 
mostly from other government ministries (see 6.6.4). Nevertheless, despite the local 
councils not approaching them to take part in the upgrading process, most of the NGOs 
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interviewed for the research indicated they were willing to collaborate with them. None 
of the NGOs was involved in human settlement but they could still provide other 
supportive services since they were already providing various social services in squatter 
settlements (see 7.6). In KIP and PFB, NGOs were mainly involved in socio-economic 
issues such as skills training and income-generating activities (see 3.5.4). LSUP also 
had an NGO called American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) that government 
engaged to organise the squatter communities for community participation (see 6.6.4). It 
appears though that the scope for AFSC did not go beyond community organisation.  
Seemingly, there is not much scope for participation of financial institutions within the 
squatter upgrading framework. Nonetheless, the scope for private sector participation 
could be expanded if the local councils adopted the Lusaka model of squatter upgrading 
(see 7.6). The possible explanation for lack of stakeholder involvement in squatter 
upgrading is the absence of plans and funding for squatter upgrading. It would be 
unreasonable for the local councils to involve other stakeholders until there was 
reasonable assurance of financial resources to proceed with squatter upgrading.  
9.3.4 Community Participation 
Community participation in community-based programmes is a key ingredient for 
success (see 2.4). Besides, squatter upgrading takes place in identifiable communities 
where it might involve displacing some residents and disrupting their livelihoods (see 
2.2.3). Therefore, it must involve the participation of the community in one way or 
another. Evidence shows that in programmes where communities were involved in later 
stages of the process it was challenging to encourage participation in maintenance 
activities (see 3.5.5). LSUP also experienced poor community participation in 
maintenance activities because it had sidelined the communities in the planning and 
implementation stages. Hence, the communities did not feel a sense of ownership 
towards the programmes to be involved in maintenance of infrastructure. One of the 
benefits of community participation in projects or programmes is to make communities 
have a sense of ownership and responsibility towards the projects or programme (see 
2.4). Therefore, community participation in squatter upgrading must start early in the 
programme to secure its future. Besides, the programme needs acceptance and support 
from the community without which it would fail.  
Yet, the results show that community participation in squatter upgrading was lacking. 
Besides, instead of technical personnel engaging communities to explain squatter 
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upgrading to squatter communities, the local councils have entrusted ward councillors 
to carry out this important responsibility (see 8.2). Ward councillor are policy makers 
who do not have the expertise in squatter upgrading. Moreover, they are politicians who 
serve own interests and those of their sponsoring parties (see 5.5.2). This research 
established that the politics in local government are party-based or partisan politics 
where politicians are accountable to the sponsoring party and not the electorate (Copus, 
2004). Councillors act in ways that promote their party agenda and not in the interest of 
the populace (Resnick, 2010; 2014; Rakodi, 2003). Therefore, the councillors are more 
likely to have represented themselves to the communities than the local councils – the 
chances that they intentionally misinformed the communities on the true nature of the 
upgrading programmes are quite high (see 2.3.3). On the other hand, councillors could 
have accidentally misinformed communities on squatter upgrading because they 
themselves did not understand it. None of the local councils has a comprehensive plan 
for upgrading. Besides, they have not defined the upgrading programmes to outline the 
objectives and interventions (see 7.3). Another important point is that few squatter 
residents indicated attending meetings that the councillors held in the settlements. Most 
residents claimed that they were unaware of such meetings (see 8.2). On the other hand, 
squatter residents overwhelmingly indicated their willingness to participate in upgrading 
activities (see 9.2.5). There are two possibilities arising from this scenario. The first one 
is that the squatter communities were excited at the prospect of development of their 
areas since they had waited for too long for development (see 7.7.3). Secondly, they had 
unrealistic expectations from squatter upgrading. For instance, some of the squatter 
residents interviewed in Mchini, expected government to build houses for them (see 
6.3.4). Therefore, if community acceptance of the upgrading is based unrealistic 
expectations arising from probable misinformation, there was a chance of resistance to 
the programmes when the squatter residents become aware of the true nature and 
implications of the programmes.  
An explanation for the lack of squatter community involvement in the upgrading 
process could be attributed to the absence of Ward Development Committees (WDCs) 
which are supposed to provide a link between communities and the local councils (see 
5.5.3). Clearly, the absence of WDCs has affected the squatter communities by denying 
them effective representation in the squatter upgrading process. Therefore, the local 
councils might have to involve the services of informal structures led by ‘chairpersons’ 
to organise communities in the settlements (see 8.3). Evidence shows that chairpersons 
command considerable authority in squatter settlements and hence, they have the ability 
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to ‘sell’ development ideas including squatter upgrading to the residents. However, 
chairpersons could also be self-serving and in their attempt for self-preservation, they 
could lead resistance against squatter upgrading. Therefore, WDCs would be of more 
help to the local councils in explaining the programmes to the squatter communities 
than the councillors and chairpersons. Government suspended WDCs in 2011, and there 
are no indications that government would lift the suspension any time soon (see 4.6). 
Being aware of this important fact, the local councils have failed to act proactively by 
not letting technical staff engage squatter communities to explain squatter upgrading.  
9.3.5 Support to Squatter Communities 
The research established that many squatter residents were unemployed. The few who 
said were employed fell in the category of lowly paid workers who earned less than 
K3000, a government threshold for income tax (see 8.4). Some residents engaged in 
activities including petty trading and subsistence farming to support their families. 
Nonetheless, these activities did not provide sustainable incomes beyond supporting 
daily consumption. Moreover, residents lacked access to necessities of life such as water 
and sanitation, and health care. Although not conclusive, these conditions describe 
poverty in the communities. This observation is consistent with evidence from literature 
that many people who live in squatter settlements are poor (see Chapter 2) (Arimah, 
2010a). Therefore, it means that many of the squatter residents would not be able to 
invest in housing improvements because they lack financial resources. Furthermore, 
without steady incomes squatter residents would not access formal credit from financial 
institutions. Commercial banks and Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) require loan 
applicants to be in employment or running a registered business that brings in a regular 
monthly income. They also need collateral in the form of land titles or occupancy 
licences (see 6.3.3). Although all the stated requirements are standard requirements, 
they nonetheless seem quite stringent especially for low-income households such as 
those in the case study settlements most of whom were unemployed, without regular 
incomes and without occupancy licences for their properties. Because of these 
requirements, many squatter residents would be ineligible to access formal credit for 
housing improvements from banks and MFIs.  
Some analysts have pointed noted that in Zambia most people preferred MFIs to 
commercial banks because of their ease of access and flexible collateral requirements 
(Chiumya, 2004). However, it appears that the trend has changed since the early 1990s. 
Evidence from some MFI suggests that their lending requirements are almost as 
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stringent as the banks’ (see 6.3.3). For instance, to access a house improvement loan, an 
MFI required that an applicant be in full employment with a regular monthly income, 
and produce collateral in form of land title or occupancy licence. A possible explanation 
for the transformation in requirements could be that in the 1990s the MFI sub-sector 
was still in its infancy. Now, it has established its reputation as being inclusive of all 
economic classes and hence, has become competitive within and outside of the sector.  
Nevertheless, the implication here is that without employment squatter residents would 
not have access to credit from financial institutions to invest in housing improvement 
unless the upgrading programmes included a component for community support such as 
microcredit lending. Both KIP and PFB recognised the importance of poverty 
alleviation among residents in upgraded settlements. Hence, they included socio-
economic components in the programmes, which addressed the social and economic 
issues affecting squatter residents. As such, the programmes provided for loans that 
property owners accessed to improve housing or invest in business ventures (see 3.5.6). 
LSUP also had a building materials loan component but it did not perform well because 
of poor cost-recovery (see 6.6.5). Nonetheless, it provides a basis for improving upon 
future schemes.  
9.3.6 Enabling Environment 
The general observation is that the environment in which squatter upgrading needs to 
take place was unfavourable. This research assessed the enabling environment using 
three aspects: regulatory frameworks, central-local relations, and political environment.  
Regulatory Frameworks 
The main legal texts, the Local Government (LG), and Housing Acts necessary for the 
implementation of squatter upgrading, are generally weak (see 7.7.1). Contrary to the 
local councils’ perception that the LG Act was adequate, it exhibits several weaknesses 
that render it vulnerable to manipulation and inadequate to councils themselves. 
Evidence reveals that the LG Act neither expressly defines the purpose and objectives 
of local councils nor sets minimum standards for measuring performance in local 
councils. Without standards, it is hard to measure performance of local councils. 
Moreover, the LG Act does not define the system of allocating grants to local councils 
(see 7.5.3). The implication for this is that government tends to underfund local councils 
resulting in their failing to provide quality services let alone fund squatter upgrading 
programmes. Furthermore, the LG Act does not provide for the involvement of other 
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stakeholders in local governance. This probably explains why the Minister has to 
approve any collaboration in which a local council gets involved (see 7.6). Hence, this 
limits the extent to which local councils could involve other stakeholders in squatter 
upgrading. The LG Act also places too much power in the Minister over democratically 
elected councils to approve almost all council decisions (see 7.7.1). This situation 
exposes local councils to too much political control and interference. Although the LG 
Act also gives power and authority to local councils for decision-making and 
administration of the functions delegated to them by government, they are subject to 
ministerial control (see 5.5.2). Hence, these weaknesses render the LG Act inadequate 
to support squatter upgrading.  
Regarding the Housing Act, the general agreement from the local councils was that it 
was sufficient to implement squatter upgrading. However, further examination of the 
Housing Act revealed four things that make it unfavourable to squatter upgrading. 
Firstly, by setting restrictive criteria for legalising squatter settlements, the Act was 
suppressive towards squatter upgrading (see 6.3.3). Secondly, the housing Act fails to 
provide incentives beyond legalisation to encourage housing investment in squatter 
settlements. For instance, by having an undefined duration for an occupancy licence, the 
Act does not give occupants confidence in the tenure security it offers to invest in 
housing improvement. The Housing Act states that occupancy licence shall be for a 
period of up to thirty years. However, a local council, which has the head lease to the 
land, would determine the duration of the occupancy licence. Besides, the Act also 
empowers local councils to revoke the occupancy licence after giving the occupant not 
less than three months’ notice if the licensee breached the covenant or failed to pay 
prescribed fees. This further threatens occupants’ tenure security. Thirdly, the Housing 
Act does not encourage integration of improvement areas into the city proper. Through 
legalisation, it only elevates the status of squatter settlements from illegal to 
improvement areas. If squatter upgrading aims to integrate improvement areas into the 
city proper, then declaring squatter settlements as improvement areas still distinctly 
separates them from the city proper. Integration into the city proper can only occur 
when one law applies to improvement areas and formal residential areas so that they 
enjoy the same tenure conditions. This would also ensure that improvement areas shed 
off the stigma of ‘squatterness’. Lastly, the Housing Act gives the Minister exclusive 
powers and final authority over the outcomes of the legalisation process. This is 
particularly improper because if the Minister and a particular local council do not get 
along, such relationships may jeopardise progress (see 5.5.2). Hence, there is need for 
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MLGH to relinquish the responsibility for approving squatter settlement legalisation to 
local councils to speed up the legalisation processes.  
Central-Local Relations 
Careful examination of central-local relations revealed several important issues that 
suggest they were strained (Mukwena, 2002; Chikulo, 2014). To begin with, there 
seems to be a widening imbalance of power between MLGH and local councils. The LG 
Act created local councils as autonomous corporate bodies for prescribed purposes of 
delivering public services and promoting local democracy (GRZ, 1991). However, the 
MLGH seems to be usurping powers from local councils through various acts including 
implementing policies without consulting or notifying local councils who bear the cost 
of those policies. Moreover, without legal backing, the MLGH had devised a formula 
that it applies when sharing salary grants among local councils.  
The second issue concerns failure of MLGH to perform its supervisory role adequately. 
For instance, it has failed to interpret the VISION 2030 and the role of local government 
(see 7.3). Local government has an important role to play in the attainment of the vision 
through provision of municipal services in squatter settlements to improve the living 
conditions of people. Yet, MLGH has neglected to advise local councils to prepare 
plans for squatter upgrading through which they would provide municipal services to 
the people in squatter settlements and enable them to participate in and contribute to the 
achievement of the vision. Moreover, MLGH has compromised its supervisory role by 
blatantly exhibiting bias towards some types of councils. There is a misconception 
municipal and city councils make more money from local revenue and hence, do not 
need national support as much as the district councils do. To demonstrate its power over 
councils, MLGH applies a sharing formula called herein the 50-75-100 ratio that has no 
legal backing to distribute salary grants to local councils (see7.7.2). This formula clearly 
favours district councils that receive 100 percent funding for salaries while municipal 
and city councils get 75 and 50 percent, respectively. Nonetheless, evidence gathered 
from the local councils revealed that their local revenues were insufficient to support the 
demand for services in their cities. The research also discovered that by August 2014, 
the national support for salaries to municipal and city councils had stopped (see 7.5). 
The use of an illegal formula to distribute grants to local councils is improper because in 
an environment marred with political patronage, national support to local councils 
serves as a means to punish or reward councils who seem to oppose or support 
government, respectively (see 5.5.3). Additionally, through the Local Government 
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Service Commission (LGSC), MLGH imposes employees on local councils who then 
bear the cost for them (see 7.5.3).  
Thirdly, interactions between MLGH and local councils seem to be completely lacking 
to the extent that MLGH depends on the Local Government Association of Zambia 
(LGAZ) organised forums to meet local councils. Outside of the LGAZ forums, MLGH 
does not seem to have settings where it meets local councils to discuss issues affecting 
local government. When there are pressing issues affecting local councils, the LGAZ 
intervenes on their behalf. Yet, as the research has discovered the LGAZ is a voluntary 
association without constitutional authority and therefore, outside the ‘sphere of 
influence’ to affect government decisions regarding local government. This perhaps 
explains why central government often ignores counsel from the LGAZ (see 5.5.3). The 
literature review did not reveal anything related to constrained relations between city 
and national governments with regard to implementation and management of KIP and 
PFB, respectively. Although KIP experienced some coordination problems since it was 
administered in a piecemeal fashion in the first phase, Juliman (2006) and Devas (1981) 
explain that these were resolved by creating an independent technical unit to manage the 
programme (see 3.5.1). Interactions between local councils and MLGH are central to 
the squatter upgrading programme because these are the key actors. Whereas the local 
councils’ main role is implementation, MLGH’s role would be to facilitate the 
implementation of the upgrading programme by ensuring that the councils’ upgrading 
plans are consistent with the overall national plan, that funding for upgrading 
programmes is made available, and that an enabling environment in terms of effective 
laws and favourable political environment exists. However, its failure to interact 
directly with local councils has rendered its leadership and oversight role of local 
government ineffective.  
Political Environment 
The research has established that the political environment is not sufficient to 
implement squatter upgrading. This research defined the political environment in terms 
of government influence on local councils’ operations, level of political will, and 
clientelistic relations. Evidence gathered shows that whenever there was a change of 
government, there were also new policy changes that affected local councils especially 
fiscally (see 7.7.2). For instance, with each new government administration local 
councils suffered several acts such as banning some of their levies, introduction of 
unpaid mandates, and even appropriation of some major sources of revenue (see 
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Appendix Q). These acts among many others have weakened local councils fiscally and 
hence, reduced their capacity to provide quality services and meet staff-related costs on 
a monthly basis (see 7.5). Evidence shows that the PFB survived five political 
administrations (see 3.3). The changes in political administrations at national and city 
government levels did not affect the programme - it maintained its focus until its 
completion (Magalhães & Di Villarosa, 2012). The trend exhibited in the Zambian local 
government system indicates that if the local councils implemented squatter upgrading 
programmes under one political administration, such programmes would suffer when 
another administration takes over. Evidence from the research supports this position 
because the current government of the Patriotic Front (PF) revised some national 
policies to align them to its party’s manifesto (see Chapter 7). This is the more reason 
local councils must have the responsibility of approving legalisation of squatter 
settlements so that they plan implementation of upgrading programmes to fall within the 
political calendar – five-year term.  
Regarding political will to upgrade squatter settlements, evidence shows that it is 
lacking especially at the national level. The intention to implement squatter upgrading 
as a means of improving the living conditions of squatter residents and enabling citizens 
to participate in the VISION 2030 was a positive mark (see Chapter 1). However, it 
seems government has failed to match words with actions. For instance, since 2006 
government has not formulated a national plan for squatter upgrading. Furthermore, it 
has failed to inform local councils to formulate own plans for squatter upgrading (see 
7.3). Moreover, government has not made any funding provisions for the programme 
(see 7.4). Additionally, government funding to local councils has been insufficient for 
them to provide public services (see 7.5.3). On the other hand, political interference has 
increased in local councils’ operations and management. Evidence from interviews 
showed that there was considerable political interference in local councils to the extent 
that one council reported that it was unable to implement a development project because 
of interference from the centre (see 7.7.3). The probable explanation for political 
interference from the centre is because of the weakness identified in the LG Act that 
gives the Minister for local government too much power over democratically elected 
councils (see 7.7.1). Hence, local councils cannot question government actions because 
they are afraid as an ‘endangered species’ (see 7.7.3).  
The results also show that central government exhibits clientelistic relations towards 
local councils. Clientelism seems to have dominated local government in Zambia since 
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the independence era (see 5.3). Government exhibits preferential treatment of local 
councils that seem to be supportive than those it considers unsupportive. Government 
often exhibits this clientelistic treatment in the way it distributes grants to local 
councils. Some favoured local councils seem to benefit from grants that they would 
normally not be entitled to (see 7.7.3). Because of government’s clientelistic treatment 
of local councils, many of them seem to have aligned themselves with ruling political 
parties to survive (see 7.7.3). Moreover, central government has a ‘soft’ spot for 
councils where it has the majority control than for local councils under the control of 
opposition political parties (see 7.7.3). Therefore, the finding from this research seems 
to confirm evidence from literature review that the type of politics applied to 
development determines the development outcomes (Smith, 2003). The probable 
explanation for clientelism in distributing grants to councils is the absence of an 
equitable grants sharing formula (see 7.5.3). As such, giving grants to local councils 
appears as government’s discretionary act as opposed to it being mandatory.  
9.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR SQUATTER UPGRADING POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 
This research set out to examine the adequacy of the existing institutional framework to 
initiate and support squatter upgrading in Zambia. Therefore, this section endeavours to 
respond to this concern. In Chapter 1, I described an adequate institutional framework 
for squatter upgrading as one that contained several elements/ constituents that would 
guide the successful implementation and delivery of a squatter upgrading programme. 
These included clear programme definition, stable sources of funding, independent 
programme management, stakeholder involvement, community participation, and 
community support. Additionally, there must be an enabling environment in which 
squatter upgrading can take place and succeed.  
9.4.1 Programme Definition 
One of the requirements for successful squatter upgrading which also forms part of the 
constituents of an adequate institutional framework is having a clearly defined 
programme with clear objectives and expected outputs. Evidence shows that LSUP was 
a well-defined project whose main aim was provision of infrastructure at basic 
standards, community services, building materials loans, and land tenure (see 6.6.1). 
However, LSUP was structured as a project to be implemented within a specific 
duration. As such, it seems that there were too many interventions compressed into a 
limited timeframe. Therefore, future squatter upgrading must be planned as long-term 
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endeavours to allow for monitoring and evaluation of performance and outcomes.  
9.4.2 Sources of Funding 
A stable source of funding is the key to financial sustainability for squatter upgrading. 
The LSUP had defined sources of funding which were the World Bank and central 
government (see 6.6.2). World Bank funding towards the project amounted to 48.5 
percent of the estimated total cost of US$41.2 million while 51.5 percent came from the 
government (with some donations). Despite these assured sources of funding, LSUP 
faced financial constraints for two main reasons. Firstly, government diverted most of 
the funding for squatter upgrading to conventional housing for higher income groups 
(see 6.6.2). The act of diverting funds to other concerns indicates lack of political 
commitment to squatter upgrading (see 6.5.3). Secondly, the project failed to recover 
costs on building material loans from many of the beneficiaries. The ‘unconcerned’ 
attitude from the office of the Prime Minister that micromanaged LSUP, affected the 
cost-recovery on building materials loans. As such, LSUP became financially 
unsustainable and failed to continue when World Bank funding ceased. Central 
government’s failure to design proper cost-recovery mechanisms signifies lack of 
political commitment to and concern for the sustainability of LSUP.  
9.4.3 Management of LSUP 
The LSUP had a dedicated technical unit called the Housing Project Unit (HPU) that 
had the responsibility to design, supervise and manage the programme. Housed within 
the Lusaka City Council, the HPU comprised several sections to handle various 
functions including engineering, social services, and finance and procurement (see 
6.6.3). HPU staff comprised professional staff supported by two cadres of field staff - 
community development officer and construction advisers. The HPU was responsible 
for the whole project – the technical unit designed social infrastructure, selected squatter 
settlements for upgrading, and set standards for home improvements. Briefly, the HPU 
had a structure suitable for operating within a decentralised environment. However, 
despite having a technical unit that should have operated independently, LSUP 
experienced too much political interference. Although the Lusaka City Council hosted 
the HPU, it lost control of the technical unit to central government that seemed to have 
the ultimate control and responsibility for the project. Consequently, there was neither 
institutional capacity building nor direct skills transfer to the council. Moreover, 
because of party politics which central government applied in the running of the project, 
LSUP faced difficulties with allocating plots to deserving beneficiaries who needed 
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relocating to site-and-services areas. Furthermore, because of political interference 
coupled with absence of recovery mechanisms, LSUP suffered poor cost-recovery on 
building material loans. Lastly, although LSUP symbolised government’s deliberate 
effort to ‘scale down’ housing standards, the standards imposed on low-cost housing 
were still high. It had no provision for use of traditional local materials and building 
technologies and as such, households could only use conventional building materials 
that were of high standards and costly. This caused the cost of building to rise and 
become unaffordable to most low-income households 
9.4.4 Stakeholder Participation 
The responsibility of service provision rests with local governments in many parts of the 
world. It is increasingly challenging for local governments to meet the demand for 
public services from own sources (see 2.5). For this reason, many have turned to local 
governance where they involve stakeholders in managing the development of cities in a 
variety of ways including partnering, contracting or participation. LSUP recognised the 
importance of involving stakeholders and communities in the project. However, 
stakeholder and community involvement was quite limited. Apart from government 
ministries and donors, there were no stakeholders outside of government. Although, 
government engaged an NGO at some point in the project, it appears its scope was 
limited to promoting community participation in maintenance activities.  
9.4.5 Community Participation 
Evidence suggests that LSUP had challenges of community participation in 
maintenance activities because communities felt sidelined from the project as they were 
not involved during the initial stages. There is a possibility that if the NGO had been 
involved early in the project, communities too would have been involved early and a 
sense of ownership of the project would have been higher than it was at the maintenance 
stage. Besides, LSUP used a political party structure to represent communities in the 
project. As already observed, LSUP was rife with political patronage. Therefore, it was 
likely that community participation depended on whether one was a supporter of UNIP 
or not.  
9.4.6 Community Support 
Squatter upgrading provides an opportunity for poverty alleviation among the urban 
poor. Therefore, it is logical to include a socio-economic development component in the 
design of the programme. Evidently, LSUP also had a socio-economic component built 
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into the project where it handled tenure regularisation and provision of building material 
loans to beneficiaries to enable them improve their houses. It did not make provisions 
for skills straining and entrepreneurial development. However, despite providing relief 
to poor households building material loans did not offer much in terms of support 
beyond the project. In other words, this kind of loan only serviced infrastructure 
development. Communities required support to develop new sustainable livelihoods so 
that they could continue improving their houses beyond the project.  
9.4.7 Enabling Environment 
In the context of this research, an enabling environment connotes the presence of 
effective laws, supportive central-local relations, and strong political will. Firstly, the 
legal texts that the councils apply to support their role of service delivery were generally 
inadequate to support squatter upgrading. Secondly, central-local relations were strained 
to the extent that even interactions between local councils and their parent ministry 
hardly took place. Thirdly, there was a lack of political will from central government 
towards squatter upgrading. For instance, despite announcing the squatter upgrading 
programme central government failed to formulate a national plan for squatter 
upgrading. Likewise, central government failed to fund squatter upgrading even when it 
was aware that local councils did not have the fiscal capacity to fund squatter upgrading 
from own sources. Lastly, government demonstrates its lack of political when it fails to 
fund local councils adequately for service delivery from which it expects councils to 
fund squatter upgrading.  
9.5 MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
From the foregoing, the research draws two main important conclusions. Firstly, 
following the definition of an adequate institutional framework (see 1.4), it is clear that 
the LSUP contains the structure for an adequate institutional framework for squatter 
upgrading. Its upgrading framework embodies all the constituents of an adequate 
institutional framework. Therefore, the LSUP upgrading framework provides an 
important foundation on which the local councils could base their squatter upgrading 
frameworks. It appears that the weaknesses of LSUP that several evaluation reports 
highlighted did not emanate from a lack of an effective framework (see 1.3). Instead, 
they occurred because of failure to follow the upgrading framework. For instance, by 
allowing central government to micromanage the project LSUP missed the opportunity 
of independent and unbiased management. Next, the use of the UNIP leadership in 
place of wider community participation probably created the difficulties that LSUP 
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faced in getting communities to participate in maintenance activities. Likewise, the bad 
attitude towards loan repayment encouraged by the UNIP leadership affected cost-
recovery, and not necessarily the absence of sanctions for defaulters (see 6.6.2). 
Therefore, the research concludes that the LSUP upgrading framework is adequate for 
initiating squatter upgrading.  
Secondly, an enabling environment in which squatter upgrading could be successfully 
implemented does not exist. The research has shown that the legal texts that the local 
councils would use are repressive while central-local relations are unsupportive. 
Political will on the other hand, is completely lacking on the part of central government 
(see 9.4.7). On this account, the research concludes that the environment is not 
favourable for squatter upgrading.  
9.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 
In view of the research findings, I make the following recommendations to inform 
policy and practice regarding squatter upgrading:  
9.6.1 Formulate a National Squatter Upgrading Plan 
Squatter upgrading has the potential to contribute to improving the living conditions of 
many people in urban areas, and making an even bigger impact on the VISION 2030. 
However, evidence clearly shows that the local councils, who have assumed the 
responsibility for squatter upgrading, do not have the fiscal capacity to fund squatter 
upgrading without assistance from government (see 9.2.4). Therefore, there is a need for 
central government to formulate a national plan that would address funding for squatter 
upgrading. While leaving the details to individual local councils on how they would do 
squatter upgrading, government must also formulate a schedule for funding squatter 
upgrading in districts. This research proposes that at least fifteen percent of the annual 
budget should be set aside as a separate expenditure unit within the national budgets for 
funding squatter upgrading to ensure an assured source of funding for squatter 
upgrading programmes. This provision already exists within the budget but as housing 
and community services. Over the years, allocations to this expenditure unit have 
decreased to less than two percent (see 6.3.1). Therefore, government needs to show 
strong political commitment by ensuring that it allocates sufficient resources to squatter 
upgrading annually.  
9.6.2 Improve Interactions between Local Councils and Ministry 
There is an urgent need to improve interactions between local councils and central 
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government (MLGH). The research revealed a complete breakdown of communication, 
and interactions between MLGH and local councils. The research recommends that the 
MLGH should create forums outside of LGAZ where it would interact and discuss 
important development matters with local councils regularly. The LGAZ remains an 
important institution to local councils. Yet, the fact that it is not a constitutional body it 
cannot represent local councils effectively. The research has revealed that on occasions, 
central government has blatantly ignored important counsel from the LGAZ regarding 
how it treats local councils. Another recommendation made in the spirit of improving 
central-local relations, is for the MLGH to change its secretive approach to 
communicating with local councils. Instead, it should adopt more accountable and 
transparent approaches such as circular letters or statutory instruments. This would 
ensure that all councils have access to the same information and reduce the culture of 
speculation and suspicion among them. Likewise, the MLGH must adopt an open and 
transparent grants sharing formula to reduce political patronage of local councils that 
this research has revealed government exhibits through transfers to local councils. 
Moreover, central government must make public funding disbursements to local 
councils to avoid speculation among local councils as to which council receives more 
money than others do. Publicising transfers to local councils would also make them 
accountable to the public. Equally important is the fact that the MLGH should allow 
local councils to operate likes autonomous entities they were created to be.  
9.6.3 Amendment of the Legal Texts 
The research has revealed that the main texts that the local councils expect to apply in 
squatter upgrading have several weaknesses that make them unfavourable to squatter 
upgrading. Therefore, the research recommends that the government should amend the 
Local Government (LG), and the Housing Acts to make them effective and supportive 
of local councils and squatter upgrading, respectively. Concerning the LG Act, the 
research recommends firstly, amending the LG Act to give more powers to the councils 
to make and approve decisions regarding the running of local councils. Currently, the 
LG Act vests too much power in the Minister for local government, which neutralises 
the power and authority it gives democratically elected councils. Moreover, reducing 
the powers of the Minister would help address the issue of political interference into the 
operations of local councils from the centre. Secondly, the LG Act should be amended 
to provide for an equitable grants sharing formula. Without a legally accepted formula, 
the current system of allocating grants to councils is unequitable because local councils 
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are not funded proportionate to the size of the district or demand for municipal services. 
Besides, funding to councils is inconsistent and inadequate. Thirdly, an amendment to 
the LG Act should provide for stakeholder involved in local governance. This would 
help local councils to choose stakeholders to collaborate with without seeking approval 
from the MLGH, as is the case at present.  
The Housing Act is an important piece of legislation in squatter upgrading. However, in 
its current form it serves as an obstacle to squatter upgrading because like the LG Act, it 
vests too much power in the Minister such as approving legalisation of squatter 
settlements. Therefore, this research recommends an amendment to the Housing Act to 
allow democratically elected councils to set the criteria for selecting and approving 
squatter settlements for legalisation within their jurisdictions. The Housing Act is 
explicit on the process of legalising squatter settlements. However, the process takes too 
long as councils wait for ministerial approval that most often does not happen. Another 
amendment to the Housing Act would have to address the nature and duration of the 
occupancy licence. There is need to firstly convert the licence into a land title deed 
because as a licence, it could be revoked anytime without due regard to the investments 
that one would have made on the land. Secondly, once the licence is converted to a land 
title, its duration must be increased from thirty to ninety-nine years and be subject the 
Town and Country Planning Act, and not the Housing Act. This would not only 
encourage property owners to invest in improvement of housing but it would also 
facilitate for spatial integration of former squatter settlements into the city proper 
without them being subjected to another segregating term of improvement area.  
9.6.4 Re-establish Ward Development Committees 
One of the main discoveries of the research is that lack of community participation in 
the squatter upgrading process in the two local councils is because of the absence of 
Ward Development Committees (WDCs). Therefore, this research recommends that 
government re-establishes WDCs that it suspended in 2011 to afford squatter 
communities effective representation. The suggestion by one of the local councils to use 
the informal structures within the squatter communities to provide a link to the squatters 
has potential for disastrous outcomes such as political patronage. Squatter settlements 
are strongholds of political parties. Therefore, if the local council used the informal 
structures, it would expose the upgrading programme to political control and patronage 
like it happened with LSUP that used the UNIP political structure that not only took 
over control of the project but also stifled community participation.  
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9.7 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
The research was an exploratory investigation into a subject matter on which little 
scholarly work existed in the Zambian context. Therefore, I adopted a qualitative case 
study approach that made it necessary to draw on a wide range of literature and 
qualitative methods of data collection including in-depth interviews, observations, and 
documentary reviews. This research contributes to the body of knowledge by making 
new contributions, and confirming some assertions by other scholars on the issues 
researched within the context of small and medium sized towns in Zambia. Therefore, 
the following are some of the major contributions the research has made.  
Firstly, the research has made an original contribution by tracing the close links 
between governance – in the form of the historical legacy of colonialism, post-colonial 
socialist housing policies and power dynamics between central and local government - 
and the growth of informal housing within Zambia. Further, it has shown that the 
culture of political patronage/ clientelism is a major barrier to future efforts to upgrade 
squatter settlements. While this study was carried out in Zambia, it is likely that similar 
links between governance and the growth of squatter settlements are likely to be found 
in many other Sub-Saharan countries. Similarly, the clear links between the critical 
success factors that relate to governance and the likely effectiveness of efforts to 
improve living conditions in squatter settlements are likely to be borne out in other sub-
Saharan contexts.  
Secondly, the research made another original contribution to knowledge by revealing 
the importance of power dynamics between local and central governments. The research 
has shown how central government wrestles power from local governments through 
fiscal and administrative manipulations using the very piece of legislation that created 
them as autonomous entities.  
Thirdly, this research has expanded the definition of the urban housing situation to 
include the quality, tenure, and spatial location aspects. In Zambia, the urban housing 
situation has tended to be defined in quantitative terms only - number of housing units 
required to house the urban population based on the average household size.  
The final contribution of this research is through confirmation of existing literature 
regarding the importance of tenure security in influencing investment decisions in 
housing improvements. Many analysts have debated which type of tenure security is 
necessary to influence decisions that people make regarding investments in property 
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(see 2.2.3). UN-Habitat (2008a) concluded that whatever form tenure security takes 
squatter landowners require it to have confidence to invest in home improvements. This 
research has shown that as long as squatters gained the assurance of being ‘safe’ from 
eviction, they made decisions to improve their houses.  
9.8 SUGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Although this research recommends for government to fund squatter upgrading, it did 
not undertake to estimate the cost of upgrading a squatter settlement. Therefore, there is 
need for further research that would concentrate on quantifying the cost of upgrading a 
squatter settlement. Although the cost of upgrading would vary from one settlement to 
another, and from district to district, such an indicative cost would help government 
make sufficient provisions for squatter upgrading.  
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Appendix G: List of Participants from Case Study Squatter Settlements 
 
  
Chipata Residents Kitwe Residents
SN Participant Gender Location
Duration of 
Interviews 
(minutes) SN Participant Gender Location
Duration of 
Interviews 
(minutes)
1 MC1 Female Mchini 15 1 IP1 Male Ipusukilo 18
2 MC2 Male Mchini 21 2 IP2 Male Ipusukilo 17
3 MC3 Female Mchini 46 3 IP3 Male Ipusukilo 17
4 MC4 Male Mchini 9 4 IP4 Female Ipusukilo 15
5 MC5 Male Mchini 44 5 IP5 Male Ipusukilo 12
6 MC6 Female Mchini 30 6 IP6 Male Ipusukilo 34
7 MC7 Female Mchini 14 7 IP7 Male Ipusukilo 29
8 MC8 Female Mchini 14 8 IP8 Male Ipusukilo 19
9 MC9 Female Mchini 13 9 IP9 Female Ipusukilo 19
10 MC10 Female Mchini 20 10 IP10 Male Ipusukilo 14
11 MC11 Female Mchini 15 11 IP11 Male Ipusukilo 22
12 MC12 Female Mchini 18 12 IP12 Male Ipusukilo 29
13 MC13 Female Mchini 19 13 IP13 Male Ipusukilo 13
14 MC14 Female Mchini 18 14 IP14 Male Ipusukilo 24
15 MC15 Female Mchini 8 15 IP15 Male Ipusukilo 24
16 MC16 Female Mchini 16 16 IP16 Male Ipusukilo 27
17 MC17 Female Mchini 9 17 IP17 Female Ipusukilo 20
18 MC18 Female Mchini 9 18 IP18 Male Ipusukilo 14
19 MC19 Male Mchini 9 19 IP19 Male Ipusukilo 15
20 MC20 Female Mchini 10 20 IP20 Male Ipusukilo 23
21 MG1 Female Magazine 17 21 MS1 Female Musonda 11
22 MG2 Female Magazine 15 22 MS2 Female Musonda 17
23 MG3 Female Magazine 15 23 MS3 Female Musonda 14
24 MG4 Female Magazine 9 24 MS4 Male Musonda 14
25 MG5 Female Magazine 9 25 MS5 Male Musonda 14
26 MG6 Female Magazine 9 26 MS6 Male Musonda 15
27 MG7 Female Magazine 20 27 MS7 Female Musonda 16
28 MG8 Female Magazine 19 28 MS8 Female Musonda 13
29 MG9 Female Magazine 11 29 MS9 Female Musonda 13
30 MG10 Female Magazine 15 30 MS10 Female Musonda 15
31 MG11 Female Magazine 16 31 MS11 Female Musonda 8
32 MG12 Female Magazine 20 32 MS12 Male Musonda 13
33 MG13 Female Magazine 21 33 MS13 Female Musonda 8
34 MG14 Male Magazine 14 34 MS14 Female Musonda 9
35 MG15 Male Magazine 25 35 MS15 Male Musonda 20
36 MG16 Male Magazine 19 36 MS16 Female Musonda 18
37 MG17 Male Magazine 19 37 MS17 Female Musonda 20
38 MG18 Female Magazine 9 38 MS18 Female Musonda 13
39 MG19 Female Magazine 18 39 MS19 Male Musonda 13
40 MG20 Female Magazine 17 40 MS20 Female Musonda 16
674 685TOTAL TOTAL
329 
Appendix H: Participants from Organisations 
 
  
Participant 
Organisation
Years of 
Operation
Position of Respondent
Type of 
Organisation
Coverage Target Groups
Duration of 
Interview
CETZAM 20 CEO MFI Some districts Anyone in business 10
EFC 6 Credit Manager MFI Urban areas Anyone in business 14
FINCA 13 Recovery Manager MFI Some districts Anyone in business 21
MFC 4 Credit Administration Officer MFI Some districts Anyone in business 12
VF 11 Manager MFI Some districts Rural communities 20
BBZ 100 Senior Officer Bank Urban areas Formal sector 10
FNB 5 Branch Manager Bank Some districts Formal sector 37
IBZ 18 Senior Officer Bank Urban areas Formal sector 8
SCZ 108 Senior Officer Bank Some districts Formal sector 10
ZNBS 44 Finance Manager Bank Country-wide Formal sector 21
BCP 5 CEO NGO Copperbelt Province Urban and peri-urban areas 32
CARE 20 Senior Manager NGO Country-wide All people in need 30
CZ 44 Manager NGO Country-wide All citizens 25
CHAZ 45 Office Manager NGO Country-wide All people in need 12
CIPLRN 3 CEO NGO Copperbelt Province Rural communities 43
CODEP 4 CEO NGO Eastern Province Rural communities 15
COH 5 Field Officer NGO Country-wide All people in need 11
JCTR 15 Branch Manager NGO Country-wide All citizens 28
WV 20 Senior Officer NGO Country-wide Rural communities 13
MLGH Over 50 Senior Officer Central Government Country-wide All citizens 43
CMC Over 50 Senior Officer Local Council Chipata All citizens 120
KCC Over 50 Senior Officer Local Council Kitwe All citizens 127
662TOTAL
330 
Appendix I: Interview Guide for Local Authorities (Town Clerks) 
 
1. Thanks for meeting me 
2. TOPIC: Squatter Settlements Upgrading In Zambia: Adequacy of the Institutional Framework 
3. Aim of the research 
The aim of my research is to examine the adequacy of the institutional framework to initiate and support 
squatter upgrading in Zambia 
4. Style of the interview 
The style of the interview is such that it is a face-to-face, in-depth interview, where a number of topics 
pertaining to my research will be discussed. I will ask you (the interviewee) relevant questions on topics for 
which I seek explanations or comments. 
5. Ethics  
I want to assure you that in this interview research professional ethics are of utmost importance. I wish to state 
that before we start the interview I would go through the Consent form which I prepared and which you will sign 
if you agree to the interview with me. However, I would like to mention here that should you at any point during 
the interview feel that you want to stop, please let me know. I also assure you that whatever statements you 
make that you feel may jeopardise your position or career, such statements will be treated confidentially and 
these not being attributable to named individuals in the thesis report. 
 
Administrative/ Legal Capacity 
1. What is your role in the local authority? What do you have responsibility for? How do your responsibilities relate 
to the initiation and upgrading of informal settlements? 
2. In the Sixth National Development Plan, government has indicated its plans to undertake squatter upgrading to 
improve the living conditions of the poor. 
 What are your plans regarding the squatter settlements within your jurisdiction? 
 Have you upgraded any squatter settlement in the last ten years? Which are these settlements? What criteria 
were used to choose then? What was the nature of the upgrading that was carried out? Did this vary between 
settlements? 
 How did you identify which forms of upgrading to carry out? What are the factors, which have informed this 
decision-making process? Have you consulted with the people who were living in those areas, or 
organisations that were working with them? Were any international agencies play a role in deciding the 
settlements to focus on, or are the types of upgrading to be carried out? 
 To what extent were you able to upgrade these areas? Were there any forms of upgrading that were planned 
but for which financial resources were lacking? Do you have any plans to carry further upgrading of any of 
these settlements in the next five years? 
 Do you have any plans for upgrading other squatter settlements? If so, which ones? What are the factors, 
which have informed this decision-making process? What forms of upgrading are you planning? What have 
you done so far to prepare for squatter upgrading? How much work has been done to raise awareness or 
seek views in the communities to be affected? 
3. The local authorities are constitutionally created legal entities and are guided by the Local Government Act of 
1991, which has clearly assigned the 63 functions. 
  Do you think the LG Act has adequately provided for the operations of the councils? 
 Are the local councils really empowered by the Act? Do you think that you have the autonomy/ authority to 
act as the Act stipulates? Do you have the financial resources? 
 What other legal provisions do you use as a council? How do these support your efforts to provide the 
assigned functions? 
 Does the Act provide local councils with options to take central government to task for failing to remit annual 
allocations? 
4. The Housing Act of 1974 stipulates the squatter settlements legalisation process. 
 Has the LA tried to take advantage of the Housing Act to regularise squatter settlements in its jurisdiction? If 
not, why not? If so, what difficulties were encountered? 
 What do you think about the Housing Act itself? Is it adequate to support individual home improvements? In 
addition, is it adequate to support the upgrading of the plots on which the homes are built? Would you say 
that there is any conflict between the Town and Country Planning Act and the Housing Act, in the case of 
squatter settlements? If so, do you believe that the TCPA should be modified? 
5. Limited access to land by low-income households has been cited as one of the reasons for illegal land 
occupation and development of squatter settlements. 
 Does the LA have a deliberate policy to ease land accessibility for people with low- incomes? 
  How accessible is land to low-income households in your district? Can you give recent examples? 
 What measures if any have been put in place to ease up the land acquisition process? 
Financial and Technical Capacity 
1. The LG Act mandates you to raise revenues from local sources (levies, taxation and borrowing).  
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 What is your annual budget? What services, if any, do you provide in squatter settlements? How much 
money do you spend on service delivery annually? What proportion of the budget is it? 
 Would you say that as a LA you are able to fund squatter upgrading from your own budget? If not, how does 
the LA expect to raise the funding for squatter upgrading?  
 Would you need a distinct budget for squatter upgrading? Alternatively, are you likely to work within several 
existing budgets (e.g. roads, drainage, housing, etc.). 
 How is budgeting done? Do you involve stakeholders and who are they? Are they also involved in monitoring 
budget implementation? 
 What proportion of the budget is funded by central government through inter-government transfers IGTs)? 
What services are covered under IGTs? 
2. Since 1991, government has devolved many functions to local authorities. 
 What functions have been devolved to local authorities that relate to squatter upgrading?  
 What resources have been devolved to local authorities for this purpose?  
 To what extent are these resources adequate? How do local authorities prioritise what they do within the 
resources available to them? 
3. It has been suggested that local authorities are among institutions that have experienced a loss or shortage of 
qualified staff in the last two decades. 
 What is the situation like in your organisation? Are there any skills shortages that the local authority faces in 
squatter upgrading?  
 What types of staff would you ideally employ for this? Do you think that you will be able to get such staff?  
4. Local authorities have cited inadequate financial resources as a major constraint in service delivery. 
Comprehensive squatter upgrading requires both financial resources and cooperation with various stakeholders. 
 To what extent has the local authority taken advantage of the provisions within the Public-Private Partnership 
Act to collaborate with other organisations to provide services? Are there any programmes under PPP 
arrangements and what are these programmes? 
 Can PPPs be extended to squatter upgrading? Has the LA considered this avenue for raising funding for 
upgrading processes? If yes, can you explain how the involvement of PPPs has helped? If not, what are the 
constraining factors? 
Political Context 
With each change in national governments, it appears that local government operations also change 
significantly. 
 To what extent do you think local government has been affected by change of governments in the last ten 
years? Would you mention at least two major changes that have happened during his period? How have they 
affected the local authority? 
 Do you experience political interference in your management and operations of the local authority? Would 
you say that there is too much or just-about right political interference? Please elaborate. 
 To what extent does the Local Government Act protect the powers of local authorities against political 
interference? Would you be able to use the Act against political-administrative changes? If not, how would 
express your views against such changes? 
 Do you expect any political resistance to the local authority’s decision to determine the modalities of squatter 
upgrading? If so, what measures would you put in place to ensure that all political stakeholders support the 
local authority’s decision? 
 Do you think that the way national government relates to local councils is too much bound up with politicians 
rewarding their supporters and ‘clients’?  
 Have there been any major political pronouncements or actions that have adversely affected the operations 
of local authorities with regard to squatter upgrading? Can you elaborate on these changes? 
Community Participation 
 To what extent have people living in squatter settlements been involved in decision-making about upgrading? 
 What do you think might encourage residents of squatter settlements to participate in decision-making? 
 What mechanisms would be put in place to ensure that residents living in squatter settlements are the direct 
beneficiaries of the programme? 
Concluding Remarks 
 Are there any comments that you wish to make that are relevant to squatter upgrading? 
  
332 
Appendix J: Interview Guide for Ministry of Local Government and Housing 
 
1. Thanks for meeting me 
2. TOPIC: Squatter Settlements Upgrading In Zambia: Adequacy of the Institutional Framework 
3. Aim of the research 
The aim of my research is to examine the adequacy of the institutional framework to initiate and support 
squatter upgrading in Zambia 
4. Style of the interview 
The style of the interview is such that it is a face-to-face, in-depth interview, where a number of topics 
pertaining to my research will be discussed. I will ask you (the interviewee) relevant questions on topics for 
which I seek explanations or comments 
5. Ethics  
I want to assure you that in this interview research professional ethics are of utmost importance. I wish to state 
that before we start the interview I would go through the Consent form which I prepared and which you will sign 
if you agree to the interview with me. However, I would like to mention here that should you at any point during 
the interview feel that you want to stop, please let me know. I also assure you that whatever statements you 
make that you feel may jeopardise your position or career, such statements will be treated confidentially and 
these not being attributable to named individuals in the thesis report. 
 
Supervision of Local Authorities  
 The Local Government Act has assigned sixty-three functions to local authorities. How do you ensure that all 
these functions are performed? 
 What measures have you put in place to ensure that all these functions are funded for local authorities to 
perform them? 
 How often are local authorities monitored and evaluated to ensure that they are performing? Do you have a 
schedule, which you follow? 
 How long does it take to approve budgets for local authorities? Are there instances when local authorities 
have implemented their budgets without approval? What happens when a local authority does not implement 
the approved budget? 
 What are the factors, which you take into account in deciding the budgets of individual local authorities? Do 
these vary over time? 
Regulatory conflicts 
 The Town and Country Planning Act, Lands Act and the HSIA Act may be said to be in conflict over the issue 
of squatter settlements. Do you agree that there is a potential conflict between these Acts? 
 What measures might be used to reconcile these Statutes, in the case of squatter upgrading? Have you 
attempted to put such measures in place to ensure that these statutes are reconciled and to avoid 
jeopardising the squatter upgrading process? 
Financial and Technical Capacity 
 What can you say about the financial capacity of all local authorities in the countries? Do you think they have 
the capacity to fund and manage squatter upgrading in their respective towns or cities without government 
help? 
 If not, what kind of support would be expected from central government? Would you consider allowing local 
authorities to introduce some special kind of taxation to raise funding for squatter upgrading? 
 Alternatively, is the ministry thinking about organising some public-private partnerships on behalf of local 
authorities?  
 In case, there are no immediate financial sources to fund squatter upgrading, would the ministry be in a 
position to pursue the issue of fiscal decentralisation to local authorities? If that were the case, what factors 
would be considered? 
Subsidiary support 
 What is the role of the National Housing Authority (NHA) in squatter upgrading? 
Concluding Remarks 
 Are there any comments that you wish to make that are relevant to squatter upgrading? 
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Appendix K: Interview Guide for Non-Governmental Organisations 
 
1. Thanks for meeting me 
2. TOPIC: Squatter Settlements Upgrading In Zambia: Adequacy of the Institutional Framework 
3. Aim of the Research 
The aim of my research is to examine the adequacy of the institutional framework to initiate and support 
squatter upgrading in Zambia and the role of civil society within this. 
4. Style of the interview 
The style of the interview is such that it is a face-to-face, in-depth interview, where a number of topics 
pertaining to my research will be discussed. I will ask you (the interviewee) relevant questions on topics for 
which I seek explanations or comments 
5. Ethics  
I want to assure you that in this interview research professional ethics are of utmost importance. I wish to state 
that before we start the interview I would go through the Consent form which I prepared and which you will sign 
if you agree to the interview with me. However, I would like to mention here that should you at any point during 
the interview feel that you want to stop, please let me know. I also assure you that whatever statements you 
make that you feel may jeopardise your position or career, such statements will be treated confidentially and 
these not being attributable to named individuals in the thesis report. 
 
Introduction 
 Can you briefly tell me about your organisation? What is the role of your organisation? 
 Do you provide any kind of services in squatter settlements? What services are these? 
 Have you done any work in relation to squatter upgrading? What kind of work is it? 
Service Provision and Community Involvement 
 What are the services that you currently provide? Are there any services that you would like to provide? What 
is preventing you from providing these services?  
 Does the fact that many squatter settlements are not legalised affect the services that you provide in squatter 
settlements?  
 Do you have any plans for squatter communities relating to squatter upgrading? What are these plans? 
 Having had experience working with low-income communities, what can you say about their willingness and 
ability to engage with upgrading and their likely level of participation?  
 Are there any barriers to their participation? What factors would help them to participate more actively in 
decision-making processes?  
 In what way can your organisation play a role in supporting more active participation by residents of squatter 
settlements?  
 To what extent does the organisation have the capacity to support residents of squatter settlements? 
 What are your plans? What are your priorities in terms of the improvement of housing conditions versus the 
improvement of sanitary and utility services and streets, or other community/social services? What would like 
to come first? 
Collaboration/ Partnerships 
 Do you collaborate with local authorities when providing the services that you do in the communities? At what 
level does this take place? Which departments do you most frequently deal with in relation to squatter 
settlements 
 In which squatter settlements have local authorities significantly contributed to upgrading? What forms of 
support has the local authority provided with the upgrading process? Are there any gaps in the services 
provided? Or overlaps in service provided between yourselves and that provided by the local authority? Are 
there any mismatches between the services provided by the local authority and what residents in squatter 
settlements actually need? 
 If you are not yet involved in providing services related to squatter upgrading, would you be willing to work 
with local councils in this area? What do you think would be your input?  
 Are there any existing agreements for working on settlement upgrading between yourself and the local 
authority? Would you want some form of agreement to be made? Or do you think that the Public-Private 
Partnership Act No. 14 of 2009 would suffice? 
Financial and Technical Capacity 
 Are you involved in the local authority’s budgeting process? 
 In your opinion, do you think the local authority would be able to finance squatter upgrading using its own 
resources? If not, how do you suggest they raise the funds for such? 
334 
 What do you think about fiscal decentralisation to local authorities? Would you say that fiscal decentralisation 
would enable local authorities have access to more financial resources?  
 Do you think the local authorities have enough capacity for full fiscal decentralisation? If not, what would be 
your role help the local authority? Please explain. 
Political Context 
 What are your views regarding changes in national governments? Do you think such changes also affect the 
local government operations? 
 To what extent do you think local government has been affected by change of governments in the last ten 
years? Elaborate please. 
 Do you think there is political interference in the management and operations of the local authorities? Would 
you say that there is too much or just-about right political interference? Please elaborate. 
 In your view, does the Local Government Act protect the powers of local authorities against unnecessary 
political interference?  
 Do you expect any political resistance to the local authority’s decision to determine the modalities of squatter 
upgrading? If so, what measures would you put in place to ensure that all political stakeholders support the 
local authority’s decision? 
 Do you think that the way national government relates to local councils is too much bound up with politicians 
rewarding their supporters and ‘clients’?  
Regulatory Framework 
The Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) Act was only enacted in 2009 and so far has attracted considerable 
controversy. 
 What do you think about the Act? Has it helped to improve the operations of NGOs since then? 
 Does the Act enable you to engage in collaborative partnerships with other organisations such as local 
authorities? 
 How about your interactions with local communities especially those in informal or squatter settlements? 
 Does it provide a leeway for you to provide services in squatter settlements without undue interference? 
 Is there anything you would like to change within the Act? Or are you content with its provisions? 
Concluding Remarks 
 Are there any comments that you wish to make that are relevant to squatter upgrading? 
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Appendix L: Interview Guide for Financial Institutions 
 
1. Thanks for meeting me 
2. TOPIC: Squatter Settlements Upgrading In Zambia: Adequacy of the Institutional Framework 
3. Aim of the research 
The aim of my research is to examine the adequacy of the institutional framework to initiate and support 
squatter upgrading in Zambia, and what role the financial sector can play in squatter upgrading. 
4. Style of the interview 
The style of the interview is such that it is a face-to-face, in-depth interview, where a number of topics 
pertaining to my research will be discussed. I will ask you (the interviewee) relevant questions on topics for 
which I seek explanations or comments. 
5. Ethics  
I want to assure you that in this interview research professional ethics are of utmost importance. I wish to state 
that before we start the interview I would go through the Consent form which I prepared and which you will sign 
if you agree to the interview with me. However, I would like to mention here that should you at any point during 
the interview feel that you want to stop, please let me know. I also assure you that whatever statements you 
make that you feel may jeopardise your position or career, such statements will be treated confidentially and 
these not being attributable to named individuals in the thesis report. 
 
General Information 
 Briefly tell me about your institution. How long have you been operating in the district?  
 Would you say your clientele is drawn from all economic classes (low, middle and high-income)? What is 
the proportion of the low-income group? Is it comparable to the others?  
 If not, what do you think is the main barrier preventing the low-income group/ households from accessing 
services from your institution? 
Services and Products 
 What kind of services and products does your institution offer? Which one of these do the low-income 
groups mostly access? 
 Are you aware of individuals living in squatter settlements that have used your services? If yes, what do 
you think has enabled them to do so? If no, what do you think are the barriers? 
 Home improvement or building is an evolving task even for privileged people. It also takes long to 
complete. Considering that many households in squatter settlements are on low incomes, would you be 
willing to design ‘purpose-made’ loan schemes for such a group? If yes, how might these differ from the 
loans that you offer to others? How do you think the local authority can support you in making such loans 
accessible to individuals in low-income groups? 
 Would you accept occupancy certificates issued by local authorities as collateral against borrowing? Would 
you prefer the collateral to be in form of certificate of title held by the local council as opposed to occupancy 
licences held by individuals? 
 Do you think that there is scope for more community-based microfinance initiatives in these communities? 
If yes, what support can you provide? 
Partnerships and Collaborations 
 In 2009 the government enacted the Public-Private Partnership Act and opened avenues for collaboration 
between and among sectors within and outside Zambia. 
 To what extend has your organisation taken advantage of this Act? Have you collaborated with any local 
organisations? 
 How about local authorities? How flexible are your lending conditions that local councils can borrow for 
investment? 
Concluding Remarks 
 Are there any comments that you wish to make that are relevant to squatter upgrading? 
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Appendix M: Interview Guide for Residents (Household Heads) 
 
1. Thanks for meeting me 
2. TOPIC: Squatter Settlements Upgrading In Zambia: Adequacy of the Institutional Framework 
3. Aim of the research 
Establish the Adequacy of the Existing institutional framework for squatter upgrading. (To establish how 
residents can support squatter upgrading) 
4. Style of the interview 
The style of the interview is such that it is a face-to-face, in-depth interview, where a number of topics 
pertaining to my research will be discussed. I will ask you (the interviewee) relevant questions on topics for 
which I seek explanations or comments 
5. Ethics  
I want to assure you that in this interview research professional ethics are of utmost importance. I wish to state 
that before we start the interview I would go through the Consent form which I prepared and which you will sign 
if you agree to the interview with me. However, I would like to mention here that should you at any point during 
the interview feel that you want to stop, please let me know. I also assure you that whatever statements you 
make that you feel may jeopardise your position or career, such statements will be treated confidentially and 
these not being attributable to named individuals in the thesis report. 
 
General 
 How long have you lived in this settlement? Are you the head of the family? If not, where is the head of the 
family? How many people/ families live in your house? 
 Do you own the house you live in? If so, did you build the house yourself or buy it? If you built it, how long did 
it take you to finish it? Did you get any help at all? Who helped you? 
 Was it easy to buy a plot for building? What problems did you face? 
 If you are renting, how much rent do you pay per month? Where does the landlord live? 
 Are you in employment at the moment? What type of work do you do? How many other members of your 
family are in employment? 
 What other economic activities do you do? 
Access to Services 
 What problems do you experience with your present house (e.g. its physical condition, weather-proofness, 
size, etc.?) 
 Do you have access to  
(a) Clean water for drinking, bathing or cooking? 
(b) Sanitary facilities? 
(c) Fuel for cooking? 
(d) Electricity/ lighting? 
(e) Public transport? 
(f) Local health services? 
(g) Local primary and/or secondary schools? 
(h) Telephones, access to internet? 
 What problems do you experience with the services and streets? 
 Have you ever applied for a loan? From which organisation? What was it for? Were you successful in 
obtaining the loan? Did you have any difficulties meeting the loan repayment? 
 Given an opportunity, would you apply for a loan to improve or build a new house? 
 What are your plans? What are your priorities in terms of the improvement of housing conditions versus the 
improvement of sanitary and utility services and streets, or other community/social services? What would like 
to come first? 
 What services do you receive from the council? 
 In your opinion, do you think that the council can upgrade your compound on its own? Explain your answer. 
Collaborations 
 Have you helped anyone build or improve a house? Would you be able to help someone, a neighbour, friend 
or relative build or improve a house? What skills do you have? 
 What are the three key areas that you think would improve your housing conditions/living conditions? 
 What do you think is needed in order to bring about these changes? 
 How do you think you can contribute to improving your housing/living conditions? 
 Are you in touch with any community-based organisation? What support do you get from them? 
 Have you ever met with any local authority officials? For what purpose? 
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 Have you ever been invited to meetings about squatter upgrading? Would you go if invited? If YES, why? If 
NO, why not? 
Political Affiliations and Influences 
 Do you belong to any political party or group? 
 Would your willingness to participate in activities of squatter upgrading be influenced in anyway by your 
political affiliations? 
 Do you think political differences would affect residents in your areas to work together in development 
programmes? Please explain. 
 Do you think that the political parties that people belong to can influence how they participate in squatter 
upgrading? Please explain. 
Concluding Remarks 
 Are there any comments that you wish to make that are relevant to squatter upgrading? 
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Appendix N: Colonial Legislations and Implications for Housing 
 
Compiled from: Makasa (2010), Mutale (2004), Siamwiza (1986) and Tordoff (1980) 
  
Legislation Purpose Implications
Mines and Sanitation 
Regulation, 1917
Mining companies with more than 300 
workers to provide housing for them
Migratory labour system already existed, and 
that compelled Africans to return to their 
villages.
Employment of Natives 
Ordinance, 1929
Deal with the grossly unhygienic living 
environment of the mine-workers
Compelled employers to provide housing for 
their workers but not dependents; In lieu of 
housing, employees were to be paid a 
housing allowance; Housing was tied to 
employment and loss of such employment 
resulted in the Africans being evicted from 
their houses and urban areas.
Municipal Corporations and 
Townships Ordinance, 1929
Establishment of municipal boards of 
management to administer municipal 
townships
Allowed councils to establish markets, parks, 
slaughterhouses, sewerage systems, refuse 
disposal services, water and electricity 
supplies; Also allowed councils to introduce 
property rating to all land and improvements 
within municipal boundaries.
Mine Townships Ordinances, 
1933 and 1939 (Amendment)
Establishment of mining townships 
boards of management; The 
amendment provided for the declaration 
of streets in the European residential 
areas as public, and the mining plant and 
streets in the African compounds as 
private.
Run African mine employees compounds; 
Employers to provide housing and services to 
their employees; Africans could not build their 
own houses as they depended on their 
employers providing housing.
Private Location Ordinance, 
1939
Regulate the rapid growth of squatter 
settlements.
Squatting continued on private farms through 
a system known as kaffir farming.
Urban African Housing 
Ordinance, 1948
Allow local authorities to appoint African 
housing boards; Gave powers to 
management boards to create African 
suburbs to include housing for families, 
hostels for bachelors and housing for 
rent.
Employers and local councils to provide 
housing for their workers and their families; 
Introduction of racially segregated housing 
between Europeans and native Africans; 
Inadequate housing as a result of inadequate 
funding pushed some Africans to start 
squatting.
African Housing Board 
Ordinance, 1956
Amendment to give powers to Africa 
housing boards on matters pertaining to 
urban African housing; Allow Africans to 
build their own houses in African areas of 
the municipality leased by councils.
Failed to deliver housing to meet the demand 
due to inadequate funding; Also failed to 
encourage homeownership even in approved 
residential areas; Inducement of a new wave 
of rural-to-urban migrations.
Local Government Act,1956 Oversee African housing
Lusaka housing management board and 
other government agencies embarked on 
housing schemes for both Africans and 
Europeans.
Town and Country Planning 
Act, 1961
Provide for preparation of town 
development plans; Establish a planning 
tribunal.
Implemented the zoning system; Vacant land 
left for parks and industrial development 
became prey to squatters.
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Appendix O: Socialist Policies and Legislation and Implications for Housing 
 
Compiled from: GRZ documents (NDPs and Legislation) 
  
Policies Purpose Implications on housing
Transitional Development 
Plan (TDP), 1965
To facilitate provision of basic 
infrastructure and services for 
development; Provide housing for the 
civil service
Transitional purposes; Met all its civil service 
housing targets; Ignored low-income housing; 
Growth of squatter settlements
First National Development 
Plan (1NDP), 1966
Provide housing for the civil service and 
low-cost housing for public; provide 
serviced plots
Only 15% delivered on target; 12.15% on 
serviced plots; Failed to prioritise low-income 
housing; Housing deficit increased; Subsidised 
housing was an obstacle to homeownership; 
Growth of squatter settlements
Second National 
Development Plan (2NDP), 
1971
Provide low-, medium- and high-cost 
housing for the  public; provide serviced 
plots; upgrade squatter settlement
Failed to prioritise low-income housing; 
Housing deficit increased; Subsidised housing 
was an obstacle to homeownership; Growth 
of squatter settlements
Land Acquisition Act, 1970
Make provision for the compulsory 
acquisition of land and other property
Discouraged private investment in housing; 
inadequate low-income housing; growth of 
squatter settlements
National Housing Authority 
Act, 1971
Coordinate all housing programmes
Focus on medium and high cost housing; 
Poor households systematically excluded; 
Resort to build in squatter settlements
Housing (Statutory & 
Improvement) Act, 1974
Respond to the problem of rapidly 
developing unplanned settlements in 
urban areas
Local councils hold the head lease on land; 
Absence of planning permission encourages 
haphazard & poor quality buildings; Fourteen 
year licenses limit the tenure security; No 
incentives to improve housing conditions; 
Perpetuates squatter settlements
Lands (Conversions of Titles) 
Act, 1975
Ultimate ownership of land and authority 
over land transactions vested in the 
Republican President
Land becomes valueless and property losses 
value; Limited access to land by poor people; 
Increased land invasions; Rampant illegal 
allocations of land; Creation of a black market 
for land; Growth of squatter settlements
Third National Development 
Plan (3NDP) 1979
Provide low-cost housing; provide 
serviced plots; squatter upgrading in 
Lusaka
Only 1.5% delivered on housing and 34% on 
serviced plots; Housing deficit increase; 
Growth of squatter settlements
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Appendix P: Activity Flow of the Land Delivery Process in Zambia 
 
Source: Mutale(1999, p. 78) 
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Appendix Q: Government Actions and Consequences on Local Councils 
 
Source: Compiled from Saasa et al. (2000); Nchito (2001); UCLG (2006) 
  
Year Action Consequences
1973 Withdrawal of housing grant Loss of revenues for investment in housing
1974 Amendment of Rent Act
Rent default rates rose creating financial problems for 
councils
1975 New Land (Conversion of Titles) Act (1975)
Land becomes valueless and property losses value; Loss of 
revenues from land sales
1976 Zambian Electricity Supply Corporation formed Councils not compensated for revenues lost
1980 New Local Administration Act (1980)
More responsibilities transferred to local authorities without 
the requisite financial resources; Huge financial burdens on 
councils
1982
Government directs councils to invest in commercial 
ventures
Heavy investment in non-profitable ventures; No returns on 
investment; Loss of capital invested
1991 New Local Government Act (1991)
Sixty-three functions assigned to councils; No corresponding 
resources; Expanded financial obligations
1992
Local Authorities Superannuation Fund (Amendment) Act 
No. 27 of 1991
Compulsory retirement of all staff who had clocked 22 years 
in local government; Robbed the councils of experienced 
workforce; Forced them to look for money (even borrow) to 
pay the retirement packages
1992 Councils directed to disinvest from all commercial ventures
Immediate loss of revenues for those councils who had 
viable commercial ventures
1992
Creation of independent water companies from councils' 
water departments
Local authorities left with the responsibility of paying benefits 
to former workers of defunct water departments; Loss of 
revenues
1992 Scrapping off of the local sales tax share with local councils Local councils lost substantial revenues
1993 Withdrawal of agency for motor vehicle licencing Councils lost revenues
1993 Grants to municipal and city councils suspended Loss of revenue for service delivery
1994 The Personal Levy Act (1994)
Fixed very limited minimum and maximum amounts for 
personal levy; Reduce amount of local taxes from personal 
levy
1996 Circular No. 2 (1996): Homeownership scheme
Sale of council houses denies councils of revenue from 
rentals
1996 Withdrawal of Road licenses No compensation; Councils lost revenue
1997
Introduction of the Rating Act No. 2 (1997), though it was later 
revised by Act No. 9 (1999)
Exempts properties in the education, agriculture, mining, 
electricity, telecommunications, sport and recreation sectors 
without any compensation; Loss of revenue from rates
1998
Directed Bus stations and markets to be managed by private 
associations
Councils lost out on revues in levies from markets and bus 
stations
2000 Creation of District Commissioner’s office DC’s office allocated more resources than local authorities
2001
Government gave a 50% pay rise to all unionised council 
employees 
Created financial pressure on councils 
2009 Crop levy banned Councils lost substantial revenue
2010 Reduced national support to councils Budget deficit
2010
Reintroduction of the Local Government Service 
Commission
Diversion of resources from local councils to pay 
commissioners’ salaries; Commission’s continued 
recruitment of staff resulted in over blown labour force and 
financial stress for councils 
2010 Arbitrary grants sharing ratio for local councils
Councils get less than what they need; causes financial 
stress
2011 Political interference in property rates Council budget deficits; Increased financial stress
2014 Introduced monthly allowances for councillors Increased financial stress
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Appendix R: Neoliberal Policies and Legislation and Implications for Housing 
 
Source: Compiled from Makasa (2010), Mutale (2004) 
Appendix S: Evolution of Local Government in Zambia 
 
Source: Compiled from Chikulo (2002a), MCRC (2005)& Mukwena and Lolojih(2002) 
  
Statute/ Policy Purpose Implications on Housing
Lands Act, 1995 Liberalise the land system in Zambia
Increased land speculation; increased absentee 
landlordism; reduced investment in housing; reduced 
access to land by the poor; increased illegal land 
subdivisions and invasions; Growth of squatter 
settlements
National Housing 
Policy, 1996
Create an enabling environment for providing 
adequate and affordable housing to all 
Zambians
Lacked an implementation strategy; Enabling 
environment not sufficient for the poor; State monetary 
commitment not reached; No incentives for the poor; 
failed to stimulate private sector investment in low-
income housing; The poor build in squatter areas - no 
controls and use of cheap materials.
Homeownership 
and Empowerment 
Policy, 1996
Promote homeownership and empower citizens
Councils lost revenue from house rentals; Cannot invest 
in more low-income housing; Poor people have no 
access to low-income housing, and end up in squatter 
settlements
Employment 
(Amendment) Act, 
1997
Remove the compulsory obligation of 
employers to provide for employees; employers 
to provide housing allowances in lieu of housing
Inadequate housing allowances; loss of job security 
through labour casualization; limited access to credit; 
reduced individual investment in housing; growth of 
squatter settlements
Town and Country 
Planning 
(Amendment) Act, 
1997
Provide for the appointment of planning 
authorities, for the establishment of a Town and 
Country Planning Tribunal for the preparation, 
approval and revocation of development plans, 
for the control of development and subdivision 
of land, among other things.
Tribunal does not sit regularly and is only confined to 
Lusaka; Land matters take too long to resolve; The Act 
still does not tolerate squatting hence conflicts with the 
Housing Act; has failed to control unplanned 
development; inadvertently encouraged squatter 
settlements
Phase Guiding Law Actions Implications for Local Councils
1965-80
Local Government Act 
of 1965
Creation of three types of councils: urban 
councils (city and municipal), township 
councils, and rural councils divided into 
wards with councillors
Gave local councils wide-ranging powers to 
discharge functions; Local councils had vast 
sources for service delivery; Government 
constantly disbursed grants based on a pre-
determined formula
1980-90
Local Administration 
Act of 1980
Merged party and local council structures; 
Ended three-tier council system; Created 
district council; Appointment of councillors; 
Governors as council heads
Politicisation of local governance; Lost 
distinction between party and local councils; 
Minister’s powers frustrated decisions of district 
councils; Wrong investment decisions that cost 
district councils
1991-to 
date
Constitution of 
Zambia Act of 1991; 
Local Government Act 
of 1991
Delinked ‘party’ from government; 
Established autonomous councils; Elected 
councillors and mayors; Return of three-tier 
council system; Mayors and council 
chairpersons as council heads; Town clerks 
and council secretaries as executive heads
Many powers to the minister who has to 
approval many of councils’ decisions and to 
suspend councils whenever he deems it 
necessary; Fails to define grants sharing 
formula; Assigns too many functions without 
corresponding resources
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Appendix T: Details of JCTR Basic Needs Basket (January-October 2013 
 
 
JCTR Basic Needs Basket for a family of six (Kwacha) Average for January to October 2013
Consumption Items Qty Unit Price Cost Cost (KR) Cost (US$)
Cooking oil local 1Ltr 3 13,760.00        41,280.00        41.28       7.69         
Dried beans 1Kg 3 18,000.00        54,000.00        54.00       10.06       
Dried bream 1kg 1 52,000.00        52,000.00        52.00       9.69         
Dried kapenta 1Kg 2 51,400.00        102,800.00     102.80     19.15       
Beef/ mixed cut 1Kg 4 25,800.00        103,200.00     103.20     19.23       
Fresh milk 500ml 4 5,200.00          20,800.00        20.80       3.88         
Onion (Large) 1kg 2 6,000.00          12,000.00        12.00       2.24         
Eggs 1 unit 2 8,000.00          16,000.00        16.00       2.98         
Bread 1 loaf 30 5,200.00          156,000.00     156.00     29.07       
Tea Leaves 1Kg 1 35,000.00        35,000.00        35.00       6.52         
Sugar 1Kg 6 14,400.00        86,400.00        86.40       16.10       
Table salt 1kg 1 2,900.00          2,900.00          2.90          0.54         
Tomatoes 1kg 4 5,700.00          22,800.00        22.80       4.25         
Breakfast Meal 25kg 2 54,900.00        109,800.00     109.80     20.46       
Vegetables 1kg 4 4,700.00          18,800.00        18.80       3.50         
Sub-Total 833,780.00     833.78     155.35    
Charcoal 90Kg 2 145,000.00     290,000.00     290.00     54.03       
Bath Soap (Lifebuoy) tablets 10 3,000.00          30,000.00        30.00       5.59         
Washing Soap 400g 4 4,500.00          18,000.00        18.00       3.35         
Petroleum Jelly 500ml 1 9,100.00          9,100.00          9.10          1.70         
Electricity (medium density- fixed) 1 372,000.00     372,000.00     372.00     69.31       
Water & Sanitation (3-bedroom) fixed 1 210,000.00     210,000.00     210.00     39.13       
House Rent (medium density 3-bedroom) 1 1,750,000.00  1,750,000.00  1,750.00 326.05    
Sub-Total 2,679,100.00  2,679.10 499.16    
Total BNB 3,512,880.00  3,512.88 654.51    
Food Items
Non-Food Items
 344 
Appendix U: Magazine Squatter Settlement - Thematic Framework 
 
  
Participant
Length of 
stay (years)
Household 
size
Home 
ownership
Property acquisition
Household 
Employment status
Other Economic 
activities
Physical 
conditions of 
housing
Access to 
Water
Sanitation 
facilities
Energy for cooking & 
lighting
Education 
facilities
Health 
facilities
Communication 
mode
Transport 
mode
Problems with services received
Access 
to loan
Can get a loan
Involved in 
community projects
Skills
Priority areas for 
improvement
MG1, adult female 
and divorced
5 9 Tenant N/A Unemployed Trading
House is small; mud 
brick house
Kiosk; water 
well
shared pit 
latrine
Charcoal for cooking; 
candles & torces for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; buy a plot 
and build a 
house
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
Farming
Access roads; water & 
sanitation; health and 
schools
MG2, adult female 
and married
1 3 Tenant N/A
Unemployed; husband 
employed as shop 
assistant
None House is small Water well
shared pit 
latrine
Charcoal for cooking; 
candles & torces for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; buy a 
house
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
None
Access roads; water & 
sanitation; health and 
schools
MG3, adult female 
and married
3 5 Owner Inherited house from parents
Unemployed; husband 
employed as taxi driver
None
House is small; 
unplastered; mud 
brick house
Kiosk; water 
well
shared pit 
latrine
Charcoal for cooking; 
candles & torces for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
Farming
Access roads; water & 
sanitation; health and 
schools
MG4, adult female 
and divorced
15 7 Owner
Bought plot from chairman and 
built house; financial difficulties; 
took 7 years to build; no help
Unemployed
Farming; Farmily 
support
Roof leaks; no floor 
screed; unplastered
Water well
shared pit 
latrine
Charcoal for cooking; 
candles & torces for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
Yes; willing to participate 
in projects
Farming
Health and schools; water & 
sanitation; access roads
MG5, adult female 
and married
5 3 Tenant N/A Unemployed
Farmily support 
(husband does 
casual jobs)
House is small; mud 
brick house; roof 
leaks
Kiosk; water 
well
shared pit 
latrine
Charcoal for cooking; 
candles & torces for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No No
Yes; willing to participate 
in projects
Bricklaying
Access roads; water & 
sanitation; health and 
schools
MG6, adult female 
and married
0.25 6 Tenant N/A Unemployed
Trading; charcoal 
burning
House is small
Kiosk; water 
well
shared pit 
latrine
Charcoal for cooking; 
candles & torces for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; buy a 
house
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
None
Access roads; water & 
sanitation; health and 
schools
MG7, adult female 
and widowed
20 6 Owner Inherited house from parents Unemployed
Trading; casual 
jobs
Unplastered; no 
floor screed
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; 
candles & torces for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
Yes; willing to participate 
in projects
Farming
Water and sanitation; 
poverty reduction; access 
roads
MG8, adult female 
and married
15 7 Owner
Bought plot from someone; built 
house; took 10 years to build; 
without help
Unemployed
Trading (sells fish at 
home and market)
None
Tap water from 
neighbour; 
kiosk
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; 
candles & torces for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No No
Yes; willing to participate 
in projects
Farming
Water and sanitation; 
poverty reduction; access 
roads
MG9, adult female 
and married
7 6 Tenant N/A
Unemployed; husband is 
domestic worker
None
House is small; roof 
leaks
Water well Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; 
candles & torces for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No No
Yes; willing to participate 
in projects
Farming
Access roads; water & 
sanitation; health and 
schools
MG10, adult female 
and married
3 3 Owner
Bought plot from someone; built 
house; took 2 years to build; 
without help
Unemployed
Trading; Family 
support
Unplastered outside
Tap water 
connected to 
main
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; 
candles & torces for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
Hairdressin
g
Access roads; water & 
sanitation; health and 
schools
MG11, adult female 
and married
7 5 Caretaker N/A
Employed; pre-school 
teacher
Trading None
Tap water 
connected to 
main
shared pit 
latrine
Charcoal & electricity for 
cooking; electricity, candles 
and torches for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; buy a 
house
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
Teaching
Access roads; water & 
sanitation; health and 
schools
MG12, adult female 
and married
5 4 Caretaker N/A Unemployed Trading
Unplastered; roof 
leaks
Tap water from 
neighbour
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; 
candles & torces for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
None
Access roads; water & 
sanitation; health and 
schools
MG13, adult female 
and married
7 4 Owner
Given plot by church; built 
house; took 1 year to build; 
received help from church
Self-employed (family runs 
mechanical workshop and 
retail shop)
Farming None
Tap water 
connected to 
main
Pit latrine
Charcoal & electricity for 
cooking; electricity, candles 
and torches for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones
Walking; buses; 
bicycle
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
Yes, from 
FINCA
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
Farming
Access roads; water & 
sanitation; health and 
schools
MG14, male adult 
and married
22 2 Owner
Bought plot from chairman and 
built house; had enough 
money; has land records; took 
2 years to build
Self-employed (Runs 
small shop, Retired civil 
servant)
Farming None
Tap water 
connected to 
main
Pit latrine
Charcoal & electricity for 
cooking; electricity, candles 
and torches for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No No
Yes; willing to participate 
in projects
Farming
Access roads; water & 
sanitation; health and 
schools
MG15, male adult 
and married
0.33 4 Tenant N/A Self-employed (tailor) None
no plaster; no floor 
screed
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; 
candles & torces for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; buy a plot 
and build a 
house
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
Tailoring 
and design
Access roads; water & 
sanitation; health and 
schools
MG16, male adult 
and married
7 7 Tenant N/A Unemployed Trading; Farming
House is small; mud 
brick house
Kiosk; water 
well
shared pit 
latrine
Charcoal for cooking; 
candles & torces for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
Farming
Access roads; water & 
sanitation; health and 
schools
MG17, male adult 
and married
14 10 Owner
Bought plot from chairman and 
built house; had enough 
money; has land records; took 
1 year to build
Self-employed (runs a 
retail shop)
Farming None
Tap water 
connected to 
main
Pit latrine
Charcoal & electricity for 
cooking; electricity, candles 
and torches for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones
Walking; buses; 
family car
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
Yes, from 
EFC
Yes; improve 
existing house
Yes; willing to participate 
in projects
Farming
Health and schools; water & 
sanitation; access roads
MG18, adult female 
and single
4 5 Tenant N/A
Employed; domestic 
worker (K300)
None House is small
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; 
candles & torces for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; buy a plot 
and build a 
house
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
Sewing; 
tailoring
Access roads; water & 
sanitation; health and 
schools
MG19, adult female 
and married
21 10 Owner
Bought plot from chairman and 
built house; financial difficulties; 
took 10 years to build; without 
help
Unemployed; Husband is 
security guard
Farming None
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; 
candles & torces for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
Yes; willing to participate 
in projects
Farming
Health and schools; water & 
sanitation; access roads
MG20, adult female 
and single
10 7 Owner
Bough house; easy to buy; 
had enough money
Self-employed (runs a 
retail shop)
Farming
Unplastered; no 
floor screed
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; 
candles & torces for lighting
community 
school
No Mobile phones Walking; buses
Long distance to nearest clinics; 
congestion at clinics; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
Yes; willing to participate 
in projects
Farming; 
sewing
Health and schools; water & 
sanitation; access roads
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Access to NGOs
Community 
meetings about 
squatter 
upgrading
Reason for 
attending meeting
Services by 
council
Council capacity for 
squatter upgrading
Belong to 
political 
party
Political 
influence on 
Individual's 
participation
Political 
influence on 
community 
participation
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
grass cutting Not sure Yes No No
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
progress on 
legalisation
None Not sure No No No
Yes, CARE Intl; support 
for HIV/ AIDS patients
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Not sure No No No
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Councils needs 
funding
Yes No No
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Councils needs 
funding
No No No
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Not sure No No No
Yes; SOS Children's 
Village; support for 
orphans
Yes; willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Councils needs 
funding
No No No
No
Yes; willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Councils needs 
funding
No No No
Yes; SOS Children's 
Village; support for 
orphans
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Councils needs 
funding
No No Yes
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Councils needs 
funding
No No
No
Yes; willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Councils needs 
funding
Yes No No
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Councils needs 
funding
No No
Yes, Seventh Day 
Adventist Church; spiritual 
and material support
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Councils needs 
funding
No No No
No
Yes; willing to 
participate in projects
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Councils needs 
funding
No No No
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
solid waste collection Not sure Yes No No
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
Garbage collection; 
grass cutting
Councils needs 
funding
No No No
No
Yes; willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Councils needs 
funding
No No No
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Councils needs 
funding
No No No
No
Yes; willing to 
participate in projects
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Councils needs 
funding
No No No
Yes; Farmers' 
Cooperative; farm inputs
Yes; willing to 
participate in projects
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Councils needs 
funding
Yes No No
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Participant
Length of 
stay (years)
Household 
size
Ownership 
Status
Property acquisition
Household 
Employment status
Other 
Economic 
activities
Physical conditions 
of housing
Access to 
Water
Sanitation 
facilities
Energy for cooking & 
lighting
Education 
facilities
Health 
facilities
Communicati
on mode
Transport 
mode
Problems with services 
received
Access to 
loan
Can get a 
loan
Involved in 
community projects
Skills
Priority areas for 
improvement
MC1, adult female 
and married
0.17 2 Tenant N/A
Unemployed; husband is 
taxi driver
None no problems
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles, 
torces & kerosene for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
Farming
poverty reduction; access 
roads; water and sanitation
MC2, male adult and 
married
0.5 3 Caretaker N/A
Self-employed (Husband 
is bricklayer )
Trading no problems
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles, 
torces & kerosene for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
bicycle
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No No
Yes; willing to 
participate in projects
Building
security; acess roads; water 
and sanitation
MC3, adult female 
and married
10 2 Owner
bought plot and built house; 
took 6 years to build; without 
help
Employed (Basic school 
teacher)
Trading 
(husband runs 
bar)
No problems & 
improvements required
connected to 
mains
waterborne 
toilet
Charcoal & electricity for 
cooking; electricity, candles and 
torches for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
Farming
security; acess roads; water 
and sanitation
MC4, adult male and 
married
17 7
Owner/ 
landlord
bought plot and built house; 
took 4 years; without help
Self-employed (runs a 
shop)
Rentals no problems Kiosk Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles 
and torces for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
Farming
health and education; access 
roads; water and sanitation
MC5, adult male and 
married
16 10 Owner
bought plot and built house; 
took 2 month to build; without 
help
Unemployed
Farming; 
Trading
House is small Kiosk Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles 
and torces for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses; 
cycling
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
Building
poverty reduction; access 
roads; water and sanitation
MC6, adult female 
and divorced
5 5 Tenant N/A Unemployed Trading poor house conditions Kiosk Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles 
and torces for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
None
housing; access roads; 
health and education
MC7, adult female 
and married
2 5 Tenant N/A Unemployed
Trading; 
Family support
House is small; poor 
house conditions
Kiosk Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles 
and torces for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses; 
Bicycle
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; buy a 
house
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
None
housing; access roads; 
health and education
MC8, adult female 
and widowed
17 5 Tenant N/A
Self-employed (second-
hand clothes shop)
None no problems
Tap water 
connected to 
main
Pit latrine Electricity; charcoal
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
Yes, from 
Microibanker
Yes; buy a plot 
and build a 
house
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
None
Water and sanitation; access 
roads; health and education
MC9, adult female 
and married
14 8 Caretaker N/A Unemployed
Family support 
(husband does 
casual jobs)
no problems Kiosk Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles 
and torces for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
Yes, from 
FINCA
Yes; buy a plot 
and build a 
house
Yes; willing to 
participate in projects
Home 
making
health and education; access 
roads; water and sanitation
MC10, adult female 
and single
2 1 Tenant N/A Unemployed Trading poor house conditions
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles 
and torces for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No No
Yes; willing to 
participate in projects
Farming
Access roads; health and 
education; water and 
sanitation
MC11, adult female 
and married
16 9
Owner/ 
landlord
bought plot and built house; 
took 5 years to build; without 
help
Unemployed
Trading; 
Rentals
no problems water tap
Pit latrine; 
waterborne 
toilet
Charcoal & electricity for 
cooking; electricity, candles and 
torches for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
None
Access roads; water and 
sanitation; health and 
education
MC12, adult female 
and married
15 7 Owner
bought plot and built house; 
took 4 years to build; without 
help
Unemployed; Husband 
employed (mechanic)
Trading no problems
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal & electricity for 
cooking; electricity, candles and 
torches for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
Yes, from 
FINCA
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
Farming
Access roads; water and 
sanitation; health and 
education
MC13, adult female 
and widowed
15 6
Owner/ 
landlord
bought plot and built house; 
took 7 years to build; without 
help
Unemployed
Trading; 
Rentals
no problems Water well
shared pit 
latrine
Charcoal & electricity for 
cooking; electricity, candles and 
torches for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
None
Access roads; water and 
sanitation; health and 
education
MC14, adult female 
and single
5 3 Tenant N/A
Employed (hairdresser - 
casual work)
Trading poor house conditions Kiosk Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles 
and torces for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No Yes
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
None
water and sanitation; access 
roads; health and education
MC15, adult female 
and married
6 8 Owner bought plot and built Unemployed
Trading; casual 
jobs
no problems water tap Pit latrine Electricity; charcoal
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
None
Access roads; water and 
sanitation; health and 
education
MC16, adult female 
and married
10 7 Owner
bought plot and built house; 
took 4 month to build; without 
help
Unemployed; Husband is 
domestic worker
Rentals; 
Farming
poor house conditions
Kiosk; water 
well
shared pit 
latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles 
and torces for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
Farming
Access roads; water and 
sanitation; health and 
education
MC17, adult female 
and widowed
21 9 Owner
bought plot and built house; 
took 1 year to build; without 
help
Unemployed
Farming; 
Trading
poor house conditions
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles 
and torces for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No No
Yes; willing to 
participate in projects
Farming
Access roads; water and 
sanitation; health and 
education
MC18, adult female 
and married
9 6
Owner/ 
landlord
Bought house; had enough 
money
Self-employed (runs a 
shop)
Farming; 
Rentals
no problems
Kiosk; water 
well
shared pit 
latrine
Charcoal & electricity for 
cooking; electricity, candles and 
torches for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
Farming
Access roads; water and 
sanitation; health and 
education
MC19, adult male 
and single
1 1 Tenant N/A
Self-employed (runs a 
shop)
None poor house conditions Kiosk
shared pit 
latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles 
and torces for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; buy a plot 
and build a 
house
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
Farming
water and sanitation; access 
roads; health and education
MC20, adult female 
and single
24 6 Owner Inherited house Unemployed Trading no problems
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal & electricity for 
cooking; electricity, candles and 
torches for lighting
primary school; 
community schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
No problem with services No No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
None
water and sanitation; access 
roads; health and education
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Access to NGOs
Community meetings about 
squatter upgrading
Reason for 
attending 
meeting
Services by council
Council capacity for 
squatter upgrading
Belong to 
political party
Political influence 
on Individual's 
participation
Political influence 
on community 
participation
Yes, CARE Intl; support for 
HIV/ AIDS patients
Never attended any meeting; 
willing to attend future meeting
general 
development 
issues
solid waste collection Not sure No No No
Yes, CARE Intl; support for 
HIV/ AIDS patients
Never attended any meeting; 
willing to attend future meeting
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection Not sure No No No
Yes, CARE Intl; support for 
HIV/ AIDS patients
Never attended any meeting; 
willing to attend future meeting
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Council needs funding No No No
No
Attended meeting before; willing 
to attend future meeting
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Council needs funding Yes No No.
No
Never attended any meeting; 
willing to attend future meeting
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Council needs funding No No No
Yes, CARE Intl; support for 
HIV/ AIDS patients
Never attended any meeting; 
willing to attend future meeting
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Council needs funding No No No
Yes, CARE Intl & Plan 
Zambia; support for HIV/ 
AIDS patients
Never attended any meeting; 
willing to attend future meeting
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Council needs funding No No No
No
Attended meeting before; willing 
to attend future meeting
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Council needs funding No No No
No
Never attended any meeting; 
willing to attend future meeting
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Council needs funding Yes No No
Yes; Home-based care; 
support for HIV/ AIDS 
patients
Never attended any meeting; 
willing to attend future meeting
general 
development 
issues
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Not sure No No No
No
Attended meeting before; willing 
to attend future meeting
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Council needs funding No No No
No
Attended meeting before; willing 
to attend future meeting
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Council needs funding No No No
No
Attended meeting before; willing 
to attend future meeting
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Council needs funding No No Yes
Yes; Home-based care; 
support for HIV/ AIDS 
patients
Never attended any meeting; 
willing to attend future meeting
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Council needs funding No No Yes
No
Never attended any meeting; 
willing to attend future meeting
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Not sure No No Yes
No
Attended meeting before; willing 
to attend future meeting
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Not sure No No No
No
Attended meeting before; willing 
to attend future meeting
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Council needs funding Yes No No
Yes; Social Welfare; 
Support for elderly
Attended meeting before; willing 
to attend future meeting
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Not sure No No No
No
Never attended any meeting; 
willing to attend future meeting
general 
development 
issues
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Not Sure No No No
No
Never attended any meeting; 
willing to attend future meeting
progress on 
legalisation
solid waste collection; 
grass cutting
Not sure Yes No No
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Participant
Length of 
stay (years)
Househol
d size
Ownership 
Status
Property acquisition
Household 
Employment status
Other main 
economic 
activities
Physical 
conditions of 
housing
Access to 
Water
Sanitatio
n 
facilities
Energy for cooking & lighting
Education 
facilities
Health 
facilities
Communication 
mode
Transport 
mode
Problems with services 
received
Access 
to loan
Can get a loan
Involved in 
community 
projects
Skills
Priority areas for 
improvement
IP1, male adult and 
married
17 8 Owner
bought plot and built; 
took 4 years to build; 
without help
Unemployed Farming None
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal & electricity for cooking; 
electricity, candles and torches for 
lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
Farming
Access roads; health 
and education
IP2, male adult and 
married
23 5 Owner
bought plot and built; 
took 1/12 years to 
build; without help
Unemployed Farming
poor house 
conditions
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles and 
torces for lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
Yes; willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Water and sanitation; 
access roads
IP3, male adult and 
married
40 7 Owner
bought plot and built; 
took 2 years to build; 
without help
Unemployed Trading
House is small; 
poor house 
conditions
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal & electricity for cooking; 
electricity, candles and torches for 
lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
None
Access roads; security; 
water and sanitation
IP4, female adult 
and widowed
39 8 Owner
bought plot and built; 
took 5 years to build; 
without help
Unemployed Trading
Poor physical 
conditions
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles and 
torces for lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
Yes; willing to 
participate in 
projects
Farming; 
Home 
making
Access roads; water 
and sanitation; health 
and education
IP5, male adult and 
married
38 6 Owner Bought house; no help Unemployed Farming None
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal & electricity for cooking; 
electricity, candles and torches for 
lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
Farming; 
Building
Water and sanitation; 
access roads
IP6, male adult and 
married
17 9 Owner
bought plot and built; 
took 1/2 years to build; 
without help
Self-employed (runs a 
tavern)
None None
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles and 
torces for lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
Farming
Access roads; water 
and sanitation; health 
and education
IP7, male adult and 
married
20 6 Tenant N/A
Employed, security 
guard; wife is domestic 
worker (K600)
None None
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal & electricity for cooking; 
electricity, candles and torches for 
lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; buy a plot 
and build a house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
Farming
Access roads; water 
and sanitation; health 
and education
IP8, male adult and 
married
40 5 Owner
bought plot and built; 
took 2 years to build; 
without help
Unemployed Farming
Poor physical 
conditions
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles and 
torces for lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic
Mobile phones; no 
internet
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; build a new 
house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Access roads; water 
and sanitation
IP9, adult female 
and widowed
56 8 Owner
bought plot and built; 
took 1 year to build; 
without help
Unemployed 
(volunteer with NHC)
Farming None
Tap water 
from 
neighbour
Pit latrine
Charcoal & electricity for cooking; 
electricity, candles and torches for 
lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
None
Health and education; 
acess roads; water and 
sanitation 
IP10, male adult 
and married
40 10 Owner
Bought house; without 
help
Unemployed Farming
Poor physical 
conditions
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles and 
torces for lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
None
Access roads; water 
and sanitation; health 
and education
IP11, male adult 
and married
36 5 Owner
bought plot and built; 
took 1 year to build; 
without help
Unemployed
Farming; 
Trading in 
shoes
Poor physical 
conditions
Tap water 
from 
neighbour
Improved 
pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles and 
torces for lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
Farming
Water & sanitation; road 
access; street lights
IP12, male adult 
and married
40 8 Owner
bought plot and built; 
took 1/12 years to 
build; without help
Self-employed (wholes 
supplier of vegetables)
Farming None
Tap water 
connected to 
mains
Improved 
pit latrine
Electricity; charcoal
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
None
Water & sanitation; road 
access; housing 
improvement
IP13, male adult 
and married
40 7 Owner
bought plot and built; 
took 1 year to build; 
without help
Unemployed Trading
House is small; 
poor physical 
conditions
Water well Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles and 
torces for lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Access roads; water 
and sanitation; health 
and education
IP14, male adult 
and married
36 8 Owner
bought plot and built; 
took 15 year to build; 
without help
Self-employed 
(Mechanical 
workshop)
None None
Tap water 
from 
neighbour
Pit latrine Electricity; charcoal
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
Farming; 
Building
Access roads; water 
and sanitation; health 
and education
IP15, male adult 
and married
40 10
Owner/ 
Landlord
bought plot and built; 
took 3 years to build; 
without help
Unemployed
Trading; 
rentals
House is small; 
poor physical 
conditions
Tap water 
connected to 
mains
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles and 
torces for lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; build a new 
house
Yes; willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Access roads; water 
and sanitation; health 
and education
IP16, male adult 
and married
40 7 Owner Bought house; no help
Employed, security 
guard (K250-300)
Farming
House is small; 
poor physical 
conditions
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles and 
torces for lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; build a new 
house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
Farming
Health and education; 
acess roads; water and 
sanitation 
IP17, adult female 
and married
41 12 Owner
bought plot and built; 
took 1/2 years to build; 
with help
Employed, cleaner 
(K2500); Husband is 
self-employed as 
carpenter)
Farming
House is small; 
poor physical 
conditions
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal & electricity for cooking; 
electricity, candles and torches for 
lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
Yes, 
from 
CETZA
M
Yes; improve 
existing house
Yes; willing to 
participate in 
projects
Farming
Health and education; 
acess roads; water and 
sanitation 
IP18, male adult 
and married
10 8 Tenant N/A
Employed, domestic 
worker (K200)
Trading House is small
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles and 
torces for lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; buy a plot 
and build a house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Health and education; 
acess roads; water and 
sanitation 
IP19, male adult 
and married
29 11 Owner
Bought house; without 
help
Self-employed 
(Mechanical 
workshop)
Farming
House is small; 
poor physical 
conditions
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal & electricity for cooking; 
electricity, candles and torches for 
lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; build a new 
house
Yes; willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Access roads; water 
and sanitation; health 
and education
IP20, male adult 
and married
39 8 Owner
bought plot and built; 
took 4 years to build; 
without help
Self-employed (as 
carpenter and church 
pastor)
Family 
support
House is small; 
poor physical 
conditions
Water well Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles and 
torces for lighting
community 
schools; private 
schools
Clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
poor road access; congestion 
at clinic; administrative 
problems at clinic
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Access roads; water 
and sanitation; health 
and education
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Access to 
NGOs
Attended 
meetings
Will attend 
meetings
Reason for 
attending 
meeting
Services by 
council
Council capacity 
for squatter 
upgrading
Belong to 
political 
party
Political influence 
on Individual's 
participation
Political influence 
on community 
participation
No No Yes
General 
development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
No No No Yes
No No Yes
General 
development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
No No No Yes
Yes; NHC; 
health education
No Yes
General 
development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
No No No No
Yes; HOPE; 
Skills training
Yes Yes
General 
development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
No No No No
No No Yes
General 
development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
No No No No
No Yes Yes
Progress on 
upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
No No No Yes
No No Yes
Progress on 
upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
No No No No
Yes; NHC; 
health education
No Yes
Progress on 
upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
No Yes Yes No
Yes; NHC; 
health education
No No
Progress on 
upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
No No No No
Yes; NHC; 
health education
No Yes
Progress on 
upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
No Yes No No
Yes; NHC; 
health education
No Yes
Progress on 
upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
No Yes No No
Yes; NHC; 
health education
No Yes
Progress on 
upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
No No No No
Yes; Home 
Guard; crime 
prevention
No Yes
Progress on 
upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
No No No No
Yes; Residents 
Concern; rights 
awareness
Yes Yes
Progress on 
upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
No No No No
No Yes Yes
Progress on 
upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
No Yes No No
Yes; NHC; 
health education
No Yes
Progress on 
upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
No Yes No Yes
Yes; NHC; 
health education
No Not sure
General 
development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
No No No No
No No Yes
General 
development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
No Yes No No
Yes; Farmers 
Cooperative; 
farm inputs
No Yes
Progress on 
upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
No No No No
No Yes Yes
Progress on 
upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
No No No No
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Participant
Length of 
stay (years)
Household 
size
Ownership 
Status
Property acquisition
Household 
Employment status
Other 
Economic 
activities
Physical 
conditions of 
housing
Access to 
Water
Sanitation 
facilities
Energy for cooking & lighting
Education 
facilities
Health 
facilities
Communication 
mode
Transport 
mode
Problems with services 
received
Access 
to loan
Can get a loan
Involved in 
community 
projects
Skills
Priority areas for 
improvement
MS1, adult female 
and married
25 6 Owner
Bought plot and built 
house, took 3 years to 
build; without help
Unemployed; husband is 
security guard
Family 
support; 
Trading
House is small; poor 
house conditions
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles & 
torches for lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; build a new 
house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
Farming
Health and education; 
road access; water & 
sanitation 
MS2, adult female 
and divorced
15 11 Tenant N/A Unemployed
Family 
support; 
Trading
No problems
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal and firewood for cooking; 
candles, torches & kerosene for 
lighting
No schools No clinic None
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; buy a plot 
and build a 
house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
Farming; 
Building
Road access; water & 
sanitation; health and 
education
MS3, adult female 
and married
21 5 Tenant N/A
Unemployed; husband is 
domestic worker
Trading; 
Family 
support
House is small; poor 
house conditions; 
problems with 
landlord
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles and 
torches for lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
No; Unable to 
pay back
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Road access; water & 
sanitation; health and 
education
MS4, male adult 
and married
33 8 Owner
Bought plot and built 
house; financial 
difficulties;  took 2 
years to build; without 
help
Unemployed None No problems
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal & electricity for cooking; 
electricity, candles & torches for 
lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
Home 
making
Road access; water & 
sanitation; health and 
education
MS5, male adult 
and married
10 6 Tenant N/A
Self-employed 
(carpentry workshop)
Farming
poor house 
conditions
Kiosk; water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal & electricity for cooking; 
electricity, candles & torches for 
lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; buy a plot 
and build a 
house
Yes; willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Health and education; 
access roads; water 
and sanitation 
MS6, male adult 
and married
9 5 Tenant N/A
Employed (casual 
worker)
None
House is small; poor 
house conditions
Water well Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles & 
torches for lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; Buy a 
house
Yes; willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Housing; water & 
sanitation; road 
access
MS7, adult female 
and married
25 10 Owner
Bought house; without 
help
Unemployed (market 
woman)
Trading
House is small; poor 
house conditions
Water well Pit latrine
Charcoal & firewood for cooking; 
candles & torches for lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; build a new 
house
Yes; willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Road access; water & 
sanitation; health and 
education
MS8, adult female 
and married
30 15 Owner
Inherited house from 
parents
Unemployed
Family 
support; 
casual works
poor house 
conditions
Water well Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles & 
torches for lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
Yes; willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Road access; water & 
sanitation; health and 
education
MS9, adult female 
and married
31 12 1/ Landlord
Bought plot and built; 
took 5 years to build
Unemployed
Rental; 
Farming; 
Casual jobs
House is small; poor 
house conditions
Water well Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles & 
torches for lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
Yes; willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Road access; water & 
sanitation; health and 
education
MS10, adult female 
and married
15 5 Owner
Bought house; without 
help
Unemployed; husband is 
security guard
None
House is small; poor 
house conditions
Water well Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles & 
torches for lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
None
Health and education; 
access roads; water 
and sanitation 
MS11, adult female 
and widowed
15 10
Owner/ 
Landlord
Bought house; without 
help
Unemployed
Farming; 
Rentals
House is small; poor 
house conditions
Water well Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles & 
torches for lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; build a new 
house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
None
Road access; water & 
sanitation; health and 
education
MS12, male adult 
and married
6 8 Tenant N/A
Employed (security 
guard)
Farming
House is small; poor 
house conditions
Water well Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles & 
torches for lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; buy a plot 
and build a 
house
Yes; willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Road access; water & 
sanitation; health and 
education
MS13, adult female 
and married
5 6 Owner
Bought house; without 
help
Unemployed Farming
House is small; poor 
house conditions
Water well Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles & 
torches for lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; build a new 
house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
None
Water & sanitation; 
road access; housing
MS14, adult female 
and married
6 5 Owner
Bought house; without 
help
Unemployed Farming
House is small; poor 
house conditions
Water well Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles & 
torches for lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; build a new 
house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Road access; water & 
sanitation; health and 
education
MS15, male adult 
and married
19 11 Owner
Bought plot and built 
house; took 4/12 years 
to build; without help
Employed (security 
guard)
None
poor house 
conditions
Water well Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles & 
torches for lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; build a new 
house
Yes; willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Road access; water & 
sanitation; health and 
education
MS16, adult female 
and married
23 8 Owner
Inherited plot and built 
house; took 1 year to 
build; with help
Unemployed Trading
poor house 
conditions
Water well Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles & 
torches for lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; improve 
existing house
No; but willing to 
participate in 
projects
Home 
making
Housing; water & 
sanitation; road 
access
MS17, adult female 
and widowed
26 8 Owner
Bought house; without 
help
Unemployed
Trading; 
Family 
support
poor house 
conditions
Water well Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles & 
torches for lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; build a new 
house
Yes; willing to 
participate in 
projects
None
Health and education; 
access roads; water 
and sanitation 
MS18, adult female 
and married
32 6 Owner
Bought plot and built 
house; took 6 years to 
build; without help
Unemployed Farming
poor house 
conditions
Kiosk; Water 
well
Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles & 
torches for lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; build a new 
house
Yes; willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Road access; water & 
sanitation; health and 
education
MS19, adult male 
and divorced
21 12 Owner
Inherited house from 
parents
Unemployed
Trading; 
shoe 
repairing
House is small; poor 
house conditions
Water well Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles & 
torches for lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; build a new 
house
Yes; willing to 
participate in 
projects
Building
Water & sanitation; 
road access; housing 
improvement
MS20, adult female 
and widowed
31 9 Owner
Bought plot and built 
house; took 7 years to 
build; without help
Unemployed (market 
woman)
Trading; 
Casual jobs
House is small; poor 
house conditions
Water well Pit latrine
Charcoal for cooking; candles & 
torches for lighting
No schools No clinic Mobile phones
Walking; 
buses
Long distance to nearest clinic; 
congestion at clinics; 
administrative problems at clinics
No
Yes; buy a plot 
and build a 
house
Yes; willing to 
participate in 
projects
Home 
making
Road access; water & 
sanitation; health and 
education
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Access to 
NGOs
Community meetings 
about squatter 
upgrading
Reason for 
attending meeting
Services by 
council
Council capacity 
for squatter 
upgrading
Belong to 
political 
party
Political influence 
on Individual's 
participation
Political influence 
on community 
participation
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
progress on legalising 
and upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
No No No
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
No No No
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
Yes No No
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
Yes No No
Yes; AGAPE; 
support for girl 
child education
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
No No Yes
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
Yes No No
No
Yes; willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
No No Yes
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
No No No
Yes; NHC; 
health education
Yes; willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
Yes No No
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
No No No
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
No No No
Yes; OVCs; 
support for 
orphans
Yes; willing to 
participate in projects
progress on legalising 
and upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
No No No
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
No No No
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
progress on legalising 
and upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
No No No
Yes; Home-
based care; 
support for HIV/ 
AIDS
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
No No No
Yes; Home-
based care; 
support for HIV/ 
AIDS
Yes; willing to 
participate in projects
progress on legalising 
and upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
No No No
Yes; NHC; 
health education
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
progress on legalising 
and upgrading
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
No No No
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
No No No
No
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
No No No
Yes; NHC; 
health education
No; but willing to 
participate in projects
general development 
issues
Solid waste 
collection
Council needs 
funding
No No No
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Participant
Years of 
Operation
Status Targets groups
Deposit-
taking
Loans Requirements for loan
Interest 
on Loans
Max. Loan 
duration
Mortgages
Interest on 
Morgages
Max. Mortgage 
duration
Can create 
special 
packages for 
low-incomes
Partnerships 
with others
FI1 100 Commercial bank Formal sector Yes
personal loans; business 
loans; home loans
Must be in salaried employment; Must have 
an account with the Bank; Equity release for 
home loan; 20% deposit for house purchase 
loan; collateral
16 10 No N/A N/A No No
FI2 5 Commercial bank Formal sector Yes
personal loans; business 
loans; home loans
3 months recent payslips and 6 months bank 
statements; If self-employed provide audited 
financial statements or management 
accounts for the past three years; Marriage 
certificate (if applicable); Proof of residence; 
Declaration of debts; and Letter from 
employer
8.5 20 Yes 20 Yes Yes
FI3 18 Commercial bank Formal sector Yes
personal loans; business 
loans
Must be in salaried employment; Must have 
an account with the bank; collateral
28 3 No N/A N/A No No
FI4 108 Commercial bank Formal sector Yes
personal loans; business 
loans; home loans
An individual  in salaried, formal employment 
with reputable organisations; Be an account-
holder or employee of organisations signed 
up for deduction at source lending 
programme; For account-holders, the salary 
must be mandated to Standard Chartered 
Bank Zambia Plc; and Be aged between 21-
55 years
14 25 Yes 14 25 No No
FI5 44 Commercial bank Formal sector Yes
personal loans; business 
loans; home loans
Must have an account with bank or stop order 
account with other banks; formal 
identification; a letter of undertaking from 
employers where necessary for those in 
employment; collateral (title deed or 
occupancy license).
22 10 Yes 16 10 No Yes
FI6 6
Micro-finance 
institution
All economic 
classes engaged in 
enterpreneurial 
activities
Yes
personal loans; business 
loans; home loans
Collateral in form of fixed or movable assets; 
Proof of ownership of land with certificate of 
title; Employed applicant to have regular 
income and have a business; Businessperson 
needs two separate running businesses
42 5 No N/A N/A Yes Yes
FI7 13
Micro-finance 
institution
All economic 
classes engaged in 
enterpreneurial 
Yes business loans
Engaged in entrepreneurial activities; A known 
physical address; Provide some form of 
collateral
49 3 No N/A N/A Yes Yes
FI8 20
Micro-finance 
institution
All economic 
classes
Yes
business loans - groups 
or individual
Existing business; fixed place of business and 
abode; must have a guarantor; must make a 
10-15% cash deposit; must open a savings 
account; belong to a self-help group; must 
have a form of identification; some form of 
collateral (security).
55.25 3 No N/A N/A No No
FI9 5
Micro-finance 
institution
Low and middle 
income groups in 
business
No
business loans - groups 
or individual; home 
improvement loans; 
agriculture loans
Have a profitable business - generates 
income on a daily basis; Collateral (title deed 
or occupancy license
42 3 No N/A N/A Yes No
FI10 11
Micro-finance 
institution
Rural communities No business loans Entrepreneurial skills; involved in agriculture 60 1 No N/A N/A No Yes
 353 
Appendix Z: Non-Governmental Organisations – Thematic Framework 
 
 
P articipant
M ain services 
P rovided
Assessment of  
communities
District Involvement
Financial and technical 
Capacity of  Council
Capacity for S quatter 
upgrading
Decentralisation of  
Local governments
Collaborating with 
Others
Collaboratio
n with 
council  in  
squatter 
upgrading
political interference 
in  councils
E f fect of  Changes in  
Governments on councils
NGO Act and 
NGOs 
operation
W hat needs changing
NGO1, 
Kitwe, 5yrs
Nutrition and Health 
education; human 
rights awareness; 
Urban and Peri-
urban communities
communities are willing to 
participate; need to exercise 
patience with them; civic 
education is required
Not involved in council 
budgeting process; 
involved in monitoring 
through 'Publish W hat 
you Pay' campaign; 
DHMT; DDCC AIDS 
task force
Generally councils have limited 
revenue sources; need f inancial 
support; I cannot comment on 
the issue of personnel; KCC and 
many other councils in the 
country need equipment like 
graders, trucks and the like to 
use not only in squatter 
upgrading but general service 
delivery
KCC on its own cannot 
manage to f inance squatter 
upgrading; needs to embark 
on vigorous fund-raising, 
twinning or linking up with 
other cities in the W estern 
W orld who might perhaps 
give them grants to carry out 
such programmes
Not sure on the 
subject
collaborate with other 
organisations involved 
in similar causes; 
District health 
management team 
(DHMT) on nutrition 
and health
No but will 
work with 
councils
There is political 
interference; government 
interferes with council 
decisions i.e. issue of 
street vending
Changes in national 
governments affect local 
government operations 
because it depends on the 
political  priorities of the new 
national government; Reduced 
support to councils; some 
policies have affected council 
revenues; fail to provide 
services and pay salaries;
Not at the moment 
but there is likely 
to be dissent from 
NGOs
The Act appears to be 
targeting NGOs believed to 
be opposing governments in 
power; Churches must be 
part of NGOs because they 
reach many people 
government is unable to; 
need a uniting Act not a 
divisive one
NGO2, 
Chipata, 
44yrs
Civic education; 
paralegal services; 
emergence relief 
food; human rights 
awareness; in Urban 
and Peri-urban 
communities
communities are willing to 
participate
Not involved in council 
budgeting process; 
involved in monitoring 
budget activities; 
DDCC; Disaster 
Management Unit
have ability to raise and control 
f inancial resources; limited 
revenue sources; councils need 
more staff; councils must 
employ according to their needs 
and capacities
Lobby government to legalise 
some squatter settlements
Complete 
decentralisation to 
ensure autonomy and 
f inancial resources for 
councils
collaborate with local 
council
No but will 
work with 
councils
There is political 
interference at local and 
national levels
Affect council operations; 
policies change with change of 
government; Poor quality 
services provided
No
W hole Act needs to be 
repealed
NGO3, 
Chipata, 
20yrs
W ater and 
sanitation; health; 
nutrition; education; 
Urban and Peri-
urban communities
communities are willing to 
participate; need to present 
clear objectives and benefits
Not involved in council 
budgeting process; 
involved in monitoring 
budget activities; DDCC
Council has capacity to raise and 
manage finance; limited revenue 
sources; have staff but need 
dedicated staff for squatter 
upgrading; need dedicated 
equipment
need government to help 
fund squatter upgrading
total decentralisation is 
he only way to go now; 
release f inancial 
resources to councils
collaborate with council 
on various programmes 
like water and sanitation
No but will 
work with 
councils
There is political 
interference at local and 
national levels
Each new government comes 
with own policies; policy 
changes affect council 
operations; Loss of revenue 
sources; lack of autonomy; 
ineff iciency in service delivery; 
local councils become partisan 
to survive
NGO Act has not 
changed how 
NGOs operate; not 
likely to improve 
operations; will 
cause dissent 
with government; 
unhappy with Act
All churches and faith-based 
organisations should be 
included in NGOs definition; 
NGO registration should go 
back to Registrar of Societies 
off ice; W hole Act needs 
repealing and replacing with 
one that accommodates all 
stakeholders
NGO4, 
Chipata, 
4yrs
Relief food; health; 
nutrition; education; 
in rural communities
communities are willing to 
participate; need to present 
clear objectives and benefits
Not involved in council 
budgeting process
Council has capacity to raise and 
manage finance; limited revenue 
sources;  Council has the 
technical capacity; need to 
employ own according to 
capacity to maintain staff
council needs f inancial 
support; revenues sources 
not adequate
Fiscal decentralisation 
will help council have 
access to many 
sources of revenue to 
improve service 
delivery
-
No but will 
work with 
councils
No response
Affect council operations; 
policies change with change of 
government; Failing to provide 
services and pay salaries
NGOs still operate 
as before; only 
registration has 
changed, 
satisf ied with Act
Still studying the document
NGO5, 
Kitwe, 3yrs
advocacy in rural 
communities
communities are willing to 
participate
Not involved in council 
budgeting process; 
involved in monitoring 
budget activities; 
committee member  at 
council
have ability to raise and control 
f inancial resources; limited 
revenue sources; must be given 
the opportunity to employ 
according to their needs and 
capacities; need more staff;
Councils need f inancial 
support; squatter upgrading 
not the answer; may even 
fuel more squatter 
settlements
Complete 
decentralisation to 
ensure autonomy and 
f inancial resources for 
councils
collaborate with council 
on squatter settlements 
upgrading 
No but will 
work with 
councils
There is political 
interference at local and 
national levels
Affect council operations; 
policies change with change of 
government; Councils are 
unable to provide services due 
to limited funding
No
W hole Act needs to be 
repealed
NGO6, 
Kitwe, 15yrs
advocacy; Urban 
and Peri-urban 
communities
communities are willing to 
participate
Not involved in council 
budgeting process; 
involved in monitoring 
budget activities; DDCC
have ability to raise and control 
f inancial resources; limited 
revenue sources; need more 
staff that would be dedicated to 
squatter upgrading
Councils need f inancial 
support
Complete 
decentralisation to 
ensure autonomy and 
f inancial resources for 
councils
collaborate with other 
organisations involved 
in similar causes
No but will 
work with 
councils
There is political 
interference at local and 
national levels
Affect council operations; 
policies change with change of 
government; Reduced 
performance in terms of 
service delivery
No
Some clauses on definition 
of NGOs
NGO7, 
Lusaka, 
20yrs
Health and 
education 
infrastructure; relief 
food; nutrition; 
health; in rural 
communities
communities are willing to 
participate
Not involved in council 
budgeting process; 
involved in monitoring 
budget activities; DDCC
have ability to raise and control 
f inancial resources; limited 
revenue sources; need more 
qualif ied staff
No. need help
Complete 
decentralisation to 
ensure autonomy and 
f inancial resources for 
councils; councils are 
closest to the people
collaborate with other 
organisations involved 
in similar causes
No but will 
work with 
councils
There is political 
interference at local and 
national levels
Affect council operations; 
policies change with change of 
government; Councils fail to 
pay salaries to workers
No Not certain
NGO8, 
Chipata, 
5yrs
Service delivery; 
HIV/ AIDS 
prevention; Urban 
and Peri-urban 
communities
W orks mostly with reformed 
sex workers (prostitutes). 
W illingness to change and 
participate in community 
projects; get involved in 
income-generating skills
Not involved in council 
budgeting process
Not sure; council has staff
The council can do some 
things but it needs help from 
government
No response
not collaborated with 
any. But willing to work 
with council in squatter 
upgrading - 
behavioural change
No but will 
work with 
councils
No response No response No response No response
NGO9, 
Chipata, 
45yrs
Advocacy; Service 
delivery; health 
services and 
training and 
education; in urban 
and rural
-
Not involved in council 
budgeting process
council seems to be struggling; 
council has staff but no sure if 
many are skilled
Government needs to give 
them money for upgrading
councils need more 
resources. 
government must give 
back some of the 
sources of revenue it 
took from councils
Yes. Mostly with 
international 
organisations 
No Response No response No response No response No response
